Washington

by Douglas Southall Freeman

  Matthews was examined on June 23 before Philip Livingston, Jay and Morris. Washington believed that Matthews was guilty and that the conspiracy originated with Governor Tryon, but he concerned himself first with the allegation that soldiers of his own Guard, even, had been charged with crimes that ranged from threats of desertion to treasonable communication with the enemy. The men who had been plotting together apparently had considered little that was definite, but they had talked vaguely of destroying King’s Bridge to cut off reenforcements and of seizing a battery when the fleet attacked. Conspiracy must be dealt with immediately. Drummer William Greene of the General’s Guard, though among those most criminally involved, was willing to confess and throw himself on the mercy of the court. The most obdurate suspect was Hickey, one of two Continental soldiers jailed for an alleged attempt to pass counterfeit. After his arrest for trafficking in bad money, he and his companion, Lynch, were said by one witness to have sworn they never would fight any more for America. Hickey and Lynch had boasted, moreover, that almost seven hundred men had promised to stand by the King, and the two culprits confided to other inmates of the jail that the American Army had become damnably corrupted, that the fleet was soon to arrive, and that a band was to turn against the Americans then. Eight of the General’s Guard, Hickey had said, were participants in the plan.

  In these circumstances, it seemed best to make an example of Hickey. He was arraigned before a court-martial on the twenty-sixth. Greene and other witnesses adhered to their previous statements; Hickey produced no witnesses and only a pathetically feeble defence. The verdict was immediate and unanimous, death by hanging, a sentence which Washington confirmed the next day and put in execution a little before noon June 28. As far as the records show, no other was punished, though Mayor Matthews was in jail. Washington believed some of the Tories capable of almost any crime to defeat the American cause, but, with characteristic restraint, he said of Hickey’s execution, “I am hopeful this example will produce many salutary consequences and deter others from entering into like traitorous practices.” That was written at a time when events more serious, by far, than a scotched conspiracy, called for Washington’s attention.

  On the day Matthews had been arrested, June 22, an express from General Schuyler had reached Washington with news that contradicted all the high hopes in the letters from Sullivan. Thompson had proceeded to Three Rivers, had attacked the British, and had sustained a reverse on June 8. He and a considerable number of his officers and men surrendered. The remainder of the original force of approximately two thousand counted themselves lucky in getting back to Sorel, which it now was manifest the Americans could not hold. By the evening of the twenty-third Washington had dispatches which indicated that the only question in dispute among the officers immediately responsible for operations in Canada was the depth of their withdrawal. Some of those who should have best judgment on the issue thought the Army should not attempt to hold a position north of Crown Point, 150 miles south of Sorel. Arnold, meantime, on the night of June 15 had evacuated Montreal with his force of three hundred and had proceeded to He aux Noix. As reunited at that point, the American forces numbered approximately seven thousand men, about half of whom were sick and unfit for duty.

  Washington was profoundly alarmed by this reverse; Canada was lost; Sullivan would be fortunate if he could escape and, with Schuyler’s help, fortify and hold the passes of the New York lakes. Gates must proceed north at once and take command of the troops under the discouraged but still ambitious Sullivan. No detailed orders could be given the new Major General. Gates could hope to accomplish little unless there was early attainment of the goal set in Congress’ resolution of June 25 that “the number of men destined for the Northern Department be augmented to 4000.” To provide reenforcement Congress at length had heeded Washington’s plea for a bounty and offered ten dollars to every sergeant, corporal and private soldier who would enlist for three years.

  Gates had to do what he could in reorganizing the broken forces that had survived the campaign. Washington, for his part, had to face the high probability that soon the British would be hammering at both ends of the waterline and portages that linked the St. Lawrence with Sandy Hook. If Gen. John Burgoyne already had begun the ascent of the Richelieu, it could not be long before Howe would be pointing the bows of his ships up the Hudson. While giving all possible assistance to Gates’s expedition, Washington had to struggle with the supreme vexation of command, that of trying to achieve quickly and securely what ignorant men with rude implements and feeble equipment were apt to do slowly, awkwardly, and in slovenly style. Fortunately, brigade and regimental organization now was familiar with its duties and was able to take some of the detail off the hands of the commanding General.

  So much had to be done! The establishment of a Troop of Light Horse had to be approved and encouraged; fortification had to be pressed; obstructions were placed in North River to discourage a naval commander who might feel confident he could pass the batteries; arrangement had to be made for the prompt summons of the militia from other Colonies when the fleet hove in sight; greater vigilance in the patrol of nearby waters was ordered to prevent communication between ship and shore; additional arms were sought from captured stores in Boston; snarls in the negotiations of Schuyler with the Indians had to be untangled.

  Information that appeared to be indisputable was laid before the busy General on June 28 that Howe had left Halifax for New York on June 9 with 130 sail. It was reported that his flagship already was at Sandy Hook. Washington at once called on the authorities of Massachusetts and Connecticut to “lose not a moment’s time in sending forward the militia of your province as the enemy will undoubtedly attack us in our weak state as soon as a sufficient force arrives to enable them to attempt it with the least probability of success. . . .” About nine o’clock the next morning, as officers looked through The Narrows to the high ground on Staten Island, they saw flags were up—the agreed signal that the British fleet was in sight. By the time Washington sat down to write a dispatch to the President of Congress forty-five ships had come in; when an express arrived from the lower bay about 2 P.M., he reported that almost one hundred rigged vessels had arrived and had anchored in the Hook. Washington called a council to review plans for defence; and he wrote briefly and grimly to Hancock without any attempt at literary finish or rhetorical flourish: “I am hopeful before [the British] are prepared to attack that I shall get some reenforcements, but be that as it may, I shall attempt to make the best disposition I can for our troops, in order to give them a proper reception, and to prevent the ruin and destruction they are meditating against us.” There was no blinking the desperate task ahead of him and no disposition to ignore the possibility that the enemy’s men-of-war might slip past the batteries on the shores of the North River and pass upstream to a junction with Burgoyne.

  Preparation at New York was hampered by the shortage of senior officers. Now that Thomas had died and Gates had followed Lee away from Headquarters that were the Colonies’ one military training school, Washington had a single Major General at New York, “Old Put.” Washington also was encumbered by a mass of paper work he could not pass on readily to the inexperienced men who had joined his small staff. The American force at Washington’s command was being increased slowly, and some days scarcely at all, by the militia for whom Washington continued to call urgently. The term of the rifle companies was expiring; few of these men were willing to reenlist. Then, as the militia of Massachusetts seemed loath to assemble and start a march for the relief of New York, Washington had to arrange for the transfer of three of the five regiments of Continental troops he had left in the Bay Colony. The exposed situation in Jersey made him all the more anxious to see Congress organize the Flying Camp that had been authorized. He had to get Martha started homeward, because New York under threat of attack was no place for her, and he had as much vexation and anxiety as he would permit himself concerning developments in northern New York.


  Sullivan had reached Crown Point with all his troops except six hundred whom he had left to assist the armed vessels on Lake Champlain. He was somewhat apologetic; but he was in better spirits and felt as strongly as ever ambition to command. Within a few days he learned that Gates had been sent north to take charge of operations, and he blazed with resentment. He asked Schuyler to permit him to leave the department, with the intimation that he would resign. Schuyler, smoothing him down, gave permission for him to go to see Washington; but Schuyler himself was engaged in controversy with Gates over their respective authority. Schuyler maintained that Gates had no control of the northern troops except in Canada; Gates contended that he had command of the little army wherever it was. Both men displayed candor and good temper, but neither yielded anything to the other. Washington read with regret of their clash and referred it to Congress with a request for prompt decision. With a veritable palisade of British masts down the harbor, Washington felt he could best leave such a dispute to the gentlemen in Philadelphia.

  The movements of the British fleet indicated that Howe was about to attack one part or another of the district around New York. On July 1 many vessels raised sail, came closer to The Narrows and anchored off Gravesend, Long Island. Washington sent five hundred men to strengthen the force stationed there under Nathanael Greene. The next day some of the British men-of-war were within eight hundred yards of Long Island; before nightfall approximately fifty-five had maneuvered close to Staten Island and anchored. A heavy British landing on Staten Island, July 3, deepened concern; but when the enemy began throwing up works there, July 5, Washington concluded that his adversaries had no more serious immediate design than to make themselves masters of the island, a stronghold of Tory feeling. Other information suggested that the British might be planning an advance in Jersey simultaneously with an attack on New York by another column, which would have the support of the fleet. This operation, it was thought, the British would not undertake prior to the arrival of Gen. William Howe’s brother, Richard, Admiral Viscount Howe, newly appointed to the command of the North American Station. Prediction was that he soon would reach Sandy Hook with 150 sail and more troops.

  Washington a year before had held at Cambridge his first council of war. Incredibly, in the twelve months that had elapsed, he had fought no battle. Not once had lines been drawn where Americans and British exchanged volleys. Washington had demonstrated that he could organize, train, discipline and administer an army. By complete devotion to duty, justice to his men, moderation of judgment and unchallengeable integrity he had become the symbol of what the best of the Americans wished their cause to represent. But the stubborn fact remained: he had fame without fight. Now it would be different. It had to be; Howe, not he, had the initiative. Washington and the Army had to meet the test of battle—and meet it now with the assurance that if they failed, nobody would plead for mercy on devoted, if errant subjects of the King. The Delegates in Philadelphia had renounced that allegiance. On the evening of the fourth, the rumor spread that the Congress in Philadelphia had declared the Colonies independent. It was not until July 9 that official notice was at hand for Washington to include the intelligence in General Orders:

  The Hon. The Continental Congress, impelled by the dictates of duty, policy and necessity, having been pleased to dissolve the Connection which subsisted between this Country, and Great Britain, and to declare the United Colonies of North America, free and independent States. . . .

  There was a report on the tenth that British regulars in large number were drawn up at the Staten Island ferry. Before Washington could be certain whether this forecast an incursion of the Jersey shore, he had alarming proof that Howe was preparing for the long-dreaded move to open the Hudson to the British. On the afternoon of July 12, the forty-gun Phoenix and the Rose, twenty guns, with the accompanying schooner Tryal and two tenders, were seen to move towards North River. The alarm was sounded; within twenty-five minutes the vessels were close enough to the town for the American batteries on both shores to open. In comparison with the days of stinted artillery fire at Boston, there was a veritable avalanche of round shots and even a few shells; but few of these projectiles hulled the British oak. In a short time the two men-of-war, the schooner and the tenders were up the river, almost intact, and ere long were casting anchor in the Tappan Sea. The vessels, in the judgment of the American commander, were to be employed to stop the shipment of supplies between New York and Albany by land as well as by water or the crews were to put arms ashore for the Tories of the region. Washington was prompt to urge vigilant defence of the highland passes, and he was relieved to hear from the Commissary General that interruption of the flow of supplies would not hamper operations in northern New York. Sufficient food was stored there, Washington was told, to provide for ten thousand men over a period of four months.

  One serious aspect of this affair of the Phoenix and the Rose was the misbehavior of many American soldiers, who, at the sounding of the alarm, should have hurried to their posts. They did almost everything except that. Not more than half the artillerists even went to the guns. Hundreds of the troops appeared to forget their duty in watching the race of the ships up the stream. “Such unsoldierly conduct,” Washington said the next day in General Orders, “must grieve every good officer, and give the enemy a mean opinion of the Army, as nothing shows the brave and good soldier more than in case of alarms, coolly and calmly repairing to his post and there waiting his orders, whereas a weak curiosity at such a time makes a man look mean and contemptible.”

  While the ill-disciplined American troops were running up the east bank of the Hudson something potentially more serious was happening in the lower harbor: a tall ship flying St. George’s flag at her fore topmast head was making her way to anchorage. Experienced seafaring men identified her as the Eagle and knew from the position of her flag that she had a vice admiral aboard. Vice Admiral Lord Howe had arrived; behind him would come transports and escorts that were supposed to number 150 sail, with a reenforcement of fifteen thousand men.

  This was a prospect of adverse odds for the American commander of Continentals and militia who did not reach a higher aggregate than that of the hostile reenforcement. To strengthen the small American force, New England was to be stripped of Continentals who were to be brought to the mouth of the Hudson or were to be sent to Gates as soon as they were free of smallpox. Indians were to be enlisted; artillerymen were to be recruited; troops already in service were to receive the bounty of ten dollars, if they, like the recruits, enlisted for three years; further militia drafts were to be expected.

  Suddenly there was an entirely new development. On the afternoon of July 12 a messenger brought word that a British naval officer had come up the harbor with a flag of truce and a letter which he desired to deliver to Washington. Some intimation was given that the paper might not be addressed acceptably, for which reason Washington immediately called into council the Generals close at hand. They agreed with him that he should give safe conduct to any officer who brought an official message to him as American commander but that he should not receive any communication that did not recognize his position as head of an organized force. Reed met the British officer and found the letter was addressed: “George Washington, Esq.”

  “You are sensible, sir,” Reed said, “of the rank of General Washington in our Army.”

  “Yes, sir, we are,” replied Lieutenant Brown of the Eagle, “I am sure Lord Howe will lament exceedingly this affair, as the letter is quite of a civil nature and not a military one. He laments exceedingly that he was not here a little sooner.”

  That ended it, except as the Americans wondered whether the final remark of the British officer meant that Lord Howe regretted he had not reached New York before the Declaration of Independence.

  Washington decided he should submit his action for the approval of Congress, and he wrote at once for further instruction. Evidently, Lord Howe wished to negotiate and, while endeavoring to do so, might not str
ike a blow. This judgment was confirmed on July 16 by the tender, again declined, of a letter to “George Washington, Esq., &ca, &ca.” On the seventeenth there came a third flag with an inquiry whether His Excellency, General Washington, would receive the Adjutant General of General Howe. Immediate assurance of the American commander’s willingness to do this was given, with the result that an appointment for noon on the twentieth was made.

  Washington dressed for the occasion with much care. The visitor proved to be Lieut. Col. James Patterson, a suave and experienced officer. Colonel Patterson proceeded to explain that Lord Howe and his brother the General had large powers as the King’s commissioners to settle the unhappy differences with America. Patterson wished his visit to be considered as the first advances to that end. Washington was prepared for this approach, which he met with the statement that he had no authority to treat on that subject. He added in plain words that he thought the Howe brothers were empowered only to grant written pardons. These papers, said the General, were not desired by Americans who felt they had committed no fault but were defending their indisputable rights. This discouraged Colonel Patterson who then brought the conversation to the exchange of specific prisoners.

  Definite encouragement was found in news received a few hours after Patterson’s departure to the effect that Charles Lee and the South Carolinians had beaten off Sir Henry Clinton’s attack on Charleston. Along the front for which Washington was responsible, everything indicated a desperate contest of doubtful issue as soon as ships brought the final contingent of Howe’s army. In Washington’s own Army, hot weather and bad water were causing much sickness; desertion was on the increase. Provincial jealousies showed themselves ominously.