The Tender Soldier: A True Story of War and Sacrifice

by Gezari, Vanessa M.

  His name was Clint Cooper: Cooper is six foot two. Physical descriptions of him, Ayala, and Loyd are drawn in part from photographs taken during their time in Maiwand.

  They’d been warned: Cooper told me: “[W]e had seen intel reports of suicide bombers and things like that in our area, so we always knew that was a possibility.” Cooper, interview by author, April 22, 2010.

  She had been up all night: “Paula stayed up writing the report . . . I think it was an all-nighter.” Cooper, interview by author, April 22, 2010.

  After hearing Afghans complain: “Patrol Report: Today We Went to the Bazaar,” draft report, November 1, 2008, and Cooper, interview by author, April 22, 2010.

  Loyd told Cooper that she was irritated: Cooper, interview by author, April 22, 2010.

  The American soldiers had noticed: An Army medic in Maiwand told me: “She was pretty much interested in doing her job and [in] these people, local nationals. I got another word for them: terrorists. Don’t write that. She loved going out on patrol.”

  As always, she was unarmed: Every photo I have seen of Loyd during her time in Maiwand shows her in civilian clothes and unarmed, though she did wear a Kevlar vest and a helmet. That she wasn’t wearing a uniform on November 4, Army medics, interview by author, March 24, 2009, and Cooper’s and Ayala’s statements to Army investigators.

  others formed a human wall to protect them: “She was talking with some kids when I set up my security watching the road to the north.” Statement of Specialist Chad Schadewald, November 4, 2008, filed in federal court, May 1, 2009.

  Chehel Gazi means “forty meters”: Hajji Sadoo Khan and Hajji Qala Khan, interview by author, January 19, 2009.

  The Taliban were in the bazaar every day: Don Ayala, Clint Cooper, Timothy Gusinov, and Mike Warren, “HTT Patrol Report: Maiwand District Governor Meeting,” October 25, 2008.

  ‘Chalgazi Village has Taliban’: Ayala and Cooper, “HTT Patrol Report: ‘Hotel’ Police Station,” October 26, 2008.

  Afghanistan was the good war: For Obama’s 2008 campaign position on Afghanistan, see “Obama’s Remarks on Iraq and Afghanistan,” New York Times, July 15, 2008, and Don Gonyea, “Is Obama in an ‘Afghan Box’?” NPR, September 29, 2009.

  General David Petraeus, had recently taken charge: Petraeus was named head of U.S. Central Command in April 2008, though he did not officially take command there until October 2008. Thom Shanker, “Petraeus Steps Into New Role as Head of Central Command,” New York Times, October 31, 2008.

  “human terrain” as the decisive battleground: For Petraeus’s use of this term human terrain in 2008 and following, see General David H. Petraeus, “Multi-National Force-Iraq Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance,” Military Review, Sept–Oct 2008, 3. For his use of the term in relation to Afghanistan, see Petraeus’s remarks at the 2009 Munich Security Conference, http://www.securityconference.de/1/activities/munich-security-conference/msc-2009/speeches/general-david-h-petraeus/, accessed March 1, 2013.

  Their regular translator wasn’t with them: Cooper, interview by author, April 22, 2010, and Ayala, interview by author, January 4, 2013.

  The soldiers gave funny nicknames: “My unit called me Jack because they told me, ‘If I called your real name, that all people from Kandahar knows about yourself, you’re Afghani, or your name is—, everybody easily can memorize that name.” Jack Bauer, interview by author, September 23, 2010.

  Jack Bauer was a twenty-three-year-old Pashtun: Details about Jack Bauer and his relationship with the soldiers and Human Terrain Team members below are from Jack Bauer, interview by author, September 23, 2010.

  Jack thought that Ayala and Cooper were her bodyguards: Jack Bauer wasn’t alone in this. The platoon leader, Lieutenant Pathak, believed that Ayala’s job “was to secure the HTT,” Pathak wrote in his statement to Army investigators.

  He had been raised in Kabul: Jack Bauer was originally from Kapisa in the center of the country. He had been orphaned as a boy and raised by his grandparents in Kabul. After high school, he’d sold DVDs and carpets to diplomats and soldiers at the NATO headquarters in the capital. He liked the soldiers he met, and he knew that Afghan interpreters made good money, so he started taking private English classes and applied for a job with Mission Essential Personnel, or MEP, the Ohio-based contractor that hired nearly all interpreters for U.S. forces in Afghanistan at the time. When the call came, his new boss asked if he would go to Kandahar. Jack knew it was the most dangerous part of the country, but he needed the money; he and his brothers had their grandparents to support. The job would pay $700 a month, a generous sum for a striving Kabul boy. He lied to his grandparents, telling them he was going to Mazar-i-Sharif, a more peaceable city in the north. In mid-August, he and a dozen other Afghan interpreters were flown to Kandahar Airfield. They gave him an American uniform, body armor, and a helmet and flew him to Maiwand the same night. At first he was terrified, but he liked the soldiers and grew accustomed to the work. By the time I met him, Jack’s two brothers were also working as interpreters with American forces. “All my family is educated people,” he told me. “Most of the Afghanistan people don’t like the Talibans, because they have a different culture. They say the woman can’t be educated. In my idea, that’s wrong. The womans can working with the boys, too.” Emphasis is mine.

  A young bearded man walked past: Descriptions of the man are from interviews with Jack Bauer, Cooper, and Ayala, as well as statements from soldiers to Army investigators and photos filed in federal court.

  ‘We don’t know that guy’: Cooper, interview by author, April 22, 2010. That Salam entered a house nearby, came out, and “directed some of the kids to move away from Ms. LOYD and picked up a little boy and put him in the house he just came out of,” statement of a soldier to Army investigators. Cooper told the investigators: “Looking back I now realize that he was trying to shoo the kids away, perhaps in an attempt to clear the area.”

  ‘ask that guy if he wants to talk to me’: Jack Bauer, interview by author, September 23, 2010.

  He even knew a few words of English: Details of Loyd’s exchange with the man are from interviews with Jack Bauer and Cooper and witness statements in the Army investigative report.

  He seemed friendly enough: Cooper told me: “He seemed a little bit cocky. It’s hard to describe. He didn’t seem normal to me. He seemed like he came out of his way to talk to us. I thought that immediately. But that wasn’t uncommon . . . for an Afghan to track us down and debate one point or another with us, ‘Why are you guys here?’ And ‘You’re just causing trouble.’ You know: ‘The only reason Taliban cause trouble is because you’re here and why don’t you and the Taliban take your fight elsewhere?’ We’d have that kind of debate with villagers and people all the time.” Cooper, interview by author, April 22, 2010.

  His motorcycle was damaged: Jack Bauer, interview by author, September 23, 2010. According to the Army investigation, an interpreter (presumably Jack Bauer) “asked the man why he had ‘petrol’ in a ‘teapot’[sic], and the man said it was oil for his motorcycle.”

  that he was a shopkeeper from Kandahar: Jack Bauer, interview by author, September 23, 2010, and Jack Bauer statement to Army investigators.

  He was vaguely aware that the man with the jug: The account here and below of the man’s behavior is from interviews with Cooper and Jack Bauer, witness statements to Army investigators, and crime scene photos obtained by the author.

  The platoon medic, standing a few feet away: Statement of Specialist Djeens Brun, November 4, 2008, filed in federal court, May 1, 2009.

  a handful of soldiers formed a loose wall: It is important to note that while the platoon was armed and accustomed to providing security for its soldiers, it was not a protective detail for the Human Terrain Team, nor were the soldiers trained as bodyguards. As one soldier recalled in his statement to Army investigators: “I wasn’t really paying attention [to Loyd] because I was too busy focusing on the LT, listening to transmissions, writing notes.” />
  Jack turned to answer, turned away from Loyd: Jack Bauer, interview by author, September 23, 2010.

  Cooper was still talking to the old man: Details here and below are from my interviews with Cooper and Jack Bauer, and witness statements to Army investigators.

  yelled for the soldiers to get Loyd into the stream: “I heard a sudden rush of flame and a number of shouts. Turning around I saw Paula (HTT) engulfed in flames large enough to cause everyone around her to back off 3–5 m. As I was screaming to get her into the creek, I realized the flames were too big for anyone to approach her. Rushing to the creek, I filled my helmet with water, and instructed those nearby to help.” Statement of Lieutenant Matthew Pathak, November 4, 2008, filed in federal court, May 1, 2009.

  He pulled her watch off her wrist: Cooper statement to Army investigators and author interviews.

  unwound his cotton scarf: Jack Bauer, interview by author, September 23, 2010.

  he had thought she was dead: Specialist Djeens Brun statements to Army investigators: “[H]er body started to freeze up. [F]or a moment I thought she was died [sic]. . . . [S]he lost all feeling in her harms [sic] at that moment. [H]er face was completely burn [sic].”

  ‘I’m cold,’ she said. ‘I’m cold’: Dialogue between Cooper and Loyd here and below is from Cooper, interview by author, April 22, 2010, and Cooper’s statement to Army investigators.

  He was lying: “I was afraid to look at her,” Cooper told Army investigators. “I cut off her helmet and her hair was still intact and I could still recognize her. . . . She asked me how she looked and I lied to her miserably, I told her she looked fine and the burns didn’t look severe.”

  ‘Don’t worry. You’re always cold’: Cooper statement to Army investigators.

  Ayala saw a bright flash: This and many details below are from Ayala, interview by author, August 19, 2009, and witness statements to Army investigators.

  A young soldier named Justin Skotnicki: Skotnicki, interview by author, March 24, 2009, and Skotnicki statement (undated) filed in federal court, May 1, 2009.

  he heard someone yell: ‘Stop him!’: This was a crucial moment. “I didn’t know if he was an innocent civilian that got burned,” Ayala told me. “I didn’t know he was the attacker.” Ayala, interview by author, August 19, 2009. That someone yelled, “Stop him,” and “Shoot him,” ibid., and soldiers’ statements to Army investigators. According to the Army investigative report: “Ayala drew his pistol and aimed at the man, but recognized the HTT and Soldiers were behind the man so he didn’t fire.”

  It took three of them to subdue him: Skotnicki told investigators that the man only quieted after Ayala drew his pistol. “The man managed to slap one soldier in the face and push off soldiers in full kit bearing down on him,” Pathak recalled. Asked if the detainee had hurt any soldiers, Pathak replied: “Only their pride.” Statements of Pathak and Skotnicki, Army report and court records.

  something about handing him over to the local police: Ayala, interview by author, August 19, 2009.

  now he was starting to panic: “Now, I’m kind of like in a panic mode. I’m kind of worried about who’s burned over there. I had a feeling who it was. And I had this antsy feeling about being around this guy.” Ayala, interview by author, August 19, 2009.

  writhing and kicking though his hands were bound: Pathak told investigators: “Reports to me later indicated that he wasn’t, in fact, subdued, and continued to fight when the flex cuffs were put on him.” After he had been cuffed, the detainee was “[j]ust flailing around, trying to get out,” the investigators wrote.

  The man was not his responsibility: “I felt that it wasn’t my responsibility to have him, being a Human Terrain [team member]. The soldiers or the commander, they should have taken him.” Ayala, interview by author, August 19, 2009.

  ‘You motherfucker!’: This is Ayala’s memory of what Jack Bauer said. Ayala, interview by author, August 19, 2009. Jack Bauer told me: “I kick his face, like, two or three times.” Jack Bauer, interview by author, September 23, 2010. Another soldier told Army investigators: “I saw [the detainee] get punched once in the head and then thrown in the water. While he was in the water someone jumped down and kicked him in the side of the head.”

  ‘You can’t just kick people in the face’: “Don has told me, ‘Hey, Jack, you don’t know about our culture. It’s not allowed for you, that you should be kicking somebody’s face!’ ” Jack Bauer, interview by author, September 23, 2010.

  Jack Bauer was out of breath: Jack recalled: “I speaking English, but I was scared from that happening. My tongue is not speaking English. And Don has told me, ‘What’s up? Can you speak English or not?’ ” Ibid.

  Ayala hauled the cuffed Afghan: Ayala, interview by author, August 19, 2009.

  ‘Paula’s burned’: “I informed Don that Paula was hurt and if he wanted to, he could go see her, because we were going to be getting her out of there pretty quick. He didn’t say anything. I could see he was hurt. That’s about it.” Skotnicki, interview by author, March 24, 2009.

  The police out here were compromised: “I wasn’t comfortable with the police’s situation,” Ayala told me. “They were being paid off by the Taliban, because the central government wasn’t paying these guys. And the police feared the Taliban. They would not go into any villages without any U.S support. And I figured he would be released and he’s going to get away. The guy who attacked our patrol would have been set free and I was uncomfortable with that.” Ayala, interview by author, August 19, 2009.

  ‘Why did you burn that girl?’: Jack Bauer, interview by author, September 23, 2010, and Jack Bauer statement to Army investigators.

  ‘I’m crazy,’ he said. ‘I cannot control myself’: Tom Cruise, interview by author, March 24, 2009: “He told me, ‘I am a crazy man. I cannot control myself. Sometimes I’m walking naked in the night.’ ” See also Tom Cruise statement to Army investigators: “[The detainee] said at night he walks around the village naked and that he also has epilepsy.”

  His hands were still cuffed behind his back: Statement of a staff sergeant, Army report.

  ‘Tell this guy he’s the fucking devil’: “I told Jack, ‘You tell this guy he’s the fucking devil.’ ‘Cause that’s the last words I wanted him to hear. . . . And then I pushed the gun into his head, pushed his head into the ground, and I squeezed.” Ayala, interview by author, August 19, 2009. Skotnicki also recalled this: “[Don] wanted [the interpreter] to tell the man that he was the devil: ‘Tell him he’s the devil.’ ” Skotnicki, interview by author, March 24, 2009. See also Skotnicki statement to Army investigators.

  Chapter 2: What You Don’t Know Will Kill You

  Technology increasingly allowed the Army: Jacob W. Kipp, historian and former director of the Foreign Military Studies Office, interview by author, July 2, 2010.

  “What we need is cultural intelligence”: Major General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC, “Non-Traditional Military Missions: Their Nature, and the Need for Cultural Awareness and Flexible Thinking,” presentation to the Armed Forces Staff College, June 4, 1994, in Joe Strange, Capital ‘W’ War: A Case for Strategic Principles of War (Because Wars Are Conflicts of Societies, Not Tactical Exercises Writ Large) (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps War College, 1998), 267.

  Instead, it focused on technology at the expense of history: Colin S. Gray, “Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?” Strategic Studies Institute, March 2006, 32–33. Both this and Zinni’s presentation are cited in Christopher J. Lamb, James Douglas Orton, Michael C. Davies, and Theodore T. Pikulsky, “Human Terrain Team Performance: An Explanation, draft” (Washington, DC: The Institute for World Politics Press. Forthcoming 2013), 13–14.

  But at the Foreign Military Studies Office: Kipp, interview by author, July 2, 2010. Founded in 1986 as the Soviet Army Studies Office, the Foreign Military Studies Office had been conceived to educate the Cold War–era U.S. Army about how the Soviets thought and operated on the ba
ttlefield. Army veterans who understood the history and culture of the Soviet Union and spoke Russian worked alongside civilian academics, developing a unique intellectual culture. When the Soviet Union fell, the office changed its name and adopted a broader vision, but its hard-won knowledge of Russia and the former Soviet bloc continued to define it. In the 1990s, U.S. soldiers returning from peacekeeping missions in Bosnia complained that they hadn’t been adequately prepared for the asymmetrical, urban combat they’d found there. One of them, Maxie McFarland, would later supervise Kipp and others at the Foreign Military Studies Office. Realizing that future conflicts would probably not resemble the Cold War, the Army started using social science variables to analyze operational environments, but its focus remained on technology. “I perpetually argued that it was dangerous because it didn’t take culture into account,” Kipp told me. “But in the 1990s, culture wasn’t seen as important. We had all the people looking at advanced technology and they were saying, ‘We’ll have perfect transparency on the battlefield. . . . We don’t have to worry about this.’ ” For more on the Foreign Military Studies Office, see “Foreign Military Studies Office: About Us,” http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/About-Us.html, accessed June 26, 2012.

  Long before anyone envisioned an American war in Afghanistan: Lester Grau, interview by author, July 28, 2010. Grau joined the Foreign Military Studies Office in 1989 and published his first paper on the Soviet-Afghan War in 1995. “I got into Afghanistan back when nobody could care less,” he told me. “We were never going to Afghanistan.” Kipp recalled: “We had to struggle to get Les to have the time to do the three books” on the Soviets in Afghanistan. The powers that be argued it was a useless project for three reasons: “ ‘You want to do a book about the Soviet-Afghan War; the Soviets don’t exist. It’s about counterinsurgency; we’re not going to do that. And we’re never going to Afghanistan.’ ” Kipp, interview by author, July 2, 2010.

  Today, Grau’s books of battlefield case studies: Grau’s The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan (1996) and The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War (1998), the latter written with former Afghan Interior Minister Ali Ahmad Jalali, are included in “Pre-Deployment Afghanistan Reading List,” http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/repository/AFGReadingList.pdf, accessed June 26, 2012.