Supreme Commander

by Stephen E. Ambrose

  On the personal side Eisenhower kept a tighter grip on Patton than he had on Fredendall. He knew Patton better and had personally selected him for the command. He had tried to get Fredendall to go to the front more often; with Patton the problem was recklessness. “Your personal courage is something you do not have to prove to me,” he assured Patton, and “I want you as a Corps Commander—not as a casualty.” He had told Fredendall that the need for a commander to be at his command post was overemphasized; he now told Patton that “in actual battle under present conditions a Commander can really handle his outfit from his Command Post.”

  Finally, Eisenhower reminded Patton that II Corps would operate under Alexander’s command. “I expect you to respond to General Alexander’s orders exactly as if they were issued by me,” he warned. “I want no mistake about my thorough belief in unity of command.”3

  With Alexander, meanwhile, Eisenhower was working on a project that would bring II Corps into the offensive against Rommel. The Germans were building up their defenses along the Mareth Line while Montgomery was preparing the Eighth Army to attack it. Eisenhower met with Alexander on March 7 and persuaded the British general to give Patton the objective of seizing and holding Gafsa. Montgomery’s offensive was scheduled to begin on March 20; Patton’s should go off a few days earlier. Patton’s movement was designed to draw off reserves from Rommel, to gain control of forward airfields in order to give assistance to Montgomery, and to establish a forward maintenance center from which Eighth Army could draw supplies to maintaim its expected advance.

  Patton was unhappy with his assignment. He insisted that II Corps could do much more than simply take Gafsa and make feints toward Maknassy. He wanted to drive all the way through to Sfax, thus splitting Rommel and Von Arnim. Alexander, however, felt the II Corps was not strong enough or experienced enough to accomplish this. Eisenhower was more inclined to give Patton and II Corps credit than Alexander was, but even the commander in chief wanted to avoid another American reversal and thus he accepted Alexander’s plan with its limitation on Patton’s operations.

  Although he agreed with his deputy’s plans, Eisenhower also made it clear to Alexander that more was involved in the final campaign in Tunisia than simply military victory. Repeatedly he warned Alexander to keep Allied unity high on his priority list. On March 9 he said he had noticed that reporters were beginning to use Kasserine to start an argument about “blame and credit as between British and Americans.” American reporters were saying that the British had been slow in coming to the aid of U.S. troops, while British papers criticized the American fighting ability. Eisenhower called a press conference and gave “a rather heated lecture.” He said that any attempt to initiate a British-American argument “would be completely and invariably censored” and warned that he would order the offending reporter out of the theater. Eisenhower had also heard that German propaganda was trying to convince the world “that British and Americans are at each other’s throats in this theater.” Eisenhower passed this on to Alexander and commented, “We’ll show them.”

  On March 17 Patton got his attack off on schedule. As he had predicted, it went well. He took Gafsa and began probing to the east, pinning down the 10th Panzer Division on his front. Rommel had left Africa, a sick man, and Von Arnim, now in command of the whole front, ordered a counterattack. The U. S. 1st Infantry handily repulsed the panzers; Patton then drove on to take Maknassy. On March 20 Montgomery launched his offensive along a narrow front; despite a tremendous artillery bombardment and a four-to-one superiority in tanks, he made little or no progress against the strong entrenchments. The New Zealanders then swung around the left flank, got up to El Hamma, and threatened the German rear, forcing the enemy to withdraw. Patton tried to break through at Fondouk and Maknassy to the coastal plain, but his attacks made little progress against stubborn resistance.

  Up to this point the operation had been a success. The American troops were regaining their confidence in themselves, the Germans were pulling back, and the Allied ship was tight. Suddenly the joints began to creak. On April 1 Patton’s G-3 issued a situation report (sitrep) in which he protested that “total lack of air cover for our units” permitted the German Air Force to “operate almost at will.” Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, who headed the Allied Air Support Command, replied that Patton was using the Air Force “as an alibi for lack of success on ground.” Coningham continued, “If sitrep is earnest, it can only be assumed that II Corps personnel concerned are not battleworthy.…” He added that he had instructed his flyers “not to allow their brilliant and conscientious support of II Corps to be affected by this false cry of wolf.”4

  The exchange of messages was a bomb with a short, fast-burning fuse. Before Eisenhower even knew of its existence, Coningham’s reply to Patton was circulating among most of the headquarters in Tunisia. Eisenhower received a copy and got Tedder, now air commander in chief, on the telephone. Tedder promised to order Coningham to withdraw and cancel his message, but it was too late for that to do much, if any, good. Tedder also promised to take Coningham with him to Gafsa to meet with Patton and make a personal apology. Eisenhower was so upset that he drafted a message to Marshall saying that since it was obvious he could not control his subordinates he should be relieved. Smith talked him out of sending it.5

  Before Patton met with Coningham, Eisenhower did what he could to see to it that the meeting was amicable. Patton had complained about the wide distribution given to Coningham’s criticism and demanded a public apology. Eisenhower told Patton he understood completely, but added that “the great purpose of complete Allied teamwork must be achieved in this theater.” This purpose, he pointed out, “will not be furthered by demanding the last pound of flesh for every error …,” and he asked Patton to go easy on Coningham. Eisenhower reminded Patton that his sitrep had also been widely and unwisely distributed and asked him in the future to make sure that anything that smacked of criticism be reported to his superiors only. Even better was “a friendly and personal conference with the man responsible.”

  “In carrying out my policy of refusing to permit any criticism couched along nationalistic lines,” Eisenhower added, he did not want Patton to make the mistake of not passing on his views to Alexander. One of Patton’s obvious responsibilities was to keep Alexander fully informed. It all came down to a simple statement: “True cooperation and unification of effort will come about only through frank, free and friendly understanding amongst all.”6

  Patton took Eisenhower’s advice. When he met with Coningham and Tedder he declared peace. After everything was settled, and the three generals were enjoying a drink, three German aircraft flew overhead and strafed the headquarters building. Tedder looked at Patton, who was grinning, and said, “I always knew you were a good stage manager, but this takes the cake.” Patton responded, “If I could find the sonsa-bitches who flew those planes I’d mail them each a medal.”7

  The problem of maintaining relations was never ending. As Montgomery pushed forward from the Mareth Line, the U. S. 34th Division at Fondouk failed to break through to the coast and the bulk of the Axis forces escaped. Montgomery took Sfax on April 10, Sousse on the twelfth, and Enfidaville on the thirteenth. He was disappointed at his failure to bag any large numbers of Axis prisoners and tended to blame it on the 34th Division. For the purpose of the attack the division had been assigned to Eighth Army, and the plans under which it operated had been drawn up by British officers. Major General Charles W. Ryder, commanding the 34th, agreed with his subordinates that the trouble was that the division had been committed to a faulty plan.8

  The British plan had sent the 34th Division through a valley at end of which was a high cliff, protected by German artillery, and on the left of which was another high hill with dug-in fortifications and artillery. The American troops were pinned down by a cross fire, but the British said that they could have moved and the failure to advance caused unnecessary casualties among the Eighth Army troops. Eisenhower took some
of the blame on himself, saying that he was afraid that his orders to get along with the British had been taken so literally that the American commanders had been too meek in acquiescing in British plans. They had hesitated to insist on their own views.9

  Before Eisenhower had an opportunity to deal with the grousing he received a message from Marshall. The Chief of Staff said it was widely believed in the United States that the failure of the 34th Division to co-operate with Eighth Army spoiled a chance to trap the retreating Germans. Columnists in the States were playing up stories that American units were being used to clean up the battlefields. Publicity favorable to the American soldier was practically non-existent. Public relations officers, Marshall said, reported a “marked fall in prestige of American troops in minds of pressmen and in reaction of public.”

  Alexander’s plan for the final elimination of the Axis from their Bizerte-Tunis bridgehead called for shifting the U. S. 1st and 9th Divisions to the Mediterranean coast on the north and putting them under Anderson. The other two American divisions in II Corps would be squeezed out of the line as Eighth Army moved north and linked up with First Army. This was a logical military arrangement which allowed for the most efficient use of resources, but Marshall told Eisenhower that he was opposed to relegating the Americans to such a minor role. The Chief feared “that in this vital matter you might give way too much to logistical reasons with unfortunate results as to national prestige.”10

  Eisenhower also had his doubts about the plan, saying it seemed “to be a bit on the slow, methodical side.” He was beginning to wonder about Alexander, too. He explained privately to Marshall that Alexander was most unfair to II Corps. Eisenhower had twice been in II Corps headquarters with Alexander when the British general cautioned Patton to avoid pitched battles because the Americans “might get into trouble.” Like Patton, Eisenhower thought the II Corps could have done much more in the Gafsa-Maknassy area had not Alexander held it back.11

  Over the next few days Eisenhower applied himself to correcting the past record and ensuring that the Americans would play a key role in the future. He held a press conference in which he emphasized the American contribution to the offensive, giving facts and figures on the losses inflicted upon the enemy by II Corps in the Gafsa area. He convinced Alexander to publish an order giving II Corps credit for holding off two German armored divisions plus other units during the Mareth Line fighting. He was angry with his censors for letting British criticisms of the 34th Division be made public. He had issued an order that no criticism of himself should be censored; as he told Marshall, “the fool censor extended this to include troop units, although how he reasoned that one out is beyond me.” Eisenhower had done everything possible to make sure the Americans got the credit they deserved for the campaign and said that “to find myself defeated by the stupidity of a subordinate censor was perfectly infuriating.” He did not often get discouraged, he added, “but I must say that last night was a bad one.” He relieved the censor and asked for the best man available in the War Department for the job.12

  On April 14 Eisenhower went to the front to confer with Alexander, Anderson, Spaatz, Patton, and the American division commanders. He bluntly told Alexander that, whatever the military requirements, it was absolutely essential that the Americans have their own sector in the final phase of the Tunisian battle. He wanted II Corps to fight as a unit on the north coast, with Bizerte as its objective. Alexander demurred, saying that the terrain was difficult, implying that he thought the job was beyond the capabilities of the Americans. He said that the 1st Armored had failed at Kasserine and the 34th Infantry at Fondouk, and that he thus wanted II Corps in the rear.

  Eisenhower explained some realities to Alexander. The United States had given much of its best equipment, such as the Sherman tanks, to the British. If the American people came to feel that their troops had not played a substantial part in the campaign, they would be even more insistent upon prosecution of the war in the Pacific and less interested in the Europe-first strategy. On the local level, he argued that American divisions would surely carry a heavy load in Sicily and in all future European campaigns, and that it was therefore obviously necessary that American troops feel confident of their ability to fight the Germans.

  Alexander admitted that Eisenhower was right and agreed to send all of the II Corps north, where it would fight as a unit.13 The trucks that Somervell shipped over in March made the move possible, and in an operation that showed the Americans at their logistical best 100,000 troops, along with supporting units, shifted to the north, moving behind the British lines, in two days.

  The II Corps now had a new commander. Eisenhower had not wished to put Patton in command originally because he wanted Patton to devote himself to planning for the Sicily invasion. So at this first opportunity he pulled him back from II Corps and put his West Point classmate, Omar N. Bradley, in command. It was in no sense a demotion for Patton; Eisenhower had been intending to make the switch since early March. He did relieve Ward, putting Harmon in his place. Ward seemed to Eisenhower to be tired out and unprepared for the rigors of another campaign.14

  As Bradley took command, Eisenhower sent him some instructions. He pointed out that, while the 1st and 9th Infantry had established themselves as first-class fighting units, “there is no blinking” that the 1st Armored and 34th Infantry had left themselves open to justifiable criticism. Although it was true that there were extenuating circumstances, and also true that the British in the early days in the desert also did poorly, Eisenhower wanted the American units improved. He realized that the sector in which Bradley would be fighting was not well suited for an offensive. Anderson had been forced to use mules for transporting supplies in the area. But Bradley had to overcome the difficulties and prove to the world that the American “can perform in a way that will at least do full credit to the material we have.” He wanted Bradley to plan every operation “carefully and meticulously, concentrate maximum fire power in support of each attack, keep up a constant pressure and convince everyone that we are doing our full part.…” Since the whole armored division could not be used simultaneously, Eisenhower said, Bradley had an opportunity to deploy his armor in great depth and use a maximum portion of the division’s supporting arms to insure success.

  Eisenhower concluded by warning Bradley to be tough. He said he had just heard of a battalion of infantry that had suffered a loss of ten men killed and then asked permission to withdraw and reorganize. That sort of thing had to cease. “We have reached the point where troops must secure objectives assigned,” Eisenhower said, and “we must direct leaders to get out and lead and to secure the necessary results.”15

  “Ike’s position just now is something like that of a hen setting on a batch of eggs,” Butcher recorded on April 25. “He is waiting for the eggs to hatch, and is in the mental state of wondering if they will ever break the shell.”16 The shell was the German bridgehead at Bizerte-Tunis, and three separate beaks—the British Eighth and First Armies and U. S. II Corps—were trying to break it. Eighth Army had made one attempt on the night of April 19–20, but it had only made a dent in the German lines and Montgomery had called off his offensive in order to regroup and concentrate along the coast near Enfidaville. Anderson’s attack jumped off from Medjez el Bab on April 22. The Germans concentrated against him because they were contemptuous of the II Corps in the north and because Montgomery was presenting no immediate threat in the south. As a result, First Army scored only limited gains. This put it up to the Americans.

  Bradley had four American divisions on the II Corps front; from north to south, they were the 9th Infantry, 34th Infantry, 1st Infantry, and 1st Armored. Eisenhower spent the last week in April touring the battlefront and came away with favorable impressions. He thought Bradley was “doing a great job” and was delighted to hear from a British veteran that the 1st Infantry was “one of the finest tactical organizations that he had ever seen.” He was also satisfied with the 9th Infantry and the 1st Armored. T
he 34th Infantry, however, still had to prove itself. It had been involved, without distinction, at Kasserine, and had failed in its offensive at Fondouk. Its morale seemed low.17

  Alexander had agreed to use the division, and Bradley had complied with Eisenhower’s wishes and given the 34th strategically important Hill 609 as its objective. The hill, almost a mountain, was the key to the German defensive line facing II Corps. Von Arnim used it for artillery fire and observation, and from it the Germans could prevent movement by both the 1st Division to the south and the 9th Division to the north. From Hill 609 Tunis could be seen. It was protected not only by its own height and artillery but by fire from nearby high ground, which gave the Germans a cross fire on the slopes leading up to it. Altogether, Hill 609 was the most difficult objective in Tunisia.

  On April 30 the attack went forward. The troops slogged up the hill, falling before the cross fire but advancing relentlessly. “I sincerely hope the 34th takes Hill 609 today,” Eisenhower told Alexander. “It would do worlds for the division and for the campaign.”18 By the next morning, the Americans had the hill. The Germans counterattacked furiously all through the day but the division, its self-respect restored and its confidence high, repulsed the enemy. Eisenhower’s patience and insistence paid huge dividends, not only in the campaign but for the future. The 34th Division went on to compile one of the best combat records in the American Army, making the assault at Salerno, holding the beachhead at Anzio, and leading the drive through Italy.

  The fall of Hill 609 broke the shell of the German defense in front of the Americans. To the north the 9th Division got into the hills behind Jefna and on May 1 the Germans pulled out, retreating to Mateur. The 1st Division, meanwhile, moved eastward along the southern slopes of Hill 609, while the 1st Armored drove along the Tine River valley to Eddekhila, then turned north toward Mateur. On the afternoon of May 3 it pushed the Germans out of Mateur and was in position for the final drive on Bizerte. Most important of all, the American attack had eliminated the bulk of Von Arnim’s mobile reinforcements. Montgomery had meanwhile launched another flanking attack, which was successful.