Circle of Treason

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Circle of Treason Page 20

by Sandra V. Grimes


  While all this was going on, the wheels of justice were turning. On 28 April 1994, in the Alexandria Federal Courthouse, Ames and his wife, both dressed in jailhouse olive drab, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit espionage. The small courtroom was packed. Sandy was out of town, but Jeanne was there, as were Diana Worthen, Dan Payne, and numerous other representatives from the CIA and FBI. Rosario spoke first. She looked as if she had not slept in weeks, and she was clutching a large, stagy crucifix more suited to warding off vampires than providing solace in a difficult moment. About the only thing that Jeanne remembers from her statement was her reference to her intellectual attainments. She had it put into the record that she was a PhD candidate at Georgetown. Her sentencing was delayed until Ames’ debriefings had been completed.

  When it was Ames’ turn, he rose in a dignified manner. True to form, he pontificated at great length. What he said perhaps sounded convincing to the uninitiated. Parts of his speech were attempts at self-justification, characterizing espionage as a sham and saying that the Soviet officials he had betrayed had made “similar choices and suffered similar consequences.” He omitted to point out that many of them were executed, while he did not face the death penalty. His bitter reaction to the way that the government had treated Rosario seemed to be sincere. He had seemingly blanked out of his mind that, for the last year at least, she had known that he was committing espionage on behalf of the Russians and had greedily shopped away the profits. After he had his say, Ames was sentenced to life imprisonment.

  The debriefings of Ames began the day after his conviction. They were managed by the FBI, and at first they did not want anyone from the CIA present. After some high-level negotiations it was agreed that Jeanne could represent the CIA. She was thus present at the first thirteen sessions. Initially it was awkward. None of the FBI debriefers had any prior professional relationship with Ames, but Jeanne had known him at least casually since the 1970s. They had been colleagues working against the Soviet target, and in 1983 were fellow branch chiefs located only a few doors away from each other.

  Ames was told on the way to the first debriefing session that Jeanne would be there. He responded by muttering “Oh, shit!” (Perhaps he said something stronger, but this is what Jeanne was told.) When he first entered the debriefing room, and his shackles were removed, the FBI shook hands with him. Jeanne felt she could not do the same, so she kept somewhat in the background and merely said “Hi, Rick!”

  As a rule, we debriefed three days a week, for most of the day with a break for lunch. The venues varied. Sometimes we met at the Alexandria City Jail, but Ames disliked this because he could not smoke. On other occasions we met at the FBI’s Washington Field Office at Buzzard’s Point. At first, Ames was shackled whenever we took a break. However, the FBI soon relaxed and only chained him up at the end of the day. Ames seemed not to be embarrassed by this. When it was time to go, he just held out his arms for the cuffs. For Ames, lunch was the high point of the day. The Alexandria City Jail did not employ a cook. The inmates cooked for themselves, with generally dismal results. On debriefing days, Ames got to enjoy a pizza of his selection, a meatball submarine, or some other tasty dish. And he smoked like a chimney all day, with little concern for the non-smokers in the room.

  The debriefings covered a lot of ground, some of it only superficially because we were aware that a damage assessment team would take over when we had gone over the FBI’s and CIA’s priority requirements. Jeanne was always allotted time to ask Ames about some of the Directorate of Operations cases that he might have compromised. This was a somewhat frustrating exercise because generally the requirements she received from the various DO components were organized by cryptonym. Ames did not do well in remembering cryptonyms. One had to tell him something about a case before he could remember if he had told his Soviet handlers about it. Naturally, the people preparing the requirements did not always want to reveal this sort of sensitive information, fearing that someday Ames might be exchanged for some U.S. spy held by the Soviets, or might find some way of communicating with them from his jail cell. However, we did manage to clarify a number of points. In general, Ames appeared cooperative. He only expressed significant anger on one occasion, in relation to what he had heard about Rosario’s travails at the hands of the prosecution, particularly leading attorney Mark Hulkower.

  Did Ames tell the truth during the debriefings? Jeanne believes that he did for the most part. He knew that if he were caught in a lie it would affect Rosario’s sentence. He had not had access to sensitive Soviet operations for some years and he had no way of determining what knowledgeable sources we had acquired in the KGB and GRU during the interim, and what they had told us. Therefore, he could not know when it was safe to lie and when it was not.

  In one area, however, he was less than forthcoming. This was his description, or lack thereof, of his KGB handlers and his relationship with them. For instance, he said he could not positively identify a photograph of Viktor Cherkashin, the KGB CI chief in Washington whom he had met in the embassy on at least one occasion. (“Oh, yeah . . . it sort of looks like him . . . could be . . . maybe.”)4 He was also very vague when it came to his two regular contacts, Yuriy Karetkin and Vladimir Mechulayev, obfuscating which one was present at which meeting. Further, when asked about the details of the meetings, and what they discussed, he would say that he had been drinking and could not remember much. It was plain that his loyalties were to them, and he did not want to do anything to cause them trouble. Moreover, it was no doubt in the back of his mind at the time that perhaps at some future date he would be swapped for a U.S. spy in Russian hands.

  All this meant a heavy workload for Jeanne. It takes at least one day of writing to cover one day’s debriefing. The pressure for rapid processing of the reporting was intense at first. All the CIA powers-that-be wanted to be the first to have it. And the FBI could not write up their notes with such speed. The sessions were taped, but the FBI took notes longhand while Jeanne used a laptop. Therefore they depended on Jeanne’s reports to brief their own management. Probably the biggest drawback to Jeanne’s notes was that they were arranged strictly in the order of discussion. Jeanne did it this way as an aid to the transcriber of the tapes, because the transcriptions would be the formal record. However, the notes would probably have been more useful to management had they been arranged in some other fashion.

  While their relationship had always been casual, Jeanne rather liked Ames back in the days when they were fellow officers working against the Soviet target. To some extent this bled over during the debriefings. When they were discussing a topic of mutual interest, Jeanne would sometimes forget that she was dealing with a convicted felon who had no conscience and who was responsible for many deaths. He would just be good old Rick. Part of this was because the debriefings frequently turned into dialogues between the two about cases or programs known to both of them but with which the FBI was not familiar. Sometimes Jeanne would consciously have to pull back and regain her distance and objectivity.

  One event at the beginning of the debriefings has attracted a certain amount of attention and become part of the lore of this case. At the first session, Ames was asked if he had given any names of CIA or FBI personnel to the KGB. The intent of the question was to determine if he had signaled anyone who might have some vulnerability, which would make him or her an attractive recruitment target. Ames mentioned a couple of names and then told Jeanne offhandedly that he had also given her name to his KGB handlers. Jeanne absorbed this, but was not particularly surprised. During the early days of Ames’ contacts with the KGB, she had been a single female stationed in a remote African outpost and she knew that the misogynist KGB considered single women tempting targets, vulnerable to the wiles of a strong and handsome male. Indeed, during this tour she had sometimes wondered why the local Soviet contingent treated her with marked coolness.

  At this point, debriefing time ran out but we returned to the subject the next day. We soon learned that
we had been misinterpreting what Ames had to say. He had given the KGB the names of persons he thought could be the scapegoats for his treasonous activities. In other words, the suggestion was that the KGB could mount a disinformation operation pointing to someone other than Ames as the traitor, somewhat along the lines of the Mister X case discussed in Chapter 10.

  Ames made no apology to Jeanne when describing how he had tried to set her up in this manner. Her first instinct was to leap across the table and strangle him, but almost immediately she saw how ironic and even humorous it was. Here he was sentenced to life without parole, the object of great opprobrium from his colleagues and the nation at large. He would have to put on his chains and go back to his cell and his bologna sandwich when the day was over, while she was free to go where she wanted, and do what she wanted. Her evening might be spent with a gourmet meal at a restaurant, including a glass or two of wine, or watching an episode of Masterpiece Theater. For the rest of his life, his choices would be severely limited. He would never go to the theater again, never eat in a restaurant, or sip vintage wine, and if he had access to a group television set, he would have to watch what his generally lowbrow prison mates wanted to watch, which surely did not include the intellectually stimulating programs he would prefer. For a moment, but a moment only, she almost felt sorry for him.

  The FBI team plus Jeanne spent one session talking to Rosario. Jeanne had never met her, but had heard a great deal—almost all of it unfavorable—from the FBI. She was described as totally self-centered, controlling, obsessed by money and material acquisitions, and psychologically abusive to her son Pablo.5 Our meeting certainly did nothing to dispel this impression. Her lawyer, William B. Cummings, a southern gentleman, was present. As she entered the room, she kissed him and whined that she did not know why we wanted to badger her. If we asked a question that she did not want to answer, she would break into tears and exclaim to Cummings, “Bill, they’re being mean to me!” When given a chance, she would expound on how much better Colombia was than the United States, to include her judgment that there were no good universities in the United States—not like they have in Colombia. Also, she characterized American women as peasants. It was obvious to her that we were uncultured because we went to the supermarket in jeans and sneakers while she, being a lady, always dressed in a pants suit. Little useful information was obtained from the session.

  Overall during this period Jeanne, Sandy, and the other investigators realized that there was a certain amount of ambivalence regarding them. Were they villains or heroes? Jeanne’s treatment by HPSCI clearly showed her that there were those who, with a less than complete grasp of the facts, put them in the former camp, invoking the theme that if the investigation had been undertaken by more competent people Ames would have been arrested in no time flat. The IG report has it both ways, saying that the investigation was inadequate but placing most of the blame on senior management. As described, both Jeanne and Sandy were given medals but under circumstances that led them to view the medals with a jaundiced eye. On a more positive note, however, Sandy and Jeanne always felt that they had the support and approval of their peers and colleagues, and these are expressed even to the present day. And they are in demand on the lecture circuit, presenting their story to a wide variety of television and live audiences. This was strange to them at first because CIA officials are taught to avoid publicity at all costs and indeed a person who needs outside appreciation would probably not be happy in the CIA. Yet in time they became used to the limelight and frankly admit that the ego gratification they receive is not unpleasing.

  In addition to the television interviews, there have been five books written about the Ames case so far. Only three of them are worth mentioning. By far the most complete coverage comes from Pete Earley in Confessions of a Spy. This is the only book that we, Redmond, Worthen, Payne, and others cooperated with, having been asked to do so by senior CIA management. This book appeared about a year after other publications, and Earley used the time to do a lot of digging and interviewing, including a trip to Moscow, to round out the story.

  David Wise’s Nightmover contains some interesting material, and he obviously has some good sources among present and former CIA officers. He does, however, make one major error in postulating that Ames’ espionage began in Mexico City in the early 1980s, orchestrated by a KGB officer named Igor Shurygin. We and the FBI accept the statements by Ames and Cherkashin that Ames volunteered in April 1985. This coordinates with the facts as we know them. Ames first got access to information on sensitive Soviet cases in September 1983, yet these cases continued to run successfully and productively until the summer of 1985, when they began disappearing at an alarming rate. Furthermore, during the period September 1983 to April 1985 Ames sank deeper and deeper into debt, while in the summer of 1985 his situation markedly improved.

  A third book of some interest is Peter Maas’ Killer Spy. This was written with FBI cooperation and is mainly a blow-by-blow account of the FBI’s role in the investigation. As an insider description, it contains material not found elsewhere.

  One made-for-television movie also exists. This is Aldrich Ames: The Spy Within, with Timothy Hutton playing Ames. It has some value as a psychological study because Hutton does a good job of portraying Ames as a person. However, from a factual viewpoint, it leaves a great deal to be desired. It is decidedly off base when attempting to portray the inner workings of the CIA and the individuals who worked there, as well as some basic facts of the case. This movie was produced by a man who was a friend of Ames’ during his youthful University of Chicago phase. He telephoned Jeanne in an effort to get her to cooperate with his project, but she declined.

  AMES THE PERSON, AMES THE SPY

  ALDRICH HAZEN AMES IS AN ALL-AMERICAN BOY, born in River Falls, Wisconsin on 26 May 1941, the son of a minor academic and a high school English teacher. In 1947 the CIA was founded, with one of its main tasks the collection of foreign intelligence. Casting around for people who might be of use in this endeavor, the CIA’s attention was drawn to Rick’s father, Carleton Ames, who had received a PhD in Burmese history in 1949. Carleton was recruited into the Agency, and the family, consisting of wife Rachel Ames, Rick, and two younger sisters, moved to Washington.

  In 1953, Carleton was sent to Rangoon, and his family accompanied him. Unfortunately, aside from his linguistic abilities Carleton had no talents that would make him a success as an operations officer. His tour lasted the minimum two years, after which he returned to Washington, never to serve overseas again. He was assigned to the recently established Counterintelligence Staff and remained there in an analytical position until his retirement.

  When the family returned from Rangoon, Rick became a freshman at McLean High School, where he was active in the drama and debating clubs. His mother was a popular English teacher at the high school. After he turned sixteen, he applied for a summer job at the CIA. He worked there for two summers in lowly clerical and maintenance jobs. It was, and is, the practice in the CIA to employ teenage children of its employees for summer work. They are already vetted to some degree because of their parents’ clearances. However, due to their youth they are not polygraphed and do not have access to sensitive information.

  In the fall of 1959, Rick matriculated at the University of Chicago. This was his first time away from home and he did not have the self-discipline to study and attend class regularly. As in high school, he was active in a drama group. Eventually he was dismissed from the university, but did not return home right away. Instead he worked temporarily in a local theater.

  By early 1962 Rick was back in McLean and applied once again to the CIA. He was hired in June as a full-time clerical employee, assigned to a position in the Directorate of Operations as a document analyst. At the same time he was accepted at George Washington University, and continued his studies part time, graduating in 1967 with a bachelor’s degree in history and a fairly decent grade-point average.

  After graduation, Rick applie
d for officer status through the Career Training Program (CTP). Candidates have to pass intelligence tests, tests on current events, personal interviews, and psychological screening. Rick was successful, although not highly recommended. These were the days of the Vietnam War, and the CIA was pressed to build up its cadres. Perhaps under other circumstances he might not have made the cut. This same year his father retired from the Agency.

  Rick was in training from December 1967 to September 1968. Having successfully completed the course for DO operations officers, he was assigned to the then-Soviet Bloc (SB) Division. This is where we first crossed paths with him. He was promoted to GS-09 in June 1968, to GS-10 in June 1969, and to GS-11 in October 1970. (These promotions were non-competitive. All CTP graduates were routinely promoted as far as GS-11 unless they made some serious misstep. After GS-11, their promotions had to be earned.)

  In May 1969 Rick married Nancy Jane Segebarth, also a CIA officer. She had joined the Agency in 1964 after graduation from Denison University, and had completed the Career Training Program some time before Rick did. She subsequently worked as an analyst in the Directorate of Intelligence.

 

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