Washington

by Douglas Southall Freeman

  With emotions confused and complicated, he wrote Dinwiddie:

  I scorn to make unjust remarks on the behavior of the militia as much as I despise and condemn the persons who detract from mine and the character of the regiment . . . I only want to make the country sensible how ardently I have studied to promote her cause, and wish very sincerely my successor may fill my place more to their satisfaction in every respect than I have been able to do. I mentioned in my last to your Honor that I did not think a less number than 2,000 men would be sufficient to defend our extensive and much exposed frontier from the ravages of the enemy. I have not one reason yet to alter my opinion, but many to strengthen and confirm it. And I flatter myself the country will, when they know my determinations, be convinced that I have no sinister views, no vain motives of commanding a number of men, that urge me to recommend this number to your Honor, but that it proceeds from the knowledge I have acquired of the country, people, &c. to be defended.

  In this state of mind Washington reversed his direction on October 10. He felt he had seen what there was to see, and all of it discouraging. On October 22 he rode into Winchester and found new distress there. Indians had resumed their raids on the South Branch and elsewhere; farmers’ appeals for help were reaching Winchester daily; the whole situation was so alarming, that Washington had to confess himself deeply anxious. Fortunately, the alarm was of brief duration.

  The Virginia officers at Fort Cumberland did not see the article of the “Centinel” until October 5, while Washington was on his tour of inspection. They met the next day and sent Lieutenant Colonel Stephen a furious letter. The angry young Virginians served notice: “We are resolved to obey as officers no longer than the twentieth day of November next, unless we have as public satisfaction as the injury received.” That was serious. In several past crises the extreme utterance of others had led George to draw back. This time he perceived that what he had been tempted to do himself was dangerous when done by others. Cost what it might, he must keep the officers from leaving the service when their resignation would mean disintegration of the Regiment and further exposure of the Colony to attack. As soon as a few essential duties were performed, George hurried to Fort Cumberland and undertook to convince the officers that they had allowed too little time for the Governor, the Council or the Burgesses to give them “satisfaction.” He asked them to defer action until he could investigate and report. They assented, but they insisted they must have the thanks of the General Assembly and an avowal of disbelief in the charges of the “Centinel.” The alternative was set forth with deliberate sarcasm—that the Governor or the lawmakers must appoint in their place “a set of gentlemen who will more fully answer their and his expectation and perform that for their country which it seems their Governor, if not they, little hope for from a company of dastardly debauchees.”

  Washington agreed that their appeal should be presented. To seek vindication and to transact an accumulation of business, he prepared to start for Williamsburg. On this mission, the Colonel had reached Alexandria when he received an extraordinary letter from Dinnwiddie. The Governor had been confined to his room and not been improved in body or in temper. He had taken offence at a reference Washington half casually had made to the arrival in Winchester of eleven Catawba Indians whose number might have been increased by the use of responsible guides. Dinwiddie for months had been humiliated by the failure of his efforts to procure substantial help from the southern Indians and doubtless had been shamed anew by the arrival of Andrew Lewis with a ludicrous reenforcement of seven Cherokee warriors and three squaws. Hit where he was sore, the Governor struck angrily at Washington.

  Temper colored the whole of Dinwiddie’s letter. Most startling was a succession of brief, concluding sentences in which he said that the proposals concerning the future of Fort Cumberland had been reviewed by himself and the Council:

  In consequence thereof, I hereby order you immediately to march 100 men to Fort Cumberland from the forces you have at Winchester, which Captain Mercer says is 160 men. You are to remain at Fort Cumberland and make the place as strong as you can, in case of an attack. You are to send out parties from the fort to observe the motions of the enemy if they should march over the Allegheny Mountains. Any stores at the fort not absolutely necessary for its defense you are to send . . . to Winchester. You are to order one of your subaltern officers (in whom you confide) to command at Winchester and to oversee the finishing of the fort building at that place. These orders I expect you will give due obedience to, and I am with respect, sir, your most humble servant. . . .

  This was sharp, stern discipline for the young Colonel who was on his way to Williamsburg to tell the Governor that the officers at Fort Cumberland demanded they be replaced unless the attack on them by “The Virginia Centinel” was disavowed! Washington was astonished and stunned. To dispatch one hundred additional men to Fort Cumberland would leave Winchester undefended, the stores unprotected, and Fort Loudoun (as the defence at Winchester was now called) not only uncompleted but also exposed to the elements and to thieves who would carry off the building materials accumulated there. Of all the occasions on which Washington might have thought himself justified in throwing up his commission, this certainly was the most provoking and warrantable; but the effect on him of Dinwiddie’s criticisms was exactly the reverse. The risk to the “country” and to the work he had taken in hand cooled and calmed him.

  He obviously had to be in the Valley and not at Williamsburg. Accordingly he made his arrangements to return to Winchester and then replied to Dinwiddie’s letter point by point. He apologized for what Dinwiddie had considered his “unmannerly” reference to the Indians’ guides. “[I] am sorry,” he wrote, “to find that this and my best endeavors of late meet with unfavorable constructions.” He went on: “What it proceeds from, I know not. If my open and disinterested way of writing and speaking has the air of pertness and freedom, I shall redress my error by acting reservedly, and shall take care to obey my orders without offering at more.” After a review of the other matters of which the Governor had complained, he returned to the proposal for the abandonment of Fort Loudoun, told Dinwiddie what this involved, and then wrote a final sentence that was apt to make the Governor reconsider: “So, to comply with my order (which I shall do literally if I can) not a man will be left [at Winchester] to secure the works or defend the King’s stores, which are almost wholly removed to that place.”

  Three days later, November 27, Washington left Alexandria for Winchester and, on arrival, called immediately for a return of the troops in the Valley town. If Washington abandoned Winchester completely, he learned, he could not furnish the whole of the reenforcement ordered to Fort Cumberland. Wagons and flour for the transfer of the troops and their equipment to the Maryland post were not available immediately. Without disobedience of orders, time sufficed for an appeal to the Governor. George wrote deferentially and set forth the loss that would attend the evacuation of Winchester.

  Dinwiddie and the Council had a change of heart when they learned reenforcement of Fort Cumberland would necessitate abandonment of the unfinished fort at Winchester. Washington received instructions December 15 to evacuate all the smaller forts except Waggener’s on the South Branch and to divide available men between the garrisons of Winchester and of Wills Creek, so that Fort Cumberland might be strengthened and Fort Loudoun still be held. This meant that Indian raiders could penetrate easily the abandoned area between the two main forts, but the danger to settlers during the winter season would not be great. It was less bad to take that risk than abandon Fort Loudoun and its supplies to plunderers. Washington had won a partial victory. Fort Loudoun had been saved.

  In his letter ordering the abandonment of the stockades, the Governor had quoted a paragraph from a communication in which Lord Loudoun had said of the proposed evacuation of the small forts: “If [Colonel Washington] leaves any of the great quantity of stores behind, it will be very unfortunate; and he ought to consider that it must
lie at his own door.” That was alarming. George felt that Loudoun had somehow been prejudiced against him. He could perceive that the General wrote in misconception of the facts, if not in ignorance of them; but misconception and ignorance are sources of prejudice, not cures of it. The recourse that occurred to George was to wait in person on the new Commander-in-Chief and present the reasons for what he had proposed. Washington pressed for information of the General’s arrival. Then, on December 20 or 21, Washington took all his wardrobe, his camp equipment, his horses and the puppy he had bought that month and set out for Fort Cumberland.

  The weeks of waiting for the visit of Lord Loudoun to Virginia could not be for Washington a time of idleness even at Fort Cumberland in winter. After the Christmas holdiays, George had to find clothing for the half-naked troops, who had been expecting it since October, and had to submit to controversy with the Governor over the appointment of a Commissary. More serious was a mutiny on the South Branch. This was put down promptly and sternly. These unpleasant matters faced and endured, Washington turned to the preparation of a report to Loudoun on the condition of the Virginia forces and the situation on the frontier. He wrote this paper with much care because he intended to use it as an introduction to the new Commander-in-Chief, who had been compelled to defer plans for visiting Virginia and whom Washington wished to impress as a vigilant commander.

  Washington began a covering letter to Loudoun’s senior aide, with the assertion that a British offensive, if practicable, was necessary: “Our all in a manner depends upon it. The French grow more and more formidable by their alliances, while our friendly Indians are deserting our interest. Our treasury is exhausting, and our country depopulating. . . .” He assured Loudoun that three thousand men could cut communications between Fort DuQuesne and the Lakes and, with artillery, could destroy the fort. The difficulties that weakened the Virginia Regiment and hampered its operations were the burden of the report.

  Washington held to his purpose to find the earliest possible opportunity of “testifying” to the qualities of the man who could advance him quickly. When he learned Loudoun had called a conference of Governors to meet in Philadelphia, he sought and received Dinwiddie’s permission to attend. Washington reached the place of conference about February 21, 1757—only to find that the new Commander-in-Chief had not made his appearance. Pending that gratifying event, Washington had to make the most of such dull diversions as idle days in Philadelphia could offer in midwinter. At last on March 14, the guns of the Association Battery and of ships in the harbor announced Loudoun’s arrival. As the waiting Governors had become impatient, they sat down eagerly to confer with him and hear the little Loudoun had to say about his military plans. There were some ceremonials, but, in the main, there was solid discussion, which soon turned to the means by which the people could be aroused to support the war with vigor.

  Washington found Lord Loudoun, a bachelor of fifty-two, stout and below middle height but strongly muscled and apparently fit for the field. The General had the marks of high station and good living and he displayed an interest in administration. From Loudoun’s senior aide, Washington soon learned the General had been much pleased with Washington’s report on the situation in Virginia. Loudoun doubtless was equally pleased when he met the young Virginian who succeeded in nothing more certainly than in winning the good-will of his seniors. George was not invited to all meetings of the conference, but he was called in March 20 when a choice was to be made concerning the forts to be held in western Virginia and the garrisons to be employed there.

  The council of Governors sat with Lord Loudoun through March 23. Loudoun told the council virtually nothing concerning his plan of operations in the north, but he and the Governors agreed that no offensive could be undertaken in Pennsylvania or to the south during 1757. A defensive must be maintained there and particularly in South Carolina, where a French attack from Santo Domingo or from the Alabama fort in the Creek country was apprehended. Washington knew nothing of the situation in South Carolina and expressed no opinion of it. From his point of view, the single gratifying decision of the council was a minor one—that Maryland was to assume responsibility for Fort Cumberland.

  Washington already regarded himself as a fatalist. He was disposed now to take a gloomy view of the future, in so far as his own military future was concerned; and when he reached Alexandria early in April he had added another to the long list of disappointments that had been his in pursuit of military fame. His initial command had been hampered by Mackay and then by defeat at Fort Necessity; Braddock had been good enough to promise advancement but had been killed; after George had been named Commander-in-Chief of Virginia troops under his second commission, first Dagworthy and then Sharpe had stood in his way; when Dagworthy had been eliminated and Sharpe had been won over to ask for him as second in command, Shirley had promised to give him that post—and then Shirley had been superseded; now Loudoun was favorable, but there was to be no offensive against the Ohio in 1757.

  At Alexandria he found a letter in which Captain Mercer, commanding at Winchester, said that ninety-five Catawba Indians had arrived in the town. This presented possibilities of a sort that revived Washington. Perhaps these warriors could be used in an expedition towards Fort DuQuesne. In the transfer of Fort Cumberland to the custody of Maryland, someone must see that all Virginia property, except provisions, was removed to Winchester. Weakening of the Regiment in order to strengthen South Carolina must be resisted. Evacuation of Fort Cumberland would release some troops for garrisoning the stockades between that post and Winchester. These men must be posted wisely. Finally, the Governor had directed George to come to Williamsburg during the session of the General Assembly beginning April 14 and report on arrearages of pay. If immediate tasks were to be discharged, Washington must be off to the Valley.

  Busy days followed. The Governor was as anxious to get a contingent for South Carolina on its way as George was to hold it. Transfer of Fort Cumberland involved delays as well as formalities. Much had to be done in anticipation of the coming of a larger force of Cherokees and Catawbas. Meantime, the French Indians were appearing again, almost under the stockade of Fort Cumberland, and waylaying small parties of men on the road. Officers at that fort were renewing their appeal for King’s commissions. George visited Wills Creek briefly and then started at his usual speed for Williamsburg. He was in Fredericksburg April 24 and by the twenty-seventh was in the capital.

  Washington was receiving thirty shillings per diem pay and 2 per cent commission on all funds he handled for the troops. Dinwiddie regarded this as too high a rate compensation, but George now earnestly asked the Governor not to lower either pay or commission. It was not altogether a vain plea. The General Assembly heard Washington’s statement of the arrearages due the Regiment and gave him good-will and admiration; but members did not change the plan to entrust financial administration to the Governor nor did any of them prevail upon the Governor, if even they tried, to continue the commission of 2 per cent. Dinwiddie kept George’s salary at thirty shillings, agreed to provide for the men who attended his horses and allowed him a flat £200 per annum for his table and expenses.

  The remonstrance of the officers was unavailing; relief and recognition must come from the Crown, not from Burgesses who were conscious of the Colony’s financial distress. They were well-inclined, if powerless, and as always, they were sociable. George accepted entertainment and gave it. Conferences came at last to an end. Washington completed all his business by May 17 but left the General Assembly still in dispute over the size of the forces to be employed for the operations to be undertaken that year and in 1758. Return was by Fredericksburg, to Alexandria and then to Winchester, which he reached May 24.

  In Winchester and nearby Washington found a larger number of Indians than ever he had seen together previously. He could not escape the presence or the importunity of Cherokees, Catawbas, Nottaways and Tuscaroras. Negotiation, treaties, presents and promises had brought Washington more
savages than he could employ advantageously while Virginia remained on the defensive. “They are,” said Washington, “the most insolent, most avaricious and most dissatisfied wretches I have ever had to deal with.”

  The nuisance was immediate; the benefit in futuro; the danger that the Indians would march off in dudgeon could not be blinked. Responsibility of conciliating them was not long to be Washington’s. The home government had named Edmund Atkin Superintendent of Indian Affairs in the Southern Colonies in recognition of a long report on the southern natives, written by Atkin. Atkin did nothing in haste and preferably did nothing at all. He had come to Williamsburg on April 9, but he resisted all prodding to go to Winchester. If the management of the Indians was the affair of Atkin, then George wanted to be relieved of the Indians and wished the new official to be present to look after them. Washington sent an express with a request that the Governor speed the agent, but it was not until June 2 that Atkin arrived and, after some diplomatic delays and pretended indifference, began a council with the savages. This was long and complicated. Atkin professed to act in superior knowledge of the Indians, but he did not impress Washington. It would be far better, the Colonel thought, if Virginia had a single agent of her own—Christopher Gist, for example—who would transact all business with the Indians.

  Circumstance for some weeks saved Washington from the tedium of administrative routine. A delicate negotiation was that of determining the military relationship Washington was to bear to Col. John Stanwix of the Sixtieth Infantry, whom Loudoun had named to command five companies of regulars assigned to support Colonials in the defence of the western frontiers of Virginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania. Washington took pains to inquire of the Governor: “If I should meet with anything from [Stanwix] at any time that may clash with your instructions to me, how I am to conduct myself in the affair[?]” The reply was: “You are to follow such orders [as] Colonel Stanwix may send you from time to time, without any regard to any orders you may have received from me.”