Jeanne’s contacts with Rick covered the same period, but were more casual. Like Sandy, she remembers him as being mildly unkempt, with hair that badly needed styling, teeth stained from his cigarette habit, and outmoded frames for his eyeglasses. On the other hand, she found him an interesting conversationalist, full of ideas. He was not the sort of person who bored his listener with descriptions of the traffic on his way to work or comments about the cafeteria menu. Like many who knew him superficially in the office, Jeanne as well as Sandy had no idea that his alcohol consumption was anything but normal.
In retrospect, there are some aspects of Rick’s background and persona that warrant comment. First of all, his father’s CIA career was a relative failure, a fact he must have known. Indeed, Rick has stated that he read his father’s personnel file. This is somewhat baffling because he should not have had access to this restricted record. Rick could not or would not explain how it happened. Yet it was important enough for him to have remembered it and mentioned it during his 1994 debriefings.
Rick’s mother, on the other hand, was a popular teacher at McLean High. In contrast to his father, his mother was successful in the career path she had chosen. It must not have been comfortable for Rick to be a student at a school where his mother was a teacher, but we do not know how he dealt with this situation.
Many have commented on Rick’s lack of self-discipline and tendency to procrastination. His unsuccessful career at the University of Chicago is an early example. Certainly he had the intelligence to succeed but, away from home for the first time, he failed to study or attend classes regularly. Throughout his career his managers recorded his inattention to submitting his financial accountings on time. And there was one fairly egregious instance where he neglected to submit a performance appraisal report (PAR) for one of his employees on time, finally handing in a sloppy, superficial product. It was so far below standards that, when the promotion panel convened to review all PARs for the year it was singled out for criticism and a formal memorandum was sent to Rick outlining his deficiency in the matter.
Along with his lack of self-discipline, Rick had a habit of doing only what interested him, and letting other things slide. As someone said, he “never had a boss.” When intellectually engaged, he could do a superior job and could articulate why a certain project was important or why it was necessary to make a specific decision. His work in the counternarcotics center in developing coordination between the countries bordering the Black Sea is an example. Even after his sentencing, he was still interested in how this initiative was faring.
Another example is his behavior vis-à-vis the GTWEIGH case in the summer of 1985. He had an advisory role in operational decisions involving Division sources and developmental cases outside the Soviet Union. For the first time in Sandy’s experience in the Africa Branch, Rick not only exercised his role on one of her cases, but did so forcefully. He was adamant in his disagreement with Sandy on the passage of funds in Moscow and repeatedly argued that the potential risk of compromise to Poleshchuk was too great.
What is of particular interest here, of course, is whether Rick was making this argument because he really believed it, even though he was working for the KGB and the position he was advocating worked against KGB interests. Jeanne believes that Rick was able to compartmentalize. Sometimes he was a straightforward, concerned CIA officer, with no heed to the fact that he was also a KGB spy.
Sandy disagrees with this interpretation. She contends that Rick wasn’t arguing his course of action because he really believed it was correct, even though it worked against KGB interests. She sees his action as a combination of guilt and self-preservation. Even Rick has some soul and it must have been almost unbearable waiting for his actions to culminate in the various arrests. Conversely, in his arrogant mind he could make himself look good by advocating the proper decision. He was in a position to say: “I told you all it was too dangerous. See how smart I am.” Lastly, his advocacy made him an unlikely suspect should GTWEIGH’s compromise lead to an immediate mole hunt.
Along with all this, as Sandy has noted, Rick had some of the attributes of an absent-minded professor. The most famous example of this trait is his behavior in New York, as recounted earlier. After meeting a sensitive asset, Rick took the subway to a rendezvous with the FBI. He got off the train, leaving his briefcase, which contained debriefing notes, behind. Luckily the FBI safely retrieved the briefcase for him.
While Rick would vehemently deny it, both Jeanne and Sandy sensed that, with the exception of his wives, he had a somewhat condescending attitude toward women. Although his first wife Nan outranked him and made more money than he did, which was unusual in those days, he remained extremely proud of her intellectual abilities and achievements. Moreover, after she left the Agency he often spoke glowingly of her work on the 1972 congressional campaign of Democrat joe Fischer, who ran against and defeated a well-known incumbent Republican. The same can be said of Rick’s respect for Rosario and her academic accomplishments. However, outside the house Rick’s offhand comments and demeanor left a different impression regarding his views on the ability of women in the workplace. Also, we had the distinct feeling that he was pleased to know that it was two women that were heading up the investigation of the 1985 compromises, because it would be easier to outwit us.
In the later days of his career, after he had become comfortable with his espionage activities, Rick exuded self-confidence, as if he was certain that he would never be caught. Whether this had anything to do with his attitude toward women, or whether it was associated with his long-held inability to face unpleasant facts, is moot, but it certainly existed. On Sandy’s first morning in the Counterintelligence Center, Rick nonchalantly walked into her work area to welcome her. After some small talk he casually asked about her new assignment. When told that she and Jeanne and two FBI representatives were going to try to find answers to our 1985 compromises, Rick immediately began a lecture on the most basic tenets of a counterintelligence investigation. “Sandy, the first thing you should do is look for differences between the cases we lost and the new sources we are currently and successfully running.” He added that he would be more than happy to offer any assistance. A few months later, Jeanne had a similar experience. The day after Rick had been interviewed by the task force, Jeanne and he happened to be waiting for an elevator at the same time. Rick mentioned the interview, said that he had given the problem some thought and, like he had with Sandy, offered his assistance.
Much has been made of Ames’ alcohol use. As we see it, he certainly abused alcohol on occasion and is best described as a binge drinker. Yet he could use alcohol normally on social occasions and he was not alcohol-dependent in the sense that he slipped some vodka into his orange juice every morning. Interestingly, neither of his two wives, when interviewed after the arrests, considered him a true alcoholic.
Rick probably began drinking early in adulthood. As noted in Chapter 12, there were two DUI incidents at the outset of his career, and he overindulged at two Christmas parties. The only time that his management took official notice of his drinking was in Mexico City. When Rick came back to headquarters after this assignment, he was called in by the Office of Medical Services for an interview. He admitted that he had been drinking too much, but attributed it to the breakup of his first marriage and the subsequent stress. He added that he was now on an even keel and alcohol was no longer a problem.
This was not the truth, however, because on one occasion in Rome he got dead drunk and was picked up by the police. Significantly, this happened while Rosario was away in Bogota visiting her family. She herself drank very little and did her best to limit his consumption when she was on the scene. For whatever reason, Station management never reported this lapse to CIA headquarters. Another binge took place not too long before his arrest. Once again he was out of Rosario’s control, on a trip to meet his KGB handler in Europe. He spent the night in a Zurich hotel. Rosario knew where he was and telephoned him. She go
t a thoroughly incoherent response when she reached him.
There were also occasions, both in Rome and at headquarters where Rick went out for lunch, had too much to drink, and came back and took a nap at his desk. These cannot have been too frequent, however, because most of his colleagues were not aware of any problem. In general, it appears that overindulgence in alcohol was a solitary pastime. When in company, he drank normally but, as he himself stated during his debriefings, sometimes he felt he “owed it to himself” to go to a bar and knock back a few vodkas.
HANSSEN AND AMES—A COMPARISON
AFTER AMES’ ARREST AND CONVICTION, Sandy and Jeanne bowed out of the “mole-hunting” business. Jeanne continued to work at the CIA part-time. She spent one year writing a classified study of the Ames case, then moved to a counterintelligence job that involved operations, not personnel. Sandy meantime devoted herself to her family and private life. However both were peripherally involved in what became, after many false starts, the Hanssen case. Both of them knew that there were several loose ends after Ames was arrested. Some CI leads that indicated a KGB penetration of the U.S. intelligence community just could not be made to fit with Ames’ access, no matter how hard the FBI tried.
First and foremost was the Felix Bloch case. As recounted earlier, Bloch was a U.S. State Department officer. In the spring of 1989, when the CIA got wind that he might be cooperating with the KGB, the FBI was immediately informed. Less than two months later, the KGB warned Bloch that he was under suspicion. Ames could not have known about this case. He was in Rome at the time and there was no Italian connection. One theory was that the French DST, which had helped with the surveillance of Bloch, could be responsible for the leak, but there was no evidence that this was so. Thus the case remained a question mark, and a burning one, in the minds of many.
Another operation involved an FBI technical penetration of a Soviet establishment in the United States. KGB technicians removed the FBI’s device and it looked as if they had known exactly where to search for it. The CIA was aware of the technical capability involved, but despite an intensive investigation, the FBI never could ascertain that anyone in the CIA knew about the specific device and its location.
Yet another operation concerned the FBI’s recruitment of a Soviet official in New York and his subsequent compromise. The CIA had been informed of the case because it had important implications for the collection of intelligence. However, after the compromise it appeared as if the KGB had information about the case not available in the CIA.
The investigation of non-Ames-related indications that there was a penetration of the U.S. intelligence community started in 1994, soon after Ames’ arrest. The FBI was the lead agency, and was convinced that the spy was to be found in the CIA. Eventually CIA officer Brian Kelley became the focus of suspicion and a broad array of the tools and techniques of an espionage investigation were employed over a period of years to prove that he was guilty. All of this was to no avail, however, because Kelley was innocent.
The FBI had made the mistake of narrowing their focus to one single person too early and ignoring the bits and pieces that did not fit. Not until late 2000 was the Bureau forced to admit that they had been wrong all along. The spy was one of their own: Robert Philip Hanssen. He had been working for the Soviets, first the GRU and later the KGB and its successor agency the SVR, since 1979. We find it ironic that the mantra of those criticizing our investigation of Ames was “What took you so long?” Yet, of the 1980s cases that caused major damage, Ames represents one of the fastest roll-ups. Hanssen spied successfully for more than twenty years. John Walker’s espionage career lasted some eighteen years. The Clyde Conrad ring operated for almost as long. It is also interesting to note that in these cases the CIA provided leads that helped in their denouement.
A comparison between Ames and Hanssen provides food for thought. Both were born in the United States as were their parents, and from the heartland. Hanssen’s father was controlling and abusive. Ames’ father appears to have been more of a withdrawn, passive type. Hanssen’s father was reasonably successful in his career on the Chicago police force, although there is some reporting that he retired under a cloud. Ames’ father, on the other hand, was something of a failure in his career. Hanssen’s mother deferred to her husband, as well she might. Ames’ mother was more assertive and outgoing.
Both Hanssen and Ames followed in their fathers’ footsteps. Hanssen joined the Chicago police force in 1972 and worked there for three years before obtaining FBI employment in 1976. As has been recounted, Ames started his CIA career as a teenager, and never worked anyplace else except for a short period in Chicago.
Both Hanssen and Ames are intelligent. They had IQs higher than most of those around them. But neither had a stellar academic career. Hanssen was a somewhat better scholar. He had poor undergraduate grades but managed to get an advanced degree in accounting. Ames flunked out of the University of Chicago. He then redeemed himself by managing to get a BA degree in history at George Washington University, with reasonably good grades, especially in the subjects that most interested him.
In matters of religion, Hanssen and Ames were at different ends of the pole. Ames never showed any interest in organized religion in adulthood, and is probably best described as an agnostic or even an atheist. His second wife was a Roman Catholic, but he did not join her church. Hanssen also married a Roman Catholic, but the results were very different. He converted from the Lutheranism of his youth and became a super-devout Catholic, often attending daily mass. He also joined the conservative Opus Dei movement and was given to proselytizing.
When it comes to personal lifestyle, there are obvious differences. As far as alcohol consumption is concerned, Hanssen drank little; Ames drank a lot on occasion and could not control his binges. They also diverged in their attitudes toward pornography. Hanssen was interested in pornography, and surfed the Internet in support of this interest. He even involved his wife though she was unwitting. He described her in sexual terms on the net, going so far as to use her real first name. In this same vein, he allowed his friend jack Hoschouer to view the two of them having sex, which again she did not know. Ames on the other hand was not very interested in sex, and was impotent at times. In any event, it is difficult to imagine him treating his wife with the disrespect that Hanssen showed his.
In 1985 both Hanssen and Ames volunteered separately to the KGB in Washington, DC. It was their idea. Both were in it at least partly for the money and neither was ideologically attracted to the USSR. However, both were interested in the Soviet Union and knew a fair amount about the country and its intelligence structure.
This was not Hanssen’s first experience as a Soviet spy. He had previously volunteered to the GRU in 1979 but his wife found out about his activities in 1980 and persuaded him to cut off contact.
Ames, who preceded Hanssen by several months in 1985, identified himself but Hanssen did not. Indeed, Hanssen never met any of his handlers while Ames had personal contacts with Washington CI chief Viktor Cherkashin, who managed both cases in the early years. It must have been comforting to Cherkashin when he discovered that there was such an overlap in their access and knowledge. Otherwise the reporting from Hanssen, the unknown quantity, would have been highly suspect. And, as the cases developed, Ames established close relations with his KGB handlers and admired them.
The timing is noteworthy. Ames worked for the CIA for more than twenty years before volunteering; Hanssen volunteered after three years. He made his approach to the GRU almost as soon as he got access to information that would interest the Soviet Union. Ames had had at least some access for many years, and broad access starting in the fall of 1983. Possibly there was some trigger, such as an especially hefty Nordstrom bill or unpalatable feedback from an Agency guidance counselor, which took him across the line in April 1985.
Both Ames and Hanssen communicated with their Soviet handlers via dead drops in the Washington area. Hanssen had no other form of communication,
but Ames also had personal meetings via a go-between in Washington and Rome, and direct personal meetings with his Moscow-based handlers in Europe and South America.
Ames was polygraphed twice after he began his espionage career. In both instances he managed to satisfy the operators that he was leveling with them. The polygraph was not an issue in the Hanssen case because he was never subjected to this kind of examination.
While Ames may have been nervous at the outset of his espionage activities, it seems that he gained confidence as time passed and he perceived no signs that he was under suspicion. When the SIU team interviewed him in 1992, he gave Sandy and Jeanne the impression that he thought that he was smarter than we were, and that he would have no trouble pulling the wool over our eyes. As we used to say at the time, he viewed us as “two dumb broads.” According to the FBI, when he was finally arrested he was dumbfounded. He did not see it coming. Hanssen, on the other hand, became more and more uneasy in the final months of his treason. His last written message to the SVR showed that he knew that his activities were bound to end in a highly unpleasant way.
FINAL THOUGHTS
WE HAVE OFTEN BEEN ASKED TWO QUESTIONS about the Ames case. One is what were the lessons learned and the other is whether there are any basic tenets of a successful CI investigation. Beginning with the lessons learned, they were few in number, and none was edifying. In retrospect, we should have done more in the way of documenting our progress by preparing periodic progress reports for the official record. Moreover, every time we or our FBI colleagues briefed our respective managements, we should have written a memorandum recording the occasion, the names of those briefed, and the contents of the briefing. If we had done this, we would have been spared some of the attempts by those who knew better to minimize their knowledge and thus their responsibility for what was judged at the time to be an investigation that had taken too long. When the joint unit first went into business in the summer of 1991, Jeanne did set up a log of “things to do.” The log included notations of what had already been done. However, Jeanne abandoned this log after a while because it appeared to be unnecessary, and just one more thing to slow us down. In retrospect, this was a mistake. In this same vein, we should have written a separate final report in 1992, or at least a CIA addendum to the FBI’s assessment, stating our conclusions as to who the spy was and who the spy was not and detailing the information that led us to that judgment.
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