The Circle

by David Poyer

  “However, in view of the sea experience of Commander Packer, and the uniformly excellent opinion of him brought out in this inquiry, it seems to me there is a more logical explanation then ‘confusion’ for such a horrendous mistake.

  “It has been clearly brought out that prior to going to his sea cabin, Packer described his intention to pass me close aboard and then turn left sharply to reach station.

  “I believe that the argument in regard to his maneuver firmly fixed in his mind that fact of a final left turn. It fixed it there subconsciously rather than consciously.

  “Once he had begun the maneuver, and realized he was standing into danger, his conscious mind was so occupied with that danger that at the critical moment he subconsciously reverted to his original plan, and said ‘left rudder’ when at a cooler moment he would have said ‘right’—which was the proper order.

  “After he came to zero-nine-zero, almost the reciprocal of my course, the closing speed of the ships was over sixty miles an hour. Warnings from his OOD and JOD led to a rapid realization that he was dead ahead of me at a short and rapidly closing range. If he had ordered right rudder then, he would have ended up roughly where he wanted to be—on my port quarter.

  “Unfortunately, though he sensed the proper moment to turn, it must have been at that point that his intense concentration, blunted as it may have been, reverted to the original plan fixed in his mind by the argument. Instead of ‘right rudder,’ what came out of his mouth was ‘left rudder.’

  “The subconscious plays that trick on all of us occasionally. In this very hearing, experienced witnesses have said Kennedy when they meant Ryan or two-three-zero when they meant three-two-zero. The slip is easily corrected here.

  “It was not so on Ryan. Even if after a second or two he realized his error, the die was cast. If he tried to shift his rudder back, he would meet me head-on. He had to bend on every bit of speed he had to get across my bow before I hit him.

  “It may be that it is difficult to tell which way a carrier is heading. If that’s so, it seems to me to be an additional reason to be cautious. However, it’s hard to believe that any commanding officer could start out crossing a carrier’s bow and not pay the most intense attention to it.

  “No, Packer knew where he was. He might not have been able to tell the exact angle, but he knew he was in mortal danger and had to act instantly. I believe he simply said the wrong thing. He realized it only when he noticed his bow swinging toward me instead of away. He made the instant decision not to reverse his rudder and plow into me bow-on, but acted decisively in an attempt to tighten his turn and get by fast. The evidence? The moment he saw his bow swing in the wrong direction, he gave the proper orders in rapid succession—‘left full, hard left, all ahead emergency flank.’ He did all he could to retrieve the slip of the tongue. I profoundly wish he had made it, and for a second there that night, I thought he had. But it was not enough.”

  * * *

  REAR Admiral Leonard A. Hoelscher, USN, then made the following oral argument.

  * * *

  “ADMIRAL Ausura, Admiral Dennison, Admiral Morehead; counsels and parties; witnesses. The collision of Kennedy and Ryan while under my tactical command has been exhaustively examined. The points in contention are many, including some internal to Ryan, but as Captain Javits has just pointed out, the most important fact is not at issue: that her commander made an error that sank his ship and killed one hundred and seventy-eight of his crew and officers, including himself. The facts surrounding this are about as clear as they can be.

  “I am a party to these investigations due to my position as CTG 21.1. Now, let us note that no allegations have been made by any person questioning my handling of the formation. The maneuvers ordered under my authority were clear, standard, and in accordance with regulations. Finally, there have been no criticisms of events subsequent to the collision: my action to extinguish the fire aboard Ryan, for reasons discussed in closed session, the hardest decision I have ever had to make; the entire process of search and rescue, which succeeded in saving over sixty men.

  “Let us go on to the only issue of possible culpability that has been raised against me, first by Ensign Lenson, later by counsels for the deceased officers. That is the issue of my stationkeeping instruction.

  “Prima facie, its import is rather innocuous. It’s the kind of combination pat on the back and kick in the pants I imagine has been used since the first man commanded another. From time to time, even with subordinates who know their stuff, it’s necessary to rake them over the coals a bit. In fact, that’s one of the prime things a skipper, a commodore, or even the Chief of Naval Operations is there for.

  “In the last few days, though, we’ve heard the entire blame for the collision traced, as though by magic, to that message. That it caused Commander Packer to throw his good sense and training overboard and stake his ship in a reckless gamble to save a few seconds.

  “Now, I’m not worried that the civilian counsel, Mr. Barrett, and the counsel for Commander Packer, Lieutenant Hauck, are going to succeed in convincing men with years at sea that because of a message like that one man should be relieved of responsibility for an accident while his senior bears the blame. If that was so, if error or excess in a subordinate was to condemn the senior, no officer could escape the wrath of the law.

  “I, too, like Captain Javits, believe that there may be some single clear explanation for Packer’s mistake. But we may wander in the murk of supposition as long as we will, and never know for sure. Like him, I wish fervently that it hadn’t happened, or that Ryan’s captain had been able to ramrod her past Kennedy’s bow.

  “The question remains, how do we prevent this from happening again? At this moment in the Atlantic, the Pacific, the Indian Ocean, destroyers are maneuvering as the Navy guards the distant stations of the world. There have been suggestions made here as to how to prevent a duplication of this disaster. I will dedicate from now on in my career a portion of my time and influence toward getting them adopted. If we can learn from what I’ve already heard called ‘the Ryan Incident,’ her men will not have died in vain.”

  * * *

  THE Court then, at 1215, took a recess until 1400, at which time it reconvened.

  Counsel representing Commander Packer, a party, then made the following oral argument.

  * * *

  “THE narrative of the collision that follows, and its attribution of the responsibility of that collision, hinges on three facts. One: The signal that the Kennedy was on course two-five-zero true was erroneous and misleading. Two: That it was received aboard Ryan in time for action by her commanding officer. Three: That it, and other errors and omissions by the captain of the Kennedy, exacerbated by mistakes in judgment by Rear Admiral Hoelscher, in charge of the task force, constitute the true causes of the collision, and not errors or omissions by the commanding officer of USS Reynolds Ryan.

  “First, let’s look at the fatal ‘mike corpen’ signal, transmitted, as Kennedy’s signal book shows, approximately one minute and forty seconds before her bow split Ryan in two.

  “The fact that it was entered in the signal book shows that aside from Captain Javits, who directed it, and Lieutenant Commander Garner, who transmitted it, others in Kennedy’s CIC heard it go out. I have made message inquiries of the other ships in formation and have received replies from Talbot and Dewey corroborating this.

  “It has also been established in cross-examination by Mr. Barrett that confusion existed in Captain Javits’s mind as to the proper meaning of the signal ‘mike corpen,’ and that this confusion persisted right up till he was confronted with the signal book on the stand.

  “Conclusion: that an erroneous and misleading signal was sent less than two minutes before the collision.

  “Second, we ask, was the signal received by Ryan? For if it was not, we face a different set of deductions, though also tending to show that the responsibility for the collision was not Commander Packer’s.

&nb
sp; “Captain Javits has told us he tested his comms at midnight, and that all ships answered the check, though Ryan came back weak. Apparently no one bothered to tell her this, so no action could be taken to correct it. However, it is proof that two hours before collision, the circuit was functioning.

  “In addition, only minutes before the fatal signal, Ryan and Kennedy communicated about whether Ryan was to resume her plane guard station. Again, the circuit was functioning.

  “Now, the JOD of Ryan, Lenson, has stated that the pritac speaker was either malfunctioning or turned down to reduce the noise on the bridge. The receiver was located on the starboard side of the pilothouse. The pilothouse on Gearing-class destroyers is only twenty feet wide. Let’s look at the positions of the officers approximately two minutes before the collision, as given by Mr. Lenson.

  “At this time, Captain Packer had given his first rudder order, left standard, with no indication of alarm or urgency. During this period, Lenson was on and off the port wing. The receiver was at least twenty feet from him, with a doorway intervening. Thus it is not surprising that he did not hear the transmission. Lieutenant Evlin, the OOD, apparently was on the port side, by the chart table, checking the solution that he had been ordered to work out by the captain.

  “Where was Packer?

  “The evidence shows that he was either on the centerline of the bridge, using the alidade, or more likely standing by his chair on the starboard side. In the first instance, he would be fifteen feet from the receiver; in the second, he would have been beside it. In either case, he was the closest man to it.

  “Conclusion: The commanding officer was the most likely person to have heard Kennedy’s signal changing her course, and probably, considering the low volume and the locations of the other officers, he was the only one who did.

  “Let’s go on to something that I only learned this morning, with the receipt of a message from USS Garcia. Her captain informs me that from 0100 to 0330 on the 25th, his primary receiver was inoperative. He was operating with his secondary, which had lower sensitivity. Garcia states that although he received the formation turn signal, which went out with the carrier’s antennas basically pointing at him, he did not receive or hear the ‘mike corpen’ signal. Yet Captain Javits stated that he received an acknowledgment from Garcia.

  “At the time, it seemed unimportant. Garcia wasn’t involved in the collision. But now we see that the testimony on this point was inaccurate. The signal went out to five ships; it was acknowledged by four. We thought the missing ship was Ryan. It now appears that it was Garcia.

  “Conclusion: It is probable that the ‘mike corpen’ two-five-zero signal was not only received but acknowledged by Ryan’s captain.

  “Now, at one minute and forty-five seconds before the collision, we see from Exhibit E that the bearing and range of Kennedy from Ryan was zero-six-zero true, two thousand yards. Yardner and Pettus testified that it was then Captain Packer abruptly ordered his helm left full and shortly thereafter left hard. What were his other choices? A centered rudder would have resulted in a head-on collision. He could have slowed; could have brightened his lights; he could have sounded his whistle. But all of these would have taken time, the one thing he did not have.

  “In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, Commander Packer must be presumed to have acted as a reasonable and prudent officer would have in that circumstance.

  “And, in fact, it is likely that if Kennedy had really been on a course of two-five-zero—as she had just told Ryan she was—rather than five or ten degrees away, and swinging toward it, Packer’s actions would have resulted in Ryan passing clear, this court would not be sitting, and one hundred and seventy-eight men would still be alive.

  “Conclusion: It was the misleading signal that led to his last-minute increase in left rudder and the subsequent collision.

  “With these facts in mind, it is easy to reconstruct the chain of events that led to the accident.

  “My narrative begins with the conversation between Evlin and Commander Packer. The captain had formulated a maneuver he would make if Kennedy came to recovery course and he was instructed to take plane guard again. He indicated the intention to come right to one-three-zero true until Kennedy bore about zero-one-zero true, then turn left and slide into position behind her.

  “Mr. Evlin objected, but Packer overruled him in view of the hortatory but ill-advised message from Rear Admiral Hoelscher. This ended the discussion, and he left the bridge.

  “No one will ever know what effect Evlin’s recommendation had on him. It seems logical to conclude that it had some effect. In the time between this discussion and the commencement of the maneuver, while he was getting his pipe, it is reasonable to think that Commander Packer reexamined this decision in the privacy of his cabin. As he did, he probably realized that Evlin’s suggestion had some merit, though not in the way the lieutenant meant it.

  “That is, Packer must have belatedly realized that one-three-zero would take him wide of the carrier and that he would conclude the maneuver aft of her and somewhat wide of station. During the turn that would then be necessary to reach it, he would be falling astern every moment. If he did so, he would never regain position. Why? Because Ryan had boiler power available for only about 29 or 30 knots, and the recovery speed was twenty-seven. Losing speed in the turn, and accelerating only gradually, he would lag behind the carrier, and would take long minutes—perhaps as long as half an hour—to regain station, if indeed he ever did.

  “This, if anything, would constitute ‘sluggish maneuvering’ in Admiral Hoelscher’s book.

  “I believe he then formulated a different maneuver in his mind. When he felt Ryan heel, he went to the bridge and found Evlin on a course of one-three-zero, as directed. He took the conn from him and ordered a course change to zero-nine-zero. Then, waiting as Kennedy closed, watching her intently, he ordered a left rudder. What was in his mind?

  “I believe that he intended to fulfill his orders to maneuver smartly by steaming down Kennedy’s port side at close range, then executing a Williamson turn. As the Court knows, this is a high-speed course reversal used to pick up men overboard. Its effect is to bring the ship rapidly around in a loop so that she has swapped ends and is steaming back along her original wake.

  “At the moment of maximum danger, however, Packer hears the carrier announce she is not on two-six-zero but on two-five-zero. Taken aback, he acknowledges the signal, simultaneously considering how to react. Looking at Kennedy, he may very well have concluded that he was actually on her starboard bow, as he would have been if she had swung a little past two-five-zero in coming to it—certainly not unlikely. Remember, as Captain Javits has said, destroyermen are taught to regard a carrier with ‘caution and to some degree even suspicion.’”

  “Now Packer had to act. The range was closing rapidly. His rudder was already left. He did not have time to reverse it, and if he believed he was on her starboard bow, such an order would have been fatal, anyway. His decision was to increase his rudder to left full.

  “A few seconds later, with horror, he must have noted that Kennedy’s bearing was nearly constant. He immediately increased rudder and ordered emergency flank speed. Unfortunately, as Lieutenant Talliaferro has testified, he was disappointed in this because of the slow response of the engines due to water remaining in the fuel tanks from ballasting in the Arctic—a decision he made reluctantly, and events bore him out.

  “So, at hard left rudder and high speed, Ryan tried to shoot across the bow of an oncoming ship thirty-five times heavier than she was. If she had traveled another two hundred feet, she would have made it. If she had made another hundred feet, Kennedy would have hit her fantail, damaging her, but without much loss of life, since most of the crew were midships and forward.

  “But the emergency speed was not forthcoming. There was a collision, and Ryan went down.

  “Every fact in this narrative is in the record. The proximate cause of the collision was Admiral Hoe
lscher’s ill-advised threat. The immediate cause was Captain Javits’s mistaken course signal.

  “It is true that Commander Packer did not inform Kennedy of his intentions, nor did he use his whistle. It can be said that his only thought at that point was to save his ship. No knowledge given to Kennedy could have done that. Signals could not have changed the momentum of thousands of tons of steel.

  “We have now covered the major causes of the collision and found Commander Packer guiltless. Let us now go on to contributing causes.

  “There is no reason why the plane guard could not have been stationed prior to turning the carrier to recovery course. Doubtless because it takes a few seconds more, it was not Hoelscher’s policy.

  “Next, Commander Packer was called on to perform like an expert on the first night he had been with the formation, after four months in the yard and two and a half weeks of independent steaming.

  “Finally, there is the question of the adequacy of an old ship like Ryan to keep up with modern carriers. Kennedy can make upward of thirty or thirty-five knots. If we’re honest, we must conclude that Ryan could actually manage no more than about twenty-eight or twenty-nine on the night in question. The task group commander and the commanding officer of Kennedy had no compunction about maneuvering at very high speeds, and there is no evidence they gave any thought to the demands this placed on their screening units.

  “But we should not place the mantle of guilt solely on the shoulders of Captain Javits and Rear Admiral Hoelscher. The maneuver that ended this time in disaster has been performed many times before, and as Captain Javits has pointed out, is probably being performed at this moment somewhere on the oceans of the world. At least two ships to my knowledge have been lost to collisions with carriers since World War Two. One wonders how many near-misses there have been. Unfortunately, last Christmas Eve, all the links in the chain of circumstances were there for disaster.