Supreme Commander

by Stephen E. Ambrose

  President Roosevelt took a different view. One could not, he roundly declared in the face of all the evidence, prejudge the political attitudes of the people of France. Still clinging to his tired old metaphor, he said he refused to help De Gaulle or anyone else ride into power on a white horse. As far as possible, he wanted to ignore the FCNL, maintain a military occupation in France until the prisoners of war returned, then hold free elections supervised by the American Army. On the surface it was a policy of idealism and justice, but it ignored many realities, of which De Gaulle’s self-evident popularity was only one. Eisenhower did not want to occupy France because it would waste manpower. From a purely military standpoint, the French had fighting divisions to offer and the Supreme Commander had to have the Resistance with him. To have the Resistance he had to have De Gaulle. There was in addition a contradiction in Roosevelt’s policy; time and again he told Churchill the United States would not be responsible for France in the postwar world, while at the same time asserting that the American Army could hold the country in trust until the French people could create their own government.

  The larger reality, obscured often by smaller considerations, was the question of who would control Europe when the German grip on the Continent ended. The United States had twice in a quarter century gone to war to prevent one-nation dominance of Europe. The unconditional-surrender policy guaranteed that when the war ended there would be a vacuum in central Europe. The Red Army, growing stronger every day, would certainly, it seemed, flow into that vacuum. The smaller European nations, all defeated by the Germans, could not resist. Italy was distraught and occupied. Few doubted at that time that the American people would certainly insist on bringing the boys home, so there seemed little possibility of America playing a leading role. Britain, strained to the limit, was incapable of matching Russian strength, even in western Europe. That left France. Churchill had insisted from the first that he wanted a strong and vigorous France after the war precisely because he wished to maintain some kind of balance of power in Europe and Britain would need help in offsetting the Russians. None of this had much, if anything, to do with ideology; it was simply traditional British diplomacy, a diplomacy to which the United States had in 1917 and again in 1941 lent its name and its great power. For innumerable reasons, the United States agreed with the United Kingdom that one-nation control of the Continent would be bad.

  Roosevelt was aware of the many complex factors in the situation. He was not opposed to a strong, revived France, but he doubted that such a recovery was possible and certainly was opposed to a France dominated by De Gaulle. He seems to have genuinely felt that France’s policy under De Gaulle would be anti-American. Churchill may have agreed with this analysis, but he could see no way of promoting the revival of France without De Gaulle. For Churchill, a weak France was a greater danger than a Gaullist France.

  Eisenhower was caught in the middle. With all his great responsibilities and many worries, he found that the difficulties that arose between the Western Allies and De Gaulle created one of the “most acutely annoying” problems he had to face before D-Day.1 He had to try to reconcile the conflicting policies and at the same time to emphasize his first concern, the defeat of Germany. France could render invaluable aid in this task, but only through De Gaulle. Eisenhower therefore gave first priority to convincing Roosevelt and the State Department that the Americans had no choice—they had to co-operate with le grand Charles.

  Eisenhower began his campaign for a working relationship with De Gaulle in January when he was in Washington. He tried hard to persuade the President and the JCS that a close operating arrangement with the FCNL could be helpful, if not essential, to the success of the campaign in France. But Roosevelt was adamant. He insisted that the French people would not submit to the authority of the FCNL and that any attempt to impose De Gaulle on France could lead to civil war.2 The State Department, meanwhile, made the American position clear to the British in a January 14 note from Hull to Eden. SHAEF should have complete control in liberated France, Hull declared. “The restoration of civil administration in France will be left to the French people in conformity with the traditional love of liberty and independence.” Hull added that “it is the hope of the Allies that the French people, having as their primary objective the freeing of France from Nazi domination, will subordinate political activity to the necessity for unity in ejecting and destroying the enemy.”3

  Eisenhower knew better than to put much faith in Hull’s hopes, and had in fact already taken steps to ensure the success of a policy based on more practical and predictable conditions. On December 27 Smith, acting as Eisenhower’s representative, had met in Algiers with De Gaulle and produced a draft of an agreement with the FCNL. De Gaulle approved of putting French forces under Eisenhower’s control and Smith in turn assured the French that they would play a major role in the return to their homeland, including a “presence” in northwestern France. Smith further agreed that when the Allied forces approached Paris, Eisenhower would ask the CCS “to insure the inclusion of a token French Force, preferably a Division,”4 in the liberation of the capital.

  But Hull’s position knocked the pins from under the Smith-De Gaulle agreement. Eisenhower was disturbed by this and was even more upset to learn from Smith that there was no intention in the United States of dealing with the FCNL on civil affairs. Eisenhower agreed with Smith that the Committee was the only realistic “vehicle” with which to deal with the French on both military and civil matters, and felt that if the Committee was ignored on civil affairs De Gaulle surely would not cooperate on military matters. Shortly after arriving in London, therefore, Eisenhower sent a plea for a more realistic policy to Marshall and the CCS. In tightly constructed sentences, Eisenhower declared, “It is essential that immediate crystallization of plans relating to civil affairs in metropolitan France be accomplished. This requires conferences with properly accredited French authorities. I assume, of course, that such authorities will be representatives of the Committee of National Liberation.” He requested that De Gaulle be invited to send an individual or a committee to London with whom he could enter into immediate negotiations. The need for prompt action could not be overemphasized, Eisenhower said, since he wanted to turn over to the French control of the countryside at the earliest possible date after the invasion.5

  Marshall gave Eisenhower’s cable to Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy, who took it to the President. When McCloy emphasized the importance of the Resistance to SHAEF’s success, Roosevelt agreed to a slight shift in position. He authorized McCloy to cable Eisenhower, saying “informally” that he should “feel entirely free” to make decisions about the Resistance, even if it involved dealing with representatives of the FCNL. McCloy did so, and added his own belief that on civil administration real progress was being made. He hoped that the CCS would soon send Eisenhower a basic directive for dealing with the Committee.6 Roosevelt, however, continued to hold back on any directive that might in any way imply a recognition of the FCNL as the provisional government of France.

  Roosevelt delayed in acting for more than two months, as conversation went on in Washington and London. Finally, on March 15, the President sent Eisenhower a basic directive. He gave the Supreme Commander power to decide where, when, and how the civil administration of France should be exercised by French citizens, “remembering always that the military situation must govern.” Eisenhower had permission to “consult” with the FCNL for local civil administration, subject to the distinct understanding that this action did not constitute recognition of the Committee as the government of France. If Eisenhower did choose to deal with the FCNL, he should require from it three guarantees: (1) it had no intention of exercising the powers of government indefinitely, (2) it favored the re-establishment of all French liberties, and (3) it would take no action to entrench itself pending the selection of a constitutional government by the free choice of the French people.7

  De Gaulle, upon being informed of these re
quirements, commented, “The President’s intentions seemed to me on the same order as Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland.” Giving Eisenhower a choice in deciding which French officials to deal with was ridiculous. The alternatives were Vichy or De Gaulle, and Vichy was too compromised by collaboration, and the reaction to the Darlan deal too fresh in everyone’s minds, to make it a real alternative. De Gaulle felt that, “without any presumptuousness, I could defy General Eisenhower to deal lawfully with anyone I had not designated.” De Gaulle professed himself not to be worried anyway, since, he said, Eisenhower had told him, “Now I can assure you that as far as I am concerned and whatever apparent attitudes are imposed upon me, I will recognize no French power in France other than your own in the practical sphere.”8

  In public, De Gaulle took a strong position. On March 27, referring to Roosevelt’s requirement that he guarantee traditional liberties, he declared, “France, who brought freedom to the world and who has been, and still remains, its champion, does not need to consult outside opinions to reach a decision on how she will reconstitute liberty at home.” A week later he added, “Wherever they may be and whatever may happen, Frenchmen must accept orders only from this Government [the FCNL] from the moment they are no longer personally subjected to enemy coercion. No authority is valid unless it acts in the name of this Government.”9

  The Roosevelt-De Gaulle clash distressed Eisenhower. While he agreed “that too great a concession to the French National Committee will result only in that body becoming even more arbitrary and high-handed than at present and will cause us acute embarrassment,” he realized “we are going to need very badly the support of the Resistance Groups in France,” and they could be brought to play their full role only with De Gaulle’s help. Meanwhile Eisenhower had no one at all with whom he could deal on civil affairs in France.10

  In April the French took one step forward and one backward. On the twenty-first the FCNL adopted an ordinance providing for the election of a Constituent Assembly by universal suffrage within one year of the liberation and promised to surrender its power to the new Assembly. This was reassuring, but the effects were lost a few days later when De Gaulle assumed final authority in all matters relating to French armed forces. General Giraud, angry at being reduced to a figurehead, resigned and went into retirement. This signaled the end of the original Roosevelt-Murphy French policy. The situation brightened again on April 25, when General Koenig, the senior French commander in the United Kingdom, began what was intended to be a series of informal discussions with the SHAEF staff. At the first session he pleased everyone by saying that questions involving the sovereignty of France could be put aside until later.11

  Almost immediately, however, the FCNL instructed Koenig to end the discussions. De Gaulle was unhappy because the British had declared that all foreign diplomatic representatives, save those from the United States and the U.S.S.R., would be barred from sending or receiving uncensored communications. This diplomatic ban had come about as a result of a fervent plea from Eisenhower, who on April 9 had told Brooke that diplomatic communications had to be censored as a part of the over-all security measures for OVERLORD. Eisenhower explained, “I regard this source of leakage as the gravest risk to the security of our operations and to the lives of our sailors, soldiers and airmen.” Although De Gaulle still carried the reputation of being unable to keep a secret, there is no evidence that Eisenhower had the French specifically in mind in propagating the ban, and when the War Cabinet imposed it, it applied the policy equally to all nations except its two major Allies.12

  Every party except De Gaulle was agreeable, albeit with some grumbling. De Gaulle, rather than have his communications censored, decided to have no communications at all. No notes moved between London and Algiers, which made it impossible to secure any agreement between the FCNL and SHAEF, or even to have informal meetings with Koenig, since Koenig could not receive instructions. De Gaulle took his drastic action because he was sure a compromise would be reached. He based his belief on the assumption that he had a high-placed friend in London. General Eisenhower, he told an American correspondent, had “a friendly disposition toward France.”13

  Whatever the Supreme Commander’s disposition, he had a battle to fight and was willing to make concessions to De Gaulle or anyone else in order to be in a position to fight it at full strength. He complained to the CCS that the limitations under which SHAEF had to operate with the French were “becoming very embarrassing and are producing a situation which is potentially dangerous.” The President had told him to deal with any French body that could deliver the military forces needed for OVERLORD; in practice this meant the FCNL. Eisenhower suggested to the CCS that the best course would be to bring De Gaulle himself to London and tell him of the place and date of the invasion. SHAEF could then work out civil affairs agreements with the French.14

  Eisenhower told Churchill of his request, and Churchill sent a cable to Roosevelt urging him to agree to it. The President approved of bringing De Gaulle to London but emphasized, “I do not desire that Eisenhower shall become involved with the Committee on a political level.”15 Roosevelt also insisted that if De Gaulle did come to London and was informed about OVERLORD, for security reasons he would have to stay in the city until after the invasion. Smith talked over the telephone to Churchill about this requirement; both agreed that De Gaulle would indignantly refuse an invitation that had strings attached. Nothing, therefore, was done.

  This situation left Eisenhower unable to act. He had no formal directive from the CCS for carrying on French affairs, he had been warned by the President to avoid all political discussions with De Gaulle, an obvious impossibility, and he was acting on a unilateral directive from the President, which was difficult because he was an allied commander. Most of all, he still had no agreement with the French about either civil or military affairs. He decided to try for conciliation again. On May 16 he sent a message to Marshall for delivery to the President. Eisenhower promised to make no political agreements with De Gaulle but added, “I think I should tell you that so far as I am able to determine … there exists in France today only two major groups, of which one is the Vichy gang, and the other characterized by unreasoning admiration for de Gaulle.” He expected that the Allies, once ashore, would find “a universal desire to adhere to the de Gaullist group.” Having explained the realities, Eisenhower made a final plea: “Because this is an allied command, I hope that your desires on this subject of which I am aware, can eventually come to me as a joint directive of the two governments.”16

  The timing of Eisenhower’s request for a saner French policy was unfortunate. The same day the FCNL passed a resolution stating that henceforth it would be known as the Provisional Government of the French Republic. Roosevelt was livid. He ordered OWI never to refer to the Committee as the Provisional Government, which gave the French an opportunity to have some fun at America’s expense. The Committee delighted in issuing bulletins referring to itself as the Provisional Government. The BBC read the bulletins as issued, while American broadcasters had to substitute “the French Committee” for the forbidden words.

  Pettiness aside, Roosevelt disagreed with Eisenhower’s basic analysis of the situation. On June 2 he told Marshall that Eisenhower “does not quite get the point. He evidently believes the fool newspaper stories that I am anti-de Gaulle, even the kind of story that says I hate him, etc., etc. All this, of course, it utter nonsense. I am perfectly willing to have de Gaulle made President, or Emperor, or King or anything else so long as the action comes in an untrammeled and unforced way from the French people themselves.” The President thought that when the Allies got into France SHAEF should do what AFHQ had done in Italy—that is, send a team into each of the villages, talk to local leading citizens, and appoint a mayor. He should not let De Gaulle appoint one, Roosevelt said, as he already knew of one case in which De Gaulle had designated a mayor for a town, and the man was “an unsuccessful politician and, in all probability, a porch-climbing rob
ber.” Referring to Eisenhower’s belief that France was split into two groups, Vichy and Gaullist, the President mused, “I wonder how he knows this because nobody else knows anything really about the internal situation in France.” Roosevelt thought the largest group in France was the one that did not know what was happening. He knew it was “awfully easy to be for de Gaulle … but I have a moral duty that transcends ‘an easy way.’ ” It was, he felt, his responsibility to see to it that the French did not have a government foisted on them by outside powers.17

  Whatever motivated Roosevelt—he himself said it was idealism, a concern for “a very deep principle in human affairs,” that of self-determination—his policy made for “friction and bad atmosphere,” as Eisenhower put it. Still, Eisenhower would not give up. He thought that once OVERLORD started “I can secure from the French the cooperation that I need.”18

  He had help. In late May Koenig worked out the diplomatic ban impasse. He allowed Allied authorities to examine his cables going to Algiers, then sent them in French code. The Allies allowed him to do this because he gave his word he would make no changes before encoding the messages. Incoming cables from Algiers were of course not at issue.19

  On June 1 Churchill made his contribution to conciliation by inviting De Gaulle to come to London to be briefed on the operation.20 The Frenchman at first refused, but the other members of the Committee convinced him he had to go, and on June 4 he arrived in England. Immediately, he began to say non to every proposal SHAEF made. Churchill briefed him on OVERLORD and asked him to co-operate by broadcasting to the French people and to the Resistance the strong request that they follow Eisenhower’s orders. De Gaulle refused. He was, Churchill noted, “bristling.” De Gaulle said political and military matters went hand in hand and that he could do nothing until political recognition of some kind was accorded him. He asked for an absolutely free right to telegraph to Algiers in his own cipher, without anyone reading the messages beforehand. Churchill calmed him, then asked him to make a broadcast to the French people on the eve of the invasion. De Gaulle agreed, or at least seemed to. The conversation turned to the American President. De Gaulle made no attempt to hide his bitterness, and finally Churchill shouted at him, “Each time we must choose between Europe and the open sea, we shall always choose the open sea. Each time I must choose between you and Roosevelt, I shall always choose Roosevelt.” De Gaulle growled that he had expected as much and the interview ended.21