When faced with this knotty problem, Ames did what he often did—he procrastinated. Indeed, he never wrote a report on this meeting. He had good excuses for getting behind in his write-ups, because on 1 August KGB CI officer Vitaliy Yurchenko defected and Ames was chosen to be one of his debriefers. Also, he was deep in wedding plans. Thus, despite repeated requests he managed to avoid putting anything on paper. And soon he was in full-time Italian language training, away from the headquarters building except on Fridays and hard to reach by telephone, because he was in class.
Some have tried to give a sinister cast to the connection between Ames and Yurchenko. However, Ames did not choose himself for the job of debriefer; it was chosen for him by division management, probably because he was knowledgeable about the KGB, had some Russian, and was available. Furthermore, he was only one of a team of three CIA debriefers, with the FBI fielding its own team. To cap it off, Yurchenko had round-the-clock guards from the CIA’s Office of Security. (As it happened, Dan Payne, a prominent figure in this book, was one of them.) In sum, before his defection Yurchenko could not know the circumstances he would be held under, and Ames only knew after the event that he would be involved in the debriefing. The two did have one or two semiprivate conversations at an early point but there’s no reason to think they touched on Ames’ espionage activities. And in September Ames left his debriefing activities to start Italian language lessons and had no further contact with Yurchenko.
Rick and Rosario’s wedding celebration was a low-key affair, although he now had enough money to allow for more of a splash. It took place on 10 August, not long after his divorce was finalized. The ceremony was held in a Unitarian Church. It was attended only by family members and a few close friends, including Diana Worthen. Rosario was a Roman Catholic but the Unitarian Church was selected because of Rick’s divorce. Rick himself is not known to have been a churchgoer, or to have had any particular interest in organized religion once he reached adulthood. By this time, Rosario had become a U.S. citizen, which was required by CIA regulations. She had also successfully completed a CIA polygraph.
Ames’ first face-to-face meeting with Vladimir Mechulayev, the KGB officer who was to become his primary handler for the next few years, took place in Bogota in December 1985. As previously agreed in operational notes, Ames waited for his Soviet contact in a Bogota shopping mall. His handler approached him with the proper password or parole. They then proceeded to a Soviet embassy vehicle and drove away to the Soviet compound. Once inside, in a room set aside for the purpose, the two men began to get to know one another. They had a lot to discuss, with emphasis on making arrangements for communications during Ames’ upcoming tour in Rome. The meeting lasted a long time. Ames’ excuse for leaving Rosario and her family was that he wanted to do some Christmas shopping. However, when he did not return in good time, they began to worry about his safety. Luckily, Ames did return before they called the police, but it was a close shave.
In July 1986 Rick and Rosario left for Rome, where Rick was assigned as chief of the Enemy Targets Branch. This meant that he had responsibility for operations not only against the Soviet target, but also against the East Europeans, the Chinese, and the North Koreans.
As far as his espionage activities were concerned, they followed more or less the same pattern that had been developed in Washington. Again, a go-between was employed. This time it was a Soviet diplomat named Aleksey Khrenkov. However, the relationship between Ames and Khrenkov was somewhat different from that between Ames and Chuvakhin. Chuvakhin had always been a reluctant player, and he and Ames never had any conversations relative to the clandestine aspects of their lunch dates. Khrenkov, on the other hand, seemed to enjoy Ames’ company and from time to time stated that it was an honor to be dealing with him. We do not know whether Khrenkov was a deep-cover KGB officer. The CIA had no previous traces on him, but it is certainly possible. It is also possible that he was someone known to us, serving abroad in alias.
The procedure of exchanging shopping bags continued, with Ames handing over large volumes of Rome Station traffic and receiving money, vodka, and innocuous unclassified Soviet embassy handouts in return. It had been arranged with Mechulayev during the Bogota meeting that Khrenkov would be at a certain diplomatic reception in Rome and that Ames should be there too. They would meet casually in the course of the party and strike up a light conversation. Eventually, one or the other would extend an invitation for drinks or lunch. This charade was employed so that Ames would have a cover reason for his acquaintance with Khrenkov. Indeed, as had been the practice with Chuvakhin, at least at first, Ames duly reported each meeting with Khrenkov, describing it as low-key developmental activity. Because the CIA file on Khrenkov contains only three cables, some of this reporting must have consisted only of comments to Station management on the order of “By the way, I ran into Khrenkov the other day, but he didn’t have anything noteworthy to say.” Ames was faced with the same dilemma as in Washington. He wanted to cover himself by reporting his contacts, but he did not want to say anything that would cause anyone to pay particular attention to them. As it happened, he was lucky because senior Station management did not seem overly interested in the Soviet target and he was able to take advantage of this lack of attention.
The meetings with Khrenkov were supplemented by annual visits from Moscow by Mechulayev. After a clandestine car pickup, Khrenkov would drive Ames to the Soviet housing complex where Mechulayev would be waiting for him in a private room. As before, they would have a long sit-down meeting, discussing events so far and making plans for the future. During one of these meetings, Ames told Mechulayev about two cases that he had not included in the big dump. One was Sergey Fedorenko, the think-tank researcher who was run by the FBI and CIA in New York in the 1970s. The other was a Soviet academic whom Rick had also known in New York. It appears that Rick had some residual feeling for these individuals, because of his personal encounters with them, and was somewhat reluctant to betray them. However, by 1986 his loyalty to his KGB handlers overrode these qualms.
It was during one of these Rome meetings that Rick struck a new financial agreement with the KGB. It appears that, having promised him two million dollars in late 1985, there were no plans to pass him additional funds. However, Ames wanted a regular income so it was finally decided to pay him ten thousand dollars per month. He also received a bonus at the time of his son’s birth in November 1988.
Because he was always paid in cash, Ames began to have a money-laundering problem. To alleviate his situation, he opened two accounts at the Credit Suisse in Zurich and traveled there from time to time to make deposits. He would usually drive and take Rosario with him, because Zurich was her kind of town. Ames had bought a second-hand jaguar and, as he drove over the Alps, he pictured himself as the new James Bond. At least that is what he told his debriefers after he had been convicted and sentenced.
In July 1989 Ames and his family left Rome. They took some vacation time, and then proceeded to buy a home in North Arlington and decorate it to their liking. Before leaving Europe, Ames went to Switzerland to withdraw most of his ill-gotten gains from his bank accounts. It was this money that was used to buy the house.
After tending to his personal affairs, Ames reported for duty at CIA headquarters in September 1989. He was assigned as chief of the European Branch in the External Operations Group of the Soviet and East European Division. In this position he had access to information on all developmental cases and recruited assets run by the CIA against the Soviet and East European target in the European area. This was a position that must have been of high interest to his KGB handlers, but he held it for only a few months. In the wake of the upheavals in Eastern Europe he was transferred to be Chief of the Czechoslovak Operations Branch in January 1990, to manage the new opportunities now available in that country. In this position he had much less access to information of value to the KGB.
Another reassignment took place in August. Ames was chosen to serve on a p
romotion panel, ranking GS-12 officers and evaluating their eligibility for promotion to GS-13. He was now almost completely divorced from regular access to operational information, but no doubt gleaned some juicy personnel tidbits that could be of value to his handlers, should they ever decide to use them. Specifically, he reviewed the files of our officers under non-official cover, our most vulnerable employees. How much of this information he gave to the KGB is unknown. Ames says that he did not supply them with most of what was available to him, at least in any systematic way.
The panel lasted about two months. Ames did not return to SE Division, but moved to the Analysis Group of the Counterintelligence Center for a one-year rotational assignment. There his job was to provide analysis on the KGB. It was in this position that he got access to CIA holdings on the double agents being run by the U.S. military and the FBI against the KGB and GRU. He periodically copied this information from a computer database and passed it to the KGB, thereby compromising pretty much the entire program. He also had access to historical information on some of our most important Cold War cases. This too was passed. Professionally, he wrote a paper on the internal KGB, with emphasis on its regional offices, and one on the KGB’s relationship with Cuban intelligence.
Once his tour in the Analytic Group was at an end, Ames returned to SE Division for a short time. He was assigned to the “KGB Working Group,” and worked closely with the new division chief, Milt Bearden. His job was to think strategically about how the CIA should manage its dealings with the KGB in the future. This effort has been described as “placing a stake in the heart of the KGB,” but the evidence does not support that view. Indeed, as outlined in Chapter 13, the KGB was no longer considered a major adversary and Ames, as instructed by Bearden, wrote short conceptual reports about the new outlook.
Once his temporary assignment to the KGB Working Group was finished, Ames was transferred to the Counternarcotics Center, where he served as the officer responsible for Central Eurasia in the Regional Programs Branch of the International Counternarcotics Group (CNC/ICGRP). He remained in CNC until his arrest in February 1994.
We cannot take credit for assigning Ames to CNC, although it was an ideal place to put him as our suspicions continued to grow, and we kept him there as part of a conscious effort. Indeed we got him promoted to a more prestigious position in 1993. This served two purposes. First, he was required to serve in CNC for another year as part of his enhanced status. Secondly, he now had a private office. This permitted the FBI additional opportunities for video coverage of his activities.
Our interests in the counternarcotics arena are similar to those of Russia, and we have developed a cooperative relationship. Therefore Ames had little access to specific operational endeavors that would have been of use to his SVR handlers. (As previously noted, the foreign operations element of the KGB had metamorphosed into the SVR in December 1991.) However, he was still privy to such CIA matters as personnel assignments, policy and guidance directives, technical developments, and changes in our methods of operation.
Before Ames returned to the United States in the summer of 1989, he and his handlers had worked out a system of two-way dead drops in the Washington area. Ames would put down a package in a pre-arranged location. One drop site was located under a bridge. The package would be covered in dark plastic, such as is used for garbage bags, and would contain classified documents. Ames would then signal to the KGB that he had loaded the drop by making a mark. One such signal was a chalk mark on a mailbox in Georgetown. The KGB followed a reverse procedure. They would load a drop containing money and perhaps an operational note with questions for Ames or directions for future communications. Once they had loaded their drop they would signal to Ames and he would pick it up.
The above procedures worked successfully, but were only carried out a few times a year. just as had been done with Walker in the past, and was being done with Hanssen concurrently, it was possible for the KGB to circumvent FBI coverage. However, each exchange had its risks, and because they were infrequent Ames was limited in the amount of classified materials he could pass.
The drop system was supplemented by annual meetings either in South America or in Europe. As always, Ames preferred Bogota because he had a reason to go there. However, the KGB sometimes insisted on meeting in other venues, to include Vienna and Caracas. There were some hitches in the procedure, with Ames not always showing up where he was supposed to at the scheduled time, because of either his drinking or simple carelessness. At some point Mechulayev was taken off the case. He was replaced by Yuriy Karetkin. We do not know why the change was made, but it may have been caused by KGB management’s concerns over Rick’s undisciplined behavior and their lack of control over him.
Throughout the operation, the KGB and SVR generally paid Ames in non-sequential U.S. hundred-dollar bills but at least once during the Roman phase in Swiss francs or German deutsche marks. During his yearly meetings, he was handed $100,000 to $150,000 in currency. The procedure was for Ames to bring a stash of classified documents from the United States to each overseas meeting. Generally, he placed these in his carry-on luggage or in an empty computer carrying case. When he got his bundle of cash in return, he again used his hand luggage for transportation. In those pre-9/11 days, he relied on the fact that he was traveling as a U.S. official and that he did not fit the profile of a terrorist. Therefore he thought it unlikely that his luggage would be searched.
Not surprisingly, Ames had an ever-growing cash flow problem. His solution was to dribble his currency into the economy in relatively small amounts. He made cash deposits to his various bank accounts, and he paid Rosario’s credit card bills at local upscale department stores and boutiques the same way. Sometimes he had a cash backlog so he hid stacks of bills in his garage, where Rosario had access to them if needed.
We are often asked about Rosario’s role in Ames’ espionage career. As described in Chapter 16, some have concocted a theory that his espionage started in Mexico City in the early 1980s and that Rosario played a significant role from the beginning. However, this theory does not seem to be tenable.
According to stories told separately by Rick and Rosario after their arrest, in 1985 or 1986, when the money started to roll in, Rick explained to Rosario that the new income came from a friend named Bob in Chicago. When Rick was at the University of Chicago back in the 1960s, he had done Bob a favor by arranging an abortion for Bob’s girlfriend. In the intervening years Bob had become wealthy and when he heard that Rick was going to Rome, he asked Rick to take care of his European investments. This was a pretty unbelievable story because Bob did not manifest his existence in any way. He did not send a Christmas card, did not write or phone, and never visited the Washington area. Furthermore, as Rosario should have been aware, Rick had absolutely no qualifications to serve as anyone’s financial counselor.
In any event, Rosario must have known that Rick was up to something illegal because she co-signed his income tax returns each year. These were filled out as if Rick’s only substantial income was from his GS-14 salary, as reflected on his W-2 forms. On the other hand, we tend to believe that Rosario did not know that he was involved in espionage on behalf of the Russians until a year or so before their 1994 arrest. They both told a somewhat muddled story about her having found an operational message in one of Rick’s old wallets. She was upset for two reasons. First of all, this was serious business and could incur severe penalties. Secondly, she did not like Russians, believing them to be uncultured peasants.
All of this did not stop her from enjoying the ill-gotten gains, however. Before Rick made his last trip to Bogota, he and she had a conversation that was recorded by the FBI in which she discussed the money that he was going to get. And when he reached Bogota they had another conversation, this time on their tapped telephone, which indicated that she was anxious that everything would go smoothly and successfully. These conversations, plus her signature on the IRS forms, earned her a five-year prison sentence. After
she finished serving it, she left immediately for Colombia, where she still lives today with her family. The family had cared for her son while she was incarcerated. Typically, she accepts no responsibility for what happened, blaming everything on Rick.
What was Rick like as a person? Sandy first met Rick in the early 1970s when they were in the early stages of their careers as SE Division officers. Although they did not socialize outside the office, they came to know one another fairly well in 1975, when they, along with two other Division officers, carpooled. The rides to and from work were enjoyable, consisting of friendly banter and discussions of hypothetical operational scenarios. To Sandy the Rick Ames of the 1970s and early 1980s was simply a nice guy—easygoing, a good conversationalist, and comfortable to be around. Like an absent-minded professor, he was unpretentious in dress and manner. His hair was unkempt, his sock colors often did not match, his shirts were rarely pressed, and he was always late for the carpool whether he was the driver or the rider. However, none of that really mattered to his contemporaries at the office. Rick was just Rick—a gentle sort whose company his fellow officers enjoyed while silently laughing at his goofy physical appearance. This is not to say that he was always happy-go-lucky. Occasionally he became irritated, particularly if his operational judgment was questioned by those at his level. They might be equals, but he was a greater equal. Nevertheless, to this day Sandy insists that there was no way the Rick of those early years could have ever betrayed his colleagues and his country to become one of the most famous traitors of our time. He had neither the anger, the courage, nor the soul to commit such an act.
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