Crossing the Buffalo

by Adrian Greaves

  Britain finally annexed the whole of Natal into the Cape Colony during 1845, including Boer-held territory. Reluctantly the Boer Volksraad acquiesced. They had overreached themselves and, by provoking the British, lost sovereignty over lands won by great sacrifice. Settlers continued arriving from Europe and Durban rapidly prospered as the influence of Pietermaritzburg declined. During the European upheaval in Natal, the Zulus under their new king, Mpande, had decided to avoid further confrontation with the whites and had withdrawn to the north side of the Buffalo and Tugela rivers.

  The following period was one of relative peace as King Mpande ruled the Zulu nation fairly but firmly according to Zulu custom; it was also a welcome period of consolidation after the internecine wars of 1838 and 1840. Having been preoccupied with internal politics and the successful rebuilding of his nation, King Mpande was able to turn his attention away from politics and towards the isigodlo and feasting, until he became too obese to walk; he was moved about in a small cart. His activities in the isigodlo produced nearly thirty sons; the firstborn was named Cetshwayo and was followed shortly by a brother named Mbulazi. As the king aged, schisms developed within the Zulu nation and the subservient chiefs and clans gradually inclined to either Cetshwayo or Mbulazi. The two brother princes were now in their early twenties. Cetshwayo was a traditionalist and much admired the regal days of Shaka whereas Mbulazi was more inclined to intellectual matters, though he was equally devious and powerful. In 1856 both sought to be king and, traditionally, resolution came through bloody conflict, perhaps the worst seen or recorded in South African history. Near Ndondakusuka Hill, Cetshwayo mustered 20,000 warriors, the uSuthu, and pitted them against Mbulazi’s 30,000 iziGqoza, who included many women and old men. The confrontation took place on the banks of an insignificant stream, the Thambo, which fed into the Tugela river. The battle lasted no more than an hour, with Mbulazi’s army being heavily defeated. In customary Zulu fashion, Cetshwayo gave orders for their total slaughter and only a handful of survivors escaped across the river. Cetshwayo was later song-praised for his victory as being the victor who ‘caused people to swim against their will, for he made men swim when they were old’.6

  Cetshwayo assumed command of the Zulu army, leaving the aged King Mpande a mere figurehead. Cetshwayo had long since observed the underlying tension between the British in Natal and the Transvaal Boers and knew he was in a position of considerable strength. He now had full control of Zululand and in order to strengthen his grip further he astutely courted friendship with the British, whereupon Shepstone, Secretary for Native Affairs, went to King Mpande and suggested that, in the name of Queen Victoria, Cetshwayo should be appointed heir apparent. The king accepted the proposal on behalf of the Zulus though Cetshwayo was aware that his future now depended, to a degree, on British support. King Mpande died in 1872 after thirty relatively peaceful years on the Zulu throne, a reign marred only by his two sons’ recent battle by the Tugela.

  In 1873, following a traditional wild animal hunt that saw the slaughter of a number of rare black rhinoceros, Prince Cetshwayo became king of Zululand and immediately sought British confirmation of his position. Shepstone readily agreed and, in a sham ceremony on 1 September 1873, Cetshwayo was crowned king of the Zulu nation, in the name of Queen Victoria. The ceremony became lively when a small grass fire swept into the camp. One headman seized the opportunity to steal two dozen bottles of medicine thinking they were gin; he became the first person to be executed under the new regime. King Cetshwayo, now in his mid-forties and perhaps the most intelligent of all the Zulu kings, ruled a united nation; his army was the strongest in southern Africa and the Zulus had a most powerful friend, Queen Victoria, and no apparent enemies. With his military position secure, King Cetshwayo began to strengthen his economic and political control.

  Since Shaka, young men had been obliged to serve in the army as a means of binding the nation together; this policy was now rigidly enforced. At the age of 18 all Zulu men were required to serve part-time in the amabutho as a form of national service. Each ibutho was given a distinctive name and ceremonial uniform of feathers and furs. Their war shields remained the property of the king, being issued only for special ceremonies or to settle disputes and to maintain the ibutho bond and identify its own warriors; ibutho shields were invariably of a matching colour. An ibutho was required to give service to the king only until such time as the men married, when their primary duty reverted to their families and local chiefs. To maximize the time the young men were available to serve them, the Zulu kings had often refused to allow a regiment to marry until the men were in their late thirties. The amabutho were the king’s active service units and in peacetime gave service at the king’s command, often as tax officials or by undertaking policing duties. When each regiment assembled to answer the king’s call they were fed and quartered at the king’s expense. Because it was logistically difficult to sustain such large concentrations of men for long periods, the amabutho were seldom mustered for more than a few weeks each year. For the most part the men lived at home with their families, fulfilling the normal duties of their ordinary civilian lives. An amabutho, apart from drawing young men together for military and work purposes, also served to accustom warriors to identifying the Zulu king as their leader, regardless of their origins. However, if young men came from an outlying area or had recently been absorbed into the Zulu nation, they were initially allocated menial work and were known as amalala (menials), amanhlwenga (destitutes) or iziendane (unusual hairstyles).

  Warriors allocated to their regimental amabutho remained celibate until the king authorized their ‘marriage’; this was another misunderstood concept that has often led to confusion. Zulu marriage has invariably been interpreted through European eyes with overtones of repressed sexuality and transposed with European values of marriage. To a Zulu, marriage denoted the most significant event of his life by giving him the right to take a number of wives; he was then free to establish his personal kraal and he could own land for his cattle and crops. King Cetshwayo controlled marriage as a means of keeping his young men under arms and out of the economic structure of Zululand. Had every warrior been permitted to establish his own kraal at will, the effect on various Zulu social processes, including production and reproduction, would have resulted in economic instability. Concomitantly, by delaying the time when Zulu women could marry, the birth rate, growth and pressure of an increasing population could be strictly controlled and maintained in line with economic production.

  Every Zulu knew his or her place and their society was efficient. Those who sought to escape the rigidity, strictness and dangers of King Cetshwayo’s rule had only one escape route – to flee to Natal.7 Many of the younger Zulus who fled to Natal saw the forthcoming British invasion as a means of settling old scores and regaining lost family lands – they were quick to volunteer for the fight.

  CHAPTER 3

  The Zulu Military and Their Tactics

  By 1878 the machine of military service in Zululand was, in effect, an integral part of everyday life in the kingdom although, unlike the British army of the time, the part-time Zulu army was neither professional nor well trained. The only military training Zulu warriors received took place during their initial induction into their age-set regiment; in all matters they relied on instructions from their indunas who, in turn, demanded absolute obedience from their warriors. British intelligence led Chelmsford to believe that the total strength of the Zulu army amounted to between 40,000 and 50,000 men immediately available for action. The total Zulu population in 1878 only amounted to some 350,000 people and so this figure is probably correct. At each year’s umKhosi or ‘First Fruits’ ceremony, held before the king at Ulundi, young men who had attained the age of about 16 years, known as inkwebane, were formed into companies or amaviyo, which after a year’s probation would be placed in an ibutho or regiment. This first year also symbolized the transition from boyhood to manhood as a warrior. The new inkwebane might either belong to anoth
er regiment with which the young one was incorporated, or be newly formed. As a rule several regiments of different ages were combined at the same ikhanda or barracks so that the young soldiers might have the benefit of the experience of their seniors and, when the latter died out, might take their place and maintain the name and prestige of the ikhanda. In this manner loyal corps were formed, occasionally some thousands strong.

  The Zulu army was soundly structured and consisted of twelve such corps, each with one or more regiments. These corps necessarily contained men of all ages, some being married, others unmarried, some being old men scarcely able to walk and others mere boys. Five of these corps consisted of a single regiment while the remaining corps was composed of several regiments. Each corps or regiment possessed its own ikhanda and was controlled by one commander, one second in command and several junior commanders who controlled the flanks in action. The uniform of the Zulu army was clearly laid down and was different in each corps. The great distinction was between the married and unmarried regiments: the former were obliged to shave the crown of the head and to wear a head-ring made of hemp and coated with a hardened paste of gum and grease; they also carried shields with predominantly white colouring whereas the unmarried regiments wore their hair naturally and had coloured shields. By the time of the Zulu War, the total number of regiments in the Zulu army amounted to thirty-four, of whom eighteen were married and sixteen unmarried. Seven of the former were composed of men over 60 years of age, so that for practical purposes there were only twenty-seven Zulu regiments fit to take the field, amounting to some 44,000 warriors. Intelligence figures of the day break these down as 17,000 between 20 and 30 years of age, 14,500 between 30 and 40, 5,900 between 40 and 50 and 4,500 between 50 and 60.

  At Ulundi the ibutho in residence was the uThulwana. These were the men who looked after the king and their work was rarely of a military nature; they maintained the nearby military amakhanda and engaged in planting, reaping and fulfilling the king’s wishes. Each amakhanda was cared for by a skeleton staff and was only occupied when the king called up its ibutho. There were twenty-seven amakhanda, or royal homesteads, scattered about the kingdom, thirteen of them located in the region of the Mahlabatini plain, near Cetshwayo’s residence at Ulundi. Ulundi itself was a huge complex of some 1,200 huts whose garrison was more or less permanently in residence.

  Tactical drill was unknown to the Zulu army though they could perform a number of essential movements with some accuracy, such as forming a circle of companies or regiments. Their skirmishing skills were extremely good, and, in the coming war, would be performed under heavy fire with the utmost determination. The officers had specific duties and responsibilities according to their rank, and discipline was most rigidly enforced. Commodore Sullivan, writing in August 1878, gave an accurate account of the discipline of the Zulu army. He stated that the regiments were so well disciplined that ‘the men never fell out of the ranks on the march under any pretext; they marched at the double, and were said to keep up from 50 to 60 miles daily, carrying their own provisions’.1 It was a warning that Lord Chelmsford disregarded.

  Unlike the lumbering British invasion force being assembled, the Zulu army required but little commissariat or transport. Three or four days’ provisions consisting of maize or millet and a herd of cattle accompanied each regiment. The older boys followed their allocated regiment and assisted in driving the cattle; they also carried the provisions and camp equipage, which consisted of sleeping mats and blankets. They would avoid rivers that were normally impassable but, when necessary, the Zulus adopted a remarkable method to get across: they would plunge into the water in a dense mass, holding on to one another, those behind forcing the others forward, and thus they would succeed in crossing, usually with the loss of only a few of their number. When hostilities were decided upon, the king sent out messengers; travelling night and day they would order the warriors to assemble in regiments at their respective amakhanda where their commanding officers would be sent to receive them. When corps or regiments were assembled at the headquarters they were usually ordered to proceed to the king’s royal homestead. Before marching, a circle, or umkumbi, was formed inside the homestead, each company together, and their officers in an inner ring with the first and second in command at the centre. The regiment then proceeded to break into companies, beginning from the left-hand side; each company formed a circle and then marched off, followed by uDibi boys carrying provisions, mats and food supplies. The company officers marched immediately in rear of their men, the second in command in rear of the left wing, and the commanding officer in rear of the right. This tried and tested plan was now set into operation to defend Zululand from the massing British invasion force.

  By the time of the British invasion the Zulu army possessed a large number of antiquated firearms. An English trader trusted by the Zulus, John Dunn, is often blamed for this trade but he only ever obtained permits to import 250 guns for King Cetshwayo. During the 1870s as many as 20,000 guns entered southern Africa through Mozambique alone, most of them intended for the Zulu market. The majority of these firearms were obsolete military muskets, dumped on the unsophisticated ‘native market’; this mass importation of firearms also contributed greatly to the destruction by Zulu hunters of remaining big game. More modern types were available, particularly the percussion Enfield, and a number of Zulu chiefs had collections of quality sporting guns. Some individuals, such as Prince Dabulamanzi and Chief Sihayo of Rorke’s Drift, were recognized as good shots but most Zulus were untrained and highly inaccurate; numerous accounts of Zulu War battles note both the indiscriminate use of their firepower and their general inaccuracy.

  It was a coincidence in favour of the Zulus that the British planned their invasion just as the Zulu regiments were assembling at Ulundi for the annual umKhosi. On arrival at the king’s royal homestead, certain additional and important pre-war ceremonies took place and various medicines were administered to the warriors to enhance their fighting capacity and render them immune from British firepower. On the third day after their assembly at the king’s homestead the medicine men sprinkled the warriors with magical muti or medicine, and after all necessary formalities were completed the warriors commenced their long march of some 70 miles towards the British border with Natal. The march was initially led by a corps specially nominated by the king, followed by the remainder of the army along the umsila or path beaten through the grass by the advance corps. The advancing Zulu army would have been similar to a British division advancing in line of brigade columns, each brigade in mass, each regiment in close column. The line of provision-bearers moved on the flank; the intervals between the head of columns varied, according to circumstances, from several miles to within sight of each other, and constant communication was kept up between them by runners. The march continued in this order but the baggage and provision-bearers fell in at the rear of the column on the second day and the cattle composing the commissariat were driven between them and the rearmost regiment until the force approached the advancing British force. When the latter were within striking distance the whole army formed an umkumbi for the purpose of enabling the commander-in-chief to address the men and to give his final orders for attack.

  The battle tactic for engaging the British was proven, efficient, simple and understood by every Zulu warrior. The Zulus historically favoured a dawn attack but were prepared to fight at any time. Military operations were always controlled by senior Zulus, usually from a remote vantage point, although one of their number could be dispatched into the battle to rally or lead if an assault faltered, as happened at Isandlwana. The Zulus made great use of spies; they had an elaborate system for obtaining and transmitting intelligence and were efficient at outpost duty. They already knew exactly where the British were and were able to report their every move back to the Zulu generals. Immediately prior to an attack the Zulus would be indoctrinated by sangomas (diviners and medicine men) and the use of cannabis and other narcotics as stimulants was w
idespread.

  Zulu tactics were based on the encircling movement, often wider than a mile across, which had developed over hundreds of years when hunting large herds of game. The actual Zulu battle formation resembled a crescent shape with two flanks moving to encircle the enemy. The formation was invariably known by Europeans as the ‘horns of the bull’ and by the Zulus as the impondo zankomo.

  The fast-moving encircling horns consisted of the younger, fitter warriors, with the body or chest made up of the more seasoned warriors who would bear the brunt of a frontal attack. The tactic was most successful when the two horns completed the encirclement of the enemy and relied, in part, on the main body of warriors remaining out of sight until the horns met – they would then rise up and close in to slaughter the victims. A large body of troops were also kept in hand as a reserve; they were usually held with their backs to the enemy to prevent their overexcitement. The commanders and staff would assemble, where possible, on high ground between the battle and their reserves, all orders being delivered by runners. No great changes had been introduced into Zulu tactics consequent on the introduction of firearms, though in addition to firearms each man usually carried four or five spears. One short and heavy-bladed spear was used solely for stabbing and was never parted with; the others were lighter, and sometimes thrown. The men armed with firearms rarely carried a shield. Features of the attack were speed and precision; the Zulu force would approach an enemy, be it native, Boer or now the British, in huge columns that could then rapidly deploy into an encircling movement.