Washington

by Douglas Southall Freeman

  Relief came with laughter. By the evening of January 4 sufficient militia had arrived for the Brigadiers to reoccupy thinly those parts of the line that had been undefended for three days. In another four days the number of men present for duty, fit, was to rise to 10,209, but that was less than half the authorized strength of the Army, and even that figure now might face subtraction because of new developments to which Lee insistently called attention.

  Lee had gone to Rhode Island to advise Governor Cooke concerning the defence of the Colony. Upon his return shortly before the beginning of January, Lee was alarmed by reports which indicated that the British in Boston were fitting out a fleet. The objective of this force might be New York and its aim might be not only to seize the most valuable point strategically on the coast but also to rally and recruit Tories, who had made that city their stronghold. New York must be occupied and the Tories curbed—that became Lee’s temporary creed.

  Washington as long previously as October had considered the possibility of a British descent on New York and had asked whether he should detach troops, should await instructions, or should rely on the men of that and nearby Colonies to defend the city. No decision by Congress had been communicated to him. Now that a British movement from Boston was in the making, Washington shared Lee’s view that immediate action should be taken and urged that New Jersey troops be thrown into the city. More than this he did not think he should urge, because of his lack of familiarity with conditions in New York. Distance and circumstances had made his position as Commander-in-Chief more nominal than directional. He held the inclusive title; he was not sure he should exercise all the powers his title seemed to confer. Lee made a detailed proposal for the occupation of New York City and the nearby country. The plan appealed to Washington; but he remained in some doubt concerning his authority, and, as John Adams happened to be near at hand, Washington consulted the Congressman. His long experience as a legislator had taught the General that the time to avoid criticism was in advance of action and that the way to do this was to consult and convince those who might be critical later. Washington told Adams that if the plan was to be executed, it should be undertaken at once and by Lee. Adams’s reply was unequivocal: Washington should seize New York; it was entirely within his authority to do so. Specifically, said the Massachusetts leader, “your commission constitutes you commander of all the forces . . . and you are vested with full power and authority to act as you shall think for the good and welfare of the service.”

  Lee’s instructions were drafted forthwith. He was to raise volunteers in Connecticut, proceed to New York, get assistance from New Jersey, and put New York City “into the best posture of defence which the season and circumstances will admit of.”

  The day after he gave Lee his papers Washington received the first detailed returns of the new Army. He had estimated from incomplete weekly figures that the total would be 10,500, or about 45 per cent of the authorized strength. Now he was appalled to find that actual enlistments were 8212, and that the number of men present for duty, fit, was 5582 only. In the light of these unhappy facts he was so discouraged that he doubted whether the Army ever could be completed by voluntary enlistment. He said so without advocating immediately an alternative policy, though he believed a draft or a bounty for long-term enlistment would be necessary. He had once again to look to the militia. The time of those called to the lines in December would expire January 15. Although Washington’s anxiety prompted him to ask the Massachusetts Legislature to keep these men with the Army until February, his experience admonished him of the old, ugly, fact that a great part of the militia would not extend their service even for two weeks.

  Weakened in this way, Washington felt that he should call a council to consider how he could get the men with whom to carry out the plan to which he always returned from every wrestle with adverse circumstance, the plan of attacking Boston or of inducing Howe to come out and fight. Washington asked John Adams and James Warren to attend along with his general officers, and on January 16 he laid before them “a state of the Regiments in the Continental army, the consequent weakness of his lines, and, in his judgment, the indispensable necessity of making a bold attempt to conquer the ministerial troops in Boston, before they can be reenforced in the spring, if the means can be provided, and a favorable opportunity offered, and then [he] desired the opinion of the council thereon.” This time, all the doubters were convinced: the attack should be made as soon as practicable; to facilitate it, Washington should call for thirteen militia regiments to serve from February 1 to the end of March; these regiments should have the same number of officers and men as were authorized for the Continental regiments. Massachusetts must be asked for seven, Connecticut for four, and New Hampshire for two.

  The call went out accordingly. What the result of this new application might be, Washington could not foresee; but in the acuteness of his anxiety he opened his heart to his friend Reed: “Could I have foreseen the difficulties which have come upon us; could I have known that such a backwardness would have been discovered in the old soldiers to the service, all the Generals upon earth should not have convinced me of the propriety of delaying an attack upon Boston till this time. When it can now be attempted, I will not undertake to say; but this much I will answer for, that no opportunity can present itself earlier than my wishes.”

  Opportunity! The word seemed to be mocked by papers that lay in Washington’s Headquarters as he wrote. He discovered now that, if such a thing was possible, he was even worse off for arms than for soldiers. His long anxiety over the outcome of the advance of Montgomery and Arnold to Quebec was more and more acute. Schuyler had written January 5 that Arnold and Montgomery had formed a junction, “but,” the New Yorker said, “their force is so small and the weather has been so severe that I fear they have not been able to possess themselves of Quebec.” Unhappy and in ill-health, Schuyler had added: “I tremble lest Canada should be lost.” Receipt of this letter deepened Washington’s dread and when, on January 17, he broke the seal of a dispatch written by Schuyler from Albany on the thirteenth, the opening words were so many blows in the face: “I wish I had no occasion to send my dear General this melancholy account. My amiable friend, the gallant Montgomery, is no more; the brave Arnold is wounded; and we have met with a severe check in an unsuccessful attempt on Quebec.” The situation, Schuyler wrote Washington, called for “an immediate reenforcement that is nowhere to be had but from you.”

  This news stunned. The invasion of Canada had been ordered by Congress but the cooperation of Arnold through an advance on Quebec had been Washington’s own design, his first adventure in strategy on a scale of any magnitude. It had failed, with heavy loss and with dark potential consequences: If Canada were lost to the Americans, that country would be a secure base for the confident planning of an offensive down the lakes and down the Hudson simultaneously with an attack on New York City by the British fleet and perhaps by Howe’s army. Were this joint operation to succeed, then the Colonies would be divided and might be subdued. As Washington saw it, the question was not one of detaching troops from his command to reenforce Arnold; it was, instead, how could additional soldiers be found elsewhere for the relief of a gallant man and the capture of the enemy’s northern base?

  He summoned an immediate council, to which Adams accepted an invitation, and when he had the Generals and the Delegate together in a private room, Washington inquired “whether it proper, in the present circumstances of the lines, to detach a reenforcement from hence to the succor of the troops in Canada?” The senior officers were convinced that this was “improper,” but there was unanimous assent to a proposal Washington made that the New England Colonies be requested to supply men to aid Arnold. As Canada went, the balance might turn; the winter of 1775-76 would be decisive there because, when spring came, the enemy most certainly would send large reenforcements to the St. Lawrence. Washington had more confidence than ever in Arnold, and he hoped that officer, recovering promptly, would add, a
s he wrote him, “the only link wanting in the great chain of continental union.”

  Scarcely had this exhortation been written than Washington found affairs in Canada involved anew and differently with those of New York. During the last week in January he learned that Lee had been halted at Stamford, Connecticut, by an attack of gout and had been confronted there by a strange and disconcerting letter from the Committee of Safety in New York City. The committee told of reports it had received that Lee was about to enter the city with a considerable body of troops, and it informed him that it had little powder and no defensive works. Because of this situation, members felt that hostilities in New York City should not be provoked before March 1, if then. Lee was requested to halt his troops on the western confines of Connecticut “till we shall have been honored by you with such an explanation on this important subject as you may conceive your duty may permit you to enter into with us. . . .” Lee’s letter to Washington enclosed this document and his reply, the substance of which was that his object was to keep the British from taking post in the city or from effecting lodgment on Long Island. “. . . I give you my word,” Lee had written the committee, “that no active service is proposed as you seem to apprehend.” He specified: “If the ships of war are quiet, I shall be quiet; but I declare solemnly that if they make a pretext of my presence to fire on the town the first house set in flames by their guns shall be the funeral pile of some of their best friends—but I believe, sir, the inhabitants may rest in security on this subject.” Further, Lee wrote his chief, he had concluded he would receive instructions from Congress, to which he had written on the subject. The response of Congress was to send a committee of three members—Harrison, Lynch and Andrew Allen—to decide what should be done for the defence of New York.

  Before Lee had recovered sufficiently to proceed on his way, his direction of defence at New York for any length of time was put in doubt. At Headquarters it was surmised by some, that Schuyler did not wish to exercise general command in Canada, but Washington thought he might be prevailed upon to accept the responsibility. If the New Yorker did not, then Charles Lee would be the logical man to head the operation. When Washington received a request from Congress that he designate one of his Generals for the Canadian command, he suggested that Lee be left temporarily in New York and that Schuyler be entrusted with the Canadian command.

  Soon papers that came to Cambridge told of plans for the dispatch of Lee, rather than of Schuyler, to Canada. Lee was willing, and he was insistent only in asking for the essentials of war most difficult to get in America—trained subordinates, cannon and ammunition. He wished to have either Greene or Sullivan assigned him, but the qualities that made him desire the services of one or the other of them were the very excellencies that led Washington to want both men to remain with the Army in front of Boston. Lee did not insist. He was in good spirits; because his proposal to occupy New York brought him much praise. This aroused no jealousy in Washington’s heart. He wanted Canada, he would part with his most experienced lieutenant were that necessary to get it; he regretted that he could spare no troops to help in the northern province, but he was convinced he could not afford to detach even a battalion.

  This unyielding insistence by Washington on concentration of force accorded with his answer to previous appeals for detachments: If Howe did not attack, he would, and to do so he required every man. He needed, too, more powder than ever, and he had relatively less, both because of wastage and because he now had more heavy guns. Knox had arrived at Framingham with fifty-two cannon, nine large mortars and five cohorns, which he had hauled over the snow from Fort Ticonderoga. Washington might hope to drive the British from the wharves of Boston if ever he had in store sufficient powder for a long bombardment.

  Artillery was Knox’s assignment and was well handled; transaction of much of the other public business was more difficult now because of changes in Washington’s staff. Edmund Randolph had been compelled to start back to Virginia in November to look after the estate of his uncle, Peyton Randolph, who had died suddenly in October. To Washington’s distress, Joseph Reed had set out for Philadelphia to look after certain cases pending in his law practice. Reed had proved himself so nearly indispensable that Washington had written Richard Henry Lee to endeavor to prevail upon opposing counsel to agree to postpone trials in order that Reed might return promptly to Cambridge. For the discharge of the less important duties of aide, Washington procured the services of Robert Hanson Harrison. Stephen Moylan gave such help as he could, but he had his own regular work to do as Mustermaster General.

  February 13 Washington went to Lechmere Point. He found the ice there solid all the way across the channel to Boston. Would it be practicable to attack across the ice and to rely primarily on the fire of small arms? If this bold move was to be undertaken at all, it should be attempted at once, because the ice might break up and British reenforcements might sail into Boston. So, on February 16 Washington submitted his plan to his Generals.

  Every man of them was against it. Washington was set back by this counsel. He had reckoned the cost of the long assault over the ice and had agreed that success would depend on the good behavior of the troops, but he had been willing to take the risk because this seemed the one feasible operation for an army that lacked powder for a sustained bombardment. When his Generals were decidedly of opinion that he was wrong, he could not persist in asserting himself right. He did not change his mind but, he admitted subsequently, “the irksomeness of my situation . . . might have inclined me to put more to hazard than was consistent with prudence.” Washington had to turn again to the almost hopeless task of building up a reserve of powder and the enterprise the council had recommended, that of occupying some of the hills of Dorchester Neck in the hope the enemy would attempt to drive the Americans from the high ground. In spite of ice, everything seemed to be proceeding well. The secret reports from Boston were to the effect that the British were putting heavy guns and a quantity of bedding aboard ship. Townsfolk believed Howe was preparing to move to New York or Virginia.

  Washington reasoned that Howe might be fashioning a ruse, might actually be about to leave Boston or might be making ready in anticipation of orders to evacuate the city. Speculation on Howe’s designs was not permitted to slow the preparations for the seizure of high ground on Dorchester Neck. As Washington developed his plans for this operation, he gained faith in it.

  Time seemed now to run swiftly towards a decision. At all the batteries within easy range of Boston, solid shot and shell were brought forward, and the precious kegs of powder were placed where no moisture could reach them. Nurses were sought; bandages were prepared. Every effort was made to get full information of the enemy and stop passage from the American lines to Boston, but this precaution did not suffice. On February 27 Washington learned of the desertion of a rifleman who of course would disclose to the enemy as much as he knew.

  As the extra day of the Leap Year gave place to a cold first of March it was known in the camps, by the soldiers’ own strangely accurate intelligence system, that the Dorchester Heights were to be occupied. By the second engineers had placed a thirteen-inch mortar and a ten-inch at Lechmere Point and a thirteen-inch companion at Lamb’s Dam in Roxbury. The Massachusetts Legislature was sending up militia Washington had asked from the Dorchester area. The bombardment would be started that night:

  Cambridge, March 2, 1776

  [General Ward, Roxbury]

  Sir: After weighing all circumstances of tide, &c, and considering the hazard of having the posts on Dorchester Neck taken by the enemy, and the evil consequences which would result from it, the gentlemen here are of opinion that we should go on there Monday night [March 4]. I give you this early notice of it, that you may delay no time in preparing for it, as everything here will be got in readiness to cooperate. In haste I am sir, etc.

  GEORGE WASHINGTON.

  For the operation Washington had approximately 14,000 foot soldiers, of whom about 9000 were Continenta
l troops and 5000 militia. Militia of Roxbury and Dorchester could man part of the lines in event the regular defenders had to be moved. Artillerists under Knox were counted at 635. The supply of powder probably amounted to 174 barrels, exclusive of what had been issued for small arms.

  On the night of March 2 Abigail Adams, at Braintree, was writing for all New England women when she shaped these words to her husband: “I have been kept in a continual state of anxiety and expectation ever since you left. It has been said, ’tomorrow’ and ’tomorrow’ for this month, but when the dreadful tomorrow will be, I know not.” At that instant, across field and water came the sharp sound of an explosion. It was a cannon shot—that was certain. The house shook; the young wife of John Adams went to the door and listened. Another explosion, another, and another! Word spread mysteriously that this was it; all the remaining militia were to repair to the lines by midnight of Monday. Abigail came back to her writing: “No sleep for me tonight.”

  Except as the bombardment indicated that the Americans had seized the initiative, it was a trifle—only eleven shells and thirteen solid shot. The British reply was prompt and lively but was not of a sort to make a quaking militia fearful of instant death. The enemy’s fire inflicted no damage, but two of the Americans’ large-bore mortars at Lechmere Point and one at Roxbury split. Washington’s chief concern was that the enemy had intelligence of the impending attack and might seize Dorchester Heights before the Americans could. Occupation of the high ground must not be delayed. General Thomas was to be in immediate charge; General Ward was to have supervision of everything on his part of the front and now was assured he would get reenforcement of infantry and riflemen.