On 3 February Glyn received a further curt note from Chelmsford marked ‘Private’ reminding Glyn that Chelmsford was still waiting for the Rorke’s Drift report; Glyn ignored the communication, knowing that Chard’s report would soon reach Chelmsford. When it arrived, Chelmsford immediately forwarded the report to the Secretary of State for War. Chelmsford knew that the victory at Rorke’s Drift could deflect those who would soon seek to humiliate him for the appalling loss of men and the longer-term implications of a highly trained British force being defeated by a native army. It would not have escaped Chelmsford that an inglorious defeat could be offset by a glorious victory. And so it was. Chelmsford also had influential friends and before Parliament could act to censure him for his unauthorized invasion of Zululand, Queen Victoria pre-empted any criticism by ordering a congratulatory message to be sent to him via the Secretary of State for War:
The Queen has graciously desired me to say she sympathises most sincerely with you in the dreadful loss which has deprived her of so many gallant officers and men and that Her Majesty places entire confidence in you and in her troops to maintain our honour and our good name.22
This was followed by a further message from the Field Marshal His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, Commander-in-Chief of the British Army. His telegram reads:
Have heard, by telegraph, of events occurred. Grieved for 24th and others who have fallen victims. Fullest confidence in regiment, and am satisfied that you have done and will continue to do everything that is right. Strong reinforcements of all arms ordered to embark at once, February 13th.23
Chelmsford’s use of the ‘Chard report’ was skilful; it was initially hailed throughout the British and Colonial press as evidence of Britain’s strength in adversity while both Chard and Bromhead were fêted in the newspapers and popular weekly journals as heroes – as indeed they were. Yet the event was viewed differently among their fellow officers; resentment and incredulity for their unexpected status as popular heroes began to grow and Curling and others were soon annoyed by the intensity of fame being attached to the two officers. Curling wrote:
It is very amusing to read the accounts of Chard and Bromhead. They are about the most commonplace men in the British Army. Chard is a most insignificant man in appearance and is only about 5 feet 2 or 3 in height. Bromhead is a stupid old fellow, as deaf as a post. Is it not curious how some men are forced into notoriety?24
On 15 February a report now known as the ‘Bromhead Report’ was submitted to Glyn concerning the bravery of certain soldiers of the 24th during the Rorke’s Drift skirmish. This report, signed by Bromhead in his capacity as commander of B Company, was submitted to Colonel Glyn more than two weeks after the defence of Rorke’s Drift. The identity of the author of this report is unknown although the report is signed by Bromhead. The report recorded the names of the six men belonging to B Company who specially distinguished themselves during the attack. It was to this report that Lord Chelmsford added the names of Lieutenants Bromhead and Chard, a highly irregular action, as Chelmsford should have discussed any recommendation for awards with Glyn. Apart from the above ‘Bromhead Report’ and his note warning those at Helpmekaar, only two other letters are known to have been written by Bromhead during this period. The first was to Lieutenant Godwin-Austen of the 2/24th on 19 February; Godwin-Austen had been with Chelmsford on 22 and 23 January. The style and syntax in the official Bromhead Report differ significantly from those used in the two letters – which suggests that Bromhead was not the willing author of the report. (Both letters are reproduced as Appendix F.)
CHAPTER 12
The Coastal (No.1) Column
The column marched only 17 miles in four days – hardly a lightning campaign.1
CAPTAIN WYNNE RE
But for the brilliant Zulu victory at Isandlwana and the remarkable heroism of the Rorke’s Drift defenders, the achievements of the Coastal Column would have ranked among the finest deeds recorded in British military history. However, because Colonel Pearson’s victory at Nyezane occurred on the same date as Isandlwana and Rorke’s Drift, the battle of Nyezane and the subsequent Zulu siege of Eshowe were both overlooked and then largely forgotten, and in many accounts of the Zulu War neither receives much more than a footnote entry.
Colonel Charles Knight Pearson was 45 years old. He was highly regarded for being a well-balanced officer with sound experience on active service with the 3rd Regiment, the Buffs, from which he had resigned in order to obtain a more prestigious appointment on Chelmsford’s staff. He was a veteran campaigner whose regiment had already served in South Africa for three years and Chelmsford was aware of Pearson’s deep-seated affinity with the Buffs, which may explain the agreeable appointment to Pearson of command of the Coastal Column – thus reuniting him with his regiment.
The starting point for the Coastal Column was the very strong fortification of Fort Pearson, named in his honour. This was purpose-built on the Natal bank of the 200 yard wide Tugela river which separated Natal and Zululand. It overlooked the Lower Drift all the way to the Indian Ocean shimmering in the distance. Its hilltop position on the bluff gave it a commanding view to the sea and across the Tugela river, giving the British a clear view for several miles into Zululand. Like the depot at Helpmekaar, its sole purpose was to keep its advancing column well supplied. Pearson’s orders were to move his column the 35 miles from Fort Pearson to Eshowe to occupy and convert the small Norwegian mission station into a fortified advanced supply depot. Mission stations were conveniently situated at strategic crossing border points so it was no coincidence that both the Centre and the Coastal columns planned to use missions as their forward bases. Once the depot was established, the column’s supply wagons were to return to Fort Pearson to collect additional stores before Pearson could advance on the Zulu capital at Ulundi, ideally at the same rate of advance as the Centre and Northern columns.
The Coastal Column’s infantry was composed of the Buffs and the less experienced 99th Regiment, while the column’s heavy firepower came from the Royal Artillery and the Naval Landing Brigade which each supplied two 7 pound guns and a rocket battery. The 136-strong bluejackets from HMS Active and HMS Tenedos provided a further two rocket tubes and were supported by the American-built Gatling gun, about to be used in action by the British for the first time.2 With the column was a force of about 2,000 black retainers of the NNC. These locally recruited auxiliaries were poorly trained, ill equipped and not expected to fight; their role was to scout, and disperse the beaten foe. The Royal Engineers supplied eighty-five sappers, and the 312-strong squadron of horsemen was made up from the Mounted Infantry as well as from local units such as the Natal Hussars, Victoria Mounted Rifles, Alexander Mounted Rifles and the Durban Mounted Rifles, making the total number of fighting men in excess of 4,000. In addition, 620 civilians were employed to drive the 384 ox-wagons. All in all it was a formidable force, but it constituted a logistical nightmare.
Having assembled his force, Pearson’s first task was to cross the Tugela river, now dangerously swollen by the first of the inevitable summer storms, and establish a base on the far bank. This enormous task was unopposed by the Zulus and successfully accomplished in just five days by the use of a large pont constructed by the carpenters from HMS Active. Seaman Martin of that ship’s crew had the sad distinction of becoming the first casualty of the Zulu War when he fell into the fast-flowing, crocodile-infested river and was lost. Having crossed the Tugela, Pearson immediately constructed a fortified camp that was named Fort Tenedos.
Strategically the concept of a Coastal Column in support of the main Centre Column was logical, but it overlooked some important factors. It was the beginning of the rainy season and the task of moving several thousand men and heavily laden wagons over 37 miles of rugged terrain, following nothing more than a rough, twisting track, proved extremely difficult. Furthermore, debilitating sickness had begun to spread among the men and there was the constant threat of an enemy whose tactical aptitude and ent
husiasm for battle were unknown qualities. So far the few Zulus seen had kept their distance, content to observe and report back to King Cetshwayo. Leaving a garrison of sailors, two companies of the 99th and some NNC to guard Fort Pearson, Colonel Pearson and two columns set off on 19 January across enemy country towards the abandoned Norwegian mission station at Eshowe. Because of the heavy rains, long stretches of the track quickly became treacherously boggy and the many dongas and rivers crossing the route were swollen with deep rushing water. Progress was slow but steady; the most difficult part was manoeuvring the heavily laden wagons through stretches of deep mud and across the many flooded watercourses, which necessitated the Native Pioneers digging away the steep banks to create crossing points. Soaked to the skin and exhausted from each day’s toil, the men endured miserable nights in their leaky tents. When on night guard the inexperienced and nervous recruits of the 99th further tried their comrades’ patience with regular false alarms. Notwithstanding Chelmsford’s orders, no attempt was ever made to laager the wagons and, with the two columns stretched out for several miles along the track, they were highly vulnerable to Zulu attack. In fact, a Zulu impi numbering some 3,500 warriors had already been detached from Cetshwayo’s main army at Ulundi and was steadily marching to intercept Pearson’s straggling column.
Then, on 21 January, Pearson received information that between 4,000 and 5,000 warriors were assembling close to his proposed route to Eshowe at the royal Gingindlovu ikhanda. In order to verify this information Pearson detached two companies of the Buffs with most of the Naval Brigade, his artillery, some mounted men and two companies of NNC. It was certainly good luck for this strung-out British reconnaissance force that the report was inaccurate, otherwise they might have been annihilated. The ikhanda was deserted; pausing only for some target practice on the deserted huts, the detachment returned to the main column.
Unseen by Pearson’s men the destructive activities of the column had been observed at a distance by the approaching Zulu scouts, which forced their leader, Chief Godide kaNdlela, to hasten his plan to attack the column. After dark, the Zulu force assembled at the smouldering homestead and then followed the detachment’s trail until they approached the sleeping British camp. Fortune again favoured the British; the gathering Zulus surrounded Pearson’s camp but did not attack, being uncertain of Pearson’s exact position. During the night the Zulus were joined by increasing numbers of local warriors until their force totalled more than 6,000. Under the cover of darkness they silently moved across the valley to the nearby Wombane hill, a location that held special significance for the Zulus, having been the setting of an earlier Zulu success against a Boer commando. The hill crest overlooks the Nyezane river and at first light the Zulu scouts were able to assess the main advancing British column as it began crossing the river in the valley below them. The dawn discovery of heavily trampled grass around the camp alerted Pearson and his column to their narrow escape and the proximity of a large force of Zulus. Chief Godide kaNdlela now commanded 6,000 Zulus from the uDlambedlu, izinGulube and umXhapho regiments and an unknown number of local irregular Zulu units.
Opposing him was Colonel Pearson’s force, which amounted to a total of 2,782 men of whom 1,660 were black auxiliaries. Pearson’s column ponderously set off at 7 a.m. with its advance scouts following the existing traders’ track which led towards a plateau between two low hills, the final approach to Eshowe.
Wombane Hill, only 3 miles from Eshowe, dominated the front and right of the infrequently used traders’ track now being followed by Pearson’s column and looked down on the river crossing less than a mile distant. On the left of the track and nearing the summit was an abandoned umuzi. The location boded well for the Zulus who began to assemble out of sight of the unsuspecting British – now highly vulnerable as they prepared for the river crossing.
The shallow Nyezane river was to be Pearson’s first obstacle of the day; he sent his mounted scouts ahead and their officer, Captain Barrow, reported that a flat plateau just beyond the far bank would make a suitable place to halt the wagons for breakfast. The track from the river followed a low ridge that ran up the middle of a valley; on either side were gullies thickly filled with tall reeds and long grass. Despite having reservations about halting in an area surrounded by thick undergrowth, Pearson decided to accept Barrow’s suggestion and ordered the first wagons across the river.
It was difficult and overgrown terrain that confronted Pearson as he joined Barrow to discuss the next stage of the advance; meanwhile the laborious task of bringing the wagons across the Nyezane river was well under way. The day was already stiflingly hot and some of the troops took the opportunity to bathe in the river as the first wagons passed them by before halting at the open area below the centre spur. Shortly after 8 a.m. one of the vedettes reported to Barrow that a small party of Zulus had been seen gathering on Wombane; it was clear to Barrow that the column was being observed so he passed this information on to Pearson who immediately ordered the NNC forward to engage the Zulus. Led by Captain Hart, the NNC advanced up the track and along the centre spur, which prematurely sprang the Zulu trap. A small party of Zulus was then seen moving on the skyline above, melting into the bush and then reappearing on the lower slopes of Wombane to the right of the British.3
Hart led his NNC up the slope with the intention of clearing the hill of Zulus. They left the track and crossed through the thick undergrowth in the ravine before emerging onto the lower reaches of Wombane hill. The NNC officers in question, of German extraction, had all been locally recruited and few had any military training; they had no knowledge of their troops’ language and during their advance confusion inevitably ensued. The leading NNC skirmishers quickly became aware that Zulus were hiding in the long grass ahead and tried to warn their officers. In turn, the officers could not understand their men’s reluctance to advance and tried to urge them on. At the sight of a party of Zulus moving towards them the NNC panicked, probably because they possessed only ten rifles between them, and ran back down the slope towards the protection of the ravine. At the same time hundreds of Zulus emerged from behind the crest of the hill and fired a number of ragged volleys towards the column before charging down in pursuit of the retreating NNC. Several white officers and NCOs were either overconfident or rooted to the spot with fear; they appeared to try to hold their ground for a moment but were quickly overrun and killed. Hart sped after the fleeing NCOs and managed to get back to safety.
Meanwhile the sudden sounds of gunfire and shouting alerted the remainder of the troops still crossing the river and those at the wagon park. The bathers hastily dressed and rushed forward towards the centre spur. Sapper Cullern later wrote:
I am thankful to say I escaped. We expect another battle in a few days. We were taken by surprise in the bush.4
The Zulu charge was the premature attack by their left horn: they were supposed to be part of a carefully planned ambush, but the centre and right horn were not yet in position to pose an effective threat. The Mounted Volunteers quickly formed a firing line to the right of the track and fired into the approaching left flank of the Zulu horn as they tried to work their way towards the wagons. In the confusion, Hart’s NNC started to emerge from the undergrowth of the ravine only to be met by undisciplined friendly fire until they were identified.
Pearson could see he was in a highly vulnerable position. His wagons were strung out for over a mile and the river was dividing his command. Initially he was in no position to form an effective defence and his only course of action was to rush as many reinforcements forward as possible. Fortunately he already had his artillery with him together with the gun and the men of the Naval Brigade plus two companies of the Buffs. As they were getting into position, the men of the Royal Engineers, who had been working at the river crossing, joined the Mounted Volunteers along the firing line and helped keep the Zulus at bay. One Zulu later stated:
The whites shot us down in numbers, in some places our dead and wounded covered th
e ground, we lost heavily, especially from the small guns, many of our men were drowned in the Nyezane River.5
Another recalled the difficulties experienced by the Zulus:
We went forward packed close together like a lot of bees. We were still far away from them when the white men began to throw their bullets at us, but we could not shoot at them because our rifles would not shoot so far … the battle was so fierce that we had to wipe the blood and brains of the killed and wounded from our heads, faces, arms, legs and shields after the fighting.6
Pearson was now able to order a defensive deployment by his column – and he did so in full accordance with Chelmsford’s written orders for engaging Zulu forces. Indeed, identical orders were being followed by Colonel Pulleine at Isandlwana that very same morning less than 100 miles away. The Zulus responded by advancing towards Pearson’s column, leaving the British officers in no doubt that they were about to come under a serious attack. Pearson quickly deployed two companies of the Buffs and part of the Naval Brigade along with two guns and a rocket tube from the Royal Artillery. Still further down the track were the Mounted Infantry and Volunteer troopers; when they heard the firing they ran forward and formed a skirmish line to the right of Pearson’s headquarters and started to fire steadily into the mass of Zulus who were now streaming down Wombane hill with the intention of surrounding those wagons that had managed to cross the river.
Crossing the Buffalo Page 23