Wherever men are gathered together, power and authority (shi) arise. Wherever wealth is found, men assemble. Where the claims for fame are suppressed, order may turn into disorder. The sage ruler rides on the power factors as the dragon rides on the misty clouds. Before the morning is over, rain will fall on all-under-Heaven, and people will not know who is in possession of authority over them. Great indeed is the sacred vessel [i.e., the sage ruler]! The lives of millions of people depend on him. Is his wisdom sufficient to prevent the rise of the villainous and his strength [sufficient to suppress] covetous schemers? Only when power, gain, and fame are employed with purely moral motives will all-under-Heaven be well governed. . . .
Humankind is the kernel (ren/humaneness) of Heaven-and-earth. Wherever human beings are congregated, the qi of humaneness (renqi) is concentrated. . . . “Human beings are the noblest [creatures] in the nature of Heaven-and-earth.” The Son of Heaven represents the aggregate of the multitude of the people—if he insults the people, is he not insulting Heaven? When the people gather together, they are strong. When the people are dispersed, their strength is dissipated. When they are pacified, the country is prosperous; when they litigate against each other, the country lies in waste; when they revolt, the country is destroyed. Therefore, when the Son of Heaven regards himself as one of the multitude of people, he regards all-under-Heaven as belonging to all-under-Heaven. The Classic of Odes says: “What is most powerful is the man [the monarch] / His influence will be felt in all directions.”15
The sage rules over the superior men of all-under-Heaven by virtue of the teaching of moral norms (mingjiao), yet he rules over the common people by providing sources of handsome profit. Should the high ministers and officials act like petty people and seek farmland and residences, to be a merchant or to trade in oxen, they will be criticized; the little people are not expected to act like high ministers and officials. . . . Ina great, flourishing age, all-under-Heaven may be expected to regard rightness as profitable.16 The next best thing is to let the people pursue profit. The Classic of Odes says:
Ordinary people’s follies
Are but sicknesses of their own.
It is the wise man’s follies.
That are a rampant pest.17
When the people are forced to do what they cannot do, the statute will fail. When the people are restrained by laws that they must violate, the law cannot prevail. Moreover, even such statutes as can be established and prohibitions as are feasible may produce contrary reactions, should good government be sought in an excessively short time, should evil be dealt with in an overly strict fashion or abuses be done away with too summarily. To be too sudden in introducing new personnel, too ready to listen to advice, or too hard on oneself—all may result in starting a plan that may run out of control. Should one be able to combine the strengths of the Yellow Emperor, of Laozi, of Shen Buhai, and of Han Feizi and yet remove their weaknesses, would one not govern the country like a master cook [who combines different ingredients]? The Odes says:
The tree-fellers follow the slant of the tree,
The wood-cutters follow the direction of the grain.18
[Mogu xia, sec. 3, in Wei Yuan ji 1: 43–45—KCL]
ON INSTITUTIONAL PROGRESS IN HISTORY
Wei held a distinct theory of institutional progress, which contrasted the imperial era with the ancient Three Dynasties and concluded that the imperial age since the Han was indeed superior in several ways to the Three Dynasties. He affirmed the irreversible progress of institutions in serving the changing interests of the people (bianmin). Wei Yuan’s conception of development or irreversible change (progress?) is of indigenous origin and may be compared with that of Liu Zongyuan (chapter 19) and Wang Fuzhi (chapter 25).
There are three principal ways in which the later ages were superior to the Three Dynasties. The emperor Wendi of Han abolished punishments that involved mutilation of the flesh [for example, cutting off arms and legs]. In this egard the Three Dynasties were cruel and the later ages humane. [The Tang scholar-official] Liu Zongyuan was outspoken against the enfeoffment system; indeed the institutions of the Three Dynasties were particularistic (si) and the later ages universalistic (gong). The change from selection of officials from aristocratic families (shizu) to the rise of the examination system paralleled the transition from the enfeoffment system to the system of prefectures and districts (junxian). The weaknesses of the Three Dynasties’ employment of men was that with aristocratic familism, high and low statuses were hereditary; this system had arisen along with enfeoffment in high antiquity and both systems were unfair. It is true that the ancient people educated their youths properly, and among the eldest sons of the dukes and ministers most were versed in the Six Arts [ritual, music, archery, charioteering, calligraphy, and arithmetic]. But how could they have been always more worthy than men from the countryside, generation after generation? It is not likely that the ancient sage kings did not clearly see the weaknesses of the system, but until the enfeoffment system gave way to change, aristocratic familism could not be expected to change. . . . If Confucius had gained an influential position and had been enabled to carry out the Way, he would have carried out great systemic reforms (dabian qifa) long ago and replaced aristocratic familism with [officials] trained in the Four Curricula. . . .
The [early Tang system of taxation in grain and cloth as well as corvee labor] was replaced by the Twice-a-Year Tax [in 780], and the Twice-a-Year Tax eventually by a Single Whip reform [in the sixteenth century under the Ming, when numerous taxes were consolidated into one or two annual payments in silver]. The more extensively the ancient ways were changed, the more convenient it was for the people. Even if the sage kings should return and be with us, they would not abandon the Single Whip and revive the Twice-a-Year Tax, nor abandon the latter in favor of the early Tang system. The system for selection of officials has been changed from nomination at the village and neighborhood level to recruitment from members of the prominent families, and eventually through the examination system. In the system of local services, the corvee laborer (dingyong) has given way to drafted laborers (chayi), replaced in turn by hired laborers (guyi). Even if the sage kings should return and be with us, they would not abandon the examination system and revive the recommendation system, nor abandon hired laborers in favor of drafted laborers. Conscript soldiers (qiujia) gave way to territorially administered militias (fubing), which in turn were replaced by cavalry and infantry battalions. Even if the sage kings should return and be with us, they would not abandon the battalion system and revive the military colonies (duntian) or territorially administered militias. In the affairs of all-under-Heaven, whatever changes the people have found to be inconvenient can be reversed; but whatever the people have found to be convenient cannot be reversed. . . .
[Mogu, Zhipian, 5, 9, in Wei Yuan ji 1: 48–49, 60–61—KCL]
ON MERCHANTS AND REFORM
Although Wei Yuan was concerned with the scholar-officials’ intellectual outlook and their service to society, he was sympathetic to the activities of the merchants, who, he believed, could render vital assistance to the operation of governmental affairs. In the period from 1826 to 1832, Wei served in the personal secretariat of the governor of Jiangsu and also in that of the governor-general at Nanjing. He made a thorough study of two urgent problems of state business at the time: (1) the transport of the tribute rice to north China to meet the food-supply needs of the Beijing area, a problem created by the very poor navigability of the Grand Canal as a result of the flooding of the Yellow River, and (2) the dwindling revenue of the Huaibei [i.e., north of the Huai River] salt administration, owing to the government-licensed monopoly’s having to compete with salt smugglers in distributing the salt to markets in the Yangzi provinces. In both cases, Wei found that more merchant participation would help. While the transport of tribute rice to north China could more safely be carried out by the large Jiangsu seagoing junks, whose owners would be pleased with compensation smaller than the cost o
f the Grand Canal transport, in the case of the salt monopoly, hitherto restricted to thirty or so principal licensed merchants, the best way to counter smuggling was to allow many more merchants to share in the trade, indeed to sell “salt trade tickets” to whoever might apply. Both of Wei’s proposals were adopted at the time and later more permanently.
ON TAXATION AND THE MERCHANTS
If the people are deprived of their concern for probity and integrity, the country will decline. If the people are made to be afraid of tending to their family affairs, the country will be destroyed. Rulers who are good at levying revenue from the people are like those who plant willow trees: [they] use their leaves and branches as fuel but nourish their roots. Those who are not good at taxing people are like those who cut scallions; they cut entire plots until all are gone. The way to preserve wealth, according to the Institutes of Zhou [Rites of Zhou] is to regard rich people as essential to the vitality of the area. Large-scale mobilization of funds or labor depends on the existence of rich people, as do the needs created by a major war or famine. When the greedy rule the country, the rich are especially exploited. When these [resources] are about to run out, they exploit the middle classes (zhonghu), and when those are about to run out, cities and homes will be in ruins. Thus, when there are no more rich people in the land, the state itself is pauperized. When there are no middle classes in the land, the state is in danger; by the time even the lower classes flee the land, the state is no longer a state!
[Mogu, Zhipian, 14, in Wei Yuan ji 1: 72—KCL]
ON REFORM OF THE TRIBUTE-RICE TRANSPORT SYSTEM, 1825
My guest asks: “Is it feasible then to ship the tribute rice by sea?”
My answer: “In the affairs of all-under-Heaven, the most important thing is the actual circumstances (shi). The present dynasty has its capital near the sea, in contrast to earlier dynasties that had their capitals near the Yellow River or in the Kaifeng area. Jiangsu and Zhejiang are upon the seacoast, unlike other provinces remote from the sea. These are the geographical circumstances.
“During the Yuan and Ming dynasties, it was the government that promoted shipping routes by sea. Under the present dynasty, it has been merchants that developed the sea routes. Seamen are accustomed to the sea, just as river-men are accustomed to the river. These are the circumstances regarding the available resources [in transport and communications].
“When the Yellow River and the Grand Canal are unimpeded, transporting rice by way of the canal is the normal policy; when the Yellow River and the Grand Canal are not navigable, sea transport provides the alternative. Such are the circumstances of the time.
“How are we, then, to take advantage of these circumstances?
“It is not necessary to explore the [alternate] routes of transport, nor is it necessary to build new ships. It is not necessary to recruit workmen, nor to raise new revenue. To transport rice on the merchant shipping routes, to use the merchant vessels as grain transport vessels, to employ commercial personnel as military attendants, and to apply the revenue for Grand Canal transport to the sea transport. . . [these are the solutions].”
[Zhou cao pian, in Wei Yuan ji 1: 404—KCL]
ON REFORM OF THE SALT MONOPOLY
There is no institution under Heaven that is certain to promote profit [li] for the state. When abuses are removed, however, profit [resources] will naturally be produced. Regarding the salt trade, there is really no way to get on the trail of salt smugglers. Only when the smuggling is transmuted into [legitimate enterprise] under the government’s aegis will government finances be eased.
In order to deal effectively with illicit salt, it is necessary to reduce the price of legitimate salt, which, in turn, requires that the cost of supplying salt be reduced to as little as possible. In order to reduce the cost of salt, however, it is necessary to rid the salt trade of its abuses. Profits and abuse—can they ever coexist? The smuggling trade and the trade under official auspices—are they not parts of a collusive process? If it is so difficult to remove the abuses [of the salt trade]—is this not because there are people who rely on abuse for their living?
The “ticket system for the salt trade” (piaoyan) has been put into practice in Huaibei for a few years now [since 1831]. This new system, from the time it was first carried out, has transformed the illicit trade at the factories (chang) east of Honghu and, later, the illicit trade west of Zhengguan, involving illicit salt originally produced in Changlu in north China. . . . Now the sale price of salt under the Ticket System is only half of that under the Licensed Monopoly System. Why was it that [formerly, under the Licensed Monopoly System] the monopoly merchants allowed the ports to be undersupplied and the taxes to be in arrears, whereas there has been a big rush to ship salt in abundance under the new Ticket System? The reason is that profits under the Monopoly System were split as the corrupt middlemen’s plunder. Two-tenths of the profits would go to the porters at the riverbanks and to the packaging houses; another two-tenths to the smugglers at the lakes and riverbanks [who would stay out of the market only for a fee]; still another two-tenths would go to the official levies at the salt-producing factories and riverbanks; and another two-tenths to theft by servant-carriers and to excessive and fraudulent claims [regarding the quantity of salt in each package]. The merchants therefore could not even enjoy a 10 percent profit. What the Ticket System has done is to rid itself of the corrupt middlemen’s takings and give the profit to the ticketholders who applied to ship salt and paid the taxes in advance. This is why they are assured of profit even after the salt prices have been reduced by half. . . .
To sum up, abuses are usually part of a complex and difficult system, whereas it is only by making the system simple and easy that abuses can be prevented. To increase tax revenue it is necessary to reduce the cost [of salt]; heavy taxes, by increasing this cost, result in decreasing revenue. This rule applies. . . also to all fiscal affairs, including the administration of tribute rice and customs revenue.
[Huaibei piaoyan zhi xu, in Wei Yuan ji 2: 438–440—KCL]
THE WESTERN INTRUSION INTO CHINA
The year 1839, which saw the beginning of the Opium War between Britain and China, is a milestone in Chinese foreign affairs. As a result of this and subsequent victories, Britain, followed by other Western nations and Japan, imposed a series of “unequal” treaties on China. Over the course of the nineteenth century Western powers came to control areas of China known as concessions, leaseholds, and spheres of influence; Western nationals in China came to be judged by their own laws, not China’s; Chinese tariffs on exports and imports were kept low; opium was eventually legalized and missionaries allowed to proselytize in China’s hinterland. All of these developments deeply affected the course of Chinese history, and Chinese attempts to reverse them led to major changes in the Chinese state, society, and culture. The new China might be slow in coming, but the outcome of this historic encounter was to ensure that eventually forces from the West would join with indigenous forces to shape a new future for China.
The outbreak of the Opium War may be attributed to three background factors. The first was the Guangzhou (Canton) trading system. For almost three centuries since the first arrival of the Portuguese off south China, the Chinese court had succeeded in dealing with Westerners on its own terms. Trade was confined to a few ports where agents of the court could regulate it strictly and skim profits off the top. Beginning in 1759, the British East India Company, a monopoly licensed by the crown, was limited to trading in the port of Guangzhou, as were other Western traders. Here, the company had to deal with a guild of Chinese traders, who were often in debt and had to be propped up by the foreign merchants. The foreigners had to obey Chinese laws (which they believed to be arbitrary), were restricted to a wharf on the river off Guangzhou, and could not communicate directly with Chinese officials. Any communication had to go through the Chinese merchant guild. Even the British superintendent of trade, the representative of the British crown in Guangzhou after the demi
se of the East India Company (1834), could not communicate directly with Chinese officials. Westerners, especially British traders in the early nineteenth century, remained restive under these restrictions and resentful of them. The British “free trade” philosophy that called for governments not to interfere with commerce heightened this resentment.
The second factor was the huge trade imbalance between Great Britain and China in the eighteenth century. By the middle of the century, Britons of all classes had developed the habit of tea drinking. The East India Company therefore bought massive amounts of Chinese tea but could not find products the Chinese were willing to buy in equal amounts. As a result, the British paid for the tea mostly with silver, leading to a serious bullion drain at a time when European nations considered bullion reserves to be the cornerstone of a nation’s wealth and power. The Chinese economy, on the other hand, benefited from the massive influx of silver, and the commercial prosperity that China enjoyed in the eighteenth century can be attributed in part to the trade imbalance.
To remedy these problems the British dispatched a mission to China in 1793, ostensibly to offer felicitations to the Chinese emperor on his eightieth birthday. The mission, under the experienced diplomat Lord Macartney, hoped to put trade between the two empires on a solid footing, interest the Chinese in British goods, and place a representative of the British crown permanently in Beijing. Despite some progress in trade talks, the mission did not greatly advance British goals, and the Chinese court showed no inclination to establish equal relations with Western powers.
Sources of Chinese Tradition, Volume 2 Page 30