Sources of Chinese Tradition, Volume 2

by Wm. Theodore de Bary

  [Adapted from China’s Destiny, trans. by Wang Chung-hui, pp. 72–84, 212–221]

  JIANG JINGGUO (CHIANG CHING-KUO): THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN TAIWAN

  After the Nationalists’ withdrawal from the mainland to Taiwan in 1949, Sun Yat-sen’s Three People’s Principles remained the basic ideological text of the Taiwan regime under Chiang Kai-shek and his son, Jiang Jingguo (Chiang Ching-kuo), with the latter taking successive steps to implement the transition to representative government under a constitution modeled on Sun’s ideas. A practical and rather unpretentious person rather than a dynamic leader or brilliant theoretician, Jiang Jingguo left no great body of doctrine, but the following brief excerpts explain in rather simple terms his view of how the Nationalists moved to implement Sun’s goals.

  Although the local inhabitants, who suffered repression in the early years of mainlander rule, and the political opposition would question whether the process was as gentle and benign as Jiang describes it below, most observers would grant the substance of his claims: that economic reform led to rapid and substantial prosperity; that the new wealth became widely shared among the population, rather than accruing only to the benefit of an upper class; that this shared affluence became the basis of a greatly expanded modern educational and training system; and that the latter supported the quick development of efficient, high-tech industry. Finally, the lifting of martial law, freeing of the press, and holding of elections for the executive and legislative branches completed the transition to representative democracy, which contrasts with the Communists’ declared opposition to any such “peaceful evolution” to democracy.

  Not mentioned in Jiang’s statements for a Western audience is a notable feature of Nationalist policy: its defense and promotion of Chinese cultural traditions during the same period when Communist China was engaged in the great Cultural Revolution directed especially against Confucianism. It has remained a question just how these traditions, including Confucianism, religious Daoism, and Buddhism, would adapt to rapid modernization, but toward the end of the century they remained shared cultural links to mainland China, once the latter abandoned its anti-traditionalism in the eighties.

  THE EVOLUTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN TAIWAN

  The following excerpt is from “The Struggle with the Communists Is a Struggle Over Lifestyle,” an interview with Hong Kong English-language reporters on February 5, 1987.

  Since the founding of the Republic of China [in 1912], implementing democratic, constitutional government has been the goal of our nation. Unfortunately, because of frequent domestic and foreign turmoil, constitutional government could not be realized until 1947. It had not been in force for even two years when the Communists seized the mainland. In order to prevent Communist military invasion and subversion after the government moved to Taiwan in 1949, we declared martial law on Taiwan and [the offshore islands of] Penghu, Jinmen, and Mazu to protect national security and guarantee a secure environment for the constitution. The facts clearly show that the scope of martial law was extremely limited and had little effect on the people’s daily life and basic rights. Moreover, the government on Taiwan, Penghu, Jinmen, and Mazu worked steadily and vigorously to promote democratic, constitutional government.

  The recent decision by the government to end martial law and lift the ban on political activities seeks to realize policies to promote democracy and the rule of law adopted at the beginning of the republic. With more than thirty years of work [on Taiwan], the political situation is stable, the economy flourishing, and education universal. Consequently, the government, after carefully researching social change and the needs of the people, has decided to end martial law, lift the ban on political activities, and expand democratic, constitutional government in the near future.

  [Jiang Jingguo xiansheng wenji 15: 196—RL]

  IMPLEMENTING “THE THREE PEOPLE’S PRINCIPLES”

  The following are excerpts from an interview with an editor of America’s Readers Digest, December 11, 1985.

  Question: How did the Republic of China achieve its remarkable economic development?

  Answer: The basic reasons for the success of our nation’s economic development are:

  1. We advocate freedom and democracy and hold fast to a constitutional system. The government and the people trust one another and are harmoniously united, providing for democracy and a stable political environment.

  2. Our policy of a free economy with planned characteristics encourages private enterprise and stimulates the diligence of the people and the creativity of entrepreneurs.

  3. The implementation of an excellent, universal educational system with everyone having equal access to education and the promotion of the development of science and technology have raised the productive power of the people.

  4. [By] adhering to a policy of [providing] equal [access to] wealth, we have lessened the gap between rich and poor, enhanced social well-being, raised the quality of life, and created an equal and harmonious society.

  Question: What specific policies did your government adopt to promote this economic development?

  Answer: These can be divided into several stages:

  1. In the early 1950s we first carried out currency reform, encouraging saving and successfully stabilizing the value of the currency and the price of commodities. Next, we implemented equitable land reform and adopted the strategy of developing both agriculture and industry equally, [thus] smoothly solving the unemployment problem.

  2. At the end of the 1950s we successively reformed foreign exchange, trade, financial administration, and banking and encouraged light industry, which already had a foundation to open up export markets. [All of these measures] caused industrial production and foreign trade to soar in the 1960s.

  3. In the 1970s we methodically developed heavy industry and the chemical industry while improving basic infrastructure such as transportation and electricity, [thus] establishing an excellent foundation for economic growth and development. In addition, successive administrative reform measures such as extending compulsory education to nine years beginning in 1968 and actively encouraging foreign-trained students to return and serve the nation greatly enhanced the human resources needed for economic growth.

  4. Now in the 1980s our policy is to emphasize the development of hightech industry and the implementation of the requisite social and economic systemic reforms. At the same time, we strive to maintain the good quality of the environment to become a truly modern nation.

  Question: If the regime on the mainland were not communist, could it reach the same economic level as the Republic of China?

  Answer: I must first stress that as long as the Communists occupy the mainland, no matter what economic reforms they carry out they will be unable to become a noncommunist regime. Therefore, if the mainland wants to reach our economic level, it must abandon communism and adopt “The Three People’s Principles.” If it can do this, considering the size and great human and material resources of the mainland, it would of course be able to attain the economic level of the Republic of China on Taiwan. This is why we have raised the slogan “Unite China with ‘The Three People’s Principles.’”

  [Jiang Jingguo xiansheng wenji 15: 154–159—RL]

  1. On this point, see further Harold Schiffrin, “Sun Yat-sen’s Land Policy,” Journal of Asian Studies 16, no. 4 (August 1957): 549–564.

  2. See ch. 24.

  3. Probably a reference to Huang Zongxi, whose writings on rulership and law Sun had reprinted and widely distributed. See ch. 25.

  4. Sun Yat-sen had argued the need for nationalism on the grounds that the Chinese had hitherto lacked a conception of nationhood and had known only loyalty to family or to dynastic state. After the fall of the Qing dynasty, however, he spoke of “state and nation” in almost one breath. The character for state and nation being the same in Chinese, these slogans also had the meaning of “the state’s salvation” and “the state’s reconstruction.” The emotional appeal of nationali
sm was used, in this case, for the strengthening of the state.

  5. This is not to say, of course, that the three did not differ considerably in other respects.

  6. Standard translations for these terms are li, ritual/decorum; yi, rightness or duty; lian, integrity or honesty; chi, sense of shame. Since Chiang defines the terms in what follows, we have kept the romanized forms here.

  Chapter 33

  THE NEW CULTURE MOVEMENT

  As its name implies, the New Culture Movement was an attempt to destroy what remained of traditional Confucian culture in the republican era and to replace it with something new. The collapse of the old dynastic system in 1911 and the failure of Yuan Shikai’s Confucian-garbed monarchical restoration in 1916 meant that, politically, Confucianism was almost dead. It had, however, been much more than a political philosophy. It had been a complete way of life, which nationalism and republicanism supplanted only in part. There were some even among republicans who felt that certain aspects of the old culture, Confucian ethics especially, should be preserved and strengthened, lest the whole fabric of Chinese life come apart and the new regime itself be seriously weakened. Others, with far more influence on the younger generation, drew precisely the opposite conclusion. For them, nothing in Confucianism was worth salvaging from the debris of the Manchu dynasty. In fact, whatever vestiges of the past remained in the daily life and thinking of the people should be rooted out; otherwise the young republic would rest on shaky foundations, and its progress would be retarded by a backward citizenry. The new order required a whole new culture. The political revolution of 1911 had to be followed by a cultural revolution. In this conflict of views many issues surfaced that reappeared in the 1980s and 1990s between those who advocated a return to Confucianism and those who saw “modernization” as requiring liberation from the past.

  During and just after World War I the intellectual spearhead of this cultural revolution went on the offensive, launching a movement that reached out in many directions and touched many aspects of Chinese society. Roughly, it may be divided into six major phases, presented below in more or less chronological order. They are (1) the attack on Confucianism, (2) the Literary Revolution, (3) the proclaiming of a new philosophy of life, (4) the debate on science and the philosophy of life, (5) the “doubting of antiquity” movement, and (6) the debate on Chinese and Western cultural values. Needless to say, these phases overlapped considerably, and certain leading writers figured prominently in more than one phase of the movement.

  From the movement’s anti-traditionalist character one may infer that its leaders looked very much to the West. Positivism was their great inspiration, science and materialism were their great slogans, and—in the early years especially—John Dewey and Bertrand Russell were their great idols. The leaders themselves were in many cases Western-educated, though not necessarily schooled in the West, since Western-style education was by now established in the East, in Japan, and in the new national and missionary colleges of China. Often college professors themselves, the leaders now had access to the lecture platform, as well as to the new organs of the public journalism and the intellectual and literary reviews that were a novel feature of the modern age. Above all, they had a new audience—young, intense, frustrated by China’s failures in the past, and full of eager hopes for the future.

  THE ATTACK ON CONFUCIANISM

  The open assault on Confucianism, which began in 1916, was led by Chen Duxiu (1879–1942), editor of a magazine titled The New Youth. Earlier reformers had attacked certain of the concepts of Confucianism, often in the name of a purified and revitalized Confucian belief or, with less obvious partisanship, combining criticism of certain aspects with praise of others. Chen, by contrast, challenged Confucianism from beginning to end, realizing as he did so that he struck at the very heart of the traditional culture. For him, a partisan of “science” and “democracy,” Confucianism stood simply for reaction and obscurantism. He identified it with the old regime, with Yuan Shikai’s attempt to restore the monarchy, with everything from the past that, to his mind, had smothered progress and creativity.

  Such an uncompromising attack was bound to shock many—those who had taken Confucianism as much for granted as the good earth of China or those who still held to it consciously, and with some pride, as an expression of cultural nationalism. But there were others upon whom Chen’s bold denunciations had an electrifying effect—those, particularly young teachers and students, for whom Confucianism had come to hold little positive meaning as their own education became more Westernized; those for whom, in fact, it was now more likely to be felt in their own lives simply as a form of unwanted parental or societal constraint. Young people of this group, with Beijing as their center, The New Youth as their mouthpiece, and Chen as their literary champion, were glad to throw themselves into a crusade against this bugbear from the past and to proclaim their own coming of age in the modern world by shouting, “Destroy the old curiosity shop of Confucius!”

  CHEN DUXIU: “THE WAY OF CONFUCIUS AND MODERN LIFE”

  Through articles such as this, which appeared in December 1916, Chen Duxiu established himself as perhaps the most influential writer of his time. His popular review, Xin qingnian (The New Youth), had for its Western title La Jeunesse nouvelle, reflecting the avant-garde character of its editor, who had obtained his higher education first in a Japanese normal college and later in France. Here the Westernized and “liberated” Chen directs his fire at social customs and abuses that seemed to have Confucian sanction but have no place in the modern age. Here the man who was to found the Chinese Communist Party five years later speaks as an individualist, who attributes the lack of individualism in China to the traditional view of property as family-owned and -controlled rather than belonging to an individual.

  The pulse of modern life is economic, and the fundamental principle of economic production is individual independence. Its effect has penetrated ethics. Consequently, the independence of the individual in the ethical field and the independence of property in the economic field bear witness to each other, thus reaffirming the theory [of such interaction]. Because of this [interaction], social mores and material culture have taken a great step forward.

  In China, the Confucians have based their teachings on their ethical norms. Sons and wives possess neither personal individuality nor personal property. Fathers and elder brothers bring up their sons and younger brothers and are in turn supported by them. It is said in chapter 30 of the Record of Rites: “While parents are living, the son dares not regard his person or property as his own” [27: 14]. This is absolutely not the way to personal independence. . . .

  In all modern constitutional states, whether monarchies or republics, there are political parties. Those who engage in party activities all express their spirit of independent conviction. They go their own way and need not agree with their fathers or husbands. When people are bound by the Confucian teachings of filial piety and obedience to the point of the son not deviating from the father’s way even three years after his death1 and the woman not only obeying her father and husband but also her son,2 how can they form their own political party and make their own choice? The movement of women’s participation in politics is also an aspect of women’s life in modern civilization. When they are bound by the Confucian teaching that “To be a woman means to submit,”3 that “The wife’s words should not travel beyond her own apartment,” and that “A woman does not discuss affairs outside the home,“4 would it not be unusual if they participated in politics?

  In the West some widows choose to remain single because they are strongly attached to their late husbands and sometimes because they prefer a single life; they have nothing to do with what is called the chastity of widowhood. Widows who remarry are not despised by society at all. On the other hand, in the Chinese teaching of decorum, there is the doctrine of “no remarriage after the husband’s death.“5 It is considered to be extremely shameful and unchaste for a woman to serve two husbands or
a man to serve two rulers. The Record of Rites also prohibits widows from wailing at night [27: 21] and people from being friends with sons of widows. For the sake of their family reputation, people have forced their daughters-in-law to remain widows. These women have had no freedom and have endured a most miserable life. Year after year these many promising young women have lived a physically and spiritually abnormal life. All this is the result of Confucian teachings of ritual decorum.

  In today’s civilized society, social intercourse between men and women is a common practice. Some even say that because women have a tender nature and can temper the crudeness of man, they are necessary in public or private gatherings. It is not considered improper even for strangers to sit or dance together once they have been introduced by the host. In the way of Confucian teaching, however, “Men and women do not sit on the same mat,” “Brothers- and sisters-in-law do not exchange inquiries about each other,” “Married sisters do not sit on the same mat with brothers or eat from the same dish,” “Men and women do not know each other’s name except through a matchmaker and should have no social relations or show affection until after marriage presents have been exchanged,”6 “Women must cover their faces when they go out,“7 “Boys and girls seven years or older do not sit or eat together,” “Men and women have no social relations except through a matchmaker and do not meet until after marriage presents have been exchanged,“8 and “Except in religious sacrifices, men and women do not exchange wine cups.“9 Such rules of decorum are not only inconsistent with the mode of life in Western society; they cannot even be observed in today’s China.