As to Lord Chelmsford’s orders to Colonels Pulleine and Durnford before leaving the camp on the morning of January 22nd, the evidence adduced before the Court of Inquiry conclusively proved that the former was directed to defend the camp, whilst the latter was to move up from Rorke’s Drift and take command of it on his arrival. Colonel Durnford would consequently, on assuming command, take over and ‘be subject to the orders given to Colonel Pulleine by Lord Chelmsford’. [Original italics]11
Durnford’s character was ruined beyond redemption. Notwithstanding the decision of the court to vindicate Chelmsford, it is relevant to raise the question: who actually had command at Isandlwana? The answer has to be Pulleine. Chelmsford never intended the two columns to merge and it is inconceivable that he would not have referred to such an important policy change in his orders. It was later ‘leaked’ by Chelmsford’s staff that Durnford and Pulleine had hotly discussed the issue of taking Imperial troops from the camp to deter the Zulu advance, but Lieutenant Cochrane, who was present, denied that this was so. It seems more likely that Durnford wished to strengthen the weak position to the north of the camp but at the same time also protect the rear of his mounted men as he moved towards Chelmsford’s location at Mangeni. Pulleine’s concern was apparently shared by some of the camp’s officers who felt that the removal of such a large part of the camp’s force did not accord with Chelmsford’s orders. Durnford’s two reconnaissance troops were still out on the Nqutu plateau, and without their reports neither Durnford nor Pulleine knew what the Zulus were intending. Cochrane recalled that Lieutenant Melvill, the adjutant of the 1/24th, approached Durnford and said:
‘Colonel, I really do not think Colonel Pulleine would be doing right to send any men out of camp when his orders are to defend the camp.’ Durnford replied: ‘Very well, it does not much matter. We will not take them.’12
Following Durnford’s departure to intercept the advancing Zulus, two companies of the 1/24th had been marched from the camp to the spur leading to the Nqutu plateau. The suggestion may originally have been Durnford’s but Pulleine had clearly thought it necessary. One of the two companies so dispatched was quickly overrun by the advancing Zulus; the other just made it back to the camp before it too was annihilated. The whole question of Durnford’s orders has previously hinged upon the supposition that Durnford received specific orders from Chelmsford to take charge of the camp. Following Isandlwana, Chelmsford reproduced from memory his recollection of this particular order for his official report and expediently backdated it to 19 January; he knew that the original order had never been found and no one challenged his account. The replacement version of the order, using Chelmsford’s remembered words, reads:
Head Quarter Camp
Rorke’s Drift, Zululand
19 January 1879
No 3 Column moves tomorrow to Insalwana Hill and from there, as soon as possible to a spot about 10 miles nearer to the Indeni Forest.
From that point I intend to operate against the two Matyanas if they refuse to surrender.
One is in the stronghold on or near the Mhlazakazi Mountain;the other is in the Indeni Forest. Bengough ought to be ready to cross the Buffalo R.at the Gates of Natal in three days time, and ought to show himself there as soon as possible.
I have sent you an order to cross the river at Rorke’s Drift tomorrow with the force you have at Vermaaks.
I shall want you to operate against the Matyanas, but will send you fresh instructions on this subject.
We shall be about 8 miles from Rorke’s Drift tomorrow.
In 1885, in an unusual twist of fate, the commanding officer of the Royal Engineers in Natal, Colonel Luard, heard rumours of a ‘cover-up’. This related to the surreptitious removal of Chelmsford’s written orders to Durnford from his (Durnford’s) body by the then Captain Shepstone of Chelmsford’s staff. Luard cautiously advertised his fears in the Natal Witness newspaper and on 25 June 1885 he received the following significant reply:
P.M.B. 25 June 85 ORIGINAL TEXT
F. Pearse & Co
14 Cole St.
E.D. Natal Witness Office
Dear Sir
Referring to yr. Advertisement wh. Appeared a few weeks ago in the Natal Witness respecting relics of the late Colonel Durnford. I write to inform you that I have in my possession a document which was picked up by my brother A. Pearse late trooper in the Natal Carbineers. It appears to be the instructions issued by Lord Chelmsford to the late Colonel on taking the field.
I have written to my brother to ascertain whether he is willing to part with it in the event of your wishing to have it in your possession.
Yours truly
(signed) F. Pearse
These original orders were discovered on or near Durnford’s body by Trooper Pearse who was searching for another brother, also a trooper and presumed killed. The papers were in a poor condition, having been subjected to several months of weathering; at the time of their discovery some parts were so fragile that they could not easily be unfolded or read. The details on the envelope and the location when found were clearly sufficient for Pearse to realize that the envelope contained Chelmsford’s instructions to Durnford. They were possibly kept as a battlefield keepsake but in consequence of the advertisement, Pearse forwarded the papers to the editor of the Natal Witness who promptly delivered them to Luard.
The discovery of Chelmsford’s original orders to Durnford provoked Luard to write to Sir Andrew Clarke, Head of the Corps of Royal Engineers, with a plea to reopen the enquiry. This was duly approved although the Acting High Commissioner in South Africa was quick to see the implications for Chelmsford and wrote to Luard before the court convened at the end of April 1886, ‘I have taken measures to limit proceedings and to prevent, I trust, the possibility of other names, distinguished or otherwise, being dragged into it’.14 Shepstone, now a successful lawyer, agreed to attend a new Court of Enquiry.
To Luard’s surprise, those in authority maintained the conspiracy against Durnford and, worse, certain important witnesses who could have given evidence were refused leave from the army and the civil authorities. The enquiry was strictly limited to the investigation of whether or not papers had been removed from Durnford’s body. Without being able to refer to relevant evidence, or call vital witnesses, Luard’s case crumbled. The conspirators’ ‘cover-up’ succeeded, Shepstone was cleared and Luard was obliged to apologize to Shepstone. And there the matter rested – for the time being.
At a date unknown, the envelope and orders were forwarded to the Royal Engineers Museum at Chatham where they lay, presumably unread, until discovered in 1990 by two researchers, Jackson and Whybra, who painstakingly analysed the orders. The orders are in two parts; the first relevant part was Chelmsford’s original order, genuinely dated 19 January 1879, and it is on this order that Durnford must have based so much of his decision-making when he arrived at Isandlwana. The original text is reproduced below and the order leaves little doubt what was in Chelmsford’s mind when he wrote it. The order differs considerably from Chelmsford’s later recollection, printed above.
NB Where a word or words are unreadable, a possible interpretation is included in bold.
Lieut. Colonel Durnford R.E
Camp Helpmakaar
1. You are requested to move the troops under your immediate command viz.: mounted men, rocket battery and Sikeli’s men to Rourke’s Drift tomorrow the 20th inst.;and to encamp on the left bank of the Buffalo (in Zululand).
2. No.3 Column moves tomorrow to the Isandhlana Hill.
3. Major Bengough with his battalion Native Contingent at Sand Spruit is to hold himself in readiness to cross the Buffalo at the shortest possible notice to operate against the chief Matyana &c. His wagons will cross at Rourke’s Drift.
4. Information is requested as to the ford where the above battalion can best cross, so as to co-operate with No.3 Column in clearing the country occupied by the chief Matyana.
By Order, H. Spalding. Major DAAG
This penultimate order to Durnford, signed and sent by Crealock, preceded the final order that was received by Durnford at Rorke’s Drift on 22 January. Durnford was clearly ordered to ‘co-operate with No. 3 Centre Column in clearing the country occupied by the chief Matyana’; likewise, he was never ordered to take command of the temporary camp at Isandlwana. In essence, Durnford did exactly as he was ordered. Because the final order is so ambiguous, it is reproduced exactly:
You are to march to this camp at once with all the force you have with you of No.2 Column.
Major Bengough’s battalion is to move to Rorke’s Drift as ordered yesterday. 2nd 24th, Artillery and mounted men with the General and Colonel Glyn move off at once to attack a Zulu force about 10 miles distant.15
In 2001 yet another set of Chelmsford’s orders came to light; they had also been recovered as a souvenir from the battlefield and had since been held in private ownership without their significance being noted. The orders were addressed to the officer in command at Helpmekaar and the hypothesis has to be that they were Glyn’s original orders. With minor exceptions, these recently discovered orders match those of Durnford. At last there is additional evidence to prove that both Pulleine and Durnford totally obeyed Chelmsford’s orders. It is also evident that, after Isandlwana, Chelmsford’s original orders to Durnford and received by him on the day of battle were later ambiguously reworded by Crealock to vindicate Chelmsford and his staff – a deliberate action to incriminate Durnford. One must presume, therefore, that Chelmsford’s staff believed that the actual orders had been destroyed on the battlefield; indeed, until recently there was no indication that these orders even existed.
Early on the morning of 22 January 1879, the same day as Isandlwana, Pearson’s column was attacked near the Nyezane river. Pearson arranged his troop dispositions according to Chelmsford’s instructions to all column commanders, i.e. the same instructions as issued to Durnford and Glyn (and inherited by Pulleine).
Although separated by 50 miles, the respective troop deployments by Pulleine and Pearson on 22 January correspond exactly to both known sets of Chelmsford’s orders. It is unlikely to have been a coincidence as within hours Colonel Wood’s Northern Column dispersed a strong force of Zulus near Hlobane mountain 40 miles to the north of Isandlwana; Wood also used identical tactics in accordance with the orders.
In 1998 a further remarkable set of documents was discovered; three bundles of faded letters were about to be discarded when it was realized they related to the Zulu War. They were the letters of Lieutenant Curling RA, the only surviving British officer who fought and witnessed events on the British front line at Isandlwana. His letters provide a fascinating insight into what really happened at Isandlwana as well as casting some doubt on the previously accepted theories of the RA guns’ final position after the British defeat. The crux of the difference between Curling’s eyewitness version and that previously guessed by modern historians is that Curling saw the horses and limbers overturn beside Black’s Koppie whereas the historians consistently maintained that the guns ran along the ravine for some 400 yards and then stuck.
Curling also wrote a report for the Court of Enquiry though it is not surprising that the enquiry members ignored his evidence; his account confirmed Pulleine’s inability, probably as a result of his lack of fighting experience, both to prepare for the Zulu attack and then to take appropriate measures to counter it. On 28 April Curling wrote to his mother from the Victoria Club, Pietermaritzburg:
I am sorry to say our column is still to be commanded by the General [Lord Chelmsford]. I feel these disasters have quite upset his judgement or rather that of his staff and one does not feel half so comfortable under his command as with a man like Col. Wood. Our column is likely to be the one that will have all the fighting.16
Indeed, Chelmsford formally sought to be returned to the UK on the grounds of ill health. On 9 February 1879 he wrote:
In June last I mentioned privately to His Royal Highness The Duke of Cambridge, Commander in Chief, that the strain of prolonged anxiety and exertion, physical and mental was even then telling on me – What I felt then, I feel still more now.17
The Standard quipped:
No such appeal to the Authorities of England for dismissal from a position to which Lord Chelmsford felt himself unequal had ever before been addressed to them by a General in the field commanding Her Majesty’s troops.18
He was not replaced until after the battle of Ulundi on 4 July 1879.
Matters were no less complicated following the battle for Rorke’s Drift. Before Chelmsford departed from Helpmekaar, he not only gave specific instructions for a formal enquiry to be conducted into the Isandlwana defeat, but also ordered a further report concerning the victory at Rorke’s Drift. Chelmsford’s own correspondence reveals that he was most anxious to receive the account, although it is not known who ordered the report or who was to write it. As early as 28 January Chelmsford wrote to Glyn:
I hope you are sending me in a report of the defence of Rorke’s Drift post and also the names etc of the killed during that gallant fight.19
A further request from Chelmsford’s staff officer reached Glyn on 31 January; it is ambiguous as it relates to ‘reports’, indicating that Chelmsford was expecting at least two reports, presumably concerning Isandlwana and Rorke’s Drift. He wrote:
Your immediate attention is called to the fact that no reports have been received from you regarding the entrenchment of your column or of the occurrences of the 22nd instant;neither has any return of casualties been made.20
Back at Rorke’s Drift, the soldiers would have normally occupied themselves with writing letters home but all available paper had been burnt in the fire or destroyed during the fighting. When Commandant Hamilton-Browne sought to arrange a field court martial for a captured Zulu spy he had great difficulty finding paper or pens to record the proceedings. All of a sudden, paper had become a very rare commodity; one soldier, Private Robert Head, was so desperate to write a letter to his brother with the news that he was still alive that he paid one shilling, a day’s pay, for a scrap of paper burnt on two edges. This scrap of a letter survived – but the true identity of the soldier remains unknown as there was no Private Robert Head recorded either in the 24th Regimental records or on the list of Rorke’s Drift defenders. Presumably he wrote home using his correct name but at the time of his enlistment used a false name.
Lieutenant George Stanhope Banister of the 2/24th, having accompanied Chelmsford during the previous four days, was unexpectedly appointed as assistant garrison adjutant at Rorke’s Drift. Because the Zulus had destroyed the officers’ tents, there was no writing paper; Banister wrote a brief note to his father dated 27 January 1879: ‘No paper or pens or in fact any single thing. I have managed to get some foolscap in my extra capacity as Garrison Adjutant.’ No camp orders could be issued until 28 January, six days after the battle, when a limited official supply arrived from Helpmekaar. The soldiers had to make do with scraps; one soldier, Private John Bainbridge, even sent a note to his family in England with a request for writing paper – on the grounds that there was ‘none to be had within 200 miles of here’. Lieutenant Curling, who was a compulsive letter writer, could not find any writing paper; he bemoaned his plight but was thankful to have been the sole survivor from the British front line. He eventually managed to write home and stated:
One ought not to think of anything after having had such a wonderful escape. As to clothing, blankets etc., there have been sales of all the kits belonging to the officers who were killed and I have been able to get the most necessary things one requires. This paper I am writing on belonged to one of the poor fellows in the 24th.21
Notwithstanding that there was no shelter from the incessant heavy rain and the camp was wallowing in mire and chaos, within two days of the battle Chard ostensibly managed to obtain a sufficient supply of clean, undamaged paper in order to secretly prepare and submit
a perfectly sequential report of the battle. Though not noted either for report-writing skills or for eloquence, he carefully composed a neatly written account of the battle that was complete in extraordinary detail. The report included accurate and precise timings, and locations and names of the thirteen different units represented, as well as listing all the names and units of those who were killed or injured or who might receive acknowledgement for their outstanding courage during the battle. Yet there is no record of any participant in the battle having assisted Chard with his meticulous report. It is also a mystery how Chard was able to recall accurately the names of all the participants, bearing in mind that prior to the battle he had not met anyone at the post other than Bromhead; and how he was also able to prepare accurate drawings of the hospital building after it had been destroyed by fire. Bromhead was subsequently requested to write an account but he repeatedly avoided the issue until 15 February when he wrote a brief report outlining the bravery of certain participants in the battle. There is no evidence that anyone present during the battle assisted Chard or Bromhead in the preparation of their reports, and none of the purported ‘original’ Chard reports bears his signature. Colour Sergeant Bourne left no contemporary account. Both before and after the battle of Rorke’s Drift, Chard’s reputation was linked with slothfulness. The mystery of Chard’s report deepens because this truly masterful and perceptive account of the battle was written under extraordinarily difficult circumstances. Curiously, if Chard made any notes in the preparation of the report, they have never been seen; when, over twelve months later, he was asked to rewrite the account for Queen Victoria, he reported that he had lost his original notes.
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