Beyond Peace

by Richard Nixon

  As realists, we do not want to become involved in foreign ventures unless our interests are threatened. As idealists, we insist that what is right for us must also be right for others. Bill Safire properly observed, “America will not defend with its lives what it cannot defend with its conscience.”

  Enlargement is a tricky word. In photography, a negative can be enlarged to a three-by-five snapshot or a wall-size mural. Based on the record so far, the present administration is aiming for wallet-size. Some officials clearly believe that the United States overextended itself during the Cold War, particularly in Vietnam, one of its major battles. They tend to resist American involvement, except in humanitarian activities that have overwhelming public support. They have yet to face up to the fact that it will at times be necessary to use American power and influence to defend and extend freedom in places thousands of miles away if we are to preserve it at home. It is a role that will require global vision and big plays from this President and every successive one in the era beyond peace.

  In his Inaugural Address, John F. Kennedy vowed “to pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty.” Even during the Cold War, such a policy was praiseworthy but unrealistic. Then, as now, world peace was threatened by several enemies of liberty. We cannot afford to fight them all at once. Since the Cold War, the choices about how and when to fight for peace and freedom have become even more complex.

  We must begin by asking ourselves what kind of world we want, now that we have peace. Ideally, all nations should have free economic systems, free political systems, and an unfailing commitment to social justice and human rights. But the world is not a blank canvas on which we can paint our vision. We must take its myriad realities into account as we seek to realize our goals. The United States cannot become involved in every nation or region where our ideals have not been achieved. We favor extending peace and freedom—but extending peace without compromising our interests or principles, and extending freedom without risking peace. If peace is our only goal, then the victory of freedom may be imperiled. If freedom is our only goal, then peace will be imperiled. It is the burden of being the only superpower that there are things we do not wish to do that we must do, and it is the burden of being a responsible superpower that there are things we wish to do that we cannot do.

  In a world without a dominant enemy, we must consider each situation on its merits. Will our involvement be consistent with our values? Will it serve our interests? Will it serve the interests of our friends? Will it serve the interests of those directly involved? During the Cold War, the answer to each of these questions, where our efforts to oppose communist expansionism and Soviet aggression were concerned, was yes. The answer to each question should also be yes regarding our efforts to help bring about the victory of freedom in the former Soviet Union. No other single factor will have a greater political impact on the world in the century to come than whether political and economic freedom take root and thrive in Russia and the other former communist nations. Today’s generation of American leaders will be judged primarily by whether they did everything possible to bring about this outcome. If they fail, the cost that their successors will have to pay will be unimaginably high.

  Russia and the Victory of Freedom

  Writing this spring in The Washington Post, one of the United States’s most distinguished foreign affairs observers asserted, “Russia is no longer a world power and will not be for some time.” If the United States falls into the trap of making this fatally flawed assumption the basis of its policy, prospects for peace and freedom in Russia, Europe, and elsewhere in the world will be gravely imperiled.

  Those who suggest that its massive problems disqualify Russia from being treated as a great power ignore an unpleasant but undeniable fact. Russia is the only nation in the world with the capability of destroying the United States. For that reason alone, it remains our highest foreign policy priority. But the importance of Russia does not turn only on our immediate national security. Many millions of Russian people, who for three quarters of a century suffered under the most entrenched and brutal totalitarian dictatorship in history, depend on the survival and success of economic and political freedom.

  The failure of freedom would also have a profoundly negative global impact. The reestablishment of a dictatorship and a command economy in Russia would give encouragement to every dictator and would-be dictator in the world. Since an authoritarian Russia would be far more likely to adopt an aggressive foreign policy than a democratic Russia, freedom’s failure would threaten peace and stability in Europe and around the world. If Russia turns away from democracy and economic freedom and we have not done everything possible to prevent it, we will bear a large measure of responsibility for the ominous consequences.

  As we develop policies toward Russia for the future, it is essential that we understand its past. The Bolshevik triumph in the Revolution of 1917 and in the civil war that followed shaped the course of events in the twentieth century and led to the rebirth of the Russian empire in a new, more deadly totalitarian form. The communist victory also contributed to the polarization of world politics, facilitating the Nazis’ rise to power in Germany. Despite the brief alliance with the West during World War II, the Soviet Union became the principal threat to world peace. As a result, the United States had no choice but to make victory in the Cold War its number-one foreign policy priority.

  Even before the Bolshevik Revolution, the requirements of building and maintaining the empire had a debilitating impact on Russia’s political and economic development. Empire was incompatible with liberalization and democracy. The cost of maintaining a huge standing army was an obstacle to economic growth. The constant provoking of fear and hostility in neighboring countries proved incompatible with Russia’s own security. In the process of empire building, Russia was both aggressor and victim. While enslaving others, the pre-communist Russian empire had isolated and enslaved itself.

  When the communists came to power in 1917, the pattern of Russian imperialism and internal decline went from bad to worse. By the late 1970s, the Soviet empire was so overextended that even its own rulers began to recognize that the costs of expansionism threatened their ability to govern. By 1985, a significant part of the communist nomenklatura was ready to experiment with domestic reform and “new foreign policy thinking.” Mikhail Gorbachev became their standard-bearer.

  Gorbachev sought to reform the Soviet empire in order to save it. Contrary to the illusions of many of his admirers in the West, he wanted to save communism, not abandon it. This was an impossible task. His totalitarian empire, built and sustained by force and coercion, could not be fundamentally reformed. The crucial flaw in Gorbachev’s thinking was his failure to comprehend the law of history that dictatorial regimes collapse precisely when they begin to relax controls and create expectations they cannot fulfill.

  It was inevitable that, liberated from strict totalitarian controls, the peoples of the Soviet Union would seek to remove from power the communist authorities in Moscow who continued to determine their national destinies. Yeltsin’s unique contribution to Russia and the world was his understanding of this historical fact and his courageous determination to give his people a chance to enjoy political and economic freedom by putting an end, simultaneously, to communism and the empire. As Isaiah Berlin has observed, “Never before has there been an empire that caved without war, revolution, or invasion.”

  Often the demise of old adversaries leads to the emergence of new, sometimes more dangerous challenges rather than to peace and harmony among nations. After the defeat of the German and Austro-Hungarian empires in World War I, Woodrow Wilson and many other idealistic Americans hoped we would have an era of peace under the League of Nations. Instead, the United States was confronted with communism in Russia, fascism in Germany and Italy, militarism in Japan, and ultimately a new global war.

  Our justifiable sati
sfaction with the end of the Cold War must not obscure the urgent need to address the extremely difficult and contradictory transition in the post-Soviet region. Until this transition culminates in irreversible political and economic freedom and nonaggressive foreign policies, there is the danger that the remnants of the shattered Soviet empire will strike back at the world, with devastating consequences.

  Will Boris Yeltsin be able to continue to provide the leadership Russia needs to achieve the goals of the second Russian revolution—political and economic freedom at home and a nonaggressive foreign policy abroad? History is made by the acts of individuals, and history has placed enormous problems and extraordinary opportunities on President Yeltsin’s agenda.

  No one questions his courage. We all remember his standing on a tank, facing down a group of card-carrying communist killers who were supporting the coup attempt in August 1991. Most would agree that he is a strong leader. He did not hesitate to use the necessary military force to put down the reactionary mob that rampaged through Moscow in October 1993. In the process he taught a lesson to those who resort to arms rather than votes in a democracy.

  Some observers make the fatuous argument that Yeltsin demonstrated a disregard for law by not following the provisions of the Soviet-era Russian constitution and by dissolving the Gorbachev-era Congress of People’s Deputies. To his credit, despite the fundamental flaws of the Soviet-era constitution, he did not disregard it lightly. Only after a great deal of hesitation did he come to the conclusion that the Congress of People’s Deputies and the Parliament had become intractable roadblocks not only to reform but also to responsible government.

  Other leaders might have handled the difficult relationship with the Congress of People’s Deputies in a less confrontational manner. I myself urged that he do so when we met in Moscow in February 1993. But he turned out to be right. Within certain reasonable limits, leaders should do what is natural for them. Each must find his or her own way to deal with challenges. Winston Churchill, Charles de Gaulle, and Ronald Reagan were all effective in serving their nations. Yet they had different styles and used different methods to accomplish their objectives. The product of a unique period in Russian history, Yeltsin cannot be judged as if he were the president of a stable democracy with an established constitutional order. If he acted like one, he would probably fail.

  We should learn from history. This is the second experiment with a Russian transition to democracy. In 1917, the Provisional Government under Kerensky tried to adhere to strict democratic standards. It failed to develop close ties with the military and continued to fulfill its obligations to the allies to pursue the war with Germany, despite Russia’s desperate situation. The outcome was the Bolshevik takeover and more than seven decades of communist dictatorship. The United States does not need another Kerensky at Russia’s helm at this moment of trial. It is shortsighted of Yeltsin’s Western critics to attack him for precisely the kind of conduct that makes him an effective leader under these extraordinary circumstances. And it is hypocritical of them to be less patient with him and his fellow reformers after barely a year of dramatic progress than they were with Gorbachev after six years of timid incrementalism and broken promises.

  Now that a new constitution has been adopted and a new Parliament democratically elected, the charges against Yeltsin have become moot. In view of the massive problems he confronts, Russia is fortunate that he has not been more authoritarian in trying to implement his reforms.

  To evaluate Yeltsin, it is useful to compare him with Gorbachev. Gorbachev should be remembered as a great leader in Russian history. His political reforms made Yeltsin possible. Yeltsin, on the other hand, holds Gorbachev’s place in history in his hands as he tries to implement the economic reforms Gorbachev was unwilling and unable to carry through.

  Both Gorbachev and Yeltsin had history working against them. Generally, good revolutionary leaders are not good nation builders. Revolutionary leaders must destroy the old institutions. Nation builders must create new ones. Two leaders as different as George Washington in the United States and Jawaharlal Nehru in India were able to be both good revolutionary leaders and nation builders. Gorbachev failed that test. Now Yeltsin must demonstrate that he can succeed where Gorbachev failed.

  Both began their careers as peasants. Gorbachev became a man of the world. Yeltsin remained a man of the people. This has proved to be his major source of strength in the crises he has confronted as Russia’s President. When I saw him in 1992, I told him that as he traveled around the world, it was far better for him to be seen tipping glasses with a peasant than with a President. His early popularity was due to the fact that he attacked the obscene perks of the communist nomenklatura. He must be careful not to indulge in some of the same luxuries that he once criticized.

  I have often described Gorbachev as being an excellent politician. Yeltsin is a better one. Both exude charisma. But Gorbachev seems more contrived; Yeltsin seems more genuine. Gorbachev is more sophisticated; Yeltsin is more down-to-earth. Gorbachev is better in drawing rooms; Yeltsin is better in family rooms. Gorbachev seems to speak more from the head than the heart; Yeltsin seems to be talking more from the heart than from the head.

  When confronted with a crisis, Gorbachev frequently appeared at a loss and resorted to pathetic half-measures; Yeltsin, on the contrary, draws strength from crisis. His authority has come not from established political structures but from a special chemistry with the people.

  The difference between Gorbachev and Yeltsin that matters most is that they stand for different values. Czech President Václav Havel told me, “Gorbachev is still a captive of communism. Yeltsin has liberated himself.”

  Unlike Gorbachev, Yeltsin both preaches and practices democracy. He is the only elected Russian head of state in a thousand years. Gorbachev refused to risk his power in a free election. Unlike Gorbachev, Yeltsin has repudiated both socialism and communism. Most important, Yeltsin has adopted a nonaggressive foreign policy and has made massive cuts in Russia’s nuclear and other weapons.

  American commentators from both ends of the political spectrum deplored Yeltsin’s recent actions. While liberals were outraged that he dissolved the Congress and used force, conservatives fear the new Russian foreign policy assertiveness, which they view as a sign of neoimperialism. While both groups of critics are right in part, both miss the point.

  Yeltsin is a tough and sometimes ruthless Russian patriot. Otherwise he would never have been able to come to power and withstand the numerous challenges to his rule. Gorbachev started reforms without understanding their likely consequences and then backed down when the dangers became apparent, exposing himself—as one former senior Soviet official described him to me—as a “brutal wimp.” It should be remembered that Gorbachev had appointed the reactionaries who led the attempted coup against him in 1991. In contrast, Yeltsin acts preemptively and decisively. This is the key to the continuing support he has among the Russian people, despite all the pain associated with his country’s transition to democratic capitalism.

  Pushkin wrote in the nineteenth century that rebellions in Russia tend to be “bloody and senseless.” It is a political miracle that the unprecedented transition from dictatorship to democracy and from a command economy to a free-market economy is being accomplished relatively peacefully. The remarkable aspect of the October 1993 rebellion by hard-line reactionaries is that so few lives were lost, owing in great part to the fact that after some hesitation the armed forces stood by the democratic government.

  Many observers have expressed concern about Yeltsin’s personal weaknesses. Some say he has a drinking problem. Heavy drinking has been a characteristic of most Russian leaders throughout history, and of some American leaders as well. After Grant’s victory at Vicksburg in 1863, as Lincoln was considering appointing him commander of all Union forces, one of his advisers urged him not to do so because Grant drank. Lincoln reportedly responded, “Get me the name of his brand of whiskey so that I can give some to m
y other generals.” Yeltsin’s personal habits matter only if they affect his conduct in office.

  Yeltsin sometimes becomes depressed after winning a battle against those who oppose him. This is not an uncommon characteristic of leaders. What matters most is that Yeltsin so far has met the test when the stakes were highest. He himself has admitted in a television interview that he is at his best when the going gets rough but does not always follow through once the crisis is over.

  Yeltsin is the most pro-American Russian leader in history. He is at times too pro-American for his own good at home. Any of his potential successors would have a hard time following an equally moderate foreign policy. It is vitally important that we do not put Yeltsin’s administration or that of any democratic successor in the position of appearing to go in lockstep with the United States on foreign policy. This would do irreparable damage to the chance that political and economic freedom will survive in Russia.

  It is also important that we never put our chips on just one man, even one as powerful and able as Yeltsin. Our concern should be not the man but rather what he stands for. We stuck too long with Gorbachev. As long as Yeltsin has a foreign policy that serves the interests of peace and a domestic policy that serves the interests of the Russian people, he deserves our support.