Blunder–28 :
Not Settling Boundary Dispute with China
Nehru failed to negotiate with China on a peaceful settlement of borders, so vital to India's security. Doing so was not difficult considering that China at that time was not strong, had numerous external and internal problems to contend with, and was therefore willing for a “give and take”, particularly ‘Aksai Chin—McMahon Line swap’: recognition of McMahon Line by China in return for India's recognition of China's claim on Aksai Chin, with minor adjustments. For over a decade (the whole of fifties and the early sixties), umpteen occasions presented themselves, both during the numerous visits of Zhou En Lai to India and the visit of Nehru to China, to settle the issue, but Nehru frittered away all the opportunities. Nehru let go even the Panchsheel moment to close the issue.
In his book ‘India-China Boundary Problem, 1846-1947’, AG Noorani mentions that a map annexed to the Mountbatten’s Report on his Viceroyalty labelled northern boundaries as ‘Boundary Undefined’. Map annexed to a White Paper on Indian States released in July 1948 by the Ministry of States under Sardar Patel also did not show these borders as clearly defined, unlike the McMahon Line which was clearly shown. The controversial area was Aksai Chin.
However, the maps were unilaterally altered after July 1954 at the instance of Nehru, and began to show a clear, demarcated border—that included Aksai Chin—as unilaterally decided by India. In his memo of 1 July 1954 some of Nehru’s directives were:
“All our old maps dealing with this frontier should be carefully examined and, where necessary, withdrawn. New maps should be printed showing our Northern and North Eastern frontier without any reference to any ‘line’. These new maps should also not state there is any undemarcated territory. The new maps should be sent to our Embassies abroad and should be introduced to the public generally and be used in our schools, colleges, etc... Both as flowing from our policy and as consequence of our Agreement with China [which agreement?], this frontier should be considered a firm and definite one which is not open to discussion with anybody. There may be very minor points of discussions. Even these should not be raised by us...”
Writes Kuldip Nayar in ‘Beyond the Lines’: “...I was only the home ministry’s information officer and had no official locus standi, but it was obvious that the Polish ambassador was on a mission. He invited me for a chat at his chancery and expected me to convey what he had said to [Gobind Ballabh] Pant [Nehru’s Home Minister]. At the beginning of the conversation he said that the proposal he would make had the support of all Communist countries, and specifically mentioning the Soviet Union. His proposal was that India should accept a package political deal, getting recognition for the McMahon Line in exchange for handing over control of some areas in Ladakh [Aksai Chin] to China. He said that the areas demanded had never been charted, and nobody could say to whom they belonged. What was being claimed to be India’s was what had been forcibly occupied by the UK. No power could honour ‘the imperialist line’, nor should India insist upon it. Whatever the odds, China would never part with the control of the road it had built. That was lifeline between Sinkiang and other parts of China, he argued. I conveyed the proposal to Pant who gave me no reaction, his or that of the government.”
What is the position now? India would be happy to do what China had repeatedly proposed in the 1950s and early 1960s, but what Nehru had declined. But, now being a super power, China is playing difficult. In personal life, as also in the life of a nation, what you don’t do when it can and should be done, you fail to achieve later. Time and tide wait for none. Who is paying for the missed opportunities? The whole nation—for the last many decades.
Blunder–29:
The Himalayan Blunder: India-China War
India and China had a record going back thousands of years for never having fought a war between them. Nehru, through his unwise and ill-considered policies, broke that record, though unwillingly.
Nehru’s ‘forward policy’ and his failure in settling the borders resulted in India-China war and its consequent human and financial loss. Here, we are talking of what India could control, not what China had in mind.
India began building forward check-posts under its hare-brained Forward Policy—which was actually a “bluff” masquerading as a military strategy. Their locations were as per the border unilaterally determined by India, and not as per mutual discussions with China. There was, therefore, a possibility of China's objection, and even Chinese action to demolish the posts. The fact was that the boundaries were not settled, so what was say within Indian boundary for India, may have been within Chinese boundary for China.
If you had not settled the boundaries, controversies were bound to arise. But, rather than negotiating a boundary with China and reaching a peaceful settlement, Nehru-Menon & Co in their wisdom—their Forward Policy—convinced themselves that it is they who would determine the boundary, and in token thereof, establish their posts, like markers. That China could object, and then attack and demolish those posts, and even move forward into India did not seem to them a possibility.
Why? Because, reasoned Nehru: any such "reckless" action by China would lead to world war, and China would not precipitate such a thing! That what they were themselves doing was also "reckless" did not apparently strike the wise men.
Writes Kuldip Nayar in ‘Beyond the Lines’: “...Nehru ordered that police check-posts be established to register India’s presence in the Ladakh area. As many as 64 posts were built, but they were not tenable. Home Secretary Jha told me that it was the ‘bright idea’ of B.N. Malik, the director of intelligence, to set up police posts ‘wherever we could’, even behind the Chinese lines, in order to ‘sustain our claim’ on the territory. This was Nehru’s ‘Forward policy’, but then Jha said, ‘Malik does not realise that these isolated posts with no support from the rear would fall like ninepins if there was a push from the Chinese side. We have unnecessarily exposed the policemen to death.’ He went on to say: ‘Frankly, this is the job of the army, but as it has refused to man the posts until full logistical support is provided, New Delhi has pushed the police.’”
“Mao commented on Nehru’s Forward Policy with one of his epigrams: ‘A person sleeping in a comfortable bed is not easily aroused by someone else’s snoring.’...[commented Mao:] ‘Since Nehru sticks his head out and insists on us fighting him, for us not to fight with him would not be friendly enough. Courtesy emphasises reciprocity.’”
—Henry Kissinger, ‘On China’
President Dr Radhakrishnan was so aghast at the Indian military debacle that when someone told him of a rumour that General BM Kaul had been taken prisoner by the Chinese, he commented, “It is, unfortunately, untrue.”
Wrote S Gopal, Nehru's official biographer: “Things went so wrong that had they not happened it would have been difficult to believe them.”
And, this is what Nehru himself admitted:
“We were getting out of touch with reality in the modern world and we were living in an artificial atmosphere of our creation...”
“We feel India has been ill-repaid for her diplomatic friendliness toward Peking... Difficult to say the Chinese have deliberately deceived us... We may have deceived ourselves...”
Blunder–30 :
Criminal Neglect of External Security
Nehru seemed to be clueless, even irresponsible, in not realising what it took for the country of the size of India, with its many inherited problems, to be able to defend itself adequately and deter others from any designs over it. On one hand, Nehru failed to settle border-issue with China, and on the other, he did irresponsibly little to militarily secure the borders we claimed ours. Nehru and his Defence Minister Krishna Menon ignored the persistent demands for military upgradation.
General Thapar had submitted a note to the government in 1960 pointing out that the equipment that the Indian army had and their poor condition was no match to that of China and even Pakistan. Prior to the operations against China
to get certain territories vacated, Thapar had impressed upon Nehru that the Indian army was unprepared and ill-equipped for the task it was being asked to undertake. He even got Nehru to cross-check these stark realities from some of his senior staff. Yet, Nehru persisted, saying China would not retaliate! General Thapar told Kuldip Nayar on 29 July 1970, as stated by Nayar in his book ‘Beyond the Lines’: “Looking back, I think I should have submitted my resignation at that time. I might have saved my country from the humiliation of defeat.”
India’s army chief KS Thimayya had repeatedly raised the issue of army’s gross weaknesses in defending itself from China. Frustrated at his failure to get the needful done despite his entreaties to Krishna Menon and Nehru, this is what he told his fellow army-men in his farewell speech upon retirement in 1961: “I hope I am not leaving you as cannon fodder for the Chinese. God bless you all!”
Wrote Brigadier JP Dalvi in his book ‘Himalayan Blunder’: “There was no overall political objective; no National Policy; no grand strategy and total unreadiness for military operations in the awesome Himalayan mountains, against a first-class land power... We did not study the pattern of weapons and communications equipments that we may require. Army Schools of Instruction were oriented towards open warfare. There was little emphasis on mountain warfare despite the Army’s deployment in Kashmir from 1947... The Army was forgotten; its equipment allowed to become obsolete, certainly obsolescent; and its training academic and outdated. We merely tried to maintain what we had inherited in 1947... The political assumptions of our defence policies were invalid and dangerous... In October 1962 Indians were shocked beyond words to discover that we had no modern rifle, although we were supposed to be ready to ‘manufacture’ an aircraft; and had the know-how to make an atom-bomb...
“Assam Rifles posts [under the forward policy] were deployed non-tactically and they were ill-armed and even worse equipped that the Regular Army. At best, they could only function as border check-posts and yet their task was ‘to fight to the last man and the last round’... There were no inter-communication facilities between Assam Rifles’ posts and the nearest Army sub-unit... The standard explanation was that there was a general shortage of wireless sets in the country. The Assam Rifles was a separate private army of the External Affairs Ministry. And who would dare bell the cat about the extraordinary command system?”
Despite the above sorry state of affairs, this is what Nehru stated in the Parliament: “I can tell this House that at no time since our independence, and of course before it, were our defence forces in better condition, in finer fettle... than they are today. I am not boasting about them or comparing them with any other country’s, but I am quite confident that our defence forces are well capable of looking after our country.” Nehru had stated: “It is completely impracticable for the Chinese Government to think of anything in the nature of invasion of India. Therefore I rule it out...” Contrast Nehru’s above statement with the wisdom of Margaret Thatcher: “Hope is no basis for a defence policy.”
Blunder–31 :
Politicisation of the Army
Politicisation of the army high command was one of the reasons India performed miserably in the India-China War.
Instead of heeding sound military advice, Nehru and Menon had put in place submissive officers at the top in the military, who would carry out their orders. Krishna Menon ill-treated people. He was offensive to the top-brass of the military. He antagonised many through his acerbic comments, sarcasm and supercilious behaviour. He had publicly humiliated top brass of the army. Eventually, some of their chosen submissive officers contributed to the humiliation of India.
General Verma had dared to write to the higher authorities the facts of poor operational readiness. He was asked to withdraw his letter. He refused and wanted the letter to be put on record. That honest, forthright and very capable officer was victimised—ultimately he resigned. Similarly, General Umrao Singh was removed for objecting to the reckless putting up of forward posts.
Writes GS Bhargava in his book ‘The Battle of NEFA’: “...a new class of Army Officer who could collude with politicians to land the country in straights in which it found itself in September-October 1962. Since qualities of heart and head ceased to be a passport to promotion for military officers...the more ambitious among them started currying favour with the politicians.”
Whichever domain, department, sector the babus, the IAS stepped in that area went to dogs. Came the defence secretary and his babudom between the army and the Defence Minister after independence, and the results are for anyone to check. Babus, who knew next to nothing on the defence matters, started dictating terms and making money.
Politicisation and favouritism became the order of the day, and professionalism went for a toss. Instead of exercising ‘political control’ over the military, what is exercised in practice is ‘bureaucratic control’. Defence Secretary is the boss and the Service Chiefs have a subservient role, with the military isolated from real decision-making! For example, the inputs of the Indian army on the military and strategic implications of Nehru’s forward policy were ignored.
The British-Indian army under the British, during the pre-independence days, though under the political control of the Governor General, enjoyed a large degree of autonomy, and was not subservient to the bureaucracy. That changed post-independence.
The top bureaucracy, noticing Nehru’s suspicion for and bias against the army, cleverly manoeuvred a note declaring the Armed Forces Headquarters as the “attached” office of the Defence Ministry. That ensured ascendency for the top babu of the Defence Ministry—the Defence Secretary—over the army chief. The post of Commander-in-Chief was also done away with.
Defence Ministers largely rely on the “know-nothing-on-defence” bureaucrats from Defence Secretary down, who, in turn, deal with the three Services Chiefs, and those lower down in the army, making the army dependent upon them (bureaucracy) for approval for various promotions, purchases, and facilities. The Babudom has therefore began to act like a mai-baap government to the army.
Blunder–32 :
Lethargic Intelligence Machinery
China declared unilateral ceasefire on 21 November 1962. However, even such an important announcement of China became known to the government belatedly.
Wrote Kuldip Nayar in ‘Beyond the Lines’:
“...A cavalcade of cars moved to the prime minister’s residence. Nehru had just woken up and was totally unaware of the Chinese offer. This was typical of our intelligence agencies and of the functioning of the government. Though the statement on the ceasefire had reached newspaper offices just before midnight, the government was unaware of it. Even the official spokesman whom the pressman awoke for a reaction expressed ignorance. What a way to fight a war, I thought.”
In the Tehelka Magazine of 13.10.2012, BG Verghese states in ‘The War We Lost’:
“Around midnight, a transistor with one of our colleagues crackled to life as Peking Radio announced a unilateral ceasefire and pull back to the pre-October ‘line of actual control’... Next morning, all the world carried the news, but AIR still had brave jawans gamely fighting the enemy as none had had the gumption to awaken Nehru and take his orders as the news was too big to handle otherwise! Indeed, during the preceding days, everyone from general to jawan to officials and the media was tuned into Radio Peking to find out what was going on in our own country…”
The above are only two illustrative examples. When on critical matters you had no intelligence or prior information, what to speak of other matters. The life of our brave jawans came cheap. Just dump them in the war without any proper protective gear or arms, and without any intelligence on the enemy positions and preparation! All that the top bosses of the intelligence did was to butter up the higher authorities and the prime minister.
Blunder–33 :
Suppressing Truth
Another notable aspect of the India-China boundary dispute was that like a dictator Nehru kept the whole
thing under wraps. Wrote Neville Maxwell: “…This was true of the handling of the boundary question [with China] which was kept away not only from the Cabinet and its Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees, but also from Parliament until armed clashes made it impossible to suppress.”
The India-China war of 1962 was indeed independent India’s most traumatic and worst-ever external security failure. Any democratic country, worth its salt, would have instituted a detailed enquiry into all aspects of the debacle. But, what happened in practice under Nehru? Nothing! Nehru had stated in the Rajya Sabha on 9 November 1962 during the lull (24 October to 13 November 1962) in the war on account of the Chinese ceasefire, after the first phase of the India-China war that began on 20 October 1962, and lasted mere 4 days: “People have been shocked, all of us have been shocked, by the events that occurred from October 20 onwards, especially of the first few days, and the reverses we suffered. So I hope there will be an inquiry so as to find out what mistakes or errors were committed and who were responsible for them.”
Why Nehru talked of enquiry above? During the lull period (24 October–13 November) India was making its preparations and those in power in Delhi were sure India would give a befitting reply to the Chinese—such was the unbelievable extent of self-deception! However, the subsequent war of 14-20 November 1962 proved even more disastrous for India. Sensing its consequence upon him, Nehru conveniently forgot about the enquiry.
Although no enquiry was set up by the Indian Cabinet or the Government, the new Chief of Army Staff, General Chaudhuri, did set up an Operations Review Committee headed by Lieutenant-General TB Henderson-Brooks, aka HB, of the Indian army—an Australian-born, second-generation English expatriate who had opted to be an Indian, rather than a British, citizen in the 1930s—with Brigadier Premendra Singh Bhagat, Victoria Cross, then commandant of the Indian Military Academy, as a member. However, the terms of reference of the Committee were never published; it had no power to examine witnesses or call for documents; and it had no proper legal authority. The purpose was to ensure it didn’t morph into a comprehensive fact-finding mission that could embarrass the government. Reportedly, its terms of reference were very restrictive confined perhaps to only the 4 Corps’ operations. However, going by the fact that the report, referred to as the Henderson-Brooks Report or Henderson-Brooks/Bhagat Report or HB/B Report of even such a handicapped Committee has been kept classified and top secret even till today signifies that the Committee went beyond its limited terms of reference, did some very good work and managed to nail the root causes, which the powers that be wanted to remain hidden. Perhaps, had the HB report been made public, Nehru would have had to resign.
Nehru's 97 Major Blunders Page 9