Supreme Commander

by Stephen E. Ambrose

  Eisenhower continued to insist that he had not changed his plans. He did admit that Churchill had introduced “a new idea respecting the political importance of the early attainment of particular objectives.” He said he could “clearly see your point in this matter,” but insisted that the only difference between the SHAEF plan and Churchill’s suggestion was one of timing. After he had linked up with the Red Army near Dresden, Eisenhower said, he would give American troops to Montgomery for a drive over the Elbe to Luebeck. Although Eisenhower did not say so, this policy would not meet Churchill’s demands for the capture of Berlin, but it would give the British a leading role in the last act. “I am disturbed, if not hurt,” Eisenhower declared, “that you should suggest any thought on my part to ‘relegate His Majesty’s Forces to an unexpected restricted sphere.’ Nothing is further from my mind and I think my record over two and a half years of commanding Allied forces should eliminate any such idea.”12

  Eisenhower was not being totally candid with Churchill, a reflection perhaps of his irritation at having had his every move called into question. Like Marshall, he felt he had proven he should be trusted. Probably more important was the fact that he would not give in. Marshall had informed him of the backing the JCS was giving him, and Eisenhower knew how strong his position was. He did not want to hurt or disturb the British, but neither would he allow them to set the objectives of his last campaign. Determined to hold to his own plan, he still hoped to satisfy the British; thus his refusal to take up a discussion with Churchill on Berlin, which could only have led to recrimination and bad feeling, or to admit that he had made any change in plan. If he were forced, however, he would speak out. “So earnestly did I believe in the military soundness of what we were doing,” Eisenhower later declared, “that my intimates on the staff knew I was prepared to make an issue of it.”13

  One way to avoid placing a strain on the alliance, and the one Eisenhower usually tried to adopt, was to act as if there were only objective military considerations at stake. This would work, however, only if the British agreed to limit the discussion to military objectives. Eisenhower tried to get them to do so, and at the same time to feel that British interests were well protected in SHAEF, by emphasizing the number and importance of the British officers on his staff. “I hope it will not be forgotten that some of the ablest members of my staff are from the British Army,” he said in one cable to Marshall. “Such men as Tedder, Morgan, Whiteley and Strong possess great ability and are absolutely unimpeachable in their objective approach to every question.” He said Tedder had been consulted at every step of the way.14 To Churchill, Brooke, and Montgomery, this was hardly satisfactory, however, as they considered that the British officers at SHAEF were too much under Eisenhower’s influence.

  Still, the BCOS quickly recognized that, unlike the 1942–43 period, they could no longer control CCS decisions. To save face, they decided to accept Eisenhower’s formula, which held that there had been no change in plans. At an April 1 meeting at Chequers, the Chiefs discussed the entire problem. Brooke said he was mollified because “it is quite clear that there is no very great change,” but he was still irritated because “most of the changes are due to national aspirations and to ensure that the U.S. effort will not be lost under British command. It is all a pity and straightforward strategy is being affected by the nationalistic outlook of allies.”15

  There was a court of last resort. If the British contribution to the AEF was not sufficient to allow the BCOS to dominate or even have an equal voice in the CCS, Churchill still might be able to persuade the President of the soundness of British policy and thereby bring about a switch in the plans. His appeals to Roosevelt, however, were unsuccessful. Marshall, whose influence with the President had grown steadily throughout the war, convinced Roosevelt that all matters of military importance should be left to Eisenhower.

  The storm now began to subside. Neither side wanted a split. The British agreed in practice to the relegation of Montgomery to a secondary role. Churchill, deeply impressed by the need for Anglo-American solidarity in the postwar world, took the lead in calming the waters. In a message to Roosevelt he said, “I wish to place on record the complete confidence felt by His Majesty’s Government in General Eisenhower, our pleasure that our armies are serving under his command and our admiration of his great and shining quality, character and personality.…” Churchill passed the statement on to Eisenhower, saying in addition that it would “be a grief to me” if anything he had said “pains you.” The Prime Minister took the opportunity, however, to add that he still felt the AEF should take Berlin. “I deem it highly important that we should shake hands with the Russians as far to the east as possible.” Thus, though the British had accepted the transfer of Ninth Army from Montgomery to Bradley, they still wanted the question of Berlin left open.

  Eisenhower was fulsome in his reply. “I feel an immense satisfaction that up to this point our strategic plans formulated more than a year ago have successfully developed so closely according to conception,” he declared. “The generosity of your language is equalled only by my continued determination that every action of mine shall be governed by the single purpose of winning this campaign at the earliest possible moment. In doing so I shall likewise devote myself toward sustaining among the forces of the United States and Great Britain those feelings of mutual respect and unification that have been the mainspring of effectiveness in this command.” He promised that the G.I. and the Tommy would march forward shoulder to shoulder, and “if Berlin can be brought into the orbit of our success the honors will be equitably shared.”16

  Three days later Brooke sent Eisenhower his best wishes on the occasion of the U. S. Army Day. The CIGS offered his “warmest congratulations” on Eisenhower’s “super-leadership” and said the overwhelming victories which Eisenhower was winning would “go down in history as among the greatest military achievements of all time.”17 Eisenhower told Marshall of Brooke’s message, said it was especially pleasing because of all the arguments he had had with the CIGS, and added that it showed “that there is a bigness about him that I have found lacking in a few people I have run into on this side of the water.”18

  On April 5 Churchill put the seal on the controversy by wiring the President: “The changes in the main plan have now turned out to be very much less than we at first supposed. My personal relations with General Eisenhower are of the most friendly character. I regard the matter as closed, and to prove my sincerity I will use one of my very few Latin quotations: Amantium irae amoris integratio est,” which the War Department translated to read, “Lovers’ quarrels are a part of love.”19

  Eisenhower had not waited for the BCOS or Churchill to approve of his plans; he had already acted. On April 2 he sent out the directive that implemented his program. The Ruhr had been isolated, and so Eisenhower declared it was his intention to divide and destroy the enemy forces by launching a powerful thrust on the axis Kassel-Leipzig. He gave Montgomery the objective of advancing on Bremen, then going on to the Elbe, where he should “seize any opportunity” to capture a bridgehead “and be prepared” to conduct operations east of the river. Bradley’s task was to mop up the encircled German forces in the Ruhr, drive from Kassel to Leipzig, and take bridgeheads over the Elbe if possible. Devers was to protect Bradley’s right flank and, after that was secured, advance on the axis Nuremberg-Linz.20

  The British did not approve. Having surrendered on the point of command of Ninth Army, they still wanted the advance from Kassel to head for Berlin. Again, however, the BCOS were rebuffed by the JCS. On April 6 the JCS told their British counterparts, “Only Eisenhower is in a position to know how to fight his battle, and to exploit to the full the changing situation.” Even if the JCS wanted to interfere they would not in this case, because they agreed with the Supreme Commander’s assessment of the situation. On Berlin, the JCS declared that such “psychological and political advantages as would result from the possible capture of Berlin ahead of the Russians
should not override the imperative military consideration, which in our opinion is the destruction and dismemberment of the German armed forces.”21

  The next day Eisenhower told Marshall that once he reached the Elbe River he planned to clear out his northern and southern flanks. If after these operations were concluded he could still take Berlin, he would do so. He insisted that his judgments were made purely on military grounds, and declared that he would need a new directive if the CCS wished him to operate on political grounds. He said he regarded a drive to Berlin as militarily unsound and added, “I am the first to admit that a war is waged in pursuance of political aims, and if the Combined Chiefs of Staff should decide that the Allied effort to take Berlin outweighs purely military considerations in this theater, I would cheerfully readjust my plans and my thinking so as to carry out such an operation.”22 If, in other words, Churchill was prepared to make Russia instead of Germany the enemy, and if he could get Roosevelt to agree, Eisenhower would willingly change his plans, for then the military considerations would be much different. But the CCS did not even discuss Eisenhower’s cable or the question of Berlin, and the final decision was left to Eisenhower.23 His directive remained unchanged, Germany remained the enemy, and Russia continued to be an ally.

  On April 6 Montgomery made another effort to persuade Eisenhower to try to take Berlin. He said that after the British Second Army captured Hamburg and reached the Elbe it should advance both toward Luebeck and to the southeast toward Berlin. Montgomery felt this would hit the Germans from an unexpected direction “and should be comparatively easy.” Montgomery knew that Eisenhower did not feel Berlin had much value as an objective but said, “I would personally not agree with this; I consider that Berlin has definite value as an objective and I have no doubt whatever that the Russians think the same; but they may well pretend that this is not the case!!”

  Eisenhower told Montgomery that his proposal for a double thrust from the Elbe was currently unfeasible, for it implied that Bradley would protect the right flank of Second Army. This was not what Eisenhower wanted; Twenty-first Army Group’s responsibility was, on the contrary, to give security to Bradley’s left flank. “It is not his [Bradley’s] role to protect your southern flank,” Eisenhower said. “My directive is quite clear on this point.” Eisenhower admitted that Berlin had “political and psychological significance but of far greater importance will be the location of the remaining German forces.… It is on them that I am going to concentrate my attention.” He added that if he had a chance to take Berlin cheaply he would do so.24

  With the Berlin question settled for the time being, it was imperative for Eisenhower to get some co-operation with the Russians under way. The danger was real and apparent—troops of the Red Army might bump into American or British soldiers and start shooting. The chances were great because of the unfamiliar uniforms and the language differences. Further, Bradley and Eisenhower had been given to understand that the Russians “had grown increasingly cocky and rash with each mile they advanced toward the west.” They were shooting everything in sight.

  Early in February Eisenhower had discussed with Bradley the problem of avoiding an accidental clash in closing head on with the Russians. The two Americans agreed that prearranged recognition signals were not likely to work; they had even less faith in the use of radio contact because of the language barrier. What they needed was a visible geographic line of demarcation. At the time of the conversation the Russians had closed to the Oder-Neisse, SHAEF forces to the Rhine. The only major river between them was the Elbe, which ran north and south to Magdeburg, where it bent to the east. South of Magdeburg the Mulde River ran on nearly straight south to the Czech border. It could be used to continue the boundary. Eisenhower, from then on, had the Elbe-Mulde in mind as a demarcation line. It was an optimistic thought, for his forces were two hundred and fifty miles or more from the Elbe while the Russians were within a hundred miles; in Bradley’s words, “The Elbe River line looked almost hopelessly beyond the reach of our Allied forces.”25

  Reaching agreement on a line of demarkation proved extraordinarily complex. Soviet, British, and United States airmen had been trying to work out solutions to the problems of bomb lines since June 1944, with little success. On the ground the matter was even more difficult because, in addition to such problems as language barriers and the absence of direct wire communication, there were the questions of the nature of lines of demarcation, procedure to follow when contact was imminent, withdrawal of various troops to their proper zones of occupation, and the probable necessity of having to advance beyond an agreed line of demarcation for emergency military purposes. There was no effective liaison between the advancing forces, for although the Russians had some political contact with the Western Allies the Soviet government had consistently refused to allow the British and Americans to gain any significant knowledge of the Red Army’s military plans and operations. The United States and Great Britain maintained military missions in Moscow, but until Eisenhower began his direct communication with Stalin the military missions merely passed on general information of SHAEF’s operations; the amount of information the West received through the missions was infinitesimal.

  In view of all these problems and, more important, in view of the rapidly changing military situation, Eisenhower knew it was obviously impractical to make any definite proposals on boundaries until he had a better idea as to where the two sides would actually meet. General agreements were, however, imperative. On April 5, therefore, he proposed that “both fronts should be free to advance until contact is imminent.” Stop lines might then be worked out by local commanders on the spot. Since this might bring the Western armies into the Russian Zone, he further proposed that, subject to operational necessity, either side would withdraw into its own zone at the request of the other.26

  The British, just recovering from their shock over Montgomery’s secondary role, were furious. Churchill felt that Eisenhower’s proposal would throw away the best bargaining point the West would hold at the end of the war. He most definitely wanted Allied troops within the Russian Zone when the Germans surrendered, and he did not want them pulled out until he was certain Stalin would give something in return.* He insisted that questions of withdrawal from the Russian Zone were governmental, not military matters, and had the British Chiefs of Staff suggest to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that Eisenhower be directed that “On cessation of operations our respective armies will stand fast until they receive orders from their Governments.”27

  The business of holding the other side’s territory for trading purposes, however, could work two ways, as the State Department was quick to see. Officials of the European and Russian Affairs Divisions declared “that for governments to direct movement of troops definitely indicated political action and that such movements should remain a military consideration at least until SHAEF is dissolved and the ACC [Allied Control Commission] is set up.” The State Department feared that the British proposal might send the Russians racing over Germany in an attempt to acquire as many square miles as possible before the war ended. Officials of the War Department were thankful for this interpretation of the British proposal because it indicated that the Department of State preferred “a straight military solution to the problem”.28

  The BCOS and the JCS directed Eisenhower to get an agreement with the Russians that would allow both sides to advance until contact was imminent. Division of responsibility would then be settled by army group commanders. The Russians were suspicious of the proposal, fearing that the West was trying to redraw the zonal boundaries, and demanded that Eisenhower clarify that point. He assured the Red Army leaders that these arrangements were tactical only, and on April 15 agreement was reached. The Combined Chiefs of Staff then instructed Eisenhower to make no major withdrawals without consulting his superiors. The policy was finally clear.29

  The question of where to stop was not. Even with agreement reached, Eisenhower could not simply have his troops rushing forward un
til they bumped into the Russians. He attempted to work out a system of signals and markings through which the two sides could identify themselves and avoid firing on each other, but no one had much faith in them. On April 21, therefore, Eisenhower told the military missions to Moscow to tell the Soviets that he intended to stop on the Elbe-Mulde line. Thereafter he would turn his forces north and south.* The Russians almost immediately agreed.30

  Thus Eisenhower had turned down both Montgomery, who wanted his army group to have the leading role in the last campaign, and Churchill, who no longer argued about who was to do it but still wanted the AEF to get as far into the Russian Zone as possible, and certainly into Berlin. The differences in views were caused, in large part, by different perspectives. Montgomery was a field commander whose forces had won great victories in Africa, Italy, France, and Germany. He was proud of what his men had done and was convinced that they could achieve almost anything he asked of them. They wanted to deliver the final blow, he wanted to see them do it, and he thought they could. Berlin was before them, the obvious objective. The Germans defending the capital were facing east, awaiting the Russian onslaught. Montgomery was confident he could take Berlin with one lightning thrust, and it seemed to him madness to hold his armies back.

  Churchill’s concerns were wider. If Eisenhower’s responsibility was to defeat Germany, the Prime Minister’s was the security of Great Britain. This was a continuing problem and he had to take into account what Europe would be like once German military might had been eliminated. The most obvious fact then would be the presence in central Europe of a triumphant Red Army, backed by a state that had the sharpest possible ideological differences with the West and had already indicated deep suspicions of Western motives. Roosevelt had told Churchill that the Americans would not leave their troops in Europe for more than two years, and Britain was exhausted.