Supreme Commander

by Stephen E. Ambrose

  Butcher had a simple way of judging the progress of events. He always felt that the best indication of how the battle was going was Eisenhower’s disposition; on August 14 he found it “sunny, if not almost jubilant.”48 Another indication of Allied success, unknown to them at the time, was a crisis in the enemy’s high command. Hitler decided that Von Kluge was a defeatist, believed the rumor that his general was making arrangements to surrender to Eisenhower, and then lost all faith in Von Kluge when he learned that the general was involved in the July 20 plot against his life. On August 16 Hitler replaced Von Kluge with Generalfeldmarschall Walther von Model.49

  The general sentiment in the West during mid-August was one of enormous optimism. Newspaper correspondents who had been overly pessimistic during the Normandy stalemate now went to the other extreme. Eisenhower held a press conference on August 15 and the reporters kept asking him how many weeks it would take to end the war. Furious, “Ike vehemently castigated those who think they can measure the end of the war ‘in a matter of weeks.’ He went on to say that ‘such people are crazy.’ ” He reminded the press that Hitler could continue the war effort through the Gestapo and pointed out that the German leader knew he would hang when the war ended so had nothing to lose in continuing it. Eisenhower said that he expected that Hitler would end up hanging himself, but before he did he would “fight to the bitter end,” and most of his troops would fight with him.50

  Eisenhower was right. The Germans in the Falaise pocket rejected the easy way out—surrender—and fought to hold open the jaws of the trap that were slowly closing on them. They tried to make it a Dunkirk in reverse. Despite Eisenhower’s plea in his Order of the Day, it was the Germans, not the Allies, who made the supreme effort at Falaise. The rigidity with which the field commanders held to the boundary lines aided the Germans (Eisenhower supported Bradley’s decision to adhere to the established boundary), even though late on August 15 Montgomery agreed to change the boundary slightly to permit the U.S. troops to come farther north.51 Those Germans not involved in holding the gap open, meanwhile, were fleeing as fast as they could; in the end, some 40,000 escaped. The gap was not closed until August 19.52

  Eisenhower was disappointed but not downcast. “Due to the extraordinary defensive measures taken by the enemy,” he explained to Marshall, “it is possible that our total bag of prisoners will not be so great as I first anticipated.” Still, he felt that “the beating up of his formations along our whole front has been such that with the cleaning up of the pocket and a resumption of our advance east and northeastward, the opposition will be greatly weakened.”53

  Falaise was, in short, a victory, even if a somewhat limited one that left a taste of bitterness and led to recrimination between the British and Americans as to whose fault it was that any Germans escaped. Some 50,000 German troops were captured, another 10,000 killed. Those who did escape left their equipment behind. An officer who had observed the destruction of the Aisne-Marne, St. Mihiel, and Meuse-Argonne battlefields in World War I found that “none of these compared in the effect upon the imagination with what I saw [near Falaise].… As far as my eye could reach … on every line of sight, there were … vehicles, wagons, tanks, guns, prime movers, sedans, rolling kitchens, etc., in various stages of destruction.… I stepped over hundreds of rifles in the mud and saw hundreds more stacked along sheds.… I saw probably 300 field pieces and tanks, mounting large caliber guns, that were apparently undamaged.”54 The extent of the destruction is best measured in the August 28 report of strength by the Fifth Panzer Army; it had 1300 men, 24 tanks, and 60 pieces of artillery.55

  The Allied Expeditionary Force was now approaching the Seine, with no coherent German defenses standing between it and the West Wall. The problems at Falaise and the escape of some German soldiers could not disguise the fact that Montgomery had engineered one of the great victories of the war. He had planned and conducted the operation, however, without consultation with Eisenhower and, in some cases, against Eisenhower’s known wishes. He had achieved a complete breakthrough, but unless he could also achieve better co-ordination with SHAEF, or unless Eisenhower could learn to work with Montgomery and accept his methods, the Allies might not be able to take full advantage of the new situation.

  * A sidelight on Brest-Lorient and Eisenhower’s and Marshall’s desire to bring the American divisions into the battle through those ports was that, if this had been done, the major argument in favor of ANVIL would have been eliminated. ANVIL’s biggest contribution, the one Eisenhower always emphasized, was that it would allow him to put more American divisions into the Continent. If he could do the same thing with Brest-Lorient, ANVIL was unnecessary. Eisenhower and Marshall seem to have ignored this, but as has been seen in Chapter 8 the Prime Minister did not.

  * There was later much controversy about this decision. Bradley has given the authoritative last word: “Monty had never prohibited and I never proposed that U.S. forces close the gap from Argentan to Falaise.” A Soldier’s Story, p. 377. Chester Wilmot concludes that the fault lay with the Canadians; he feels they should have closed the gap and prevented the escape of the German troops. Struggle for Europe (London, 1952), pp. 424–35.

  CHAPTER 10

  The Liberation of Paris

  During June and July 1944 Allied-French relations seemed to be stuck in the mud. De Gaulle was furious with the Allies because they had disregarded his protests and issued their own invasion currency, just as if France were an occupied country like Italy. No civil affairs agreements with the French had been signed, and no recognition had been extended to the FCNL. Roosevelt still believed “that de Gaulle will crumple and that the British supporters of de Gaulle will be confounded by the progress of events,” this despite the reports of all the military men in Normandy that the average Frenchman looked to De Gaulle “as the natural and inevitable leader of Free France.”1 De Gaulle was trying to drive a wedge between the smaller Allies and the British and Americans in order to get FCNL recognized, and while he was in London after D-Day persuaded the governments of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, and Norway to recognize the FCNL as the provisional government of the French Republic. They did so despite American protests. De Gaulle also tried to split the Americans. He told his bitterest enemy in the State Department, Robert Murphy, that Eisenhower had been “most apologetic with regard to the arrangements which had been made for handling of civilian administration in France,” and remarked that he realized that Eisenhower “was a good soldier who was being made to do something he did not want to do.”2

  By mid-1944 Eisenhower had become adept at weighing his own military needs against the instructions he received from the White House with regard to the French. Without making any long-term political commitments, he was able to work out a modus operandi that gave SHAEF the benefit of the forces at the disposal of the FCNL. The key decision was to elevate Koenig to a status equal to that of any other Allied commander serving under Eisenhower and to give him command of the French Forces of the Interior (FFI, the Resistance). Whiteley, in co-operation with Koenig, drew up the basic agreement three days before D-Day; SHAEF issued Koenig’s directive as commander of the FFI on June 17; on June 23 Eisenhower announced Koenig’s new status. Smith, who had been Eisenhower’s expert on French affairs in North Africa, continued meanwhile to work behind the scenes. By July 4 he was able to announce that Koenig had agreed to accept the Allied invasion francs, even for taxes. Smith had also arranged to attach French military tactical liaison officers to Allied army groups, corps, and divisions, and French administrative officers to the SHAEF section dealing with French civil affairs. Smith was most pleased about the good relations SHAEF had with Koenig.3

  De Gaulle took note of the steady inroads he had been making. In a speech on June 18, the fourth anniversary of his call to arms, he stressed French sovereignty, then praised the strategic understanding of General Eisenhower, “in whom the French Government had complete confidence for the victorious conduct
of the common military operations.”4 This speech helped set the stage for De Gaulle’s previously planned trip to Washington and contributed to a smooth meeting between De Gaulle and Roosevelt. De Gaulle arrived on July 6, and both he and the President made efforts to be affable. On July 11 Roosevelt told the press that he had decided to consider the committee the “dominant” political authority of France until elections could be held. De Gaulle expressed his satisfaction with this formula. He added that it would not only be an error but an impossibility to exclude France from her true place among the great nations of the world.5

  The breakout from the Normandy beachhead accelerated the amiable developments. Everyone was smiling and in a generous mood. As the Allied armies began to overrun France, meanwhile, the need for a signed, regularized civil affairs agreement—as opposed to the ad hoc arrangements Smith had worked out with Koenig—became more obvious. The FFI meanwhile contributed significantly to Allied military progress. The Resistance was of assistance everywhere, most notably in the south of France, in Brittany, and by protecting Patton’s open flank through interference with enemy railroad and highway movements. Eisenhower later paid tribute to the FFI: “As the Allied columns advanced, these French forces ambushed the retreating enemy, attacked isolated groups and strongpoints … [and] provided our troops with invaluable assistance in supplying information of the enemy’s dispositions and intentions. Not least in importance, they had, by their ceaseless harassing activities, surrounded the Germans with a terrible atmosphere of danger and hatred which ate into the confidence of the leaders and the courage of the soldiers.”6

  De Gaulle returned to Algiers in late July. As the Allies began to sweep across France he grew impatient. Unwilling to wait for an invitation from SHAEF or the British and American governments, and determined to be in France for the liberation of Paris, he announced on August 14 that he was flying to Normandy in the next day or two. He added that he would fly in a French plane piloted by a Frenchman, that he would land only in France and that he would not stop in the United Kingdom. Officers at AFHQ tried to convince him to fly in an American plane, partly because the French Lockheed Lodestar did not have the range to make the non-stop flight, and partly because the French plane was unfamiliar to the men operating Allied anti-aircraft batteries and might get shot down. General Eaker, the senior U.S. air officer in the Mediterranean, even offered De Gaulle the use of his private B-17. De Gaulle said non.7

  A flurry of messages followed. Koenig tried to convince De Gaulle that he should co-operate with SHAEF. Smith warned that if the French leader flew in the Lockheed Lodestar he “does so at his own risk and the Supreme Commander will not be responsible for the consequences.…”8

  For Eisenhower, meanwhile, the more important problem—assuming De Gaulle landed safely—was what to do with him when he arrived. No civil affairs agreement had yet been signed, so Eisenhower was still working under the pre-D-Day directive that instructed him to work with whatever Frenchman he chose on an informal basis. Eisenhower told the CCS he had no objection from a military standpoint to De Gaulle’s coming to France, but he did want to know if it would in any way embarrass the British or American governments. He said that if De Gaulle arrived before the civil affairs agreement was signed he would receive the Frenchman as simply “Commander of the French Army.” If however De Gaulle came after the signing, Eisenhower added, “he presumably will arrive as head of the Provisional Government of France.”9

  Eisenhower’s little concluding phrase was hardly as innocent as it appeared. It amounted to a recognition of the FCNL as the provisional government, for if Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, received De Gaulle on French soil in the capacity of “head of the Provisional Government,” it would have the effect of committing the British and American governments to this recognition. Eisenhower may have been aware of this; certainly he desperately wanted to regularize his relations with the French, and recognition was the easiest way to do it. It would be making policy, and high-level policy at that, by a soldier in the field, but if it accomplished its purpose Eisenhower was willing to do it.

  The CCS, however, saw what was at stake and would not allow Eisenhower to make policy in the field. The Chiefs told Eisenhower the governments had no objection to De Gaulle’s coming to France but added, “… the signing of the agreement will have no bearing on the reception arrangements.” Whether the agreement was signed or not, “General de Gaulle should be received as the Commander of the French Army.” Eisenhower should treat him as a soldier, not a head of government, and the basic policy of ad hoc arrangements without recognition would continue.10

  De Gaulle arrived on August 19. Within less than a week Patton’s Third Army and Hodges’ First, driving north and east, were approaching Paris. The immediate question was, Should Paris be liberated? Eisenhower wished to avoid it, at least for the present. To attack Paris might involve the Allies in prolonged street fighting and lead to the destruction of some of the most hallowed cultural monuments in the West. Once the Allies took Paris, they would be responsible for supplying its 2,000,000 civilians; planners estimated that 4000 tons of supplies per day would be required, equivalent to the daily needs of seven reinforced divisions. It would be better, Eisenhower and his planners thought, to encircle Paris, let the Germans in the city retain responsibility for it, and drive on to the German border. Eisenhower realized that this would mean a week or so of extreme privation for the Parisians, since the city was already low on food, coal, gas, and electricity, but he felt they would gladly accept the suffering if it brought a quicker end to the war.

  There was also a political problem. So far De Gaulle had been able to maintain himself as the symbol around which all patriotic Frenchmen could rally, and the Resistance had held together only because its members all shared the fundamental aim of ridding France of the Germans. The presence of the Nazis was the organization’s cement, and the conflicting groups in the Resistance and the FCNL would fall apart as soon as the Germans left. The Communists had a strong position within the Resistance, especially in the cities, and although they could easily profess their loyalty to a De Gaulle in far-off Algiers, a De Gaulle in Paris would be another matter. This does not mean that political lines were sharply drawn within all areas of the Resistance, but a large, vociferous, and influential group within the Paris Resistance was already preparing to contest De Gaulle’s leadership. Both De Gaulle and the Allies had long recognized this problem, and therefore material supplied to the FFI had been dropped in rural areas rather than near urban centers, only partly to escape German detection, more particularly to inhibit the development of the Communists within the cities. As a result, few of the FFI within Paris were armed.11

  In July, nonetheless, rumors of unrest in Paris and thoughts of a possible uprising similar to that of the Poles in Warsaw, caused great concern at SHAEF. Koenig ordered the Resistance to cease immediately any activities that might cause social or political convulsion, or might lead to German reprisals. His orders were not obeyed. On August 19 small local FFI groups in Paris, without central direction or discipline, took possession of police stations, national ministries, newspaper buildings, and the seat of the municipal government in Paris. They issued a call for a general uprising. That evening the German commander of the city, General Dietrich von Choltitz, asked for an armistice. Together with some Resistance representatives, he arranged for a truce until noon, August 23.12

  From De Gaulle’s point of view this was the most serious possible development. He would have been willing to consent to Eisenhower’s plan to by-pass Paris as long as the Germans controlled the city, but he would not allow Paris to fall into the hands of the local Resistance. Acutely conscious of the dictum that he who holds Paris holds France, keenly aware of the Parisian’s revolutionary instincts and his readiness to respond to the cry, “Aux barricades!” De Gaulle was determined to get regular French troops into Paris immediately.

  Thanks to his own foresight, and Eisenhower’s co-operation, a for
ce was at hand. Before Eisenhower left Algiers in late 1943 he had made an agreement with De Gaulle—a French division would participate in OVERLORD and, by implication at least, liberate Paris. The division selected was Brigadier General Jacques Philippe Leclerc’s 2d French Armored Division, and it entered France in late July as a part of Patton’s Third Army. It had since been switched to Hodges’ First Army as a part of Gerow’s V Corps. Although it was near Argentan, more than a hundred miles from Paris (American troops were within twenty-five miles of the capital), it could still be the first Allied division into Paris.

  On August 21 De Gaulle, accompained by Koenig, called on Eisenhower. They asked him to liberate Paris at once, and to use Leclerc’s unit for that purpose. Eisenhower replied that he would not change his plan to by-pass Paris, but when the time came to take the city he promised that he would give Leclerc the honor of entering Paris first. De Gaulle found this thoroughly unsatisfactory. Although Koenig had promised that French military forces would obey the Supreme Commander’s orders De Gaulle, after leaving the meeting, wrote a letter to Eisenhower in which he politely threatened that if Eisenhower did not send troops to Paris at once he would have to do so himself. Leclerc, in other words, would follow the orders of his government, not those of the Supreme Commander.13 Eisenhower scribbled a memorandum to Smith at the top of De Gaulle’s letter: “I talked verbally to Koenig on this. It looks now as if we’d be compelled to go into Paris. Bradley and his G-2 think we can and must walk in.”14