The Circle

by David Poyer

  “Thank you,” he said, and cursed himself. Stupid. Stupid! Why hadn’t he simply reached across, taken Evlin’s hand? But he hadn’t. Now he’d never know for sure. He got up, looking around, looking for him in the crowd. But he wasn’t there.

  * * *

  THE Court reconvened at 1423. Present: all members, counsel for the Court, the parties, and their counsel.

  Captain Roland Javits, on the stand when recess was taken, resumed his seat. He was warned that the oath taken previously was still binding.

  WITNESS: Before we begin, may I make a statement?

  COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: Please go ahead, Captain.

  WITNESS: I would like to have the record show paragraph 1506, from the manual for carrier air operations. It states, “Carriers, right of way. Carriers have the right of way in launching and recovering aircraft. Other ships are to keep clear.” Also, paragraph 532: “In addition to the International Regulations for Prevention of Collision at Sea, the following rules are applicable: A carrier has the right of way when showing a signal to indicate that she is launching or recovering aircraft.”

  COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: Your point is made, sir.

  WITNESS: May I also read from Allied Tactical Publication 1: “A clear situation should not be changed to an awkward one by any ship either through lack of timely indication to others of her intent, or from an impatient haste in accomplishing this movement.”

  COUNSEL FOR LT EVLIN: Apropos of doctrine, Captain Javits, are there any provisions in those publications that authorize a carrier to change course without ensuring ships in company are notified?

  WITNESS: I don’t—while conducting flight operations?

  MR BARRETT: Yes.

  WITNESS: Not to the best of my knowledge.

  COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: Let us return to normal examination. Captain, I would like you to try to reconstruct what happened from a different point of view. In your experience as a navigating officer, if you were on RYAN and a carrier was on your port bow, apparently closing fast, and you received a signal saying, “My course two-five-zero—”

  A. I don’t believe you can ask me to guess at another man’s responses.

  Q. I am asking you to tell me what you would do in that situation, not guess what Commander Packer thought.

  THE COURT: Question is correct. Witness will answer.

  Q. As I was saying, if you were CO of RYAN and you received a signal saying, “Mike corpen two-five-zero” from the carrier, assuming he did in fact receive it, what would you do?

  A. I think you are misinterpreting the signal. It does not mean as you seem to be saying that “My course is two-five-zero.” It is a signal of intention, meaning “my course will be” or “I am coming to two-five-zero.”

  In the second place, if I was in a formation where I knew my ordered station, where I clearly saw where the carrier was and understood that other units had to remain clear of her, not pass close aboard or in front of or in any way embarrass her when she is engaged in flight operations, my answer is that I would have turned right and given sea room.

  Q. You would have turned right?

  A. To starboard, that’s correct.

  Cross-examined by counsel for Lieutenant Evlin.

  Q. Captain, you have testified that a “mike corpen” signal means that your intention is to come to a certain course. Are you quite sure of that, sir?

  A. Yes, that’s what it means.

  Q. I show you, sir, a copy of the Allied Tactical Signal Book. Does the signal “mike corpen” appear there, sir?

  A. Yes.

  Q. Will you read for us what the meaning of that signal is?

  A. It says, “My course is.”

  Q. Thank you, sir. Would you like to modify your testimony in view of this?

  A. My rudder was over and the bow was swinging. In another minute, we would have been on two-five-zero. So no, I still consider that a correct signal. As I pointed out, the collision would still have occurred.

  Q. Perhaps.

  A. I think certainly.

  Q. I don’t want to get too far away from the points I have already made, but I would like to ask you this: After RYAN had increased rudder on her last left turn, could you have avoided the collision?

  A. I didn’t know he had increased his rudder. All I knew was that his lights were getting too damn close.

  Q. I am sorry, sir, I may have phrased that question badly. What I meant was: Knowing what you do now, do you feel that there was any way you could have averted the collision by any procedure or act other than what you actually did, which was essentially to do nothing?

  A. I backed emergency and lighted ship. Carriers don’t turn or stop on a dime. No, collision was inevitable then.

  THE COURT: Captain, before you step down. As a result of this collision, do you have any recommendations for changes in tactical instructions or doctrine?

  A. I will have to think about that one, sir. There may be something in what the various counsels have said about lighting aboard carriers being confusing.

  I also think perhaps we need to deemphasize speed in maneuvering. Admiral Hoelscher is not at fault here. He was merely trying to execute current doctrine. Maybe we need to modify it in the direction of safety, at least in peacetime.

  Neither the counsel for the Court, the Court, nor the parties desired further to question this witness. He was duly warned and withdrew.

  * * *

  THE Court was cleared. When all witnesses other than the parties and their counsel had left, Lieutenant Reed was recalled and reminded that his previous oath was still binding. Cross-examined by counsel for the Court.

  Q. Mr. Reed, were you in charge of the nuclear weapons aboard RYAN?

  A. Yes.

  Q. What was her loadout?

  A. RYAN was carrying four Mark 5 nuclear warheads, with associated boosters, and sixteen conventional homing torpedoes. Two practice torpedoes, Mark 43s, had been expended in the Arctic.

  Q. Did RYAN’s weapons doctrine call for flooding of the torpedo magazines upon collision or fire aft?

  A. The answer is yes, but it wasn’t in the weapons doctrine. That tells you how to use the weapons in battle. It was in the damage-control instructions.

  Q. To your knowledge, were the magazines flooded after the collision?

  A. To my knowledge, they were not.

  Q. Whose responsibility was it to flood them?

  A. Mine.

  Q. Did you attempt to flood?

  A. I was in my stateroom when the collision occurred. I endeavored to make my way aft to ascertain the condition of the magazine. Due to fire, I was unable to reach it.

  Q. Did the guard on duty know he was expected to flood them?

  A. Yes.

  Q. But you do not know if he did?

  A. No. He did not survive.

  Cross-examined by counsel for Commander Packer.

  Q. Mr. Reed, given the location of the warheads, do you think it likely that they could have gone off in the manner Admiral Hoelscher feared?

  A. It’s possible.

  Q. Please elaborate.

  A. There’s nothing to elaborate on. They might have gone off.

  Neither the counsel for the Court, the Court, nor the parties desired further to examine this witness. He resumed his seat.

  * * *

  A witness was then called by counsel representing Commander Packer. He entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

  Examined by the counsel for the Court.

  Q. Please state your name, rank, branch of service, and present duty station.

  A. I am Olen P. Piasecki, captain, U.S. Navy, retired. I am attached in a civilian capacity to the surface combatant branch of the Bureau of Ships.

  Q. Captain Piasecki, please describe your experience with destroyers.

  A. I have spent most of the last thirty-nine years in them. I was on REUBEN JAMES as a boatswain’s mate and on HICKOX and BENHAM in the Pacific. After the war, I was on FRAN
K EVANS, fleeted up to her XO. I commanded an NROTC unit at University of Pennsylvania, then did another XO stint on TURNER JOY, then commanded USS NORFOLK. I taught at the Emergency Shiphandling School and after that commanded USS ALBANY and then DESRON TWENTY. I am presently in charge of design workup for a new class of frigates.

  COUNSEL FOR CDR PACKER: I would like to offer for Captain Piasecki’s examination the diagrams drawn by Ensign Lenson and Admiral Hoelscher, previously offered in evidence.

  Examination by Lieutenant Hauck continued.

  Q. Captain, have you had experience operating with carriers?

  A. Yes, considerable.

  Q. In the light of your experience, is it your opinion that the angles on the bow of an aircraft carrier can be accurately estimated at night?

  A. That would depend on what angle was showing. For example, if it was bow-on, that would not be hard. For 10 or 20 degrees aspect, it could be tough.

  Q. Are you aware that a collision took place between USS KENNEDY and USS RYAN?

  A. Yes.

  Q. I shall now ask you some questions wherein I will specify certain conditions. I ask you to indicate the action you would take in the light of your experience.

  A. Very well, go ahead, sir.

  Q. Assume that conditions are as follows. Sea calm to moderate; wind light from the west; dark, overcast night. An aircraft carrier and four escorts are maneuvering in night launch and recovery under battle conditions. They are darkened and radar silence is in effect. Formation course is zero-one-zero true at twenty knots.

  One of the destroyers is on station 3,000 yards bearing two-four-five from the carrier. The commanding officer is sick and fatigued. The day before he received a message, which I now show you.

  He then receives a signal that planes will be recovered on two-six-zero true at twenty-seven knots. He is simultaneously ordered to take plane guard station.

  Now, Captain, in your opinion, would an initial course and speed to station of one-three-zero at twenty-seven knots be reasonable or unreasonable, considering the conditions given?

  A. Reasonable.

  Q. Tactically sound?

  A. Yes.

  Q. I show you now this maneuvering board. Assume the commanding officer proceeded on course one-three-zero till he reached a position where the guide bore zero-six-zero true, range a little over 3,000 yards, and the guide had nearly completed her right turn from zero-one-zero around to two-six-zero. If, under these circumstances, he ordered left rudder until the course was zero-nine-zero, and when he had reached that course continued down the port side of the carrier, intending to later put his rudder hard right, coming to the recovery course and reaching his station by a hard turn, in your opinion would this intention be reasonable or unreasonable considering the conditions existing?

  RADM HOELSCHER: I had better object here. The lieutenant is injecting suppositions into his question that have not come out in evidence. Specifically, you say that there was an intention to turn left to zero-nine-zero when the bearing was zero-six-zero; but the statement on this point, from the ensign, was that the commanding officer of RYAN intended to stay on one-three-zero and not modify course until he was past KENNEDY’s stern.

  COUNSEL FOR CDR PACKER: In answer to that objection, the diagram you yourself gave the court, sir, shows that RYAN did in fact change course at this point [indicating] where the carrier was at zero-six-zero true. It seems to me that an intention can be proven by the act, even if it was not expressed aloud.

  RADM HOELSCHER: I object to this process of feeding Captain Piasecki selected facts and then citing his conclusions, as I expect Mr. Hauck here will do, as proof Packer’s decisions were right.

  THE COURT: Is this an allowable procedure, Lieutenant Commander Johnstone?

  COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: It is my understanding that an expert witness may be asked a hypothetical question provided it is based on the evidence or on reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.

  THE COURT: The objection is not sustained. Proceed.

  COUNSEL FOR CDR PACKER: Let the clerk read back the question.

  The question was repeated.

  WITNESS: It would be risky but acceptable.

  Q. Would such a maneuver be good professional practice?

  A. Yes. It’s a fast, smart way to drive a ship.

  Q. Which was what his orders required. Now, assuming that the commanding officer is carrying out the maneuver as described, passing the carrier at a minimum acceptable distance in order to reach station quickly, and then, at approximately this point [indicating] receives a message that tells him that she has altered course 10 degrees toward his intended track—as a “mike corpen” signal actually means—would such a signal cause uncertainty in his mind?

  A. It would.

  Q. Assuming him to be momentarily uncertain under these conditions—leaving aside any question of fatigue or sickness—and that he observed himself to be on the carrier’s starboard bow at a short and closing range, and that the rudder was at that time at or close to rudder amidships and the ship steadied up; if, as I say, he saw himself on the carrier’s starboard bow, would you consider such action reasonable?

  A. Under those circumstances, eminently; that would be the only way to escape.

  CAPT JAVITS, A PARTY: I object to this misstatement of the evidence. It is clear that RYAN was not on KENNEDY’s starboard bow when this left rudder order was given but, rather, to port. Only when the turn to launch course commenced was it on the starboard quarter, and then at a distance of 3,000 yards.

  RADM HOELSCHER: I join in that objection.

  THE COURT: Once again, a court of inquiry is not bound by strict evidential procedure. Counsel representing RYAN has been asking hypothetical questions. The Court does not sustain, but will expect counsel to show relevance.

  COUNSEL FOR CDR PACKER: Thank you, sir, I will at this time. Now, Captain Piasecki, you will note from the diagram that when RYAN was approaching the position where she turned left KENNEDY’s track shows a waver to the left, as if she began to turn to two-five-zero. By your eye, what is the angle between her bow and RYAN at that moment?

  A. In the neighborhood of 10 degrees, roughly.

  Q. Captain, recall that shortly after you took the stand I asked you whether the angle on the bow of a carrier could be accurately estimated at night. You replied, and I quote, “That would depend on what angle was showing. For example, if it was bow-on, that would not be hard. For 10 or 20 degrees aspect, it could be tough.” Based on his having been informed that KENNEDY was actually on two-five-zero, would it not be easy for the destroyer’s commanding officer to conclude he was on the carrier’s starboard bow, and that he had to turn left to avoid her?

  A. I suppose so. But he was wrong.

  Q. Surely; but why? Gratuitous error? Or because of poor lighting on the carrier and a misleading signal?

  A. I would say the latter.

  Q. Thank you, sir.

  Cross-examined by counsel for the Court.

  Q. Captain, don’t you think that if the man described in Lieutenant Hauck’s imaginary scenario was confused, he should have sounded whistle signals, or called the carrier to ask his intentions?

  A. Assuming that he had time to do so, yes.

  Cross-examined by Captain Javits, a party.

  Q. Sir, you have agreed that there were things the captain of the destroyer could have done to let the carrier know he was uncertain or felt he was in danger. If he had not done any of these, would there have been anything in the actions of his ship that would have led the carrier to think anything was wrong?

  A. Negative.

  Cross-examined by Rear Admiral Hoelscher, a party.

  Q. Captain, I must question your statement that it is impossible to determine a carrier’s target angle at night within 20 degrees. That’s hard to swallow.

  A. I did not say it was impossible, but that it was difficult. It can be done with practice—observing the individual lights, the silhouette, over a period of days. In t
he daytime, it’s possible to tell how a carrier is pointing and turning by her list. But for a captain who had just joined, it would definitely be difficult. I stand by that answer.

  None of the counsels or parties had further questions of the witness.

  Examined by the Court.

  Q. Captain, as a result of what you have learned about this collision, as well as your extensive experience, do you have any suggestions or recommendations to read into this testimony?

  A. Well, sir, this issue of taking plane guard during a course change has been around a while. Not only do people get confused, you have the possibility of a steering casualty or a loss of power. I have recommended in years past that at night and in fog or rain we should put plane guards on station before turning into the wind. Some commanders do that and some don’t. I think it should be made mandatory. It may take a few minutes more, but we should eat those minutes in the interests of safety.

  THE COURT: We will consider this recommendation in our final report.

  The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

  * * *

  A witness called by counsel representing Commander Packer entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

  Examined by counsel for Commander Packer.

  Q. State your name, occupation, and permanent address.

  A. Burford Packer, retired projectionist, 1113 Preuss Avenue, Los Angeles.

  Q. Mr. Packer, will you inform the court of the nautical experience of your son, other than that performed in the U.S. Navy?

  A. Jimmy left home early, sir. Before he joined the Navy, he was a crewman on the ORIENT HONOLULU out of San Francisco, with the Bear Line. He made several cruises with her and ended up as third mate. He was studying for his master’s ticket when he decided to try for the Navy. He was only twenty-one then.

  Q. Do you know whether your son could swim?

  A. They made him swim some at school back east. He wrote his ma he couldn’t get the hang of it. Come to it too late, I guess.

  Neither the counsel for the Court, the Court, nor the parties desired further to examine this witness.

  The Court then, at 1647, adjourned until 0830 the next day, the fourth day of the inquiry.