Washington

by Douglas Southall Freeman

  News that came to American Headquarters in early June indicated that this plan, or a second best, had to be put into operation with the least possible delay. The situation in Virginia had become desperate. Cornwallis was known to have formed junction at Petersburg on May 20 with Phillips’s troops, who now were under Arnold; additional British transports had arrived in the Chesapeake; Joseph Jones sent warning that disaster might weaken resistance. Lafayette must avoid action until he was reenforced or Greene could take some of the pressure from him.

  Help must be given Lafayette. Congress immediately authorized requests for 4200 three-months’ militia from Pennsylvania, Delaware and Maryland. Washington did not fail to make it plain that if Virginia was overrun, the enemy soon would be north of the Potomac. The reorganized Pennsylvania Line, which included numerous veterans, must be started from York and pushed to Lafayette by steady marches.

  While these hurried measures for the relief of imperilled Virginia were still in their first stage, Washington learned that Admiral Barras disapproved the suggestion made at Wethersfield for the removal of the French fleet to Boston after Rochambeau left Rhode Island for the Hudson with the greater part of the French infantry. Besides, the French now wanted one thousand militia, not the agreed half that number, for the protection of the Newport anchorage and the stores. Washington had to ask Massachusetts and Rhode Island for five hundred each to serve with the four hundred French whom Rochambeau intended to leave there, an arrangement that was not effected otherwise than with some muttering by the state authorities. The American commander renewed his appeal to Rochambeau for the earliest possible advance of the French infantry to the vicinity of New York. He had to resist pleas that he go to Virginia and assume personal direction there. Washington needed to remain where he was and carry the heaviest of a soldier’s responsibility, that of sound decision. “. . . we must not despair,” he wrote John Mathews, “the game is yet in our hands; to play it well is all we have to do, and I trust the experience of error will enable us to act better in future.” Washington added: “A cloud may yet pass over us; individuals may be ruined; and the country at large, or particular States, undergo temporary distress; but certain I am that it is in our power to bring the war to a happy conclusion.”

  Behind this now was more than hope. “Peace talk” was in the air. Washington listened but did not believe that a general treaty would be signed within a year. Then, in the last week in May, he had this intelligence from Laurens, who wrote at Passy, March 24: “The naval dispositions were made before my arrival; five ships of the line for the East Indies with troops; twenty, commanded by de Grasse, for the West Indies, twelve of which are to proceed to America. They will probably arrive on our coast in July. We have no news yet of their departure.” Washington so often had been given false news by men who believed it true that his impulse was to doubt, but daily the evidence accumulated until, at length, on June 13, confirmation came. A dispatch from Rochambeau, covered one in which de Grasse stated that he was bringing the French fleet to the coast of North America for a limited time about July 15. Washington’s mind ran ahead to what might be accomplished then. Rochambeau must be urged to appeal for the use of the troops that accompanied the Admiral. If they were made available, then the failure of the States to supply their quotas would not be fatal; and if the men-of-war under de Grasse were added to those of Barras and the total exceeded . . . but Rochambeau must be reminded at once: “Your Excellency will be pleased to recollect that New York was looked upon by us as the only practicable object under present circumstances; but should we be able to secure a naval superiority, we may perhaps find others more practicable and equally advisable.”

  What could be undertaken after de Grasse’s arrival depended on the solution of a complicated equation of at least five factors—the margin of superiority the Admiral would possess, the duration of his stay in American waters, the number of troops he brought with him, the reenforcement of the British meantime, and the successful activity of the States to make the Continentals numerically effective and mobile. These were contingencies so involved and uncertain that while Washington canvassed many possible combinations, he concluded the most practicable course was to hold for the time being to the Wethersfield plan: he would bring Rochambeau’s troops to New York to take the first steps in the investment of that city while he did his utmost to build up the American Army. De Grasse would decide where the French fleet should operate; the allied land forces must be ready to conform and, if need be, to shift the scene of operations.

  Washington concluded that the movement of Rochambeau’s troops to New York might present a chance for double surprise of the enemy at night. If Continentals could be brought down the Hudson and thrown against the outer defences of Manhattan Island at the time Rochambeau arrived from the east, advantage might be gained that could be exploited later. Washington decided to make the effort and personally supervised most of the preparations. Painstakingly he tried to make certain that he effected what he had failed at Germantown, the simultaneous convergence of columns that used different routes. When the moves were made, nothing went even decently well. Almost before a blow could be struck, the advantage of surprise was lost, and nearly all the British outposts were withdrawn over Harlem River to positions the allies could not assail. Nothing was gained beyond a good opportunity of close reconnaissance; the failure of the operation in every other particular was complete.

  To Washington, as always, the lesson was, Remember the reasons for failure—and try again! He moved to a position near Dobbs Ferry, with the French infantry on his left and their cavalry still farther eastward, and he carefully took time for ceremonial visits to Rochambeau’s Headquarters. The enemy remained obligingly lazy in New York and produced nothing more in the way of news than that Arbuthnot had turned over the naval command to Admiral Thomas Graves on July 4. Washington continued his struggle to procure bread and meat for his men with some prospect of finding enough to keep them alive, but recruitment by the States lagged so wretchedly that he had only 5835 Continental rank and file in mid-July. A humiliating plight this was, especially as he had told Rochambeau that he hoped to have 10,250 troops available for the operations against New York. He and the French commander continued their reconnaissances, as if preparing for action, and on July 22/23 they made a demonstration in front of King’s Bridge and near Morrisania.

  Startling changes were reported to Washington from Virginia. Cornwallis and his restless cavalry commanders, Banastre Tarleton and John Simcoe, had been tramping and galloping as if trying to make up for the long siesta of Clinton. Tarleton had led five hundred men half across the state to a magazine in Charlottesville. Simcoe drove Steuben and 550 recruits across James River at Point of Fork. Apparently, Cornwallis’s maneuvers were designed to destroy arms and manufactories, entrap Lafayette, if possible, and, at the least, prevent the junction of the Marquis’s force with Wayne’s part of the reorganized Pennsylvania Line, which was moving south. Lafayette played hide-and-seek with the British in frank admission that “we cannot afford losing”; and after Cornwallis left Richmond June 20 and started toward Williamsburg, the Frenchman acted as if he were pursuing a defeated foe. On the twenty-sixth he had the temerity to assail Simcoe’s Rangers. Lafayette was repulsed with the loss of at least eighteen Continentals; but when Simcoe counterattacked he had to pull back.

  Cornwallis remained at Williamsburg, too strong to be attacked by Lafayette; but it was one thing to have the British commander marching unchallenged through Virginia and quite a different matter to have him halfway down the Peninsula where he was watched by the Marquis and might be assailed readily if de Grasse came to Virginia waters with the transports of a powerful fleet. Washington’s prudent order to Lafayette was that he concentrate his forces and await the arrival of a confidential messenger, when one could be found to carry him information “of very great importance.” The next report Washington had of the Marquis was that he had been defeated July 6 at Green Spring. Casualties o
f at least 139 did not spoil Lafayette’s usual good luck; after the engagement Cornwallis crossed the James and marched for Portsmouth as if he were in retreat.

  Greene had not called on the reenforcements Washington had directed to him because he had hoped that if Lafayette retained these men, the Marquis would be able to avoid a “capital misfortune.” Greene continued to feel concern over the superiority of the enemy’s mounted forces, but with his little “army” he had maneuvered the British from all their positions in Georgia, outside Savannah, and from most of South Carolina. These were strokes that Washington praised warmly and gratefully. The most likely move of the British was for Cornwallis to establish himself strongly at Portsmouth, as Washington saw it now, and then to reenforce New York with part of his troops and Charleston with the remainder. Should an operation against the lower Hudson prove impracticable, even with de Grasse’s help, and the enemy still remain in Virginia, the campaign should be transferred to that state. Tactical dispositions in the Old Dominion seemed to be favorable, and Greene wrote confidently that an adequate force could dispose of Cornwallis in three weeks. The possibility of a laborious shift of scene appeared to Washington sufficiently real to prompt him to urge that Barras keep the French transports off Rhode Island in condition to sail on short notice.

  MAP / 14

  THE MARCH TO YORKTOWN

  AND THE BATTLE OF THE CHESAPEAKE CAPES

  Washington thought the chances of success in North River were dwindling so fast that he scarcely was justified in pursuing his plans there; but as he could not hasten by a single hour the arrival of de Grasse’s fleet, he was in the difficult situation where he neither could abandon the enterprise against New York nor delay much longer the arrangements for a move south. He had simultaneously to be asking himself how he could get forage and wheat and wagonage and much besides when he had no means of paying for anything. Collapse had come in May and by the middle of July had reached the stage where hard money alone was used in the market. This perplexity was brought to Washington’s own marquee by a visit from the Superintendent of Finance on August 11. By direction of Congress, Robert Morris and Richard Peters of the Board of War came to confer with Washington on the ironical question of providing an Army for 1782—though scarcely more than 50 per cent of the forces authorized for 1781 had yet been assembled. Washington undertook preparation of a paper to show why no reduction in the military establishment could safely be planned. Logically, this was not a difficult task; practically, it was hard to think clearly of what might or might not be required because every day’s dispatches made plain the all-absorbing fact that bleak defeat or shining victory was close at hand.

  The great, the long-awaited news arrived on August 14: Barras wrote that de Grasse was coming to the Chesapeake, not to New York, and that the Admiral had twenty-nine warships with more than three thousand troops! No such intelligence as this had been received since that glorious April 30, 1778, had brought news of the French alliance. As always, there were shadows. One of them was a warning that de Grasse could not remain later than October 15. Another was a hint by Barras that he might undertake operations with his squadron against British shipping off Newfoundland, a diversion that must be prevented if possible. The length of de Grasse’s service was much too brief unless plans for the early siege of New York were abandoned and all energies devoted to transferring Rocham-beau’s army to Virginia, along with all American forces not imperative for the protection of West Point. New York City remained the great strategical prize, but it must be left for another campaign.

  Washington started immediately his preparations. He decided that approximately 2500 men would be the maximum number he could afford to send from his own Army, along with the whole of the French, and he proceeded to select the troops who were to go. Choice of aggressive and competent command for this detachment was the next duty and a delicate one. As most of the troops named for the detachment were under Alexander McDougall, his chief thought it proper to offer him the command. When McDougall declined, Washington reverted to the rule of seniority and named Benjamin Lincoln, to the deep disappointment of Robert Howe and, in some measure, of Lafayette. In the light infantry, the command of Alexander Scammell was to be raised to its authorized strength of four hundred. A place in that expanded corps already had been found for Hamilton, whose stubborn pride Washington overlooked in careful justice to the brilliant New Yorker’s shining service. Lafayette was admonished to prevent the retreat of Cornwallis into Carolina, and was authorized to retain Wayne if that officer had not marched to join Greene.

  The lines of advance of the French and Americans were studied; a new appeal was to be made to the States for recruits to serve with the main Army and for militia to guard the defences of the Hudson. Rochambeau and Washington called on Barras to abandon his plan for an expedition to Newfoundland, and they succeeded in getting the Admiral’s promise to join de Grasse in the Chesapeake and protect vessels that were to carry the French siege artillery and the Americans’ reserve of “salted provisions.” If weather favored, Barras would sail on August 21 from Newport for Virginia. This decision was of the highest importance. With Barras’s squadron, de Grasse almost certainly would have a heavier broadside than the enemy could bring to bear. The guns and the rations from Rhode Island might make the difference between sure victory and possible failure on land.

  Washington kept clearly before him what Lafayette stated in simplest terms, “should a French fleet now come in Hampton Roads the British army would, I think, be ours”; but Washington stressed the provisos that de Grasse should arrive opportunely and that Cornwallis should not escape meantime. Cornwallis had gone to Yorktown. At that point on the Virginia Peninsula, Washington reasoned, the British commander was in a trap that could be sprung. He and Rochambeau drafted suggestions for the guidance of de Grasse in the situations the Admiral might find on arrival. Then they faced the hard question on which nearly everything else might depend: How was the greater part of the allied Army to leave its positions north of New York and proceed southward without being attacked while in motion? General Chastellux had suggested that when de Grasse approached Boston or Newport, which then was expected to be the Admiral’s port of call, the French force should advance into Jersey and remain there in a threatening position until the fleet took aboard the heavy guns and stores left in Rhode Island. Thereupon all the men-of-war should proceed to the Chesapeake and the entire Army move overland to Trenton and thence by water to Chester or New Castle. From that point the troops should tramp to Head of Elk and, reembarking, should go to Yorktown or some other landing close to the British. Washington and Rochambeau adopted this plan, or one very similar to it, and decided to develop the first phase as a ruse. Word was to be spread that de Grasse was expected hourly; the French and the American detachment intended for service in Virginia were to be moved to New Jersey, as if they were to assail Staten Island; inquiry was to be made for boats everywhere between Newark and Amboy; pontoons were to be paraded so that the dullest-witted Loyalist would guess they were intended to support a span between the mainland and the island; a bread oven built for the French at Chatham was to be mentioned as if it were the first of several to be constructed nearby. The hope was that spies would conclude that Rochambeau’s troops were to remain in Jersey for weeks.

  Washington surprisingly was able to begin his march by August 19. The first phase of the movement, though without material accident, was completed more slowly than Washington had hoped. He warned his officers that success might depend thereafter on speed. The British showed no curiosity as the Army crept south. Some activity was observed in Graves’s fleet; otherwise the enemy kept quiet, and the march continued until the twenty-seventh when reports of an increase in British force on Staten Island led Washington to halt for a day at Springfield and close the rear. When he wrote Congress that day, reporting his advance, he made no prediction, but in less formal correspondence he expressed confidence. “The moment is critical,” he said, “the opportunity
precious, the prospects most happily favorable.”

  That evening brought news of reenforcements to the British fleet off Sandy Hook. Had not this news of British naval reenforcement created a measure of suspense, September 30 would have been rewarding to Washington. He felt that it was possible to continue the ruse of an attack on Staten Island one day longer, and to bolster this artifice he hurried his Americans forward in three columns by separate routes. Washington waited for a short time at Trenton and then set out for Philadelphia with Rochambeau, Chastellux and their entourage. The approach of the cavalcade to the Quaker City was known long enough in advance for the City Guard to serve as escort. At the city, Washington did not permit events of the day to occupy his hours so completely that he had no time for the task of procuring transportation to Head of Elk. A prudent agreement provided that the troops should march all the way. Water transportation was to be employed only for the siege guns and the heavy stores. This would delay the march of the infantry, but it was the best arrangement that could be made.