General Bucher, who was in charge, but was reluctant for the Hyderabad action, finally admitted:
“I take no credit to myself for the success of the Hyderabad operation. In all the circumstances from beginning to end, I was not prepared to say ‘Go’, until every possible development had been thought out and guarded against. The Sardar was, in my opinion, a very great man indeed… Undoubtedly, he was right when he decided that either the Government of Hyderabad must accept the Indian Government’s conditions, or else the State would have to be entered in order to eliminate the Razakars.”
Pusillanimous Nehru was so opposed to the use of force against Hyderabad that after Patel got the same approved by the cabinet Nehru called his cabinet colleague SP Mukherjee and remonstrated with him for supporting Patel on the issue, and warned him [being a Bengali] that India’s action would lead to retaliation by Pakistan, which was likely to invade West Bengal, and bomb Calcutta. Unexpected by Nehru, Mukherjee nonchalantly responded that the people of Bengal and Calcutta had enough patriotism to suffer and sacrifice for the national cause, and would be overjoyed when they learn that General JN Chaudhuri, a Bengali, had conquered Hyderabad!
External Security
Blunder–24 :
Inexplicably Irresponsible Ideas
The seeds of India's disgraceful debacle in 1962 India-China War were sown soon after Independence by none other than Nehru himself, as would be shockingly obvious from the incident below.
Shortly after independence, the first Army Chief of independent India Lt General Sir Robert Lockhart (India and Pakistan had British Army Chiefs initially) took a strategic defence plan for India to Nehru, seeking a Government directive in the matter.
Reportedly, Lockhart returned shell-shocked at Nehru’s response: “The PM took one look at my paper and blew his top. ‘Rubbish! Total rubbish! We don’t need a defence plan. Our policy is ahimsa [non-violence]. We foresee no military threats. Scrap the army! The police are good enough to meet our security needs’, shouted Nehru.”
Given such a mind-set, only God could have saved India in times of disaster. Unfortunately, God too abandoned India in the 1962 War. Perhaps God was cheesed off by the “rational”, “scientific-minded”, atheist-agnostic Nehru!
The art of war is of vital importance to the State. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.
—Sun Tzu, ‘Art of War’
But, what did Nehru do? Despite the “Glimpses of World History” and the “Discovery of India”, Nehru failed to discover that India suffered slavery for well over a millennium on account of its weakness to defend itself. No wonder, he neglected modernisation of the army, strengthening of defence, and pacts with powerful nations to deter enemies and ensure India’s security.
Risking country’s defence on the altar of “Ahimsa”, and talking of scrapping the army and making do with only the Police, Nehru actually went ahead and reduced the army strength by about 50,000 troops after independence despite the looming threat in Kashmir, and the Chinese entry into Tibet.
From 1915 onwards, when Gandhi returned from South Africa, the top Gandhian leaders had 32 long years till independence in 1947 to study, discuss, argue, and thrash out all issues vital to independent India. When in the British jails together for many years, they had long, uninterrupted and undisturbed times to work out all details under the sun for free India.
In fact, all relevant policies on a variety of vital matters like external security, internal security, foreign policy, industrial and agricultural policy, education policy, and so on should have been formulated by mutual consent, leaving no room for dictators like Nehru to plough their own furrow after independence. But, no. It seems they pondered only on vital subjects like Ahimsa, communalism, secularism, upvas, nutrition, and so on! For external security, it appears they banked only on Ahimsa and their own good conduct, and reciprocation of that conduct from their potential enemies and adversaries—wishful thinking had no limits!
Blunder–25 :
No Settlement with Pakistan
Nehru failed to reach an accommodation with Pakistan during his life time, making our western and north western borders sensitive, costing us heavy to secure them.
The crux of the Indo-Pak dispute was Kashmir; and Pakistan was unwilling for settlement and for no-war pact till the Kashmir issue was resolved. Kashmir would have been a non-issue had Nehru allowed Sardar Patel to handle it; or had Gandhi not made Nehru the first PM.
However, it was Nehru who created the Kashmir problem, and made it even more complicated. It was Nehru’s responsibility to resolve the issues he had created. Nehru unfortunately expired leaving both the issues—Kashmir and Indo-Pak settlement—unsolved.
The India-Pakistan Indus Water Treaty (IWT) of 1960 on sharing of waters from the six Indus-system rivers was an unprecedented (by any nation) generous “give away” (like the India-China Panchsheel agreement later of 1954) by Nehru to Pakistan at the cost of J&K and Punjab (details in Blunder–40), with no reciprocal “take”. It didn’t occur to Nehru to make it conditional upon Pakistan settling on J&K and other matters.
Intended to palliate India’s alarm at Pakistan’s entry into SEATO in 1958, General Ayub Khan proposed security alliance/pact with India to Nehru. Nehru summarily and scornfully rejected the proposal remarking security alliance “against whom?”
Blunder–26 :
Erasure of Tibet as a Nation
This is our only foreign debt, and some day we must pay the Mantzu and the Tibetans for the provisions we were obliged to take from them.
– Mao Zedong
when he had passed through the border
regions of Tibet during the Long March
In the 8th century, Tibetan King Trisong Dentsen had defeated China, which was forced to pay an annual tribute to Tibet. To put an end to mutual fighting, China and Tibet signed a treaty in 783 CE where boundaries were confirmed, and each country promised to respect the territorial sovereignty of the other. This fact is engraved on the stone monument at the entrance of the Jokhang temple, which still stands today. The engraving is both in Chinese and in Tibetan.
~ ~ ~
The US felt disappointed to discover that India had resigned itself to leave Tibet to its fate, and sit back, and do nothing! The then US ambassador to India, Loy Henderson, described the Indian attitude as ‘philosophic acquiescence’.
~ ~ ~
I [Sardar Patel] have been eating my heart out because I have not been able to make him [Nehru] see the dangers ahead. China wants to establish its hegemony over South-East Asia. We cannot shut our eyes to this because imperialism is appearing in a new garb...He is being misled by his courtiers. I have grave apprehensions about the future.
– Durga Das, reporting his talks with Sardar Patel in India from Curzon to Nehru & After
Nehru allowed Tibet, our peaceful neighbour and a buffer between us and China, to be erased as a nation, without even recording a protest in the UN, thereby making our northern borders insecure, and putting a question mark on the future of the water resources that originate in Tibet.
The Tibetan Government protested to the UN against the Chinese aggression. But, as Tibet was not a member of the UN, it was simply recorded by the UN Secretariat as an appeal from an NGO. Their appeal, in a way, was pigeonholed.
In view of this handicap, Tibetans requested the Government of India to raise the Tibet issue in the UN. But, India was not willing to do so, lest China should feel antagonised! What to speak of helping our neighbour who had appealed to us for help, we shamelessly advised the victim, that is, Tibet, to seek peaceful settlement with the aggressor, China. Even worse, when through others, the Tibet’s appeal came up on 23 November 1950 for discussions in the UN General Assembly, we opposed the discussions on a very flimsy ground—that India had received a note from China that the matter would be peacefully resolved!
Even though China had invade
d Tibet, Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador in Beijing, went so far as to pretend that there was lack of confirmation of the presence of Chinese troops in Tibet and that to protest the Chinese invasion of Tibet would be an interference to India's efforts on behalf of China in the UN! That is, complaining against China on behalf of Tibet would show China in bad light—as an aggressor—when it was more important for India to ensure China's entry into the UN, for which India had been trying, and ensure that this effort of India was not thwarted by taking up China's Tibet aggression! Nehru agreed with the line.
What kind of crazy foreign policy was this? Our own national security interest and the interest of Tibet were sought to be sacrificed to help China enter the UN!!
With no one to sponsor the Tibetan appeal, possibility of some joint action was discussed by the Commonwealth delegation to the UN. In the meeting, the Indian representative advised that India did not wish to raise the Tibetan issue in the UNSC, nor did India favour its inclusion in the UN General Assembly agenda!
See the irony: Nehru referred to the UN what India should never have referred—the J&K issue, it being India’s internal matter—and Nehru refused to refer a matter to the UN that India should certainly have referred—Tibet, despite its criticality both to India’s external security, and to the survival of Tibet as a nation.
When Nehru should not have acted, he did act; and when he should have acted, he didn’t! Both, his action and his inaction, led to disastrous consequences for India. Nehru’s strategy was India’s and Tibet’s tragedy.
Even if China could not be militarily prevented, if India and other nations had recognised Tibet as a separate nation, pressure could have been kept up on China to get independence for Tibet on some future date.
Writes Dalvi in his book ‘Himalayan Blunder’: “In October 1950 I was a student at the Defence services Staff College in Wellington, South India. Soon after the news of the Chinese entry in into Tibet reached us, the Commandant, General WDA (Joe) Lentaigne, strode into the main lecture hall, interrupted the lecturer and proceeded to denounce our leaders for their short-sightedness and inaction, in the face of Chinese action... he said that India’s back door had been opened... He predicted that India would have to pay dearly for failure to act... His last prophetic remark was that some of the students present in the hall would be fighting the Chinese before retirement.”
The US felt disappointed to discover that India had resigned itself to leave Tibet to its fate, and sit back, and do nothing! The then US ambassador to India, Loy Henderson, described the Indian attitude as ‘philosophic acquiescence’.
Said Dr Rajendra Prasad: “In the matter of Tibet, we acted unchivalrously, but even against our interest in not maintaining the position of a buffer state, for it had thus exposed the frontier of 2,500 miles to the Chinese… I have very strong feeling about it. I feel that the blood of Tibet is upon us…”
Several prominent Indian leaders and citizens decided to observe the Tibet Day in August 1953 to protest Chinese invasion of Tibet. Nehru wrote to AICC that Congress members should not participate in the same, as it was an unfriendly act towards China!
Reportedly, Nehru tried to rationalise India’s inaction on various pretexts, the most bizarre among them being that Tibetan society was backward and feudal, and that reforms were bound to upset the ruling elite, and so on.
Walter Crocker writes in ‘Nehru: A Contemporary's Estimate’: “It was being said in Delhi in 1952-53 that Nehru, in private and semi-private, justified the Chinese invasion of Tibet...”
Says Arun Shourie in ‘Are we deceiving ourselves again?’: “Panditji has now come down firmly against the order in Tibet: it isn’t just that we cannot support Tibet. His position now is that we must not support Tibet. The reason is his progressive [How regressive progressives can be!] view of history! The Tibet order is feudal. And how can we be supporting feudalism?...
“Panditji reiterates the other reasons for neither acting nor regretting the fact of not acting: ‘We must remember that Tibet has been cut off from the world for a long time and, socially speaking, is very backward and feudal. Changes are bound to come there to the disadvantage of the small ruling class and the big monasteries...I can very well understand these feudal chiefs being annoyed with the new order. We can hardly stand up as defenders of feudalism.’”
Crazy, perplexing and inexplicable! What does Nehru’s logic lead to? It is all right for a country that is backward and feudal to be taken over by another country if that would help it progress!
By that logic, the USA could have colonised most of Asia and Africa that was backward and feudal—including India, which also fell in that category—and Nehru would have been fine with that! And, how was the brutal communism of China superior to Buddhist feudalism!!
Why did Nehru operate in such a lamentable way?
Nehru thought that doing so would appease China and make for better neighbourly relations. That was odd. It was like substituting a very peaceful and harmless neighbour for a dangerous bully.
Writes Arun Shourie in ‘Are we deceiving ourselves again?’: “...response of the [Indian] Government has been to be at its craven best in the belief, presumably, that, if only we are humble enough to the python, it will not swallow us...” Said Winston Churchill: “An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile, hoping it will eat him last.”
Watching the way India capitulated, Chinese perhaps developed contempt for India and its leaders. Mao respected only the strong, and not the weak who bent over backwards to please him. India’s pusillanimity must have emboldened China. What was the result? Those who abandon their friends and neighbours, especially weaker ones, in their difficulties, should know that their own time would also come. And it came. As India realised in 1962. What was once a most secure border became the most insecure border, thanks to Nehru.
The communist-socialist-leaning Krishna Menon and KM Panikkar were Nehru’s advisors on Tibet and China. KM Panikkar was India’s ambassador to China and had explicitly stated India’s policy on Tibet as “autonomy within the framework of Chinese sovereignty”. The actual term was “suzerainty” and not “sovereignty”, but it seems there was a criminal oversight to the advantage of China. Or, was it deliberate on the part of the communist-sympathiser Panikkar? Why was he not sacked? The correction from India’s side was belated, and it is even reported that the same was suppressed by Panikkar.
During his last days in 1964, Nehru was reported to have said: “I have been betrayed by a friend. I am sorry for Tibet.” Betrayal? One does not understand! In international politics, if you are naive and incompetent to take care of your own interests, you would keep getting betrayed.
Blunder–27 :
Panchsheel—Selling Tibet; Harming Self
Despite what China did to Tibet, India signed ‘The Panchsheel Agreement’ with China on 29 April 1954. The agreement itself was titled “Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India” thus acknowledging Tibet as a part of China.
India did this despite its own stand to the contrary earlier. The flag of Tibet was put up on 15 August 1947 in the Parliament, acknowledging Tibet as a separate nation. Right up to 1949, Nehru, in his official communications, used words like the ‘Tibet Government, our two countries’, and so on, leaving no doubt that India recognised Tibet as a separate, independent nation.
India gained nothing through the Agreement, and all benefits accrued to China.
India did not even insist on prior settlement of borders. Reportedly, Girija Shankar Bajpai of the External Affairs Ministry had advised on settlement of the borders prior to the signing of Panchsheel, but his suggestion was ignored by all the three concerned: KM Pannikar, Krishna Menon, and Nehru. Our ambassador to China, KM Pannikar, was later derisively referred to as “ambassador of China”.
“This great doctrine [Panchsheel] was born in sin, because it was enunciated to put the seal of our approval upon the destruction of an ancient nation which was associated with u
s spiritually and culturally... It was a nation which wanted to live its own life and it sought to have been allowed to live its own life...”
—Acharya Kriplani
Dalai Lama writes poignantly in his autobiography ‘Freedom in Exile’: “Yet I was conscious that outside Tibet the world had turned its back on us. Worse, India, our nearest neighbour and spiritual mentor, had tacitly accepted Peking’s claim to Tibet. In April 1954, Nehru had signed a new Sino-Indian treaty which included a memorandum known as Panchsheel... According to this treaty, Tibet was part of China.”
Ambedkar disagreed with the Tibet policy of India and felt that “there is no room for Panchsheel in politics”. He said that “if Mr Mao had any faith in the Panchsheel, he certainly would treat the Buddhist in his own country in a very different way.”
“I hope I am not seeing ghosts and phantoms, but I see the murder of Tibet recoiling on India.”
—Dr Rajendra Prasad
India did not even insist on prior settlement of borders. Reportedly, Girija Shankar Bajpai of the External Affairs Ministry had advised on settlement of the borders prior to the signing of Panchsheel, but his suggestion was ignored.
Upon criticism of the Panchsheel in parliament, Nehru had brazenly stated that in the realm of foreign affairs he could never take so much credit as for the India-China settlement over Tibet! An amazing assertion indeed! All agreements among nations involve give and take. Panchsheel was only a “give away” with no reciprocal “take”. Through Panchsheel India literally gave Tibet to China on a platter, without negotiating anything in return either for Tibet or for India.
There is also a book, ‘Born in Sin: The Panchsheel Agreement—The Sacrifice of Tibet’, authored by Claude Arpi, the French-born writer, historian and tibetologist.
Panchsheel is actually a most eloquent example of the naivety of the Indian diplomacy and a shining example of what an international agreement should not be!
Nehru's 97 Major Blunders Page 8