PLAYACTOR was more of a hindrance than a help. Its salient achievement, a monstrous wall chart, was a source of mirth and annoyance to Sandy and Jeanne. Mirth because it was a wonder to behold, and annoyance because we were constantly being asked for information to feed into it, tasking we considered a waste of valuable time because the information was often irrelevant to the problem at hand. The best description is from Peter Maas’ Killer Spy:
The chart Tim Caruso had drawn up covered an entire wall filled with cross-indexed squares. Across the top were all the known compromises. There was a dateline for them that began in 1955. Color-coded leads were at the bottom. The different colors depicted which sources they had come from. . . . In the center of the chart, also color-coded, were not only the details of past FBI operations, but all the details of CIA operations that were kept from the FBI until Jim Holt and Jim Milburn took up residence at Langley. Looking at the chart, you saw the entire history of compromises, suspected or real, the seismic moments, where the hot spots were in both time and place.1
In other words, it was the well-known mixture of apples and oranges, with some cherries, bananas, and a kumquat or two thrown in for good measure.
Unlike PLAYACTOR, Wiser’s NIGHTMOVER investigation moved along at a fast clip, employing all the means and techniques of a major FBI investigation. The CIA provided support to important aspects of the probe. When the FBI wanted to place a beacon in Ames’ car to track his movements, Dan Payne designed a scenario to deliver the car to the FBI technicians so that they could implant the beacon under controlled and relatively safe circumstances. He suggested that Ames be invited to a counternarcotics conference at FBI headquarters along with his supervisor, Dave Edger. We then primed Edger to ask Ames to drive, knowing that Ames would acquiesce in order to please his boss. While the conference was being held, the technicians moved the car from its parking space, successfully inserted the beacon, and returned the car to its slot without anyone being the wiser.
When the FBI first placed Ames under surveillance, they did so without closely coordinating with us. This turned out to be a mistake because when the FBI surveillants wanted to follow Ames onto the CIA compound, they approached the unwitting guards for assistance. This approach stirred up a spate of rumors that reached as far as Director of Security. In order to calm the situation, we caused a notice to be disseminated informing our security officers that the FBI and CIA were conducting some joint exercises and that once the FBI surveillance teams identified themselves they were not to be subjected to further interference.
One of the most time-consuming projects for us as well as for the FBI was the placement of cameras and phone taps in Ames’ CIA premises. First, we managed via Edger to get him moved to an office suitable for the FBI’s purposes. Next we facilitated the presence of the FBI’s specialists. All of the entries took place at night, after most CIA personnel had gone home. We obtained the combination to the vault in which Ames’ office was located, and one of us was always present when the FBI was at work, should it be necessary to deal with security guards or employees working at odd hours. Luckily it never was. In practice, on occasion many of us spent half the night in this endeavor, but had to disguise our moonlighting. This meant appearing the next morning on time and putting in a regular day’s work. Don Robinson, a security officer then in charge of CIC’s Counter-espionage Group, volunteered for much of this support duty.
After the camera was in place, we concocted another scenario in the hope of filming Ames purloining a top secret document. We chose a document we thought would interest Ames, but which the U.S. government could afford to lose. Again thanks to Edger, we had a copy of this document routed to Ames. We hoped that he would cut off the classification and identifying data, or stuff it into his shirt or take some other compromising action. However, it must have been one of Ames’ lazy days. He merely glanced at the document and tossed it into his out box!
Another major part of the investigation was the surveillance of Ames in Bogota. Unfortunately, our teams never did see Ames meeting his SVR case officer, although meetings did indeed take place.
Our cooperation continued to the end. When the FBI decided the time had come to arrest Ames, we produced yet another scenario for Edger to carry out. He and Ames were supposed to go on an overseas trip together. On Monday 21 February 1994, Presidents’ Day holiday, Edger called Ames in the morning. Following his script, he advised Ames that a cable had arrived that affected their trip and that needed an immediate response. Could Ames come to the office and deal with the problem? Ames trustingly left his residence. The FBI was waiting around the corner and arrested him without incident.
The FBI’s plan was to take Ames and his wife, who was arrested shortly after her husband was placed in custody, to the FBI office at Tysons Corner in northern Virginia and, dealing with them separately, induce them to confess. Sandy and Jeanne had been requested to await events at their CIA office, which was otherwise empty because of the holiday. Dan Payne was to fulfill the role of courier between Tysons Corner and CIA headquarters if needed. The FBI wanted them in position to provide instant research and expertise in case one of the Ameses began to confess. As it happened, Mrs. Ames made a few incriminating statements but Ames himself refused to cooperate.
Until the very end, Ames was totally complacent. He never had an idea that the arrest was imminent and did not attempt to keep a low profile. While the FBI’s net was closing around him, he was drawing attention to himself by approaching SE Division management in an effort to sell himself for the position of deputy chief of Moscow Station.
REACTIONS TO THE ARREST OF AMES
ALL OF US, BOTH CIA AND FBI, who had worked so hard to bring Ames to justice felt a sense of relief once we knew he was under lock and key. Of course, we were aware that there was more labor ahead to produce a conviction and a sentence of life without parole. (This was the most that could be expected, because the death penalty for espionage in peacetime did not exist at the time. It has since been reinstated.) All our self-gratification began to dissipate almost immediately, however.
The FBI drafted a public statement concerning the arrest that gave the impression that they had done all the real work, while we had merely provided cooperation and support. The draft incensed the CIA, which produced its own drafts, which the FBI refused to accept. Finally, the FBI’s version was issued by the attorney general. We also issued one. There would be no joint statement. (Retired FBI Special Agent I. C. Smith has described the atmosphere at FBI headquarters on this occasion, characterizing it as an “attempt to jab a stick in the CIA’s eye.”1) Of greater significance, news of the arrest brought Congressional wrath on the CIA and, to a lesser extent, the FBI. The investigation that led to Ames had been ongoing for years as a major effort and Congress had not been kept advised. In retrospect, this is perhaps the greatest “lesson learned” from the whole case. As one consequence, the atmosphere of CIA-FBI cooperation that had dominated the investigative phase quickly dissipated as senior managers on both sides tried to deflect criticism from the Congressional oversight committees and their own inspector general staff by shifting blame to the rival organization.
During the last year or two before the arrest, the CIA’s senior management held discussions about the advisability of notifying the majority and minority leaders of the two intelligence oversight committees, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI). Jeanne was responsible for drawing up talking points. She produced numerous drafts that were sent up the line for approval. They were returned with major revisions. Some in senior management were in favor of giving Congress ample debriefings, some wanted to provide only the bare minimum, and some did not want to tell Congress anything at all. The proponents of this last position won the day because it was never possible to fashion a draft that satisfied everybody.
Beginning the day after the arrest, CIA and FBI representatives were called to Capitol Hill to explain th
emselves to a largely hostile audience. Jeanne was summoned several times. In general, the SSCI was more thoughtful, or better controlled by its chairman, Senator Dennis DeConcini of Arizona. Requests for explanations, while often cold, were generally polite. The situation degenerated only when CIA Director James Woolsey was present. He and DeConcini had long engaged in mutual animosity and this affected the exchanges when they were in the same room.
HPSCI was not so restrained. On one occasion, Jeanne was the sole witness, or sacrificial lamb. This was a closed session, with no media representatives present. However, it appeared that the members of the committee were so accustomed to posturing for the press that they could not turn it off. The tone of the questions was accusatory, and the mantra was “What took you so long?” Jeanne felt like she was being cross-examined by a hostile attorney trying to make a point with a jury, rather than being asked in temperate terms to explain what she had done or not done in the investigation, and why. Representatives Dicks, Dixon, and Torricelli were especially vociferous. Representative Dan Glickman chaired the session, but did not have full control because members freely interrupted each other in their efforts to be heard. Glickman did, however, get at least one question in to Jeanne in a rather sneering tone: “What makes you think that you were capable of leading a CI investigation?” This was typical of the questioning. Jeanne left not only furious but downhearted, having lost whatever respect she might have had for our legislative branch, at least as exemplified by its lower house.
Eventually, both the SSCI and HPSCI produced reports.2 The bulk of the SSCI report consists of a case summary and was thoroughly reviewed with the CIA in draft. This was succeeded by conclusions and recommendations, some of which have been implemented. The HPSCI report also came up with a number of findings, with one of which Jeanne and Sandy take particular issue. This is the finding that the CIA personnel involved in the investigation failed to keep senior management advised in a timely manner. We suggest that, in part, this misunderstanding is due to statements made after the arrest by senior managers who wished to elude criticism, on the theme of “If I had known about it, I would have fixed it.” Senior managers were kept advised, at least in general terms, of the seriousness of the problem, the nature of the investigation, and the progress we were making. Indeed, Jeanne personally briefed two CIA directors—Judge Webster and Robert Gates. She always started her briefing with a statement about the executions of the Soviet officials who had worked for us, and she does not believe they could have missed the tenor of what she was saying. She continued by outlining what was being done to solve the problem, but accepts that they may not have absorbed the details because, after all, they had a great many knotty situations, some of extremely high priority, to contend with.
One aspect of the SSCI and HPSCI probes was particularly outrageous. Chairman Glickman and Congressman Combest of HPSCI and Chairman DeConcini of the SSCI conducted personal interviews with Ames. The only real result, as we see it, was to inflate Ames’ ego. If these officials did not trust the FBI/CIA debriefings, or had some questions we had not covered, there is no reason why they could not have sent one of their trusted staff members instead of traipsing down themselves to drink in what Ames had to say. “Disgusting” and “obscene” were words used by CIA employees when they heard of these interviews.
In the meantime, as mandated by Congress, the inspector general’s office at the CIA, under the aegis of Inspector General Frederick P. Hitz, was conducting its own investigation. This was a mammoth effort, yet a flawed one. Many of the investigators lacked knowledge of the Directorate of Operations as an entity, much less how it carried out its day-to-day business in the world of espionage. Moreover, the investigative techniques employed left much to be desired. The interviewers held long sessions with each individual who had taken part in the Ames case. These interviewers took notes, but the interviews were not recorded. At first, the IG staff did not want the interviewees to have access to the results of the interviews because this was their normal Star Chamber procedure. However, a flood of impassioned protests caused them to change the ground rules for this particular investigation.
Once the interviews had been typed, which sometimes took place only after a long delay, the interviewees could review them for accuracy. When Jeanne did just that, she was stunned by the inaccuracies. For instance, at one point she said that someone’s reappearance was fortuitous. This came out, the individual’s “report” was fortuitous. At another point she said that someone was a valid asset. The report of the interview erroneously reflects that she called the individual a “valued” asset. (In reality, in this particular case the asset was valid but not valuable!) Sloppy drafting had Jeanne stating that she did not remember having briefed DCI Casey. Obviously, if she had done so it would not be the sort of thing that she would have forgotten!
The IG team was in haste to prepare their report before Congress reconvened. They produced an unwieldy and unpolished draft that was parceled out to all who had played a significant role in the Ames case for comments. (Unfortunately this draft also contained some sensitive material that should never have had such wide distribution.) Jeanne’s were lengthy and critical. To give the IG credit, many of the changes she and others suggested were made and the final product, while by no means perfect, is reasonably accurate.3 In looking over this abstract now, however, Jeanne and Sandy notice one glaring omission. The report makes no mention of CIA management’s failure to keep Congress informed. As noted separately, this was one of the strongest lessons learned in their opinion. Another point not covered was the lack of a formal, written agreement with the FBI when Jim Holt and Jim Milburn came over to the CIA in the summer of 1991. The four of us did not need such an agreement in order to co-exist productively, but in the furor after the arrest, and attempts to play the blame game, it would have been useful for all to have such a document to point to.
Almost one year after Ames’ arrest, CIA management scheduled an awards ceremony to honor those who had participated in the investigation. As is traditional, the reception was to include family members. Sandy’s family had traveled from North Carolina; Dan Payne’s sister had come, or was coming, from Chicago. At the last minute the invitations were withdrawn. The word we heard was that DDCI Studeman had decided to cancel the event because the press might hear about it and “Congress wouldn’t like it.” This despite the fact that many of the honorees had played no role in deciding how the investigation should proceed. They were the loyal workers who had done a good job in such necessary areas as locating files for us, checking Ames’ time and attendance records, and helping the FBI bug his telephones.
The event was later rescheduled more than one year after Ames’ arrest. However, because of CIA management’s pusillanimity, the revised-version ceremony was limited to the actual awardees. No one else was allowed to be present, nor was the ceremony publicized in any way. Further, the designation of who was to receive which medal particularly offended Jeanne. Redmond got the most prestigious one; Jeanne and Dave Edger were awarded medals at the next level; and a medal one step further down was awarded to Sandy. Jeanne thought this was singularly unfair because she and Sandy had worked as a team and, after all, it was Sandy who was convinced throughout that Ames was a spy and who discovered the correlation that broke the case. Sandy was affronted also. This was a team effort and each played a significant role. Ames might never have been discovered without the participation of all the major players, from Worthen to Redmond. As she sees it, it should have been the same medal for all. Moreover, the fact that Dan and Diana did not receive medals at all was even more egregious. They received monetary awards. While money is always pleasant, it was not their primary motivation, and they were left without a permanent memento of their achievement.
In any event, the recognition was too little and too late for the dedicated employees who had been so helpful to us, the core team, in our efforts. Given their feelings, both Sandy and Jeanne boycotted the ceremony and neither has ever dis
played the medals they were awarded.
By the way, Wiser, Holt, and Milburn of the FBI were also given awards at this ceremony. No official recognition from the FBI was ever received, except that Jeanne and Dan got letters from Director Freeh thanking them for their contribution. By this time Jeanne may have been a little thin-skinned because of the criticism she had received, but it sounded condescending to her—as if she were being thanked for holding the FBI’s coats while they did the real work. Paul, Sandy, and Diana did not even receive a letter.
Not everything was this downbeat, however. After Ames was arrested, the Department of justice officials who had been involved in his prosecution, headed by U.S. Attorney Helen Fahey and prosecutor Mark Hulkower, hosted a relaxing private party at a tavern in Alexandria for the CIA and FBI. During the latter part of the Ames investigation, the CIA’s legal advisers had opened up a direct channel to the lawyers who would be responsible for the prosecution. We soon became close colleagues, bypassing the FBI. Indeed it was decided that Jeanne, instead of anyone from the FBI, would testify at the trial as the expert on the KGB. During the party, they gave us all framed certificates, plus some joke gifts. Ms. Fahey made a speech in which she pointed out that this sort of recognition was given only rarely to those outside the DOJ community. All in all, this was a very pleasant evening and Sandy and Jeanne are proud of their certificates.
Jeanne was present at one other noteworthy event. A day or two after Ames’ arrest, there was a meeting at the White House between Clinton/Gore and congressional leaders to discuss whether Ames’ activities would or should have any impact on our relations with Russia. (It was agreed that they should not.) Woolsey was invited to attend. He asked Jeanne and Ted Price, who by that time was DDO, to accompany him, in case he needed our expertise to answer a question. We sat behind him in the chairs reserved for various staffers. Before the meeting got under way, when everyone was milling around, Woolsey went up to Clinton and told him who Jeanne was. Clinton came over, shook hands, and then gave his famous “thumbs-up” signal. Gore also came over later and shook her hand. When Clinton said “Congratulations” or some such word, Jeanne told him that she would take his message back to our team.
Circle of Treason Page 19