Nehru's 97 Major Blunders

  If Nehru had dealt with Hari Singh wisely looking to the political options, like Sardar Patel had done in respect of all the Princely States, had Nehru not allowed his personal bias to dominate, had Nehru accommodated Maharaja suitably, had Nehru convinced him that his interests would be suitably protected if he joined India, Hari Singh may not have dithered and would have signed the Instrument of Accession well before 15 August 1947; and J&K would never have been an issue at all!

  To be anti-Maharaja was imprudent given the situation. Nehru should have tackled Hari Singh like Sardar Patel tackled the other 547 rajas and maharajas. However, Nehru, rather than giving a sympathetic hearing to Maharaja, and tackling him in a way that could lead to a favourable decision, appeared to be vindictive.

  Mountbatten was reported to have remarked about Nehru: “I thought he [Nehru] wanted to make the Maharaja lick his boots...”

  States V Shankar in his book, ‘My Reminiscences of Sardar Patel’: “...Pandit Nehru regarded it as axiomatic that only Sheikh Abdullah could deliver the goods and was prepared to make any concessions to him to seek his support... Sardar did not trust Sheikh nor did he share Pandit Nehru's assessment of his influence in the State. He felt that our case in Jammu and Kashmir had to be met on the basis of the Maharaja executing the Instrument of Accession, the thought of antagonising the one on whose signature on that document alone we could justify our legal case in Jammu and Kashmir was distressing to him.

  “...Sardar also felt it would be in the long-term interests of India to utilise the Maharaja's undoubted influence among the various sections of the people to force a permanent bond between the State and India...He [Sardar] was doubtful if the weakening of the administrative authority by the Maharaja to the extent demanded by the Sheikh was in the interests of the State and India. He felt that the last thing that should occur at that critical period was for the Maharaja and the Sheikh to work at cross-purposes with each other or for the already disillusioned people of the State to harbour doubts about the future of the Government or the Maharaja.

  “…Sardar Patel also came into conflict with Pt Nehru and Gopalaswami Ayyangar owing to the personal rift between the Maharaja and Sheikh Abdullah. It can scarcely be denied that the latter wanted the Maharaja’s head on a charger and taking advantage of the wrong assessment by Pandit Nehru and Gopalaswami Ayyangar … he literally wanted to dictate his own terms…”

  Blunder–21 :

  Kashmiri Pandits vs. Kashmiri Pandits

  The tormentors of the Kashmiri Pandits (KPs) have been Kashmiri Pandits themselves, or Kashmiri-Pandit-Converts. Most notably, people like Pandit Nehru who created the Kashmir problem in the first place; and then, rather than solving it, made it more complicated.

  Writes B Krishna in his book ‘Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel’, “Nehru’s bias in favour of Abdullah was evident from what he said in August 1945 at the annual session of the National Conference at Sopore in the Valley, ‘If non-Muslims want to live in Kashmir, they should join the National Conference or bid goodbye to the country... If Pandits do not join it, no safeguards and weightages will protect them.’”

  Nehru threatening his own people! And, not for any wrong committed by them. But to undemocratically force them to back a person who turned out to be a bigot, and an anti-national.

  Incidentally, Sheikh Abdullah himself was a Kashmiri Pandit convert. Sheikh Abdullah’s grandfather was a Hindu Kashmiri Pandit by the name of Ragho Ram Koul, who was converted to Islam in 1890, and was named Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, the name his grandson took.

  Even Sir Allama Mohammad Iqbal (1877–1938), who floated the concept of Pakistan, was a Kashmiri Pandit convert—second generation. His father was one Rattan Lal Sapru, who was caught embezzling money as the revenue collector of an Afghan governor. He was then given the option to either convert to Islam or be hanged. He chose to convert, whereupon his relatives excommunicated him.

  Those who drove out the Kashmiri Pandits from the valley also happen to be Kashmiri-Pandit-Converts. Fundamentalist Islam is supremacist, intolerant, cruel, and inhuman like the ISIS.

  That KPs have been their own worst enemies is highlighted by the following interesting historical episode: Rinchin was a Buddhist from Ladakh. Hinduism (Shaivism) was then the dominant religion in Kashmir. Islam was on the fringe, and was at the time being propagated by Saiyyid Bilal Shah, popular as Bulbul Shah. After Sahadev fled and Dulacha left, Sahadev’s Army Chief, Ramchandra, occupied the throne of Kashmir. But Rinchin, who had a key post in Sahadev’s administration, plotted and eliminated Ramchandra, and sat in his place in 1320 CE.

  To pacify the public provoked by the misdeed, Rinchin married Kotarani, daughter of Ramchandra. At Kotarani’s behest, discarding Buddhism, Rinchin adopted Shaivism to become acceptable to the public. But the Kashmiri Pandits refused to accept him in their fold, saying that his conversion was not feasible—a legend says they couldn’t decide which caste to put him in.

  As a reaction to the rebuff, and at the instance of Shah Mir, Rinchin then approached Bulbul Shah, who converted him to Islam, and gave him the name Sultan Malik Sadruddin.

  Rinchin later built a mosque called the Bodro Masjid, venerated both by the Ladakh Buddhists and the Kashmiri Muslims.

  With the king converted to Islam, many others followed. And thus Islam spread in the Kashmir Valley.

  This is how Pandits scored a self-goal. So, in a way, the Kashmiri Pandits have themselves to blame for inadvertently giving a push to the Islamisation of the Valley, though it was the later state-backed campaign—through preaching, patronage, incentives and forced conversions—that reduced the Pandits from an overwhelming majority to a minority.

  Blunder–22 :

  Sidelining the One Who Could have Tackled J&K

  Sardar Patel had remarked to HV Kamath that had Nehru and Gopalaswami Aiyangar not made Kashmir their close preserve, separating it from his portfolio of Home and States, he would have tackled the problem as purposefully as he had done for Hyderabad.

  Rafi Ahmed Kidwai, a close friend and a confidant of Nehru, had remarked: "...We should have absorbed Kashmir for good and all...I do not know where we are going. The country needs a man like Patel.”

  “Patel was as strongly against the reference to the UN and preferred ‘timely action’ on the ground, but Kashmir was Jawaharlal’s baby by now and Vallabhbhai did not insist on his prescriptions when, at the end of December [1947], Nehru announced that he had decided to go to the UN. Jawaharlal obtained Mahatma’s reluctant consent... Patel’s misgivings were amply fulfilled after India invited the UN’s assistance...”

  —Rajmohan Gandhi in ‘Patel–A Life’

  Said Jayaprakash Narayan: “Kashmir issue, being left to Nehru, proved to be unfortunate for the nation. Because of Panditji’s mishandling, the issue did no longer remain an internal affair, as it should be, but is smouldering as an international issue in the United Nations and its Security Council, making it possible for Pakistan to rake it up every now and then. Many a veteran leader in the country maintains that had the matter been handled by the Sardar, he would have found a satisfactory solution, and thus prevented it becoming a perennial headache for us and a cause of bitterness and animosity between India and Pakistan.”

  The matter of Princely States was under the States Ministry, which was under the charge of Sardar Patel. Patel had ably dealt with the complexity of over 500 Princely States. As such J&K should also have been left to Patel. However, without the concurrence of Sardar, and without even the courtesy of informing him, Nehru appointed N Gopalaswami Ayyangar as a Cabinet Minister without portfolio to assist him (Nehru) in handling Kashmir. Sardar became aware of Ayyangar’s role indirectly when he [Ayyangar] issued a note in connection with J&K, without consulting Sardar. Patel wrote to Gopalaswami in the connection on 22 December 1947.

  Meanwhile, Nehru, when he became aware of Patel’s above letter of 22 December 1947, chose to write a rather harsh and bossy letter to Patel: “Gopalaswami Ayyangar has been e
specially asked to help in Kashmir matters. Both for this reason and because of his intimate knowledge and experience of Kashmir he had to be given full latitude. I really do not see where the States Ministry comes into the picture, except that it should be kept informed of steps taken. All this was done at my instance and I do not propose to abdicate my functions in regard to matters for which I consider myself responsible. May I say that the manner of approach to Gopalaswami was hardly in keeping with the courtesy due to a colleague?”

  Response to such an intemperate letter was on expected lines. Patel wrote to Nehru on 23 December 1947: “Your letter of today has been received just now at 1pm and I am writing immediately to tell you this. It has caused me considerable pain. Your letter makes it clear to me that I must not or at least cannot continue as a Member of Government and hence I am hereby tendering my resignation. I am grateful to you for the courtesy and kindness shown to me during the period of office which was a period of considerable strain.”

  Disenchanted and frustrated with Nehru’s hubris, and his improper, thoughtless, and dictatorial ways, Patel expressed to Gandhi his wish to dissociate himself from the government in December 1947 and again in January 1948.

  Blunder–23 :

  Hyderabad—another Kashmir or Pakistan?

  The State of Hyderabad then ruled by Nizam Ali Khan first came under the paramountcy of the British in 1766. However, breaking his treaty with the British, the Nizam allied himself with Hyder Ali of Mysore in 1767. Their joint forces were defeated by the British in 1768, and Hyderabad State again came under the paramountcy of the British. In 1799 the Nizam helped East India Company defeat Tippu Sultan. Nizam Mir Usman Ali Khan, the seventh Nizam, ruled the State at the time of Independence. He was granted the title ‘Faithful Ally of the British Government’.

  At the time of Independence, Hyderabad was a premier State, with an area of about 2,14,000 square kilometres, population of 16 million, and an annual revenue of 26 crores. It had its own coinage, paper currency and stamps. 85% of its population of 1.6 crores was Hindu. However, the Police, the Army, and the Civil Services were almost completely the preserve of the Muslims. Even in its Legislative Assembly set up in 1946 the Muslims were in majority, despite forming a mere 15% of the population.

  Soon after the announcement of the 3-June-1947 Plan or the Mountbatten Plan of the partition of India, Nizam declared on 12 June 1947 that he would join neither India nor Pakistan, and would remain independent. He wanted to secure the Dominion Status for his State from the British, like the one proposed for partitioned India and Pakistan, although the same was not allowed for any Princely State.

  Had it been left to Nehru, and had it not been for Sardar Patel, Hyderabad state would have been either another Kashmir or another Pakistan.

  While Mountbatten and the British had nothing to say on the grossly unethical, illegal and even barbarous acts of Pakistan in Kashmir, and of Razakars in Hyderabad; it is significant that Mountbatten, thanks to the elevated position accorded to him by Nehru and Gandhi, was liberal in his moral lectures to India, and wanted India “to adopt ethical and correct behaviour towards Hyderabad, and to act in such a way as could be defended before the bar of world opinion.” However, moral lectures to Pakistan were out of his ambit.

  V Shankar writes in ‘My Reminiscences of Sardar Patel Vol.1’: “Hyderabad occupied a special position in the British scheme of things and therefore touched a special chord in Lord Mountbatten...The ‘faithful ally’ concept still ruled the attitude of every British of importance... all the other rulers were watching whether the Indian Government would concede to it a position different from the other states...

  “Lastly, on Hyderabad, Pandit Nehru and some others in Delhi were prepared to take a special line; in this Mrs Sarojini Naidu and Miss Padmaja Naidu, both of whom occupied a special position in Pandit Nehru’s esteem, were not without influence. There were also forces which were not slow or hesitant to point out the special position of the Muslims in the state... Apart from Lord Mountbatten’s understandable sympathy for the Muslim position in Hyderabad, shared by Pandit Nehru, in anything that concerned Pakistan even indirectly, he was for compromise and conciliation to the maximum extent possible...

  “Sardar [Patel] was aware of the influence which Lord Mountbatten exercised over both Pandit Nehru and Gandhiji; often that influence was decisive... Sardar had made up his mind that Hyderabad must fit into his policy regarding the Indian states... I know how deeply anguished he used to feel at his helplessness in settling the problem with his accustomed swiftness...”

  “...the decision about the Police Action in Hyderabad in which case Sardar described the dissent of Rajaji and Pandit Nehru as ‘the wailing of two widows as to how their departed husband [Gandhiji] would have reacted to the decision involving such a departure from non-violence.’”

  Wrote the veteran Congress leader DP Mishra: “…When he [Nehru] had written to Patel that the Muslims of Hyderabad should have weightage on the ground that ‘Hyderabad had been hundred percent a Muslim state’ [though 85% of the population was Hindu!], he seemed to forget that in that sense, Kashmir too had been a hundred percent Hindu state and that while he was placating the Nizam and the Muslim minority in Hyderabad, he had ignored the Maharaja of Kashmir and the wishes of the Hindu minority in Kashmir in order to placate Sheikh Abdullah…”

  Mountbatten, also Chairman of the Defence Committee, had recorded: “Pandit Nehru said openly at the meeting, and subsequently assured me privately, that he would not allow any orders to be given for operations [in Hyderabad] to start unless there really was an event, such as a wholesale massacre of Hindus within the State, which would patently justify, in the eyes of the world, action by the Government of India.”

  What would the world think? What Mountbatten thought? What about his own image? These seemed to weigh more with Nehru. Why couldn’t he also think the opposite: that the world would consider India a sissy and a fool to ignore its own national interests.

  Distressed about Nehru’s reluctance to act, Patel had written to NV Gadgil: “I am rather worried about Hyderabad. This is the time when we should take firm and definite action. There should be no vacillation; and the more public the action is the greater effect it will have on the morale of our people, both here and in Hyderabad, and will convince our opponents that we mean business. There should be no lack of definiteness or strength about our actions. If, even now, we relax, we shall not only be doing a disservice to the country, but would be digging our own grave.”

  On the use of force by India to settle the Hyderabad issue, V Shankar writes in ‘My Reminiscences of Sardar Patel, Vol-1’: “The entire staff for the purpose had been alerted and the timing depended on how long it would take for Sardar to overcome the resistance to this course by C Rajagopalachari, who succeeded Lord Mountbatten as Governor General, and by Pandit Nehru, who found in C Rajagopalachari an intellectual support for his non-violent policy towards Hyderabad..”

  Shankar quotes Sardar's response to a query, “Many have asked me the question what is going to happen to Hyderabad. They forget that when I spoke at Junagadh, I said openly that if Hyderabad did not behave properly, it would have to go the way Junagadh did. The words still stand and I stand by these words.”

  Writes Kuldip Nayar in ‘Beyond the Lines’: “...Reports circulating at the time said that even then Nehru was not in favour of marching troops into Hyderabad lest the matter be taken up by the UN... It is true that Patel chafed at the ‘do-nothing attitude of the Indian government’...”

  V Shankar states in ‘My Reminiscences of Sardar Patel Vol.2’: “The situation in Hyderabad was progressing towards a climax. Under Sardar's constant pressure, and despite the opposition of Pandit Nehru and Rajaji, the decision was taken to march into Hyderabad and thereby to put an end both to the suspended animation in which the State stood and the atrocities on the local population which had become a matter of daily occurrence.”

  Sardar Patel’s daughter’s “T
he Diary of Maniben Patel: 1936-50” states: “About Hyderabad, Bapu [her father, Sardar Patel] said if his counselling had been accepted—the problem would have been long solved...Bapu replied [to Rajaji], ‘...Our viewpoint is different. I don’t want the future generation to curse me that these people when they got an opportunity did not do it and kept this ulcer [Hyderabad princely state] in the heart of India...It is States Ministry’s [which was under Sardar Patel] function [to make Hyderabad state accede to India]. How long are you and Panditji going to bypass the States Ministry and carry on... Bapu told Rajaji that Jawaharlal continued his aberration for an hour and a half in the Cabinet—that we should decide our attitude about Hyderabad. The question will be raised in the UN... Bapu said, ‘I am very clear in my mind—if we have to fight—Nizam is finished. We cannot keep this ulcer in the heart of the union. His dynasty is finished.’ He (Jawaharlal) was very angry/hot on this point.”

  “…Hyderabad, a State covering 80,000 square miles in the heart of peninsular India was at that time in the grip of an unscrupulous minority which aimed at secession from India. Had the bid succeeded, India might not have survived as a political unit. This situation needed a man of iron who would not balk at coercive action, and in Sardar, India had at that vital moment just the man.”

  —Gordan Graham in the ‘Christian Science Monitor’