Supreme Commander

by Stephen E. Ambrose

  Churchill began to take over. He fired off messages to Roosevelt, telling him what he wanted, summoned his service chiefs to his side to tell them what to do, and had Eisenhower join him often for conferences. On Friday, August 28, he had Eisenhower and Clark come to his country estate at Chequers for the weekend. On Saturday morning Churchill told Eisenhower that he was willing to drop the attacks against Bone and Philippeville, but said that the British would “go it alone” at Algiers if necessary.44 While Eisenhower was at Chequers, an aide delivered to him a cable from Marshall. Tearing it open, Eisenhower learned that Roosevelt, as a result of his exchange of views with Churchill, was going to propose that landings be made at Oran and Casablanca only. Eisenhower had Clark put the staff to work on that proposal; Clark commented that “this football team of planners must be dizzy trying to follow all the signals for the play called by the several quarterbacks.”45

  Roosevelt did not send his proposal to Churchill until August 31; upon receiving it the Prime Minister immediately called Eisenhower and Clark to a conference. He told the Americans that it was a mistake to put half the strength of the operation onto a coast where the surf might make it impossible to land and that he was seriously concerned with the omission of Algiers. As a counter, he was interested in eliminating the Bone and Philippeville attacks, reducing the force at Casablanca, and making the two main American attacks against Algiers and Oran. Roosevelt had insisted that all the initial landings be American; Churchill thought the President was greatly exaggerating the French hostility toward the British but was willing to go along. Eisenhower, who by now was primarily engaged in passing on information, did give the War Department his own opinion, which was that “every possible chance of including Algiers in the first attack should be explored.” He was, however, convinced that this could be done only if the U.S. provided more ships.46

  As the heads of government worked out details and changed objectives and landing sites, Eisenhower confessed to Patton, “I feel like the lady in the circus that has to ride three horses with no very good idea of exactly where any one of the three is going to go.” He was in an irritable mood, he said, “because last night, when I hit the bed, I started thinking about some of these things all over again and at two-thirty I was still thinking.”47 That evening, August 31, Eisenhower climbed into bed at ten-thirty and went right to sleep. At eleven the phone rang. Churchill’s secretary wanted to know if Eisenhower could come to 10 Downing later “that evening.” Eisenhower said he could and went back to sleep. An hour later the secretary called back, waking Eisenhower again to tell him he did not need to come around until the next morning.48

  On the morning of September 3, Butcher brought a message to Eisenhower, saying that it looked as if the British and Americans were getting together. Eisenhower took the message and grumbled, “There’ll be something impossible in it.”49 The message was from Marshall. On September 1 Churchill had cabled Roosevelt, suggesting in effect a trade. He would agree to Casablanca if Roosevelt would add Algiers.50 This set off a flurry of activity in the War Department. On September 2 Marshall cabled Eisenhower to say that the JCS had found that the U.S. could provide all the shipping and escort vessels needed for the Casablanca operation, while U. S. Navy ships already in the Atlantic could be used inside the Mediterranean.

  Admiral King, in short, after standing up to Eisenhower, Marshall, Pound, and Churchill, had yielded to Roosevelt’s pressure and found that he could, after all, spare a few ships. This broke the impasse and made three landings possible. Marshall said the President was going to propose to Churchill simultaneous landings at Algiers, Oran, and Casablanca. Churchill received the President’s suggestions that afternoon and called Eisenhower and Clark to 10 Downing for a conference at 5 P.M., where they worked out the details.51

  On the morning of September 5 Eisenhower attended a meeting of the BCOS. They agreed to accept Roosevelt’s proposal “without qualification.”52 Churchill cabled Roosevelt, “We agree to the military layout as you propose it.” Roosevelt responded the same day with a one-word telegram, “Hurrah!” to which Churchill replied, “O.K., full blast.”53 TORCH was finally settled. There would be three landings, at Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers.

  It had been a long time coming, and it left everybody a little shaken. No one seemed to trust anyone else, except at the very top. Later in the war the CCS would give Eisenhower as theater commander a directive that set an objective for him, then let him work out plans as he saw fit. In the spring of 1943, for example, they gave him the task of knocking Italy out of the war, leaving the decision on how to accomplish this (to invade Italy or not) up to Eisenhower. But that kind of confidence came only after the Chiefs had learned to trust him and, equally important, each other. During the essay contest the Chiefs had, for the second time in six weeks, reached an impasse. As with the decision for TORCH, they had been forced to throw up their hands and turn to the heads of government for solution. The CCS-theater commander system still was not working. The Allies had much to learn about making global war, but with the inside-outside debate finished, Eisenhower could go to work and begin the process of fighting Germans.

  * At the end of the war, when Eisenhower’s deputy, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, was going to Berlin, he needed a piece of information from Smith. Tedder sent an aide to get it. The aide found Smith in a conference with the British and American ambassadors to France but barged right in since Tedder was in a hurry. “What the hell do you want?” Smith shouted. The aide explained. Smith told him to clear out. The aide refused and said he must have the information. “You’re under arrest!” Smith yelled. The aide came to full and stiff attention and said that in any case he had to have the information. Smith relented, made a telephone call, got the information, and repeated it to the aide. He then returned to his conversation with the ambassadors, who had watched the exchange openmouthed. Looking up a few moments later, Smith noticed Tedder’s aide still standing at attention. “What the hell are you doing?” “I haven’t been released from arrest, sir.” “Get the hell out of here,” Smith bellowed. Interview with Eisenhower, December 7, 1965.

  * The daily planning sessions revealed more and more difficulties; one evening in the apartment Eisenhower told Butcher he wished someone would give him some good news. Among other things, the constant work meant a definite end to the social front. On August 10 Lady Astor phoned to invite Eisenhower to dinner. Her prize guest was to be George Bernard Shaw, and Butcher wanted very much to go. “To hell with it,” Eisenhower growled. “I’ve work to do.” Butcher, My Three Years, p.48.

  CHAPTER 7

  Preparing the TORCH

  “I liked him at once. He struck me as being completely sincere, straightforward and very modest. In those early days I rather had the impression that he was not very sure of himself; but who could wonder at that? He was in supreme command of one of the greatest amphibious operations of all time, and was working in a strange country with an Ally whose methods were largely unfamiliar. But as time went on Eisenhower grew quickly in stature and it was not long before one recognized him as the really great man he is—forceful, able, direct and far-seeing, with great charm of manner, and always with a rather naive wonder at attaining the high position in which he found himself.”

  ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM1

  Dwight Eisenhower thought of himself as an apolitical being. He felt that he knew nothing about politics, did not like either the subject or its practitioners, had no political ambitions, and based all his decisions on military necessity. He was a straight-from-the-shoulder, single-minded soldier who especially abhorred the subtle niceties of international diplomacy and intrigue. Unfortunately for his personal desires, he would spend a large part of the war engaged in political and diplomatic activities and would be forced to make many political decisions. By 1945 he was as adept at politics as any professional diplomat, but he never learned to like it.

  The diplomatic education of the soldier began with TORCH. The United States was prepari
ng to invade the territory of a neutral nation without a declaration of war, and that was only the beginning of the complications. The Western Allies wanted what amounted to transit rights in Algeria and Tunisia. They had no desire for territorial gain and did not want to make war against Vichy. Ideally, they would have preferred to take Pétain’s government into their confidence and make an alliance, but it was impossible for Vichy to join their cause because the Germans lived on Vichy’s doorstep. The Allies could hope for Pétain’s surreptitious support but nothing more.

  Vichy was no ordinary government. Spawned in defeat, it lived at the sufferance of the Germans and had little popular support. It was Fascist in orientation by choice. Most of France’s colonial administrators and soldiers had remained loyal to it, but their commitment was less than complete. The Allies counted on being able to shake the colonies loose. To do that, they needed to produce a man around whom the French colonial army could rally. Here there were two alternatives—the British and Americans could support a high Vichy official who would defect to their side, or they could find a leading figure in France not associated with Vichy.

  Actually there was a third alternative, but the Americans rejected it from the start. In 1940 General Charles de Gaulle had formed in England the Free French, an organization that refused to accept the Franco-German armistice, denounced the Vichy government for treason, and asked all true Frenchmen to rally to it. Few colonies joined the Free French and the total number of Frenchmen who had thrown in with De Gaulle was small. He was entirely dependent upon the British. Still, he did represent an alternative to Vichy, and an effort could have been made to get the North African colonies and Algeria to rally to him. The British were willing to try, but the Americans were adamant about avoiding De Gaulle. The reasons were diverse and complex, but they revolved around Roosevelt’s personal feelings toward De Gaulle.2

  It would have been difficult in any case to get the French Army in the colonies to follow De Gaulle, because from the point of view of French officers, if De Gaulle was right in rejecting Vichy’s orders and carrying on the struggle, then they had been wrong to obey the surrender notice. If De Gaulle was the true patriot, they were traitors; if he was the hero, they were cowards.

  Finding either a Frenchman within the Vichy hierarchy or one who could assume leadership in North Africa was difficult, but a State Department employee named Robert Murphy was sure he could do it. Murphy had been serving in North Africa since the Franco-German armistice, knew everyone of importance in the colonies, had arranged an economic accord between the United States and Algeria, and had long advocated that the United States launch an offensive there. A conservative Catholic, Murphy was basically pleased with the Vichy government’s domestic policies. He of course condemned collaboration with the Nazis, but that part of Pétain’s program that emphasized work, family, and country appealed to him. He blamed France’s troubles on the Popular Front and liked Pétain’s stability. His French friends were aristocrats, Roman Catholics, and authoritarian in politics. He was impressed by the skill with which French administrators kept the native populations of North Africa under control and was sure that if the Allies came into the region they would have to use the existing administrative structure to keep order. He detested De Gaulle and thought Free France was dangerously radical. Murphy, in short, felt the Allies would have to make a deal with the Vichy French. Because he was the senior State Department representative in the area and because he became Eisenhower’s chief civil affairs adviser, his views were decisive.3

  Murphy was sure of himself, even cocky. He exuded confidence. His manners and dress were perfect, his smile disarming, his head full of plots and intrigues. Even though he made promises he could not keep and predictions that were hopelessly mistaken, even though he got the United States to back the wrong forces in North Africa, he always bounced back and ended up on top.

  For nearly two years he had been telling the State Department that the North African French were anxious to join the Allied cause. His reports played a role in Roosevelt’s thinking, adding to the President’s desire to mount the North African expedition. When TORCH was decided upon, Roosevelt had Murphy fly from Africa to Washington, where the President briefed him on the operation. Murphy also saw Marshall, who asked him to fly on to London to explain the political situation in North Africa to Eisenhower.

  Murphy arrived in England on September 16. Bedell Smith met him at the airport and drove him to Telegraph Cottage, where he spent a day and a night in a series of conferences with Eisenhower and high-ranking military officers and diplomats. Eisenhower listened with “horrified intentness” as Murphy described the various French factions and the possible political complications. Murphy tried to cheer him up by practically promising that he could arrange things so that the French would not resist. Aside from his contacts with local commanders, Murphy had gotten in touch with General Henri Giraud, who he said could rally the French Army in North Africa to the Allied banner.4

  Giraud had lost a leg to the Germans in the First World War, had escaped from an enemy prison camp in 1917, and had escaped again in May 1942. He was living in the unoccupied section of France. He had let Murphy know that he was ready to come to North Africa and cooperate with the United States in an invasion.5 The potential gain from collaboration was great, for although the French Army in Africa lacked modern equipment, it did have 120,000 men (55,000 in Morocco, 50,000 in Algeria, and 15,000 in Tunisia).6

  Giraud had Pétainist sympathies, had no place in the hierarchy of the French Army, no popular following, no organization, no social imagination, no interest in politics, no program, and no administrative abilities.7 None of this was known to Eisenhower, and none of it bothered Murphy. Major General Charles E. Mast, of the North African Army, told his friend Murphy that the Army would obey Giraud, and that was enough.8

  The Murphy-Eisenhower discussions at Telegraph Cottage covered a number of points—proclamations to the French, the need to impress upon them the size and power of the Allied force so that they would feel resistance was hopeless, and so on. Murphy raised one potentially dangerous point when he explained that Giraud would want to be the Supreme Commander. Eisenhower, taken aback, said the question of command would have to wait. In due time he would see to it that the French got modern arms and equipment, and he would insist that the French take charge of their own army, but only under his supreme command. After all, he explained to Murphy, the Allies would eventually be sending half a million men into North Africa—surely Giraud could not expect to command them all?9

  The next morning, September 17, Murphy flew back to Washington, where he had more conferences, and then on to Algiers. Eisenhower, usually a shrewd judge of military men, was not so good outside his field. He had formed an excellent impression of Murphy. “I have the utmost confidence in his judgment and discretion,” Eisenhower told Marshall, “and I know that I will be able to work with him in perfect harmony.” Still, he was unhappy with Murphy’s directive, which was vague on Murphy’s relationship to the commander in chief. The President had written the directive, so Eisenhower was hesitant to raise the issue, but he felt it was “essential that final authority in all matters in that theater rest in me.” Unless Murphy was clearly under him, Eisenhower said, there was a possibility that the French might think there was a division of authority between the American civil and military officials.10 Marshall talked to Roosevelt about Murphy’s status and three days later the President issued a new directive, telling Murphy that he would operate under Eisenhower.11

  Murphy had wanted to tell the French when the attack was coming; Eisenhower had refused. One reason was that he did not know himself. The complexities involved in an operation that called for three separate landings, with one of the forces starting its journey from the United States and other two from Great Britain, were enormous. The target date was October 31; as one example of Eisenhower’s problems, if he were to meet that date he had to begin combat loading in the United Kingdom by Septembe
r 26. The beginning of combat loading would mean an end to training, because of the lack of equipment. Nothing that left the United States after September 12 would arrive in the U.K. soon enough to be loaded, but as of mid-September AFHQ planners had no master list in hand that told them what had arrived, what was on the way, and what was scheduled. Eisenhower toyed with the idea of substituting British equipment for the American assault units, but that was impractical because there was not time to give the men training with the weapons. All he could do was ask Somervell for a master list “as soon as possible.”12

  The date of D-Day was worrying everyone. President Roosevelt was especially concerned because congressional elections were coming up and a successful TORCH would give a great, and needed, boost to the Democratic Party. Under the circumstances, he preferred to have the operation go before the elections. Later, the idea that Roosevelt insisted upon TORCH in preference to SLEDGEHAMMER-ROUNDUP in order to influence the elections gained wide currency, but there is no evidence to support this charge. Roosevelt never tried to get Eisenhower to push the date forward, although the President did tell the general in late 1943 that it had been a “disappointment” for him that the African invasion came just after, instead of just before, the November 3 elections (in which the Democrats took a bad beating).13

  But if Roosevelt did not interfere with Eisenhower’s choice of a date, he was interested, like everyone else. On September 8 Marshall asked Eisenhower to let Washington know what date he had selected. Eisenhower replied that the best he could do was November 4 and that a more realistic date was November 8. Churchill, Eisenhower added, had reluctantly accepted the fact that TORCH would not go before November 4.14