Any democratic country, worth its salt, would have instituted a detailed enquiry into all aspects of the debacle: “What was the nature of the border dispute? Why the issue was not resolved through talks? Why didn’t India settle it in 1954 itself at the time of signing the Panchsheel? Was Indian position justified? Did Chinese arguments have substance? Why did India change its maps in 1954—on what grounds? Were there solid grounds for India to be so adamant on its stand? Why was the Chinese offer of a swap-deal on McMahon Line and Aksai Chin not accepted? Why was the forward policy adopted? Why the Indian defence preparedness was so poor? Had there been politicisation of the army? Why was the Indian performance in the war so pathetic? What should be India’s stand going forward? How to resolve the dispute? How to strengthen India’s defence?...”. Accountability should have been established and those responsible should have got their just desserts.
Blunder–34 :
No Accountability
Such was the economy practised in sharing information with the public, the media, and even the parliament, and such was the economy with truth in Nehru’s democratic India that the blame for debacle in the India-China War came not on Nehru, the principal person responsible, but on Menon. Such was the ignorance of the opposition that Kriplani and others asked Nehru to take over the defence portfolio from Menon! The poor fellows had no idea that the disaster both in the foreign policy and in the defence was actually thanks to Nehru. Menon became Defence Minister only in 1957.
Krishna Menon was reluctantly made the scapegoat. COAS Thapar resigned. BM Kaul resigned. But, not Nehru.
Here is Israel and Golda Meir's example, in sharp contrast to that of India and Nehru's:
After its decisive victory against the joint Egypt-Syria-Jordan-Iraq army in 1967 in the Six-Day War, following its victories in 1948 at the time of its birth, and later, Israel was a little laid back and unprepared, thinking Arabs wouldn’t dare attack again. Also because Israel had nuclear weapons by then to deter the Arabs. The attack of 1973 therefore came as a surprise to it. In 1973, Yom Kipper, the holiest day of the year for the Jews, fell on 6 October. It is on that day when Israel and the Jews the world over were busy observing Yom Kipper that the Egyptian and the Syrian armies launched a surprise attack against Israel in the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights respectively. Still, after the initial setbacks and panic, it rose to the challenge, and repelled the combined attack, emerging triumphant. The war came to be known as the Yom Kipper War. Golda Meir was the president then.
Even though Israel’s ultimate victory was spectacular and decisive, they immediately instituted an enquiry to fix responsibility for the initial setbacks and the panic reaction, and the lapses that led to the attack coming as a surprise.
The preliminary report took just a few months and was released on April 2, 1974—it actually named names of those responsible. Several top-ranking staff were asked to resign. Golda Meir was not named, but taking overall responsibility, she resigned on April 10, 1974—after mere eight days of release of the report, which was only a preliminary report! This, even though Israel, under Golda Meir, had actually won the war decisively and turned the tables on the Arab countries that had attacked them!
Contrast the above with Nehru and India. Even though India lost pathetically in the 1962 India-China War, Nehru government instituted no enquiry; and Nehru did not even make a gesture of an offer to resign.
Wrote Brigadier JP Dalvi in his book ‘Himalayan Blunder’: “When the inevitable disaster came Nehru did not even have grace or courage to admit his errors or seek a fresh mandate from the people. He did not even go through the motion of resigning; he merely presented his trusted colleagues and military appointees as sacrificial offerings... Instead of gracefully accepting responsibility for erroneous policies, the guilty men sought alibis and scapegoats.
“In any developed democracy the Government would have been replaced, instead of being allowed to continue in office and sit in judgement on their subordinates... We must also learn that a democracy has no room for proven failures. This is not a matter of sentiment. Mr Chamberlain was removed after Hitler invaded France in May 1940 with Cromwell’s classic plea, ‘For God’s sake, go’. Mr Anthony Eden was forced out of office after the disastrous Suez adventure of 1956...”
Not only that, Nehru was not even willing to remove the Defence Minister Krishna Menon. Nehru told Yashwant Rao Chavan who had come to Delhi to attend a meeting of the Chief Ministers: “You see, they want Menon’s blood. If I agree, tomorrow they will ask for my blood.”
Nehru even played his old game of a threat of his own resignation. Nehru had threatened to resign on several earlier occasions to have his way safe in the knowledge that people would back off. But, not this time. When he found that the trick won’t work and he himself would have to go, he quickly backed off and asked Menon to resign.
Nehru actually remonstrated with those who criticised him, and later even took revenge against some!
What was the alibi offered to the gullible public? The nation was told that the borders were well-settled, and that the unprovoked attack from China was what the innocent India got for doing all the good to China. Even Rajaji, otherwise in opposition to Nehru by then, blamed it on the treachery of the Chinese. Perhaps, at that time Rajaji did not know all the details.
You do a Himalayan blunder, but you receive sympathy—Nehru, the poor chap, was stabbed in the back by the Chinese! How publicised misinformation can turn the scales.
Everyone remembers a popular song of those times penned by poet Pradeep and sung by Lata Mangeshkar. It went like this: "Aai mere watan ke logo, jara aankh me bhar lo paani, jo shaheed hue hai unki, jara yaad karo kurbani..." The song is invariably played on August 15 every year. Lata told in an interview when she had sung that song in Nehru's presence, Nehru had wept! So sensitive was he!! Again, additional praise. But, who was responsible for his own tears and tears in the eyes of crores of Indians, in the first place? Had sensible policies been followed, this huge tragedy that befell the nation, and the consequent tears, could have been avoided.
Blunder–35 :
Delayed Liberation of Goa
Why should it have taken 14 long years after the Indian independence to throw out the Portuguese in 1961? If the British could quit the huge Indian mainland, couldn't Nehru get a small territory vacated? It was yet another example of faulty thinking, inability to take decisions, failure of foreign policy, lack of guts, and indifference to the defence and security of India.
During a long discussion on Goa in the Foreign Affairs Committee in 1950, Sardar Patel kept to himself listening to the various tame alternatives, then suddenly said at the end, “Shall we go in? It is two hours’ work!” Patel was very keen to fulfil the assurance given to the Goa Congress in his letter of 14 May 1946 promising freedom from foreign domination. He was all for using force to settle the matter quickly. But, Nehru was too much of a sissy to take any effective steps. Patel felt exasperated.
Writes Durga Das in ‘India from Curzon to Nehru & After’ (Rupa, Page# 250): “Gandhi advised the people [Indians] of the French and Portuguese possessions in India not to revolt against their overlords on 15th August but to trust Nehru to do for his kith and kin what he was doing to assist the Indonesians to become free. Indirectly, Gandhi was voicing the fact that he differed from Patel’s view on Goa and Pondicherry and other foreign enclaves and agreed with Nehru’s that the question of their liberation could wait for some time.”
With Nehru and Gandhi desired action could always wait. Idle and misleading talks substituted for decision and action. Both are responsible for the never-ending Kashmir problem. Left to Gandhi and Nehru, and had Patel not been on the scene, while Hyderabad and Junagadh would have been another Kashmir or Pakistan; there would have been dozens of independent Princely States sucking up to Britain or Pakistan, and becoming permanent headaches like Kashmir and Pakistan!
Blunder–36 :
Nehru’s NO to Nuclear Arms
; The then US president John F Kennedy was an admirer of Indian democracy, and when he learnt that China was on its way to detonate a nuclear device, he wanted that it ought to be a democratic country like India, and not communist China, which should have nuclear capability.
The Kennedy administration was ready to help India out with nuclear deterrence. But, as expected of ‘Nabob of Cluelessness’, a man-without-a-vision and a man callous-on-external-security, Nehru rejected the offer.
Currently, India has been canvassing support from various countries to become a member of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)—in vain, so far.
Had Nehru gone along with Kennedy’s advice, India would have detonated a nuclear device well before China. Had that happened, not only would India have been a member of the NSG long, long ago, but China would not have dared to attack India, nor would Pakistan have taken liberties to attack India in 1965.
Gandhian unproven, and never proven earlier or later, principles of non-violence had not only totally vitiated free India’s approach to retaining its own freedom (that it got after a millennium) by strengthening its defence and external security; but also gave excuse to weaklings like Nehru to not fulfil their basic responsibility as prime minister of protecting India, under the garb of the hypocrisy of high moral principles, and being flag-bearers of world-peace.
Nehru failed to grasp the deterrence value of nuclear weapons. What is surprising is what were his cabinet colleagues, and other leaders of the ruling and the opposition parties doing? Were they mere mute and spineless witnesses to whatever the dictator Nehru chose to do?
Blunder–37 :
Responsible for 1965-War too, in a way
India's lack of pacts with powerful countries to back it up in case of external attacks (Nehruvian policy (fad) of “Non-Alignment” resulted in it being non-aligned with its own national security interests), its poor showing in 1962-War, the fact of its continued dependence on outdated armaments of World War-II vintage, the exposure of its gross deficiency in modern military hardware, and little efforts even post 1962-war to strengthen itself, prompted Pakistan to take advantage of the situation and attempt to grab Kashmir militarily in 1965.
India and Nehru did not wake up even as Pakistan equipped itself with first-class, modern military hardware from the USA, following its pact with the anti-communist Western Bloc.
Shastri was relatively a new entrant as PM, and he had hardly had time to come to grips with things crying for attention, let alone tackle the huge Nehru legacy of untackled problems.
The blame for the fact that Pakistan dared to attack India, on account of its known unpreparedness, therefore, rests squarely with Nehru. Nehru did not wake up even as Pakistan equipped itself with modern weapons thanks to the US and the West, and became their ally in the cold war; even as India remained neutral, non-aligned, ill-equipped, and unprepared. Nehru was apparently innocent on the fundamentals of the external security requirements.
Further, as per the US advice, had India gone nuclear (please read previous blunder), Pakistan would not have dared to attack India.
Blunder–38 :
International Record in Insecure Borders
Nehru’s policies resulted in thousands of kilometres of all land boundaries of India, whether in the north or east or west or northeast or northwest, becoming sensitive and insecure, requiring massive investments to protect them.
What is noteworthy is that there were enough opportunities to peacefully settle the boundaries with China in the 1950s and early 1960s, yet most irresponsibly Nehru failed to encash on them.
The issue of boundary with Pakistan is the product of the Kashmir problem, which was actually created by Nehru.
Thanks to Gandhi and his choice for the first PM of India, perhaps India is the only country of its size in the world with such a long unsettled border with a giant neighbour, and disputes with another.
Rather than solving a plethora of severe problems crying for attention, the Nehruvian era added new problems, and not just added them, made them more difficult and almost insolvable, the most severe being securing the long borders.
Thanks to the Himalayas, the north from time immemorial has been the most secure natural boundary. Nehruvian policies managed to make them insecure! Kashmir is a Nehru-created problem, and because of it Indo-Pak border is also insecure.
Northeast has been made insecure thanks to gross misgovernance, corruption, and insurgency, and to Nehru turning a blind eye to proselytization, and to Muslim migrations from East Pakistan (Bangladesh).
Foreign Policy
Blunder–39 :
Nehru–Liaquat Pact 1950
With indescribable atrocities against Hindus in East Bengal going unabated post-independence, the GoI made an appeal to Pakistan to call a halt on the same. But, there was little response.
There was a marked difference between Punjab and Bengal in respect of the partition mayhem. In Punjab, the carnage was on both sides, East Punjab and West Punjab, although more in the Muslim-dominated West Punjab. In Bengal, the mayhem was mostly in the Muslim-dominated East Bengal. In Punjab, the migration was both ways: Muslims migrating from East Punjab in India to Pakistan, and Hindus migrating from Pakistan to East Punjab in India. In a way, there was a population transfer between West Punjab and East Punjab. In Bengal, the predominant migration was that of Hindus from East Bengal to West Bengal. There was a reverse migration of Muslims too, but comparatively far less.
However, the continued violence against the Hindus in East Bengal had began provoking retaliation in West Bengal, like the anti-Muslim riots in Howrah that turned serious from 26 March 1950 onwards, leading to the beginning of migration of Muslims from West Bengal to East Bengal. That is, the population transfer that had happened in Punjab in 1947-48 began to happen in Bengal belatedly by March 1950. It is this which alarmed Pakistan and the Muslim League leaders, who had hitherto been inciting the mobs in East Bengal, and were happy at Hindus being at the receiving end.
It was only when the anti-Muslim riots in Howrah, in retaliation of the on-going carnage in East Bengal, took a serious turn from 26 March 1950 onwards that the Pakistan PM Liaquat Ali made his first conciliatory gesture in a speech at Karachi on 29 March 1950, and expressed his intention to travel to New Delhi soon to work out a solution.
It yet again proved Gandhian non-violence can never counter and quell violence; it is only the counter-violence or the deterrence of violence that can control violence.
Accordingly, the Pakistani PM Liaquat Ali hurried to New Delhi, and signed the Nehru–Liaquat Pact, also called the Delhi Pact, on 8 April 1950. It provided for safety of refugees, return of looted property, security of life and properties to minorities; and so on.
As expected, while India firmly implemented the Pact, not Pakistan. While the anti-Muslim violence in West Bengal was put down with a firm hand, and the migration of Muslims from West Bengal to East Bengal ceased; the violence against the Hindus in East Bengal continued unabated, so also the migration of Hindus from East Bengal to West Bengal. That is, the carnage became only one-sided: that of Hindus in East Bengal. Also, the migration became only one way: Pakistan to India.
Looking to the track-record of the Muslim League leaders, who had themselves been inciting the mobs, Nehru should have known what the result of the pact would be. Sardar Patel was unhappy with the Pact, but being in the cabinet, didn’t oppose it. However, Shyama Prasad Mookerjee and KC Niyogee, the two central ministers from West Bengal, immediately resigned from the Union Cabinet in protest against the Pact.
Rather than facilitating transfer of population between East and West Bengal, and removing forever the problem and the poison, Nehru extracted the following “benefits” from the pact: (a)checked depletion of Muslims in India by stopping their migration; (b)increase in Muslim numbers by allowing their reverse migration into India; (c)condemning Pakistani Hindus to atrocities, and (d)their forced migration into India.
Blunder–40 :
Indus Water Treat
y—A Generous Give Away
In the India-Pakistan Indus Water Treaty (IWT) of 1960 on sharing of waters from the six Indus-system rivers, Nehru gave away far, far more than what was adequate, miserably failing to envisage India’s future needs.
India-Pakistan Indus Water Treaty of 1960 has parallel with India-China Panchsheel agreement of 1954. Both had generous “give away” but no reciprocal “take” and both were thanks to Nehru!
Brahma Chellaney writes in ‘The Economic Times’ of 10 May 2012:
“Jawaharlal Nehru ignored the interests of Jammu and Kashmir and, to a lesser extent, Punjab when he signed the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, under which India bigheartedly agreed to the exclusive reservation of the largest three of the six Indus-system rivers for downstream Pakistan.
Nehru's 97 Major Blunders Page 10