War Without Garlands: Operation Barbarossa 1941-1942
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Excesses committed by the Einsatzgruppen and other state-sponsored terror committed against Russian prisoners and civilians had a cumulative moral impact on German soldiers. Although orders were not overtly questioned, many became increasingly uncomfortable at the ‘justness’ of their cause. Complicity was variable and depended upon individual standards of human decency. More recent conflicts in Europe, notably the Balkans, reveal the extent to which complicity, viewed through nationalist, UN, NATO and political-ideological filters is not clear-cut. Vernichtungskrieg in Russia was becoming increasingly transparent.
A string of campaign setbacks created further unease. One had lived with the disappointment of the ‘half result at Dunkirk because it had been followed by the French Armistice. They were to be followed, however, by reverses at Leningrad, Rostov and finally the débâcle before Moscow. The totally unexpected Soviet counter-offensive crashed into an Ostheer, which saw the cream of its generals abruptly removed in the throes of a crisis. Faith in the Führer remained, but ‘those at the top’ had badly let the men down. The German General Staff, whatever the political pressure, was equally mesmerised by the ultimate prize to be had at Moscow. Its fall came to symbolise a likely end to the war. With the veterans dead and the chalice of victory snatched dishearteningly from its lips, there was a real crisis of confidence. The Ostheer subsequently fought almost to the death in front of Moscow, not for Hitler or duty, but to survive.
The final theme to emerge is a failure of German command, a lack of OKW perception. This was firstly its misappreciation of the Russian foe, and secondly its inability to recognise the effect the campaign was having on the very fabric of the Ostheer itself. Russian casualties during the first six months, at three to four millions, dwarfed the imagination. Stupendous though they were, they were never sufficient to persuade the Soviet regime to sue for peace. As a consequence, Russia had only to weather the initial shock of invasion to survive. In time it could exploit its superior demographic and economic resources to win. Cities tended to be avoided by the Führer and the General Staff for tactical not ethical reasons. It was decided at Leningrad to starve the metropolis into submission. But they were equally significant as Communist Party centres, the focal points from which it extended its power and influence into the immense interior of the state. They were, therefore, strategic targets. Hitler’s acute perception of what was ideologically important influenced his judgement on objectives such as Leningrad, Moscow and, later, Stalingrad – ‘Stalin’s City’. Russia may not have been militarily defeated, but the Communist Party power base resided in the cities, which were vulnerable to military action but whose vulnerability was not exploited. The consequences of racial war were to prove a salvation for the Communist Party, enabling it to harness Russian nationalism as a panacea to the crisis.
The second failure of German Command was OKW’s inability to recognise the extent to which German fighting power had actually eroded by September. The force fighting on the approaches to Moscow was tangibly different from the one that had crossed the demarcation line in June 1941. Expanding the number of new Panzer divisions using the same number of equipments but with manpower increases diluted the quality of the Wehrmacht instrument that had Blitzkrieged its way through Western Europe. None of the fundamental shortcomings that emerged from the French campaign, notably insufficient motorised vehicles and effective infantry anti-tank defences, were properly addressed during the pause between operations. ‘Mot’, the German military abbreviation for ‘motorised’, was replaced by ‘Hot’, a sardonic Landser label describing the extent to which motor vehicle losses were replaced by horse power.
As the German armies ‘victored’ themselves to death, all the negative aspects of linkage between the three identified components of fighting power came together. The very ‘Verdun’ that von Bock sought to avoid at the gates of Moscow occurred before he arrived. The Ostheers momentum was halted within 20km of the Kremlin. Blind faith in the invincibility of the Wehrmacht, maintained during every campaign in this war to date, was finally shattered in the snow-covered fields and forests of the western approaches to Moscow. They had sacrificed the seed-corn of Blitzkrieg to get this far. Many of those responsible for the planning and conduct of the advance were removed from command as part of the price. The cream of the army the last vestiges of Weimar influence and the majority of World War 1 veterans had disappeared, dead or broken men. The German soldier had now ostensibly to fight for the Führer, the man to whom they swore allegiance as the Head of State and now Commander of the Army. Most, having witnessed the depredations visited on the civilian population and prisoners of war, whether they were accomplices or not, feared an inevitable retribution. They would reap the whirlwind. The war, all sensed, had reached a turning point. They would now have to fight for their comrades, their families and, above all, themselves.
Between 9 and 11 May 1942 the 7th Panzer Division was relieved in the line and sent back to France to recuperate. In June 1941 one of its units, Infantry Regiment 6, had been transported from the Cologne area to East Prussia in 12 trains in preparation for the invasion. One train was sufficient to achieve the move less than one year later.(3)
Germany’s borders might one day be under threat. Now, it was a matter for survival. This imperative was to become corrupted with further setbacks and the passage of time to a sardonic Landser motto, adopted during the eventual retreat of the German armies. ‘Enjoy the war while you can,’ it enjoined, ‘because the peace will be terrible.’
Notes to Text
Introduction
1. Kohl, Paul: Ich wundere mich, dass ich noch lebe, Gütersloh, 1990.
2. Interview ‘Mein Krieg’, German TV documentary, 1991.
3. Newspaper interview: ‘Die Zeit – Forum’, 3 March 1995.
Chapter 1: ‘The world will hold its breath’
Saturday, 21 June 1941
1. Buchbender, O. and Sterz, R.: Das Andere Gesicht des Krieges Deutsche Feldpostbriefe 1939–1945; Verlag C. H. Beck, 1982 (henceforth referred to as Feldpostbriefe); p68 Letter 12/18 Regt, 21 Jun 41.
2. Letter 21 Jun 41. Bähr, H. W., Meyer, H. J. and Orthbandt, E.: Kriegsbriefe Gefallener Studenten 1939–1945; Rainer Wunderlich Verlag, 1952 (henceforth referred to as KGS); p34–5.
3. Letter 19 Jun 41. KGS p40–1. He was killed on 25 June.
4. Letter 21 Jun 41. KGS p35. He was killed during the assault of Brest-Litovsk.
5. Feldpostbriefe p65.
6. Interview Jan Szcepanink ZDF TV 1991 documentary: Steh auf es ist Krieg.
7. Knappe, S.: Soldat; Reflections of a German soldier 1936–49; Dell, 1993 (henceforth referred to as Soldat); p198–200.
8. Glantz, D. M.: The Initial Period of War on the Eastern Front; Frankcass & Co, 1993; p30.
9. Knopp, G.: Der Verdammte Krieg; C. Bertelsmann Verlag, München, 1991; p31.
10. Ibid p37.
11. Letter 13 Jun 41. Golovchansky, A., Osipov, V., Prokopenko, A., Daniel, U. and Reulecke, J.: Ich will raus aus diesemWahnsinn – Deutsche Briefe von der Ostfront 1941–1945 aus sowjetischen Archiven; Rowohlt Verlag Hamburg, 1993 (henceforth referred to as Soviet Feldpostbriefe).
12. Kuby, E.: Mein Krieg; Aufzeichnungen aus 2,129 Tagen; Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1977; p105.
‘Forget the concept of comradeship’
1. Halder, F.: The HalderWar Diary 1939–42; Ed. Burdick, C. and Jacobsen, H. A., Greenhill Books, 1988; 31 Jul 40 p244.
2. Ibid, 30 Mar 41 p346.
3. a. ‘Behandlung feindlicher Landeseinwohner im Operationsgebiet des Unternehmens Barbarossa.’ Geheime Kommandosache Mai 1941. Az. Gen sb vb, ob d.H. Nr 75/41. G. Kdos. Chefs. Issued to 2, 4, 6, 9, 11, 16, 17 and 18 Armies and those in Norway. b. ‘Richtlinien für die Behandlung politischer Kommissare.’ Anlage zu OKW/WF St/Abt. Liv/Qu. Nr 44822/41 g. K. Chefs.
4. Hoeppner to Panzergruppe 4. Quoted from Murray W.: ‘Barbarossa’, Quarterly Journal Military History, Spring 1992; p10.
5. Heydorn, V. D.: Der sowjetisc
he Aufmarsch im Bialystoker Balcon bis zum 22. Juni 1941; Verlag für Wehrwissenschaften; München, 1989; p82.
6. ‘First hand account of Leo Scharf’ from Dills, K. W.: GermanWar Art 1939–45; Bison Books, 1983; p150.
7. Halder op cit 15 Oct 40 p263.
8. Interview ‘The World at War – Barbarossa.’ Thames TV 1973.
9. Speer, A.: Inside the Third Reich; Sphere, 1971; p257.
10. Halder op cit 16 Nov 41 p283.
11. Extract from Die Deutschen im ZweitenWeltkrieg SWF German TV 1989.
‘The Führer has got it all in hand’
1. Letter Lt P.G. Inf Ers Btl 2 151 Div 7, Mar 41. Feldpostbriefe p65.
2. Ibid Letter 27 Mar 41 p66.
3. Halder op cit 14 Mar p330, 30 Apr p378, 9 Jun 41 p403.
4. Stahlberg, A.: Bounden Duty – The Memoirs of a German Officer 1932–45; Brassey’s UK, 1990; p155.
5. Knopp op cit p40.
6. Interview Der Verdammte Krieg ZDF German TV 1991.
7. Interview Harriet Eder, Thomas Kufus, Mein Krieg WDR German TV 1988.
8. Stahlberg op cit p156.
9. Interview Steh auf es ist Krieg ZDF German TV 1991.
10. Feldpostbriefe Letters 30 Apr, 19 Jun 41 p62 and 68.
11. Thilo’s Diary Entries, 21 Sept and 2 Sept 40, quoted Glanz p292.
12. Westphal, S.: The Fatal Decisions; Michael Joseph, 1956; p34.
13. Halder op cit 29 Jan 41 p314–5.
14. Westphal op cit p34.
15. Militärgeographische Angaben über das Europäische Russland. Generalstab des Heeres, Berlin 1941. Wallets: Mappe E. ‘Weißrussland’, G. ‘Zentral-Russland’, H. ‘Moskau’.
16. Westphal op cit p34–5.
17. Historical quotations Bain and Belloc from Cooper, L.: Many Roads to Moscow; Hamish Hamilton, 1968; p55 and 150.
18. Halder op cit 5 Dec 40 p383.
19. Ibid, 26 Apr 41 p376, 5 May 41 p383.
20. Interview ‘Der Marsch in den Krieg’ from Die Deutschen im ZweitenWeltkrieg. SWF German TV 1989.
Tomorrow ‘we are to fight against World Bolshevism’
1. Knopp op cit p44.
2. Interview ‘Der Krieg im Osten’ from Die Deutschen im ZweitenWeltkrieg SWF German TV 1989.
3. Interview Der Verdammte Krieg ZDF German TV, 1991.
4. Interview Mein Krieg WDR German TV, 1988.
5. Interview Der Verdammte Krieg ZDF German TV 1991.
6. Feldpostbriefe Letters 30 Apr 41, 4 May 41, p66.
7. Interview Der Krieg im Osten SWF German TV, 1989.
8. Feldpostbriefe 2 Jun 41 p67.
9. Ullrich, K.: Wie ein Fels im Meer – Kriegsgeschichte der 3.SS Panzerdivision ‘Totenkopf’; Munin Verlag, Osnabrück, 1987; p99.
10. Zeiser, B.: In Their Shallow Graves; Elek Books, 1956; p23.
11. Soldat p204.
12. Luck, H. von: Panzer Commander; Praeger NY, 1989.; p56–7 and 64.
13. Interview Steh auf! es ist Krieg ZDF German TV 1991.
14. Diary entry 21 Jun 41. Dollinger, H.: Kain, wo ist dein Bruder?; Fischer Verlag, 1987; p78–9.
15. Geheimer Bericht des Sicherheitsdienstes der SS zur interpolitischen Lage, Nr. 185. (Auszug) from Piekalkiewicz, J: Die Schlacht um Moskau – Die erfrorene Offensive; Gustav Lübbe Verlag, 1981; p38.
16. Letter Rheydt 17 Jun 41. The letter had been apprehended by the Russians. Soviet Feldpostbriefe p15.
17. Letter Berlin 6 Jun 41. Soviet Feldpostbriefe p13.
18. Letter M. Gladbach, 17 Jun 41. Soviet Feldpostbriefe p16.
19. Interview Der Krieg im Osten SWF German TV, 1989.
20. Letter 21 Jun 41 Feldpostbriefe p68.
21. Pabst, H.: The Outermost Frontier; William Kimber, London, 1957; p11.
22. Interview Steh auf! es ist Krieg ZDF German TV 1991.
Chapter 2: ‘Ordinary men’ – The German soldier on the eve of ‘Barbarossa’
‘Endless pressure to participate’
1. Zeiser op cit p9. On joining the army 12 May 1941.
2. KGS 31 Jan 41 p34.
3. Interview Steh auf! es ist Krieg ZDF German TV 1991.
4. War of Extermination: Crimes of the Wehrmacht 1941–44; Exhibition Hamburg Institute for Social Research, 1995.
5. Interview. Der Verdammte Krieg ZDF German TV 1991.
6. Steinhoff, J., Pechel, P. and Showalter, D.: Deutsche im ZweitenWeltkrieg; Bastei- Lübbe Verlag, Gladbach, 1989; p718. Conclusion of a group of modern German historians.
7. Kuhnert, M.: ‘WillWe See Tomorrow? ‘— A German Cavalryman at War 1939–42; Leo Cooper, 1993; p2.
8. For example the American experience of the Republic of South Vietnam during the Vietnam conflict.
9. Soldat p138.
10. Interview Die Zeit 3 Mar 95.
11. Soldat p138.
12. ‘Voices from the Third Reich’ p51.
13. Interview Die Zeit 3 Mar 95.
14. Stahlberg op cit p159–160.
15. Prüller, W. Diary of a German Soldier; Faber & Faber, 1963; p63.
‘Order and Duty’ and the Führer
1. Metelmann, H.: Through Hell for Hitler; Patrick Stephens, 1990; p14 and p19.
2. Interview Mein Krieg WDR German TV 1988.
3. Interview. Ibid.
4. Becker: pen name. Becker, H.: The Devil on my Shoulder; Jarrolds, 1955; p16–7.
5. Interview Mein Krieg WDR German TV 1988.
6. Ibid.
7. Metelmann op cit p21, p14 and p15.
8. Steinhoff, Pechel and Showalter op cit p35.
9. ‘Voices from the Third Reich’ p24.
10. Ibid p50.
11. Ibid p56.
12. Interview Georg Buchwald. Vol 5. Purnell’s History of the SecondWorldWar; p2000.
13. Steinhoff, Pechel and Showalter op cit p125–6.
14. Ibid p88.
15. Ibid p150.
16. Becker op cit p16–7.
17. ‘Wovon kann der Landser denn schon träumen— Urlaub und Urlaub–Maschen.’ Article Hanns–Karl Kubiak. Band 3. Der II. Weltkrieg 1976. p26–9.
‘Prepared … to face what is coming!’ The German Army June 1941
1. Fourth Army Assessment 28 June 1940. Lewis, S. J.: Forgotten Legions; Praeger Special studies, 1986; p106.
2. XXXVIII Korps Report Aug 10, 1940. Ibid p112.
3. Ibid p103.
4. Erfahrungsbericht Aug 18, 1940. Ibid p107.
5. AOK 4. Mar 20, 21, 1941. Ibid p132.
6. Ibid p64.
7. May 15, 1940.
8. OKW KTB Vol 1. p87, quoted Lewis p121.
9. Glantz op cit p398.
10. Lehmann, R.: The Leibstandarte – 1 SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler; Vol II, Fedorowicz Publishing, 1988; p277.
11. Hinze, R.: Hitze, Frost und Pulverdampf; Der Shicksalweg der 20. Panzer Division; Heinrich Pöppinghaus Verlag, 1981; p19.
12. Gareis, M.: Kampf und Ende – Der Frankisch–Sudetendeutschen 98. Infanterie–Division; Podzun–Pallas–Verlag, 1956; p78.
13. Ibid p80.
Chapter 3: The Soviet frontier
‘There was no information’
1. Suvorov, V.: WhoWas Planning to attack Whom in June 1941, Hitler or Stalin?’ R.U.S.I. Jun 85 p54.
2. Mackintosh, M.: ‘The Red Army Before Barbarossa’, Purnell’s History of the Second WorldWar; Purnell; p654.
3. Quoted Suvorov p50.
4. Ibid p51.
5. The 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 24th, 28th, 16th and 22nd Armies. Ibid p51.
6. Ibid p52. Quoted from History of Kiev Military District, Moscow, 1974; p162.
7. Suvorov’s view, p83.
8. Subsequent interrogations of Soviet POWs appear to confirm this according to Volker Dietlef Heydorn in Der sowjetische Aufmarsch p79–80.
9. Heydorn op cit p83.
10. Glantz op cit p227.
11. Ibid p325.
12. Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion; Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt in Freiburg; p327 (Hencefor
th referred to as Freiburg).
13. Ibid p320.
14. Hinze op cit p23–5.
15. Guderian, H.: Panzer Leader; Michael Joseph, 1952/70; p153.
16. Interview Steh auf! es ist Krieg ZDF German TV 1991.
‘We’ve never had such a situation … Will there be any instructions?’
1. Starinov, I. G.: Over the Abyss – My Life in Special Operations; Ivy Books NY, 1995; p165.
2. Interview Der Verdammte Krieg ZDF German TV 1991, additional material from Steh auf! es ist Krieg ZDF German TV 1991.
3. Starinov op cit p167–9.
4. Heydorn op cit p149.
5. Knopp op cit p27.
6. Purnell’s History of the SecondWorldWar p674–5. Popel’s personal account.
7. Interview Steh auf! es ist Krieg ZDF German TV 1991.
8. Heydorn op cit p178.
9. Danishevsky, I.: The Road of Battle and Glory; Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1964; p13.
10. Heydorn op cit p155.
11. Ibid, quoted p150.
12. Danishevsky op cit p14–5.
Chapter 4: H–Hour 0315
The River Bug … Brest–Litovsk
1. Habedanck, G.: ‘Bei Brest–Litovsk über die Grenze’, DieWehrmacht, 1941, p233.
2. Gschöpf, R.: MeinWeg mit der 45. Infanterie Division; Oberöstereichischer Landesverlag, 1955; p146–7.
3. Guderian op cit p146–7.
4. These were 125 Rifle Regiment to the NW, 333 Regiment in the Citadel, 84 Rifle Regiment in the SW and 44 and 455 Rifle Regiments from 42 Rifle Division. This section is based on Heydorn, op cit, p118 and 120–122 and Auswertung der alten Unterlagen aus demWeltkrieg über die Festung Brest–Litovsk. AOC 4 Ic, 9 May 41.