Crossing the Buffalo

by Adrian Greaves

  Harmony was further enhanced with the arrival of the Reverend George Smith in his new capacity of military chaplain; he was a huge and bearded man and was formerly of the local Estcourt parish. The same reporter wrote of him:

  It is an impressive scene to witness 1,000 warlike men, in various uniforms, form square, and join a robed priest, standing in the centre, with a band of musicians – vocal and instrumental, in the worship of Almighty God. This is one of the greatest civilising influences which the forces could carry with them.9

  During the week leading to the expiry of the ultimatum, Chelmsford learned that the three columns were fully equipped and ready to invade Zululand. Colonel Pearson’s Coastal Column consisting of 1,800 Europeans and 2,000 auxiliaries and Colonel Wood’s Northern Column with 1,700 Europeans and 300 black auxiliaries were both ready for the advance; indeed, Wood had already started his advance on 6 January, five days before the expiry of the ultimatum. The main attacking Centre Column, commanded by Colonel Glyn with 1,600 Europeans and 2,500 auxiliaries, had moved down during November from Helpmekaar to Rorke’s Drift. There were two small columns held in reserve. One of these, commanded by Colonel Rowlands VC, was to stay just inside the Transvaal border. The role of this column was twofold: to be ready if called upon by Chelmsford and to keep an eye on the unsympathetic Boers who had been disillusioned since the leaking of the Border Commission’s findings against them. The other reserve column, commanded by Colonel Durnford, was at Middle Drift on the Tugela river to protect the Natal border from any Zulu incursion. Theoretically Durnford had a force of 3,000 auxiliaries but his actual establishment amounted to only 500, of whom half were the élite and very loyal Edendale Contingent (known to many as the ‘Natal Native Horse’, a term used in the writings of Frances Colenso, daughter of the Bishop of Natal). He also had at his disposal a small rocket battery commanded by Major Russell RA.

  On 10 January a general order was read to the patiently waiting troops: the Centre Column was to prepare to strike tents at 3 a.m. the following day, cross the Buffalo river and march into Zululand. At that time the camp was aroused by the trumpet calls of the different corps to feed their horses, and after a very early breakfast tents were struck; ‘boot and saddle’ was sounded, followed by ‘prepare to mount’, and then ‘mount and fall in’. By 4 a.m. not a vestige of the cavalry camp could be seen; tents and baggage were all packed on wagons, and each corps was standing in line, formed ready to march. The police led off, followed by the Carrington Horse, while the volunteers brought up the rear. Once under way, the trumpet call ‘trot’ was sounded, and then the stillness of the moonlit scene was broken by the martial sound of cavalry on the move. As dawn approached, they reached Rorke’s Drift and joined the patiently waiting columns of the 24th Regiment.

  CHAPTER 6

  The Five Invading Columns

  It is rumoured that Cetywayo is somewhat puzzled to know what to do.1

  LORD CHELMSFORD

  There can be little doubt that Lord Chelmsford fully expected an early and easy victory over the Zulu army. His officers and most of their troops were already experienced in African warfare and his main fear was that the Zulus would not fight or that his campaign would deteriorate into a series of ‘hit and run’ skirmishes similar to those he had recently experienced in the Eastern Cape Colony against the amaXhosa.

  The standard battle tactic employed by the British in South Africa had already proved to be completely successful. It relied on a combination of in-depth reconnaissance followed by ruthless skirmishing. In rough country, both the infantry and mounted troops would engage the enemy, the infantry by volley fire and the mounted troops by attacking them in flight. Chelmsford knew that in the unlikely event of the Zulus appearing in any number the British would form a square or entrench their position to draw the Zulus into the range of their overwhelming firepower. In Chelmsford’s opinion, well-aimed rifle volley fire by calm and experienced troops supported by rockets and artillery, and, later in the campaign, Gatling guns, would ensure the swift defeat of the Zulu army.2

  In order to ensure that the Zulu army would be brought to battle, Chelmsford devised a three-pronged invasion that would advance on the Zulu capital, Ulundi. Each ‘prong’ or column was thought to be strong enough to engage and defeat the Zulu army. As already mentioned, the actual tactic was remarkably similar to the Zulu tactic of the ‘horns of the bull’ and the irony of its use by the British would not have escaped King Cetshwayo and his advisers.

  Chelmsford originally intended that five columns would converge on Cetshwayo’s capital but later modified his plan to just three, the Coastal, Centre and Northern Columns. On 8 January Chelmsford wrote:

  All the reports which reach me tend to show that the Zulus intend, if possible, to make raids into Natal when the several columns move forward. The strength of the three columns, Nos.1,3, and 4 is only just sufficient to enable them to advance.3

  No. 1 Coastal Column

  Chelmsford’s orders to Colonel Pearson read:

  To cross the Tugela at Fort Pearson and encamp on the Zulu side; when ordered to advance, to move on to Eshowe, and there, or in its neighbourhood, to form a depot, well entrenched.4

  In tactical terms, a Coastal Column in support of the main Centre Column was a sound move but one which overlooked the unseasonable bad weather, rugged terrain, prevalent sickness and the constant threat of an enemy whose tactical abilities and bravery were badly underestimated by senior officers.

  Colonel Pearson’s Coastal Column assembled at the Lower Drift of the Tugela river and was tasked with the role of marching along 37 miles of rough twisting tracks to occupy the mission station at Eshowe before the Zulus destroyed the buildings. Here the column’s supply wagons were to be unloaded and returned to pick up more stores while defences were built to convert Eshowe into a fortified advanced supply depot. From Eshowe it was intended to advance on Ulundi in a converging movement with the other two columns.

  No. 2 Reserve Column

  Chelmsford’s orders to Colonel Durnford were:

  To form a portion of No. 1 Column, but act separately, reporting to Colonel Pearson;to remain on the middle Tugela frontier until an advance is ordered, and Colonel Pearson has reached Eshowe.5

  The Middle Drift near Fort Buckingham was one of the few places where, when the river was low, the water level dropped to a depth of some 3 feet; although this stretch of water was still about 100 yards across and fast flowing, the river could be crossed on foot with caution. The role of this Reserve Column, under the command of Colonel Anthony William Durnford RE, was to guard the drift.

  Durnford was the eldest son of General E.W. Durnford, Colonel Commandant, Royal Engineers. He was born on 24 May 1830 and was educated chiefly in Germany. He entered the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich in July 1846 and obtained a commission as second lieutenant in the Royal Engineers on 27 June 1848. He then enjoyed numerous and varied postings. At the end of 1871 he embarked for South Africa; upon his arrival he was employed for a short time at Cape Town and King William’s Town, and then proceeded to Natal where he formed one of the military escorts which accompanied the Minister for Native Affairs into Zululand to be present at the coronation of King Cetshwayo in August 1873. He subsequently acted as Colonial Engineer in addition to performing his own duties and under his superintendence much valuable engineering work was undertaken for the Colony.

  Durnford came prominently into public notice towards the close of 1873, at the time of the Langalibalele affair, when he was the senior officer of Royal Engineers in Natal. Durnford had been sent in charge of a small group of Colonial soldiers to disarm the rebellious Zulu leader, Chief Langalibalele, who held sway in the steep foothills of the Drakensberg mountains. In bad weather Durnford’s horse, Chieftain, lost its footing and fell, taking Durnford down a rocky slope. The horse rolled over Durnford who sustained serious injuries to his shoulder, arm and two ribs. He nevertheless continued with the mission to find Langalibalele. Durnford’s orders
were to disarm Langalibalele’s warriors without force – if possible. Durnford’s small group became surrounded and, reluctant to open fire, sought to escape. The Zulus opened fire and began stabbing the riders, killing five of Durnford’s men. The expedition was unsuccessful and Durnford was unjustly blamed by the civilian authorities for the loss of his men. Later, in 1878, he was one of the commissioners on the disputed Zulu boundary, whose award restored to the Zulus a considerable portion of territory.

  Durnford had been pleased with his appointment to the No. 2 Column, as he wrote to his mother:

  The Governor has been pleased to express his confidence in me. I shall have some 3,000 men, infantry, cavalry and a rocket battery. So the command is at least a respectable one for a Lieutenant Colonel.6

  While awaiting further orders, Durnford moved his main force to the small homestead at Kranskop, some 5 miles from the Middle Drift but with good access to any possible Zulu crossing points. His most recent orders were to send part of his force northwards to prevent the Zulus crossing into Natal and to be prepared to support Colonel Pearson’s Coastal Column once the border was secure. The final section of the order was unclear and Durnford was about to succumb to its ambiguity. The orders gave him permission to engage the Zulus if he considered such action necessary to prevent an attack but he was then to return to the Natal side of the border; otherwise, he was to await further orders.

  On 13 January Durnford received a report from Bishop Schroeder intimating that the Zulus were massing near Middle Drift prior to invading Natal. This communication seemed, at first sight, to make sense; after all, this was the very circumstance that Durnford was ordered to prevent. Durnford had not yet complied with Chelmsford’s instruction to send troops towards the north; he accordingly cancelled their impending move and sent an urgent dispatch to Chelmsford informing him that he was about to engage the Zulus with his whole force at Middle Drift. Durnford ordered his men to prepare for an advance towards the river, obviously with a view to engaging the Zulus reported by Bishop Schroeder. While preparations were under way a mounted orderly arrived with an urgent dispatch from Chelmsford; its content both startled and distressed Durnford. It read:

  Unless you carry out the instructions I give you, it will be my unpleasant duty to remove you from your command and to substitute another officer for the command of No 2 Column. When a column is SEPARATELY in an enemy’s country I am quite ready to give its commander every latitude and would certainly expect him to disobey any orders he might receive from me, if information which he obtained showed that it would be injurious to the interests of the column under his command. Your neglecting to obey the instructions in the present instance has no excuse. You have simply received information in a letter from Bishop Schroeder, which may or not be true and which you have no means of verifying. If movements ordered are to be delayed because reports hint at a chance of an invasion of Natal, it will be impossible for me to carry out my plan of campaign. I trust you will understand this plain speaking and will not give me any further occasion to write in a style which is distasteful to me.7

  Durnford was certainly stung by such a severe rebuke, and Chelmsford would hold the matter against him to deadly effect in the coming weeks. On this occasion Chelmsford was right; there was no Zulu force at Middle Drift, which added to Durnford’s embarrassment. The following day Durnford received fresh orders from Chelmsford to move towards Rorke’s Drift; whether Chelmsford had decided to keep Durnford on a tighter rein or not is uncertain. By 19 January Durnford’s force reached a point between Helpmekaar and Rorke’s Drift when he received the following order:

  No.3 Column leaves tomorrow for Isandhlwana hill [sic] and from there as soon as possible to a spot about 10 miles nearer to the Qudeni forest. From that point I intend to operate against the two Matyanas [local chiefs] if they refuse to surrender. I have sent you an order to cross the river [Buffalo] at Rorke’s Drift tomorrow with the force you have. I shall want you to cooperate against the Matyanas but will send you fresh instructions on this subject.

  Later that day Durnford was instructed to cross the Buffalo river, await further orders and make camp on the Zulu side.

  No. 3 Centre Column

  Chelmsford’s orders to Colonel Glyn read:

  No.3 Column to cross at Rorke’s Drift when the thirty days expired; to move forward and form an advanced depot, strongly entrenched, as found advisable from the nature of the country, etc. To assist in clearing the border south-east of Rorke’s Drift, and to keep up communication with the columns on left and right.8

  The backbone of the Centre Column consisted of the two regular battalions of the 24th (2nd Warwickshire) Regiment. It was coincidental, and certainly unusual, that both battalions of this regiment were to serve alongside each other for the advance into Zululand. Both battalions were enthusiastic at the prospect of leading operations against the Zulus. The very experienced 1st Battalion had not seen home service since arriving in South Africa on 4 February 1875 after a series of Mediterranean postings. They were tough and battle-hardened after four years’ active campaigning during the ninth Frontier War at the Cape. The 2nd Battalion, with twenty-four officers and 849 other ranks, had arrived in South Africa on 28 February 1878 and shortly afterwards took up their duties at King William’s Town. Both battalions were then engaged in quelling small pockets of rebellion throughout the Cape area; this added experience helped to toughen the regiment in preparation for the arduous campaign looming in Natal. During the operations against the native tribes, neither battalion had sustained significant casualties. Only two officers, Captain Carrington and Lieutenant Godwin-Austen, were wounded, one man was killed and a few wounded (though from disease the loss was higher, eighteen men of the 1/24th and twenty-one of the 2/24th). Both battalions had earned much praise by their cheerfulness in facing hardships and discomforts and by their good conduct and discipline in the field. General Thesiger (later Lord Chelmsford) spoke in the highest terms of both battalions, emphasizing how well the younger soldiers, of whom the 2/24th was in large measure composed, had come through this severe ordeal of hard work in the face of difficult conditions. Likewise, the soldiers respected Chelmsford, as the Natal Witness reported:

  The headquarter staff camp is pitched to the right of all the others, almost in the centre as you walk from one end to the other. The Union Jack flies in front of the tent of the General, and his mule wagons are placed in position behind; otherwise there is nothing to show the difference between it and the other camps. His Excellency is much liked, and sets a good example to the men under him. He rises at daylight, and when on the march assists in striking and pitching his own tent. His manner is exceedingly affable to all, and he seems to have the happy knack of thoroughly understanding at once what is meant to be conveyed to him, although it may be wrapped up either in eloquence or long-windedness. His love of punctuality is well known through the camp, and of course leads to the same system in others.9

  By July 1878 rumours were beginning to spread throughout Natal that King Cetshwayo was threatening to invade the province; consequently the 2nd Battalion was directed to Pietermaritzburg where its personnel assembled on 6 August. The 1st Battalion was not long in following the 2nd; it had been back at King William’s Town about a month when C and D Companies, under Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Henry Pulleine, were also ordered to Pietermaritzburg. It was to be the fate of the 1st Battalion and one company of the recently arrived 2nd Battalion to face the Zulu attack at Isandlwana where almost all the men and officers involved would be killed. On the very same day, B Company of the 2nd Battalion would initially suffer the ignominy of being left behind at Rorke’s Drift to guard the stores and then, within hours, find themselves facing potentially overwhelming numbers of Zulus seeking to destroy the position.

  No. 4 Northern Column

  Chelmsford’s orders to Colonel Wood VC were:

  To advance to the Blood River. In the event of a further advance, the advance depot of this column to be near the in
tersection of the roads from Utrecht to Ulundi, and Rorke’s Drift to Swaziland; but to delay its advance towards the Umvolosi River until the border is cleared, and to move in a southerly direction towards Colonel Glyn’s column to assist it against Sirayo.10

  Chelmsford appointed Brevet Colonel Sir Evelyn Wood VC as Column Commander for the advance across the difficult northern area of Zululand and home to the most aggressive Zulu group, the abaQulusi. Chelmsford had long since recognized in Wood the attributes he admired and would thereafter use him as a sounding board and allow him considerable autonomy. Wood was one of the most highly decorated officers of the Victorian era and his career was rich in incident and bravery. He was born on 9 February 1838 at Cressing, near Braintree, Essex, into a clerical background. In June 1857 he transferred from the Royal Navy to the army and exchanged into the 17th Lancers who were being sent to help quell the Indian Mutiny. A wealthy uncle had been persuaded to purchase his nephew promotion to lieutenant and, because he had learned to speak Hindustani, he was appointed to the post of interpreter. This led to his secondment to the 3rd Bombay Cavalry, with whom he saw repeated action. It was in 1859, with the Mutiny over, that Wood won his Victoria Cross for attacking the camp of a band of robbers who outnumbered his small force by about ten to one. He killed several, put the rest to flight and rescued two captives.

  Having delivered the column to the garrison town of Pietermaritzburg, Wood and the 90th were sent north to Utrecht in the Disputed Territory on the Zululand border. Frere had initially appointed Wood as political agent for North Zululand and Swaziland to enlist support for the British invasion from the Boer population.