Washington

by Douglas Southall Freeman

  This fixed the fate of New York. Establishment of the British line across the island put an end to the orderly evacuation of supplies by land, precisely as all water transit had been stopped early that morning by the dispatch of three British warships to Bloomingdale. The defeat was as grievous in loss of property as it was shameful in the cowardice it uncovered. There never had been a more outrageous affair and seldom so complete a British victory for so small an expenditure of blood and bullets. The action at Kip’s Bay was no more than a skirmish in itself, but it was of high importance in that it precipitated the evacuation of New York and deepened the anxiety of Washington over the morale of his soldiers and the competence of some of his commanders.

  During the early morning of September 16 the General sent out reconnoitering parties and then he sat down to report to Congress on the humiliating events of the preceding day. He had not completed the drafting of his letter many minutes when word reached him that the enemy was astir. If there was even a possibility of an engagement that day, Washington wanted to be on the scene before action opened in order that he might guard against surprise and make proper disposition of his regiments. He soon set out and on his arrival at the advance posts heard firing to the south, occasioned by a clash between Lt. Col. Thomas Knowlton’s Rangers and a British advance party. The exchange was not in a volume to indicate anything more than a skirmish. Washington listened and prepared to receive attack, but he had no further report of a general advance by the main body of the British. Some time passed. Then a number of Knowlton’s men began to climb back up the hill to their own positions, where they gave encouraging news of a stiff encounter still in progress with a body of Redcoats who were concealed in a wood. Joseph Reed assured his chief that Knowlton’s men had done admirably and deserved support. Would the General approve an advance in some strength to encourage the men? As Washington pondered the British came in sight and sounded their bugles—not with a command to halt or deploy but with the call of hunters who have killed the fox and are ending their chase.

  Whether or not this taunt angered him, Washington presently gave orders for a small demonstration directly in the enemy’s front. Knowlton simultaneously was to take his men and three rifle companies of Gen. George Weedon’s Third Virginia Regiment to get in rear of these contemptuous British. Washington saw the men start from the left of the line and made ready from Gen. John Nixon’s Brigade the force that was to demonstrate in front of the British. In the early afternoon Nixon’s men were sent down into the wide declivity that separated the northern part of Harlem Heights from Vandewater’s Heights, the next high ground to the south. The British, regarding this as a challenge, came down from Vandewater’s Heights and took position behind a fence and among bushes. Fire was opened at once but at too great a range to be effective.

  Soon there came to Washington’s ears the sound of an exchange of musketry from the left front, but manifestly this fusillade was not from the rear of the British who had advanced to the fence. Something had gone awry: Instead of getting behind the enemy to cut off his retreat, Knowlton’s men had attacked the enemy’s right flank. Washington heard shortly that Maj. Andrew Leitch had been brought out with three bullets through his body. After him came Colonel Knowlton, mortally wounded. Washington concluded that the flanking column, now fighting under captains, needed further support and dispatched parts of two Maryland regiments and some New Englanders. Within a few minutes the enemy’s advance party was gone, ingloriously gone. American troops had not previously seen the enemy “on the run” and could not resist the temptation to pursue; but Washington reasoned that the British would send up reenforcements and did not think his shaken Army should risk a general engagement. He ordered the men to cease their pursuit and return to their lines.

  The Americans had forced British troops to flee before them in the open field. That never had happened before. The British had retreated from Lexington and from Concord, but they had intended to return to Boston anyway. They had quit that city the next March, but they had not been worsted in a stand-up battle. The victory won by Lee in South Carolina had been an affair of naval guns. Long Island and Kip’s Bay were subjects too sore for mention. This time it was different: The Americans had proved that the British army was not invincible. Redcoats had backs! It was a great discovery. Washington was pleased but cautious. “The affair,” he said to Congress, “. . . seems to have greatly inspirited the whole of our troops.”

  CHAPTER / 11

  Washington promptly extended his new lines across the upper end of Harlem Heights from North River to Harlem River, and he soon felt that if the men would fight, the defences would make any success costly to the British whom he expected to advance at an early date. A great fire that destroyed about a fourth of New York City on September 20-21 seemed to Washington to be an instance in which, as he later wrote Lund, “Providence, or some good honest fellow, has done more for us than we were disposed to do for ourselves,” but he had to admit regretfully that “enough of [the city] remains to answer” the purposes of the British. The conflagration was followed on the twenty-third by the easy British occupation of Powles Hook. Thereafter, one or two suspicious movements convinced Washington the British would attack during the remaining weeks of open weather.

  Vigilance and discipline and leadership and almost everything else that went into the making of an army were threatened with ruin. The militia continued to disappear in such numbers that Washington despaired of getting from them a service that justified their pay. These militia were being replaced, and they represented slight numerical net loss; but they escaped with so little punishment for their contempt of discipline that many Continental troops followed their evil example. Washington had to issue successive General Orders against straggling, plundering, cowardice, malingering and desertion. He tried to be fair to the temporary soldiers, but his experience with their undependability had led him to believe that the Army must be reorganized on a basis of long enlistment under sterner articles of war. This was now absolute necessity and it called for attractive bounties of money and of land. Congress had been talking of long-term service and it acceded to most of Washington’s requests. The Delegates passed a series of resolutions for the enlistment of eighty-eight battalions, by quotas among the several States, “to serve during the present war.” Battalions already in service were to be counted in the total if they were recruited for the duration of hostilities. Every private and NCO who enlisted for that service was to receive twenty dollars and one hundred acres of land. Officers were to be commissioned by Congress, but “the appointment of all officers, and filling up vacancies (except general officers) [was to] be left to the governments of the several States.” Arms and other necessities were to be supplied by the States; clothing was to be charged against the pay of the soldier. New articles of war were adopted for the maintenance of better discipline and the firm establishment of justice to the individual soldier.

  This, in Washington’s opinion, was good as far as it went, but it did not go far enough. The bounty was too small to attract recruits in competition with higher British offers; nothing was done to encourage good officers to remain in the service or assure the appointment of leaders of station and intelligence. Elbridge Gerry, Roger Sherman and Francis Lewis, who were named by Congress to visit Washington’s camp, arrived there about September 25 and held numerous conferences in which Washington and his Generals disclosed frankly what they had not thought proper to put into official correspondence with Congress—that the corps of officers was unworthy of the country, lacking in competence, and in large measure responsible for poor discipline. Privately, Washington affirmed that even his Continental troops “never had officers, except in a few instances, worth the bread they eat”; officially he was “sensible that the very existence, that the well doing of every army depends upon good officers.” When the three Congressmen went back to Philadelphia a mildly phrased committee report was seconded by the most desperate letter Washington had addressed to the Presi
dent of Congress. He pleaded for the utmost speed in procuring action by the States on the names of new officers; he insisted on the clothing bounty for soldiers; and he argued almost vehemently for a scale of pay that would make it possible for officers to support their character as gentlemen. His conclusion was startling: “. . . such a cloud of perplexing circumstances appears before me without one flattering hope that I am thoroughly convinced unless the most vigorous and decisive exertions are immediately adopted to remedy these evils, that the certain and absolute loss of our liberties will be the inevitable consequences. . . .” One unhappy stroke, he added, would “throw a powerful weight into the scale against us.”

  This language from a trusted leader was decisive with Congress. Members voted a clothing bounty. Officers’ pay was increased. The States were urged to complete their levies of new troops by November 10 and to officer them with “men of honor and known abilities.” As far as they went, these moves gratified Washington, but a measure simultaneously adopted by Congress alarmed him. This was a call on the States that had Continental regiments in New York or in Pennsylvania to send committees to the Army “to appoint all the officers of the Regiment to be raised by their States under the new establishment.” This was to be done in order that the officers of the new regiments might “proceed immediately to enlist such men as are now in the service, and incline to reenlist during the war.” Washington saw what Congress apparently had overlooked: Until the committees arrived and chose the officers, there could be no recruiting for the new regiments.

  In the memory of his sleepless nights of December 1775, he could not be otherwise than apprehensive as December 1776 approached with the same problem of organization, but as he looked to the future he had faith in the potentialities of the American soldier. He devoted himself vigorously to the execution of the plan for long enlistment. He wrote those Governors whom he knew well and exhorted them to see that qualified officers were chosen for the new battalions. In addressing Patrick Henry, the General tactfully asked for care in the selection of officers to head the Virginia troops: “The true criterion . . . is . . . a just pretention to the character of a gentleman, a proper sense of honor, and some reputation to lose.” Washington did not want this vital requirement to wait on words. In a knowledge that the state commissioners were instructed by Congress to “advise with the general officers,” Washington instructed some of his principal subordinates to prepare lists of the competent officers in their commands.

  There he had for the time to leave it. Discipline and morale were no better; the commanding General’s barge was hit in North River and three men were killed by a careless mistake; several members of Washingon’s staff were restive; Reed was pessimistic and soon was to ask that he be replaced. The most disquieting failure in staff work was that of Quartermaster General Stephen Moylan. In spite of his devotion to the American cause, Moylan could not handle acceptably the business of procuring teams, tents, and other equipment of the Army. He confessed his failure and accepted advice that he resign. This made way for the reappointment of Thomas Mifflin at the continuing rank of Brigadier; but with the best of fortune, Mifflin could not hope soon to find and buy the clothing and blankets on which the life of the Army in large measure depended during the winter. As a result of the increase in duties without improvement in his staff, Washington was overloaded. He divested himself, as far as he could, of responsibility for naval affairs and he reduced or eliminated his detailed reports to Governors and Legislatures; but he took in hand much of the correspondence regarding a general exchange of prisoners and at times, it would seem, he deliberately turned to letter writing as if he wished to keep his mind from bootless reflection on problems he could not solve.

  Overwork, strain and the endless vexations of command brought Washington lower in spirits than he had been at any time during the war. At the end of a long review of his desperate situation, he told Congress: “. . . the difficulties which have forever surrounded me since I have been in the service, and kept my mind constantly upon the stretch; the wounds which my feelings as an officer have received by a thousand things which have happened, contrary to my expectations and wishes; the effect of my own conduct, and present appearance of things, so little pleasing to myself, as to render it a matter of no great surprise (to me) if I should stand capitally censured by Congress; added to a consciousness of my inability to govern an army composed of such discordant parts, and under such a variety of intricate and perplexing circumstances; induces not only a belief, but a thorough conviction in my mind that it will be impossible unless there is a thorough change in our military systems for me to conduct matters in such a manner as to give satisfaction to the public which is all the recompence I aim at, or ever wished for.”

  An enemy who had remained quiescent during critical days now was bestirring himself where it had been assumed he would. A British force embarking at the scene of the panic of September 15 could leave the transports at Throg’s Point and, marching less than nine miles to the northwest, not only would reach King’s Bridge, but also turn that position, force the evacuation of Harlem Heights, and isolate Fort Washington, the main American land defence against the free passage of the lower Hudson. Nature thus dictated strategy that was not the less effective because it was elementary and obvious. Howe adopted it in the knowledge that it might save him from having to storm the works on Harlem Heights and would put him where he could cut the shortest line of Washington’s land communications between New York and the lower Connecticut towns. On October 9 a squadron of three ships with their tenders passed the obstructions in North River, defied the land batteries and ran up as far, Washington guessed, as Tarrytown, where they could stop river shipment of supplies to Washington from Albany. On the morning of the twelfth, flatboats and small vessels brought ashore at Throg’s Point a strong force that had been embarked the previous night at Kip’s Bay and conveyed successfully through Hell Gate in a thick fog. The landing was unopposed, but the news was transmitted quickly to Headquarters. Washington believed he held defensible ground between the Neck and King’s Bridge. It was a district of stone fences that would confine artillery and large bodies of infantry to the main roads. Washington’s reconnaissance was encouraging; he found the men apparently in good spirits; Greene, commanding at Fort Constitution, offered, without so much as a hint from Headquarters, to bring three brigades to help his chief.

  The next day, Washington gave instructions for vigilance and for stronger guards on the lines of probable advance from Throg’s Neck. Then, as the enemy remained immobile, Washington made another reconnaissance on the fourteenth and reassigned part of his forces in order to put the best troops under the most experienced commanders and place militia where they would do least harm. Washington designated Israel Putnam and Spencer to supervise strengthening of the fortifications and assigned Heath to command south of King’s Bridge, where an attack seemed least probable.

  The most conspicuous aspect of reorganization was the return of Charles Lee to command. Lee had come to Philadelphia after his victory in Charleston harbor and had received a triumphant welcome. Ill as was his temper, his knowledge was needed where Washington did not have to count five in order to list his general officers of intelligence, promptness, decision and courage. Greene met most of the qualifications, but he was across the Hudson at Fort Constitution. Sullivan might be disciplined to full efficacy. He was on active duty again, an exchanged prisoner of war, and was assigned a division. Stirling likewise had been exchanged and was in command of a brigade. Brigadier Thompson, captured at Three Rivers, had been brought to New Jersey but had not yet been liberated. The new Major General of Massachusetts Militia, Benjamin Lincoln, who had just arrived, was showing unusual promise but still was to be tested. Eagerly, Washington received Lee and placed under him the troops above King’s Bridge.

  Washington concluded that it was possible to hold Fort Washington and not only protect the navigation of the Hudson but also establish near the fort “an easier and better
communication” between the northern and southern States. Now he had to review that conclusion: The British repeatedly had run their warships past Fort Washington and over or through the obstructions in North River. This meant that they could send a squadron up the Hudson and land troops in rear of the American Army. Simultaneously, the enemy could move westward from Throg’s Point and turn the flank of Washington’s unhappy regiments. The danger was that the jaws of the trap would be closed suddenly. American forces might be compelled to fight when and where the enemy pleased or might be cut off and starved into surrender.

  Washington read to his council of war on the sixteenth reports of Tory stirrings upstate and of deserters’ predictions of early attack. He asked whether the Army could hold its position and prevent a severance of communication. The answer of the Generals, with the exception of George Clinton, was that the Army could not keep communications open and that new positions had to be occupied. This involved the removal northward of troops in the works on Harlem Heights, because the Army could not afford to remain divided by Harlem River. Must Fort Washington be evacuated also? That earthwork was slightly more than two miles south of King’s Bridge and was considered strong. If Fort Washington were garrisoned by courageous troops with a competent leader, it would occupy the attention of a considerable British force and would make General Howe cautious in movements of men and supplies. Council advised Washington to hold the fort as long as possible.

  The test of the first of the council’s conclusions appeared to be near. Four miles north of Throg’s Neck on the coast of Long Island Sound was a better landing-place, Pell’s Point, east of Hutchinson’s River and within easy striking distance of the road from Connecticut to King’s Bridge. On the eighteenth British troops were ferried to Pell’s Point and disembarked there; those on Throg’s Neck then were moved to a junction with the men who had been landed at Pell’s Point. Washington had placed in that quarter about 750 well-schooled troops under Col. John Glover, acting Brigadier. That officer fell back gradually. At the end of the day the British were well secured on a front of about two miles and a half.