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Nehru's 97 Major Blunders

Page 11

by Rajnikant Puranik


  “In effect, India signed an extraordinary treaty indefinitely setting aside 80.52% of the Indus-system waters for Pakistan—the most generous water-sharing pact thus far in modern world history.

  “In fact, the volume of waters earmarked for Pakistan from India under the Indus treaty is more than 90 times greater than what the US is required to release for Mexico under the 1944 US-Mexico Water Treaty, which stipulates a minimum transboundary delivery of 1.85 billion cubic metres of the Colorado River waters yearly.

  “Despite Clinton’s advocacy of a Teesta treaty, the fact is that the waters of the once-mighty Colorado River are siphoned by seven American states, leaving only a trickle for Mexico.

  “India and Nehru did not envisage—you may call it a lack of foresight on their part—that water resources would come under serious strain due to developmental and population pressures. Today, as the bulk of the Indus system’s waters continue to flow to an adversarial Pakistan waging a war by terror, India’s own Indus basin, according to the 2030 Water Resources Group, is reeling under a massive 52% deficit between water supply and demand...

  “Worse still, the Indus treaty has deprived Jammu and Kashmir of the only resource it has—water. The state’s three main rivers—the Chenab, the Jhelum (which boast the largest crossborder discharge of all the six Indus-system rivers) and the main Indus stream—have been reserved for Pakistan’s use, thereby promoting alienation and resentment in the Indian state.

  “This led the Jammu and Kashmir state legislature to pass a bipartisan resolution in 2002 calling for a review and annulment of the Indus treaty. To help allay popular resentment in the state over the major electricity shortages that is hampering its development, the central government subsequently embarked on hydropower projects like Baglihar and Kishenganga. But Pakistan—as if to perpetuate the alienation in the Indian state—took the Baglihar project to a World Bank-appointed international neutral expert and Kishenganga to the International Court of Arbitration, which last year stayed all further work on the project...”

  Perplexing thing is that Nehru could settle an international water issue like Indus Water Treaty, for it involved only a generous give-away on the part of India; but he failed to tackle India’s own internal river-water disputes like those relating to the sharing of Narmada water, or the Krishna-Kaveri dispute.

  Blunder–41 :

  No Initiative on Sri Lankan Tamil Problem

  The Sri Lankan Tamil problem was allowed to fester and Nehru did little to get the matter resolved in the fifties, when it could have been—and it grew worse.

  Both the ‘Sri Lankan Citizenship Act of 1948’ and the ‘Official Language Act of 1956’ put the Tamils at a severe disadvantage. Sri Lanka witnessed mayhem of Tamils in 1958, amounting almost to genocide. Tamils everywhere were attacked mercilessly, and their properties were burnt or looted. Sinhala mobs poured kerosene over many Tamils, and burn them alive. Thousands were injured or killed. Many were internally displaced. It was a case of state-sponsored terror.

  Walter Crocker, who was then the Australian ambassador to India, says in his book, ‘Nehru: A Contemporary’s Estimate’, that while India and Nehru spoke against the treatment of Africans in the European colonies, and justifiably so; in contrast, with regard to the ill treatment of Tamils in Ceylon, they did precious little. Writes Crocker: “...and with little done to save Indians in Ceylon from treatment which was worse than the treatment meted out to Africans in European colonies in Africa.”

  But, that was typical of Nehru. He railed against the discrimination and savagery in distant lands—say, against blacks in South Africa—but remained conspicuously silent about our own people next door: against the Hindus in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), or against the Tamils in Sri Lanka. Because, the former required only talking; while the latter required action too!

  If India had succeeded in doing the needful in the fifties, much of the trouble that Sri Lanka and the Tamils and the Sinhalese faced subsequently could have been avoided. It is in such cases that the statesmanship of a leader is tested.

  Blunder–42 :

  No to India's UNSC Membership

  Both the US and the USSR were willing to accommodate India as a Permanent Member of the UNSC (United Nations Security Council) in 1955, in lieu of Taiwan, or as a sixth member, after amending the UN charter. This Nehru refused! Nehru wanted the seat to be given to PRC (Peoples Republic of China), as Nehru did not want China to be marginalised! It was almost as if Nehru, for reasons one cannot fathom, totally ignored India’s own strategic interests!

  Shashi Tharoor states in his book ‘Nehru: The Invention of India’: “Indian diplomats who have seen the files swear that at about the same time Jawaharlal also declined a US offer to take the permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council then held, with scant credibility, by Taiwan, urging that it be offered to Beijing instead... But it was one thing to fulminate against Great Power machinations, another to run a national foreign policy with little regard to the imperatives of power or the need of a country to bargain from a position of strength.”

  Reads a Business Line article ‘UN reforms—a fading mirage?’ of 16 September 2009:

  “Ironically, around 1955, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was offered the disputed Chinese Permanent Security Council seat by the US to keep out the People’s Republic of China, and he also was sounded out by the USSR Prime Minister, Nikolai Bulganin, to allow China to take this seat while giving India a sixth permanent seat in the Security Council. Nehru rejected this offer in deference to China. History may have been different if this offer had been subjected to serious negotiations. Through the decades since, we have been struggling for this seat.”

  Blunder–43 :

  Advocating UN/UNSC seat for China

  Even though never requested by China, India had been voluntarily and vigorously advocating PRC for the Permanent Membership of the UNSC in lieu of Taiwan! India lobbied with all nations for the UN membership and UNSC permanent seat, not for itself, but for China!

  Even though China had invaded Tibet, KM Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador in Beijing, stated that to protest the Chinese invasion of Tibet would be an interference to India's efforts on behalf of China in the UN! That is, complaining against China on behalf of Tibet would show China in bad light—as an aggressor—when it was more important for India to ensure China's entry into the UN, for which India had been trying, and ensure that this effort of India was not thwarted by taking up China's Tibet aggression! What kind of crazy Nehruvian foreign policy was this? Our own national security interests and the interests of Tibet were sought to be sacrificed to help China enter the UN!!

  An article on the web states: “Later, in a note on his tour of the USSR and other countries, dated August 1, 1955, Nehru wrote: ‘Informally, suggestions have been made by the United States that China should be taken into the United Nations but not in the Security Council and that India should take her place in the Security Council. We cannot of course accept this as it means falling out with China and it would be very unfair for a great country like China not to be in the Security Council. We have, therefore, made it clear to those who suggested this that we cannot agree to this suggestion. We have even gone a little further and said that India is not anxious to enter the Security Council at this stage… The first step to be taken is for China to take her rightful place and then the question of India might be considered separately.’”

  Bizarrely, leading a delegation to the UN, Nehru's sister Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, advocated China’s case even in 1963, after the India-China war of 1962.

  Blunder–44 :

  Letting Go of Gwadar

  Gwadar is a port-city on the Arabian Sea on the south-western coast of Baluchistan province in Pakistan. It is located opposite Oman across the sea, near the border with Iran, and to the east of the Persian Gulf. Gwadar is warm-water, deep-sea port, and it has a strategic location between South Asia, Central Asia and West Asia at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, just outsid
e the Straits of Hormuz. The operations of Gwadar’s strategic sea port were handed over by Pakistan to China in 2013. Now, thanks to the Chinese money and expertise, Gwadar is all set to emerge as Pakistan's third largest port.

  Gwadar was not owned by the British at the time of independence. Gwadar was an overseas possession of the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman—it was given as a gift to Oman by the Khan of Kalat in 1783—until Pakistan purchased the territory on 8 September 1958. Pakistan assumed its control on 8 December 1958, and the territory was later integrated into Baluchistan province on 1 July 1970 as Gwadar District.

  Oman was on good terms with India, and Sultan of Oman had offered to sell Gwadar to India for mere one million US dollars. However, India under Nehru did not take the offer, and let go of such an excellent strategic location. It was ultimately purchased by Pakistan on 8 September 1958 for three million US dollars.

  It had the great potential of a deep water port (which China is now exploiting), but India/Nehru didn't have the foresight to appreciate its critical benefit. Even if India/Nehru didn't see much use of the place then as a deep water port, India should have acquired it, so that it could have been used as a bargaining chip with Pakistan, vis-à-vis Kashmir and other matters.

  In hindsight, not accepting the priceless gift from the Sultan of Oman was a huge mistake at par with the long list of post-independence strategic blunders by Nehru.

  Blunder–45 :

  Erroneous Nehru-Era Map

  An error in the Indian maps shows territory as large as Sikkim or Goa in Arunachal Pradesh as belonging to China. The error has yet to be corrected.

  Extracts below from an article by Madhav Nalapat in ‘The Sunday Guardian’ of 23 August 2014 are self-explanatory:

  “Prime Minister Manmohan Singh rejected an August 2013 request by senior officials in his government to correct a serious error, dating back over 50 years, in India's official maps. In effect, this oversight in official maps mistakenly gave China control of two Arunachal Pradesh “fishtails”, a territory as large as Sikkim or Goa, and continuously inhabited by Indian citizens...

  “…The two ‘fishtail’ formations in Arunachal Pradesh were omitted from maps prepared by the Survey of India during the 1960s, although the area has always been under the control of India. No public records exist as to why and how such a significant error was made. In 1962, recognising the fact that this territory was Indian, soldiers from the People's Liberation Army of China, who had occupied the fishtails during November 1962, withdrew after the unilateral ceasefire declared by Beijing that month.

  “‘Since then and before, the area within the two fishtails has always been occupied by our troops, as well as by the Mishmi tribe, all of whom are citizens of India. Our claim on the territory is incontestable and our maps ought to have been updated to reflect this,’ a senior official stated.

  “…Asked as to why official maps did not reflect the fact of the ‘fishtails’ being Indian territory, the reply was that ‘as the mistake took place during Nehru's time, it was felt that correcting the maps formally would draw attention to this mistake on the part of the then Prime Minister and thereby tarnish his name’.

  “A retired official claimed that ‘every government has protected Nehru's reputation by refusing to make public facts dating from the 1940s that they saw as damaging to the image of Nehru’. He and a former colleague saw Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's 2013 refusal to formally change the map (a decision taken ‘after consultations with the political authority’) as part of the effort to protect the reputation of Jawaharlal Nehru by refusing to make public any details of his failures, including the decision to keep secret the Henderson-Brooks Report on the 1962 war, or to draw attention to Nehru's failures even by the necessary step of rectifying them.

  “Interestingly, the fact that maps showed the two ‘fishtails’ as being outside Indian territory was, according to a senior (and now retired) official, ‘brought to the attention of then Home Minister P. Chidambaram by the (then) Director-General of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) in 2010, along with reports of Chinese troops entering the area in 2011 and 2012, but the response was to do nothing’...”

  Blunder–46 : Nehru & Israel

  On 29 November 1947, the United Nations General Assembly voted on the modified UN Partition Plan of Palestine that effectively included creation of Israel for the Jews.

  Most (33) nations voted in favour, but India along with 12 others, that included 10 Muslim nations, voted against the plan! There were 10 abstentions and 1 absent. Abstentions included Republic of China and Yugoslavia.

  A nation which got independence only a few months earlier after having suffered foreign domination, ignominy, insult to its culture and religion and back-breaking exploitation for over 1000 years and knew in a miserably hard way what it was like to be at the receiving end should have valued independence or creation of another nation, especially those for Jews, who richly-deserved it—from all possible angles. Jews had suffered for centuries like the Hindus had suffered, though much longer. We should have had empathy for them.

  But, Nehru? What can one say of his convoluted thinking, defective world-view and faulty approach! India could have at least abstained from voting, rather than voting against. Albert Einstein had personally written to Nehru to vote for and support Israel, detailing relevant history, and logical and cogent reasons in support of his request. But, the Muslim-appeaser Nehru still chose to be on the wrong side of history.

  India under Nehru was amongst the first nations to recognise People's Republic of China when Communists took over in 1949; but when it came to Israel, Nehru did not recognise it as a nation till September 1950, even though it was established on 14 May 1948, and most nations of the world had recognised it!

  While Nehru campaigned for admission of China to the UN and even into the UNSC, sacrificing its own chances; India not only voted against the UN resolution of 1947 that had the effect of creating Israel, but also voted against Israel's admission in the UN in 1949.

  Nehru could recognise China’s sovereignty over Tibet, which had an adverse impact on India, but not build relations with Israel, with which India had much in common, and relations with whom would have been very helpful in various fields.

  Indira Gandhi, like her father, and Rajiv Gandhi, like her mother, maintained their distance from Israel. It was left to the wise non-Dynasty Prime Minister Narsimha Rao to establish formal relations with Israel in 1992.

  It is worth noting that despite Nehru-Indira Dynasty's unjust treatment of Israel, Israel helped India in whatever manner it could in India's multiple wars with its neighbours. India sought and got arms from Israel both in the 1962 India-China war and in the 1971 Bangladesh war. What Nehru-Indira Dynasty did was driven by their self-interest of vote-bank politics at the cost of the nation. Whenever non-Dynasty governments have been in power, the relationship with Israel have been better.

  Despite severe lack of natural resources, wars, and enemies on all sides, the new nation of Israel created only in 1948 became a shining first-world nation within a few decades, while India under the Nehru dynasty remained a poor, miserable, third-rate, third-world country.

  India’s relationship with Israel are getting better, and are likely to improve further, under the current dispension. Israel has been supplying us critical military and security equipments. Its modern and innovative agricultural practices are worth emulating by India. India must fully support Israel in the UN.

  For details on Israel, and India-Israel relationship, readers can refer to my blog-series ‘Israel & the Jews (I-IV): FAQs, Truths & Interesting Facts’ at:

  http://rajnikantp.blogspot.in/2014/10/israel-jews-i-faqs-truths-fascinating.html

  Blunder–47 :

  ‘Non-Aligned’ with National Interests

  Rather than having strong allies on its side to deter others, India, thanks to Nehru's self-defeating foreign policies, remained non-aligned so that Pakistan (aligned with the West) and China (aligned with t
he USSR) felt free to attack India, knowing it to be a non-risky business as no country would come to the rescue of a non-aligned India in its hours of distress. In the India-China War of 1962, even the non-aligned nations—Nehru’s friends—didn’t come out to support or help India.

  Common sense dictated that till you became strong enough to defend yourself, have sensible pacts with some strong nations to take care of your security.

  Non-aligned policy fetched no gains for India. If India had aligned itself with the US and the West, not only would India have been much better off economically, China would not have dared to attack India, nor would Pakistan have either attacked Kashmir or played mischief in J&K. Further, the UK and the USA would not have favoured Pakistan over India on Kashmir, and the Kashmir issue would have been solved in India’s favour long ago.

  Pakistan was much smarter. After its creation, its first PM Liaquat Ali Khan accepted an invitation from Moscow—deliberately. The purpose was to alarm the opposite side in the cold war: the US and the UK. Expectedly, the US and the UK made a deal with Pakistan: in return for Pakistan joining the Anglo-American Military bloc, they would support Pakistan on Kashmir and other matters against India.

  All that non-alignment did was it helped project the image of Nehru on the world stage. It did precious little for India. In fact India grievously suffered from that stand.

  In short, Nehru’s policy of ‘Non-Alignment’ was not aligned to the Indian national interests.

  Blunder–48 :

  Foreign to Foreign Policy

  The main reason Gandhi had made Nehru India’s first PM was his notion that Nehru had good international exposure and expertise in foreign affairs, and he would project India well on the international stage.

 

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