Opium

by Martin Booth

The population consists of independent hill tribes for whom opium is a traditional part of everyday life. They are not indigenous to the region but migrated here from the southern Chinese coastal provinces in the latter half of the nineteenth century, bringing their opium habit with them. The main tribes are the Hmong (also known as the Meo, a derogatory name given them by the Chinese and used by European colonials) and the Yao who migrated to escape Chinese persecution: lesser tribes include the Lisu, Kachin and Lahu who settled on the Burma-Thailand border. Some of the tribes occupy hilltop villages, others leading semi-nomadic existences and cultivating opium in slash-and-burn jungle clearings. Opium poppy farming is the main livelihood of these tribes and, suitable land being at a premium, has caused considerable deforestation. In some areas, 90 per cent of cultivated land is devoted to poppies.

  Itinerant traders, often of Chinese origin, move through the villages, purchasing opium and selling trade goods, the opium subsequently sold to warlords and drug merchants. The main purchasers are, or have been, army units of the Kuomintang (KMT), the Nationalist Chinese losing side led by Chiang Kai-shek in the war against Mao Zedong in 1949, various ethnic rebel armies in particular bands from the northern Shan states of north-eastern Burma who have been trying since 1960 to secede from Burma, and Yunnanese-descended opium warlords who are, in essence, autarchic warlords with private armies to guard their trade routes and opium caravans. Nowadays, they command forces of several thousand well-trained and armed soldiers, often with their own uniforms.

  Just who rules in the Golden Triangle or any segment of it – or has done over the last three or four decades – is beyond firm definition. It is impossible to be succinct about the situation. Opium being the only main source of finance, the region has been, and remains, in a state of flux with different forces fighting to control the opium harvest, the opium highlands and to retain or gain military supremacy with different parties forming and breaking and reforming allegiances in a continual search for wealth and power.

  Being land-locked and remote, the region has no direct outlet to international drug markets so private armies are essential to escort the opium through the mountains and jungles to remote heroin factories in Burma, Thailand and Laos. There have been two primary routes along which the opium and heroin reached the outside world. One, by air from isolated airstrips in northern Laos to Saigon, was closed after the fall of Saigon in 1975: the other main route exists to this day and goes overland through Burma and Thailand to Bangkok, now the world’s chief heroin distribution centre.

  Opium has always been important to South-east Asia. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, government monopolies supplying a predominantly Chinese opium smoking population imported it by sea from India and by mule caravan from Yunnan, taxing the trade and thereby creating a black market, especially in Yunnanese opium. En route, the traders from Yunnan bought and sold the tiny domestic harvest raised by the hill tribes, promoting trade and creating a link between them and demand in the lowlands: some tribes inevitably began growing opium as a cash crop for the illegal market but their contribution was minuscule.

  Prior to the 1940s, French and British colonial government campaigns to halt poppy cultivation kept local production low and government revenue high for imports were taxed and addicts charged inflated prices. However, as the 1950s progressed and colonial power waned, outside influences came to the fore and greatly affected the regional narcotics trade. The moving force behind this was the fight against Communism.

  In order to check the spread of Communism in Asia, tribal headmen and warlords struck deals with the French intelligence services and, more especially, with the CIA. By associating themselves with local leaders, CIA operatives were also building links with the opium business for the two went unequivocally hand in hand. Furthermore, to keep the warlords in power, the CIA allowed them to maintain their opium dealing and even provided them with open access to American munitions and air transport to further their opium or heroin distribution. In short, the CIA became inextricably entangled with the Golden Triangle opium trade, handling opiate consignments, flying drug runs and tolerantly turning a blind eye to the affairs of their criminal allies.

  For those who served in the Vietnam War, or covered it as journalists, CIA involvement in the narcotics trade was suspected, if not publicly acknowledged: it was McCoy’s The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia which blew the whistle. The CIA went to great lengths to ban his book, claiming it was a threat to national security whilst it was really an embarrassing exposé of America’s obsession with and mismanagement of the Communist threat, and the ineffectuality of Cold War strategies.

  The background to CIA involvement is important to the understanding of how the present-day international heroin situation arose.

  As soon as the Japanese were defeated and left South-east Asia in 1945, opium imports started again, supplies coming from Iran and Yunnan. The number of addicts quickly rose but it was not long before their supplies were heavily curtailed. The Communist victory in China in 1949, and the subsequent banning of poppy growing and closure of the Chinese border, halted the Yunnan trade whilst the signing of the UN protocol in 1953, in which opium producing nations agreed not to sell on to the international market, further cut imports. The only answer seemed to lie in domestic production and this set off widespread poppy cultivation in the Golden Triangle.

  Anxious to dam the flood-tide of Communism arising from China’s change of political structure, in 1950 the CIA set in motion a number of covert operations along the Chinese border in the Golden Triangle area and purchased a local airline, Civil Air Transport (CAT). This had belonged to General Claire Chennault, the leader of the famous ‘Flying Tigers’ during the Second World War and had flown military cargoes over ‘The Hump’, the mountains of Indo-China, into Kunming and Chungking in support of the Allies and Chiang Kai-shek’s army. CAT was later renamed Air America, although there were those who nicknamed it Air Arlington (after the Arlington, Virginia, headquarters of the CIA) and, more pertinently, Air Opium.

  As they had done in the war, the aircraft continued to support the Nationalist Chinese cause by supplying and arming remnants of the KMT which had fled China to settle along the border in the Shan states. Within months of buying CAT, the CIA was parachuting in arms and ammunition with military advisers who trained the KMT survivors, along with some hill tribesmen, into a 12,000-strong guerrilla army with which it optimistically invaded southern China in 1951–2.

  These invasions unavoidably failing, the force then extended itself along the Burma-China border against anticipated Communist Chinese incursion. Then, in late 1952, it began to expand into the Shan states, soon becoming the only effective government in the remote region. This was fortuitous for the Shan states were the prime Burmese opium producing area: it was only a matter of time before the KMT started to trade in opium, financing themselves from the same source as they had been funded under Chiang Kai-shek in China. Members of the KMT have confirmed the instructions to deal in opium were personally made by Chiang Kai-shek with his son and eventual successor as president of Taiwan, General Chiang Ching-kuo, again ratifying it on the Generalissimo’s death in 1975.

  Equipped with the latest American arms and expertise, the KMT were able to dominate the local population. With characteristic Chinese entrepreneurialism, they levied general taxes to finance and increase their hold on the opium traffic, centralised the opium market and charged an annual opium duty to every poppy farmer. They also consolidated their infiltration of the hill tribes by marrying into them. With their hopes dashed of winning back China, they metamorphosed into a highly proficient opium militia. By 1962, they had transformed the Golden Triangle into the world’s single largest poppy growing area with opium production increasing drastically. UN statistics assessed Burmese annual output as rising from 40 tons in 1945 to 400 in 1962, Thai annual output from 7 to 100 tons and Laotian from 30 to between 100 and 150 tons per annum.

  From time to time, conflict f
lared up between Burmese forces and KMT troops. The latter considered the former a threat to their opium business whilst the Burmese were worried the KMT were inciting separatist tendencies in the historically volatile Shan states. In 1953, Burma protested to the UN and a number of KMT soldiers were flown out to Taiwan but nothing changed: the KMT were keen to retain control because of opium.

  This control was consolidated further because of the Burmese political scene. As a federation of states, tribes and races with no common language, religion or political centre, Burma was (and still is) hard to govern. The Shan states especially have always been difficult to govern from outside. Even the experienced British colonial authorities were essentially impotent, the tribes owing allegiance to feudal sawbwas, tribal chiefs who controlled every aspect of local life but especially commerce. Faced with such localised power bases, the British gave the sawbwas responsibility for internal Shan state affairs: by so doing, they set the seal on the future of the opium trade. It was placed beyond external law and became a major source of revenue for the sawbwas who levied their own tax upon it. In 1948, when Burma gained independence, these local rulers were cajoled into accepting a place in the new Union of Burma by being promised autonomy by secession in ten years. This assurance was reneged upon in 1958 when the prime minister, U-Nu, repealed the promise, thereby setting the scene for the growth of nationalist movements.

  The diversity of Burmese society has also had the country in turmoil for decades. The minority Kachins, Shans, Karens, Lahu, Wa, Mons and others have long been waging a guerrilla war against the central government. Furthermore the Burmans, who barely make up 50 per cent of the population, only hold 40 per cent of the area of the country, none of it opium growing land. Even if they wished to control opium, they could not: and the income from it furthers the separatist ambitions of the minorities.

  Most opium in Burma is grown along the Chinese border in Shan- and Kachin-controlled regions, with hardly a vehicular road cutting through impenetrable, mountainous jungle. The population has no other source of income other than opium which, since 1959, the various Shan separatists parties have used to obtain arms to fight the Burmese government and sometimes each other. The leading groups, amongst many others, have included the Kachin Independent Army (KIA), the Kachin Liberation Army (KLA), the Lahu National Liberation Army (LNLA), the Mon National State Army (MNSA), the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the Karen National Union (KNU), the Shan State Army (SSA), the Shan National Army (SNA), the Shan National United Front (SNUF) and the Shan United Army (SUA). To say the situation has been chaotic and anarchic is a gross understatement. The rebels have fought each other, forged treaties, broken them and reforged others on a frequent basis whilst still attacking the Burmese forces.

  In many respects, opium has been the underlying cause of Burmese upheaval but the official government too has never lost sight of its economic value. When, in 1964, it sought to become a world exporter in pharmaceutical provision, a UN mission concluded it could not endorse the proposal to allow controlled opium production. It was clear the Burmese were not in command of the country.

  By the end of the 1960s, the mission’s conclusion was further proven. The opium highlands were occupied by over 100 separate, capricious, armed groups. The fabric of society had collapsed with only the opium trade flourishing. To try and gain some control over – others would suggest gain a foothold in – the opium trade, the government had set up local militia groups, the Ka Kwei Yei (KKY), in 1963, to organise some aspects of the trade whilst at the same time fighting the rebels and undermining their financial base. All that happened was the situation was further confused. KKY troops saw the financial advantages of opium and several warlords were created from their ranks. In effect, all the government could do was allow the trade to continue because, even if they could not control or tax it, it was at least a huge national foreign currency earner.

  Originating as an internal matter, by the 1970s outside interests in the form of the KMT, the CIA and the government of Thailand were all concerned with the instability in the Shan states. The KMT were satisfied to be sending their opium collectors throughout the Shan states, unhindered by the Burmese, who were kept busy with the separatists, and the CIA was similarly content. The confusion provided cover for American intelligence gathering along and over the Chinese border. As Thailand was Burma’s traditional enemy, the Thais provided arms for the rebel bands, ensuring a buffer zone between the countries.

  Prior to the KMT’s move into Burma, some opium had been sent out through Thailand but the trade was insignificant. However, as the power of the KMT increased so too did the trade, with opium being transported by mule or light aircraft to Chiang Mai then freighted on to Bangkok with the connivance of Thai police, on occasion on CAT or Air America flights.

  Like Burma, Thailand regarded opium as a major, if illicit, export commodity. It had been an important part of the economy for over a century. As Siam, the country legalised opium in 1851, the Chinese population of Bangkok being keen customers: the King of Siam and later rulers became immensely rich on the revenues. When Thailand was occupied by the Japanese in the Second World War, the national army hid out in the Shan states where it was quick to establish contact with the local warlords and the KMT Nationalist Chinese army in Yunnan. When the war ended, the Thai government had in place not only a protective shield against Burma but all the contacts it needed in the opium trade which became a major source of military funding. For four decades, the Thai authorities assisted the opium traders of the Golden Triangle, took an informal tax on opium crossing into Thailand and used the proceeds to finance political aims and many a private income: it must be remembered corruption was, and to some extent still is, endemic throughout Indo-China.

  From the 1940s, the Thais increased their own poppy production and, with KMT-owned Burmese opium entering the country as well, it was not long before the capital, Bangkok, became an important opium distribution centre.

  The military rulers of Thailand, who came to power in a coup in 1947, survived on opium. It financed their take-over and bankrolled their armed forces, successive military administrations increasing their hold on the Thai economy including the trade in, and smuggling of, opium. General Phao, head of the CIA-equipped and -trained national police force, took personal control of the opium trade and, in exchange for CIA support, furthered KMT political aims, protecting their supply lines and opium business interests and establishing what is considered the Burma to Bangkok opium corridor. He consequently became one of the most powerful men in the country. By 1955, Phao’s police force was the largest, best organised trafficking syndicate in Thailand, pivotal to every aspect of the business. By now, Bangkok was the main centre for international opium trafficking in South-east Asia, with Thailand the world’s primary distribution hub. Phao’s power was not to last. Press exposure of police corruption in 1955 undermined his position and, after a coup two years later, he fled the country, a very rich man indeed.

  At first, the new Thai government seemed no better: it entered into the opium trade to swell the exchequer. Then, in 1959, opium use was forbidden with opium production and sale outlawed. This was all very well but, like the Burmese, the Thais had little control over the remote Golden Triangle and poppy farming continued.

  The ban caused a new development. Heroin began to appear. The Thai addict population rose from 71,000 opium smokers in 1959 to around 400,000 heroin addicts in 1976. Due to indigenous corruption, little effort was made to halt the trade or the transport of opiates through Thailand by the syndicates of Chinese who had come to operate it. Military commanders and government officials continued to cream off their cut and accepted protection money from the Chinese traffickers based in Bangkok. Despite the law, it was business as usual.

  The situation altered in 1961. Fed up with the KMT in the Shan states, the Burmese joined with the Communist Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and drove the KMT into Laos and Thailand where the Thais, having successfully concealed
their opium entanglements, classified the soldiers as civilian refugees. At the same time, the Taiwanese Nationalist Chinese government reduced the financial support it had given the KMT since 1949 which forced it to become even more reliant upon the opium business to survive.

  From northern Thailand, the KMT carried on sending buying missions into the Shan states, where their middlemen – Yunnanese traders – bought opium in exchange for everyday consumer goods. The opium was collected at a number of central rendezvous points then transported by armed mule trains into Thailand. The KMT trade increased and their hold grew not only on opium production in Burma but in northern Thailand where they took over from local officials who had left the opium trade after the 1959 ban.

  The mule trains were enormous with over 100 mules – on occasion as many as 600 – carrying up to 20 tons of raw opium protected by 300 heavily armed troops trained in jungle warfare. So efficient were the troops that Shan state rebel and private merchants’ mules sometimes travelled with them, paying for the service. Those who did not seek protection were charged a KMT levied import duty to enter Thailand.

  Despite such power, the KMT did not have it all their own way. There was a potential usurper in their midst. His name was Chan Chi-fu, sometimes given as Chan Shee Fu. He is best known today as Khun Sa: khun is a Shan word meaning ‘lord’ whilst Sa is the name of his stepfather, a Shan prince. In the usual way of Oriental names, it has an alternative interpretation for Sa may also mean wealthy: therefore Khun Sa can also mean Lord of Prosperity.

  At that time, Khun Sa was the only well organised, highly proficient warlord smuggler in the Shan states. Half Chinese and half Shan, he is descended from a Chinese Yunnanese merchant family although he has claimed descent from a noble Shan family. He was born in the Shan states in 1933 and joined the KMT at the age of eighteen when he was military trained and tutored in the finer points of the opium trade. At the age of thirty, he began trading in opium on his own, supported by his own unit of KKY members. Very carefully, he consolidated his power base, gained territory and earned the respect of local hill tribes. Aware of the difficulties of transporting bulky opium, he astutely set up a simple refinery turning out morphine bricks. Within three years, he commanded a private army of 2000 and was the most important opium warlord in the Shan states.