The British discovery of opium from India as a wonder drug to cure the chronic imbalance of trade with China provides the third and primary factor in the Opium War. The East India Company had a monopoly on opium in its colony in Bengal and forced the farmers to grow poppy (the plant from which opium is derived), then processed the opium in its factories. Although opium was illegal in China, private British traders bought the company’s opium on credit, sold it to smugglers on the Chinese coast, and then paid the representatives of the East India Company in Guangzhou. The representatives then used the money to buy tea. This triangular trade arrangement kept the East India Company from becoming directly involved in the opium trade, but the effect was the same—trading opium for tea. As a result, the trade imbalance over the course of several decades shifted, and by the 1820s and 1830s silver began to drain out of China, creating enormous social and economic problems. The economy went into a depression, and increasing numbers of Chinese of all classes were becoming addicted to opium. Smuggling, moreover, proved lucrative not only for the direct participants but for local officials as well, who could be bribed to keep hands off the illegal traffic. These factors help to explain why it was so difficult for the government to put an end to the opium trade in spite of repeated bans on its importation and sale. The state was not merely in conflict with foreigners, but with its own members, whose self-interest led them to “squeeze” the traffic for their personal benefit rather than stamp it out for the good of all.
On the other hand, the “self-interest” of foreigners participating in the China trade was not wholly bound up with the marketing of opium, and it is possible that intelligent negotiation would have brought about gradual reduction in imports of the drug, while other articles, especially manufactured goods, took the place of opium in the trade. Unfortunately, the traditional conduct of foreign relations by the Chinese court was confined largely to tribute relations with smaller states. There was little inclination to establish regular intercourse with the Western powers that did not adhere to the pattern of ritual relations with the Chinese court. For want of a middle ground on which to meet, the means were lacking whereby to resolve the constant conflicts that arose in contacts between Chinese and foreigners over differing conceptions of justice and equity.
Under these circumstances conflict was difficult to avoid. The evils of the opium traffic were so far-reaching that the Chinese could ignore them only at great peril. Meanwhile, the British crown depended heavily on revenue from the tea trade. Any disruption of the trade would have great consequences. Some sort of showdown was imminent. After an extensive debate, during which the legalization of opium was considered, the Chinese court decided to take a hard line and put an end to the importation of opium to China. An experienced official was appointed as “drug tsar” and dispatched to Guangzhou with full powers to eradicate the opium scourge.
Here we shall concern ourselves less with the merits of the issues over which war eventually broke out than with the Chinese understanding of them and the effect on Chinese thinking of the events that followed. Instructive for this purpose are the cases of two Chinese leaders in the fields of government and scholarship: Lin Zexu (1785–1850), imperial commissioner at Guangzhou in 1839–1840, and the scholar Wei Yuan (1794–1856), who helped to interpret for Chinese minds the meaning of the fateful conflict.
THE LESSON OF LIN ZEXU
Lin Zexu, a native of the southeast coastal province of Fujian, was an exemplary product of the Chinese educational and civil service system. After winning the jinshi degree in 1811, he rose rapidly through the official ranks and served with particular distinction in posts concerned with fiscal matters and public works, gaining a wide reputation for his competence, integrity, and humaneness. By the late thirties, when opium smuggling became a pressing question, Lin had already established himself as an able governor and then governor-general of rich and populous provinces in central China. In such a position a man less deeply concerned over the fate of his people might have been content to enjoy the measure of personal success that was already assured him. But Lin, having taken strong measures to end the opium traffic in his own sphere of jurisdiction, placed himself in the forefront of those who called upon the court for a full-scale assault on the opium menace. The result was his appointment as imperial commissioner at Guangzhou, with full powers to deal with the problem.
On his arrival in Guangzhou in March 1839, Lin demonstrated that he was a man of serious and inflexible purpose, not the type of official who could be wheedled, bribed, or stalled off. Within a few months he had taken such strong action against the Hong merchants [Chinese Merchant Guild] and Western traders that existing stocks of opium had been destroyed and the cessation of the traffic was all but accepted by the foreigners. It was at this time that Lin addressed his celebrated letter to Queen Victoria demanding assurances of an end to the trade.
Were opium, then, the sole or chief issue between the Chinese and British, there would presumably have been no cause for the outbreak of the first Anglo-Chinese War later that same year. To the British on the scene, however, Lin’s uncompromising policies seemed not just firm or tough but arrogant and unreasonable. Though ready to make substantial concessions with regard to the drug traffic in order not to lose all opportunities for trade, for them the lure of profits did not suffice to overcome strong feelings in what they regarded as matters of principle. The lack of treaty relations meant that there was no established procedure for the administration of justice in incidents involving Chinese and foreigners. Commissioner Lin was determined that Chinese authorities should mete out punishment for crimes on Chinese soil of which foreigners had been accused. The British were equally adamant in refusing to turn over suspects, whose guilt was by no means established, to the mercies of Chinese officials whom they considered vindictive and inhumane. When Lin countered with the breaking off of all trade and expulsion of the British from China, full-scale hostilities broke out.
The Chinese, as is well known, were pitifully unprepared on land and sea to resist the force of British arms, and it was only a matter of weeks before the underlying weakness of Lin’s “get-tough” policy became fully exposed. Officially disgraced, the erstwhile viceroy and commissioner was eventually banished to Xinjiang, in the far west of the empire. In the meantime, he had become fully persuaded of the need for strengthening China through the adoption of Western arms and methods of warfare, though he could make no progress in gaining acceptance of this view at court. Even when later restored to the official ranks, partly on account of his accomplishments in flood control and land reclamation work, Lin lacked any real opportunity to influence state policy in the direction of greater realism and reform. The lesson he had learned in Guangzhou remained largely his own. It would be decades more before the court could be moved by further misfortunes to take such warnings to heart.
LETTER TO THE ENGLISH RULER
In this celebrated letter to Queen Victoria (1839), prepared as a memorial for the emperor’s endorsement, Lin argues against the opium trade with all the moral earnestness of the Confucian scholar and lofty condescension of one speaking for the imperial court. On its own terms, of course, Lin’s argument is unanswerable. Yet his tone indicates how unready the Chinese were to deal with the British as diplomatic equals or to negotiate outstanding difference on other scores.
Intransigent as he appeared, Lin nonetheless compelled admiration. His likeness appeared later in Mme Tussaud’s Wax Museum in London, and the distinguished British consular official and sinologist H. A. Giles said of Lin: “He was a fine scholar, a just and merciful official and a true patriot.”
A communication: Magnificently our great emperor soothes and pacifies China and the foreign countries, regarding all with the same kindness. If there is profit, then he shares it with the peoples of the world; if there is harm, then he removes it on behalf of the world. This is because he takes the mind of Heaven-and-earth as his mind.
The kings of your honorable country by a tradi
tion handed down from generation to generation have always been noted for their politeness and submissiveness. We have read your successive tributary memorials saying: “In general our countrymen who go to trade in China have always received His Majesty the Emperor’s gracious treatment and equal justice,” and so on. Privately we are delighted with the way in which the honorable rulers of your country deeply understand the grand principles and are grateful for the Celestial grace. For this reason the Celestial Court in soothing those from afar has redoubled its polite and kind treatment. The profit from trade has been enjoyed by them continuously for two hundred years. This is the source from which your country has become known for its wealth.
But after a long period of commercial intercourse, there appear among the crowd of barbarians both good persons and bad, unevenly. Consequently there are those who smuggle opium to seduce the Chinese people and so cause the spread of the poison to all provinces. Such persons who only care to profit themselves, and disregard their harm to others, are not tolerated by the laws of Heaven and are unanimously hated by human beings. His Majesty the Emperor, upon hearing of this, is in a towering rage. He has specially sent me, his commissioner, to come to Guangdong, and together with the governor-general and governor jointly to investigate and settle this matter. . . .
We find that your country is sixty or seventy thousand li [one li is roughly a third of a mile] from China. Yet there are barbarian ships that strive to come here for trade for the purpose of making a great profit. The wealth of China is used to profit the barbarians. That is to say, the great profit made by barbarians is all taken from the rightful share of China. By what right do they then in return use the poisonous drug to injure the Chinese people? Even though the barbarians may not necessarily intend to do us harm, yet in coveting profit to an extreme, they have no regard for injuring others. Let us ask, where is your conscience? I have heard that the smoking of opium is very strictly forbidden by your country; that is because the harm caused by opium is clearly understood. Since it is not permitted to do harm to your own country, even less should you let the harm be passed on to other countries—much less to China! Of all that China exports to foreign countries, there is not a single thing that is not beneficial to people; they are of benefit when eaten, or of benefit when used, or of benefit when resold; all are beneficial. Is there a single article from China that has done any harm to foreign countries? Take tea and rhubarb, for example; the foreign countries cannot get along for a single day without them. If China cuts off these benefits with no sympathy for those who are to suffer, then what can the barbarians rely upon to keep themselves alive? Moreover the woolens, camlets, and longells [i.e., textiles] of foreign countries cannot be woven unless they obtain Chinese silk. If China again cuts off this beneficial export, what profit can the barbarians expect to make? As for other foodstuffs, beginning with candy, ginger, cinnamon, and so forth, and articles for use, beginning with silk, satin, chinaware, and so on, all the things that must be had by foreign countries are innumerable. On the other hand, articles coming from the outside to China can only be used as toys. We can take them or get along without them. Since they are not needed by China, what difficulty would there be if we closed the frontier and stopped the trade? Nevertheless, our Celestial Court lets tea, silk, and other goods be shipped without limit and circulated everywhere without begrudging it in the slightest. This is for no other reason but to share the benefit with the people of the whole world.
The goods from China carried away by your country not only supply your own consumption and use but also can be divided up and sold to other countries, producing a triple profit. Even if you do not sell opium, you still have this threefold profit. How can you bear to go further, selling products injurious to others in order to fulfill your insatiable desire? . . .
We have further learned that in London, the capital of your honorable rule, and in Scotland, Ireland, and other places originally no opium has been produced. Only in several places of India under your control, such as Bengal, Madras, Bombay, Patna, Benares, and Malwa, has opium been planted from hill to hill and ponds have been opened for its manufacture. For months and years work is continued in order to accumulate the poison. The obnoxious odor ascends, irritating Heaven and frightening the spirits. Indeed you, O King, can eradicate the opium plant in these places, hoe over the fields entirely, and sow in its stead the five grains [i.e., millet, barley, wheat, and so on]. Anyone who dares again attempt to plant and manufacture opium should be severely punished. This would really be a great, benevolent government policy that will increase the commonweal and get rid of evil. For this, Heaven must support you and the spirits must bring you good fortune, prolonging your old age and extending your descendants. All will depend on this act. . . .
Now we have set up regulations governing the Chinese people. He who sells opium shall receive the death penalty and he who smokes it also the death penalty. Now consider this: If the barbarians do not bring opium, then how can the Chinese people resell it, and how can they smoke it? The fact is that the wicked barbarians beguile the Chinese people into a death trap. How then can we grant life only to these barbarians? He who takes the life of even one person still has to atone for it with his own life; yet is the harm done by opium limited to the taking of one life only? Therefore in the new regulations, in regard to those barbarians who bring opium to China, the penalty is fixed at decapitation or strangulation. This is what is called getting rid of a harmful thing on behalf of mankind. . . .
Our Celestial Dynasty rules over and supervises the myriad states and surely possesses unfathomable spiritual dignity. Yet the emperor cannot bear to execute people without having first tried to reform them by instruction. . . . May you, O King, check your wicked and sift out your vicious people before they come to China, in order to guarantee the peace of your nation, to show further the sincerity of your politeness and submissiveness, and to let the two countries enjoy together the blessings of peace. How fortunate, how fortunate indeed! After receiving this dispatch will you immediately give us a prompt reply regarding the details and circumstances of your cutting off the opium traffic. Be sure not to put this off. The above is what has to be communicated. [Vermilion endorsement of the emperor: ] This is appropriately worded and quite comprehensive.
[From Teng and Fairbank, China’s Response to the West, pp. 24–27]
LETTER TO WU ZIXU ON THE NEED FOR WESTERN GUNS AND SHIPS
This letter to his friend Wu Zixu, written two years after the debacle at Guangzhou, expresses Lin’s realization of the need for adopting modern weapons and methods of warfare. As one in official disgrace, however, Lin dared not speak out, nor even communicate his thoughts privately except in guarded fashion. Under such circumstances it is understandable that the advocacy of reform should have been hampered and the taking of concrete steps so long delayed.
The rebels’ ships on the open sea came and went as they pleased, now in the south and now suddenly in the north, changing successively between morning and evening. If we tried to put up a defense everywhere, not only would we toil and expend ourselves without limit, but also how could we recruit and transport so many troops, militia, artillery, and ammunition, and come to their support quickly? . . .
When I was in office in Guangdong and Guangxi, I had made plans regarding the problems of ships and cannon and a water force. Afraid that there was not enough time to build ships, I at first rented them. Afraid that there was not enough time to cast cannon and that it would not be done according to the regulations, I at first bought foreign ones. The most painful thing was that when the Humen [the Bogue or “Tiger’s Mouth,” the entrance to the Pearl River] was broken into, a large number of good cannon fell into the hands of the rebellious barbarians. I recall that after I had been punished two years ago, I still took the risk of calling the emperor’s attention to two things: ships and guns. At that time, if these things could have been made and prepared, they still could have been used with effect to fight against the enemy in Zh
ejiang last fall [1841]. Now it is even more difficult to check the wildfire. After all, ships, guns, and a water force are absolutely indispensable. Even if the rebellious barbarians had fled and returned beyond the seas, these things would still have to be urgently planned for, in order to work out the permanent defense of our sea frontiers. . . .
But at this time I must strictly observe the advice to seal my lips as one corks the mouth of a bottle. Toward those with identical aims and interests, however, I suddenly spit out the truth and am unable to control myself. I extremely regret my foolishness and carelessness. Nevertheless, when I turn my thoughts to the depth of your attention to me, then I cannot conceal these things from myself. I only beg you to keep them confidential. By all means, please do not tell other persons.
[From Teng and Fairbank, China’s Response to the West, p. 28]
WEI YUAN AND THE WEST
Wei Yuan’s Military History of the Qing Dynasty (Shengwu jixu) and Illustrated Gazetteer of the Maritime Countries (Haiguo tuzhi) are landmarks in China’s modern history, for they represent the first systematic attempts by a dedicated Confucian to provide his countrymen with a realistic picture of military affairs and the outside world. A sizable compilation running to sixty chapters, the Gazetteer owed its inception to the pioneering work of Lin Zexu, who, while in Guangzhou, made strenuous efforts to gather information about the West, taking notes himself, collecting materials, arranging translations, and compiling a Gazetteer of the Four Continents (Sizhou zhi), which Wei used as the basis for his own work after Lin’s dismissal.
In the background of the Gazetteer was Wei’s interest in military and financial history. For most of the decade beginning in 1814, Wei had lived in Beijing, trying without success to pass the metropolitan examination; he purchased a minor official position and read voraciously on problems of statecraft. Service as a tutor in the home of a leading military commander stimulated his interest in Qing military history. He took extensive notes on archival and other sources to which he was able to gain access. During the Opium War (1839–1842), Wei, then living in Yangzhou, in the Lower Yangzi area, was stimulated enough by the events taking place to complete his book Military History of the Qing Dynasty, ending with chapters on the current debacle and on the need for reform. Wei traced the weaknesses of the Qing military system to the late eighteenth century—weaknesses in the system of finance, in weaponry, and above all, in low morale and the lack of vigor with which the court’s orders were carried out. Wei came to realize that the “barbarians” from the maritime countries were advanced in the matter of technology, military as well as industrial. Moreover, although peace was signed at the Treaty of Nanjing (August 1842), the continuing threat from the British was implicit. Other Western countries, including France and the United States, were seeking to be recognized. Only five months after he completed Military History of the Qing Dynasty, Wei finished an early edition of the Illustrated Gazetteer of the Maritime Countries.
Sources of Chinese Tradition, Volume 2 Page 31