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Alexander Litvinenko

Page 38

by Blowing Up Russia (lit)


  Considering the fact that Alexander and I conducted our investigation as private citizens, I think that it has been a clear success. We identified the people who ordered and organized these terrorist attacks. I should point out that at the head of those who ordered

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  the attacks is the current president of Russia, V. V. Putin, and until he leaves his post, this crime will not be investigated in Russia by anyone.

  We know the names of the people who led the operation at the middle (practical) level.

  Some of them we have already made public. Others - not yet. When I say we know the names, I don t mean that we can guess who planned an operation or who ordered it. I mean that we have testimony from the perpetrators, who give the names of those who ordered, planned, and organized the operations.

  This is not even to mention the fact that we simply know everything about the episode in Ryazan, since the FSB itself admitted that it carried out the operation there.

  Would you agree that not all the evidence you have assembled is equally convincing?

  Which parts of it would you put before a court, if you had to present your case on one page?

  Let s start with Ryazan. Patrushev confessed that he personally issued the orders for the operation. An FSB agent admitted on camera (filmed from the back) that he personally placed the bags in the basement of the building in Ryazan. An expert from Ryazan law enforcement confirmed that he personally defused the bomb, which was real and contained a power source, a detonator, and an explosive substance. The public prosecutor in Ryazan filed a criminal charge of terrorism. The Ryazan police confirmed that at least two terrorists had been detained who turned out to be FSB agents.

  Therefore, we have to arrest the FSB agent who confessed that he personally placed the bags in the basement. We have to establish the identities of the terrorists (who were arrested and then released by the Ryazan police) and arrest them again. We have to arrest Patrushev, who confessed that he issued the orders for the operation. And I m sure that once Patrushev and others are questioned, everyone else who took part in the operation will be named and arrested.

  Then there s the cover-up, the campaign to mislead the public. Naturally, this matter must be taken up separately. The key witnesses here will be Zdanovich and other highranking FSB agents who took part in the cover-up.

  Moscow. I m certain that Patrushev knows exactly who was in charge of the operation to blow up the buildings in Moscow. Krymshamkhalov and Batchayev, who evidently had the most direct connection to this operation, named Patrushev as its head, German Ugriumov as its director, and FSB agent Max Lazovsky as a key figure in its execution.

  Since Lazovsky was shot in Moscow and Ugriumov died under unclear circumstances in Chechnya, we again have to question Patrushev. I m certain that an experienced investigator will obtain answers to all these questions from him.

  Buinaksk is the simplest case, since we know absolutely everything: the whole chain of command, from who gave the order for the operation to who carried it out. But I won t go into these details now, since for a number of reasons I don t want to disclose the source

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  of our information for Buinaksk, and if I name all the people involved, the GRU will easily figure it out.

  One way or another, if the case must be presented on one page to put before a court, the correct thing to do would be to list the names of the people who must be called in for questioning as defendants; to request materials connected with the Ryazan case from the General Prosecutor; to request the materials connected with the criminal investigations of the apartment-house bombings in Buinaksk, Moscow, and Volgodonsk. And then it will also become clear to everyone that all the legal proceedings carried out by the FSB are complete falsifications, meant to conceal the evidence of crimes and actual criminals.

  After the TV bridge in July, were you able to obtain additional proof that Gochiyaev s letter is authentic, or other evidence in addition to this letter? Do you admit the possibility that the letter may have been forged? Who would profit by such a forgery?

  After the TV bridge in July (after which, by the way, not a single reporter or commission member called me or Alexander for questions and explanations), we not only received new photographs of Gochiyaev, which proved once more that the FSB had put up pictures of another man on its website, but also a new note from Gochiyaev, confirming the authenticity of his first letter.

  We checked the information contained in Gochiyaev s letter - as far as it was possible for us to do so, acting as private citizens - and made sure it was supported by other sources. Consequently, we have no basis to consider Gochiyaev s letter a forgery.

  Therefore, I will leave your question about who would profit by such a forgery unanswered.

  On the other hand, we know very well who would profit by putting up forged materials on the FSB website - the FSB itself. And notice the shameless way in which this is done.

  Following the TV bridge, there was an announcement that the FSB will put up new evidence of a connection between Gochiyaev and Khattab. Instead of this new evidence, what appeared on the website was one more old photograph - not even with Khattab, but with someone else - and again of the wrong man, who, as we ve already established through expert testimony, is not Gochiyaev.

  I would like the following statement to be taken very seriously: The FSB has no proof that there is any connection between Khattab or the Chechens and the bombings, except for this one photograph, which is, I repeat, not a photograph of Gochiyaev, but of some unknown person.

  The FSB has no proof at all that the terrorist attacks were carried out by Chechens.

  Because the terrorist attacks were not carried out by Chechens. They were carried out by the FSB and the GRU.

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  After last year s terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, many Muscovites brought flowers to the American embassy. In September 1999, did anything analogous happen at the Russian embassy and consulates in America?

  To bring flowers to a Russian government agency (and the embassy represents Russia, and first and foremost, the Russian government) when it s well known that this very government carried out the bombings (which is something generally known in the West about the September bombings in Russia) would have been somewhat inappropriate. No, no one brought any flowers to the Russian embassy.

  And just look at how modestly this tragic date was observed in Russia itself. The government did not organize any memorial ceremonies, since it knows very well who blew up the buildings. Staging a theatrical performance on camera with the whole world watching would have been stupid and risky. The press was modestly silent. In general, the media s lack of curiosity in this matter is truly surprising and indicative. The people held several memorial services, in which local authorities took part. For the local authorities, I have no doubt, this was indeed a tragedy, as it was for the people who were the victims. Of course, Putin s refusal to observe the one-year anniversary of the event is just additional proof of the fact that he himself was at the head of the operation to blow up the buildings in Russia three years ago. But this proof is psychological. It won t get you very far in court.

  In your opinion, why did the CIA say to Litvinenko about the bombings in Russia: That s not our concern ? Does the CIA know everything, or are they really so uninterested?

  The CIA undoubtedly knows that the buildings in Russia were blown up by the FSB.

  The CIA has no psychological difficulties accepting this fact. All of the CIA s past experience with the KGB and the FSB (that is, fighting the KGB and the FSB) goes to show that this is not just a possibility, but that it can t be otherwise.

  What would you wish for the Moscow commission?

  That the Russian public takes an interest in the results of its objective investigation. As of now the public is not interested, and therefore the commission is working in a vacuum.

  It really has no one to report its f
indings to. The government has no interest in this commission. The Duma doesn t either. The law enforcement agencies - even less so.

  Reporters are hiding their heads in shame.

  The public is silent, at best. At worst, they re watching with curiosity as the government shamelessly unleashes a war against Georgia, right in front of the whole Russian public, including the reporters (in exactly the same way as Stalin unleashed a war against Finland).

  And notice: they re starting a war with Georgia only so they can destroy certain individuals who have settled there (in the opinion of the Russian government) -238 Gochiyaev, Krymshamkhalov, and Batchayev - individuals who are supplying us with testimony. Believe me, Russia has no other reasons for invading Georgia. Everything else is Kremlin PR.

  Remember how before the invasion of Finland there were provocations by the Finnish military against the Soviet Union ? In 1991 we found out that there were no provocations. There was an unprovoked invasion of Finland by Stalin. Believe me, if Russia invades Georgia, some time will go by and then we will find out that there were no provocations by Georgia, but that there was an unprovoked invasion of Georgia by Putin. And very many members of the Duma, who are today voting in favor of a new war in the Caucasus (while the war in Chechnya is still going on, and has perhaps already been lost), will be ashamed, at the very least, for collaborating in another crime perpetrated by the Russian security services. And their children will be ashamed. And someone s children, I m certain, will die in Georgia. And the children of Duma members may be among them.

  Mark Ulensh

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  Appendix 17

  Novaya Gazeta, Moscow, December 2, 2002

  TERRORISTS DEMANDED $3,000,000 FOR THEIR TESTIMONY

  Historian Yuri FELSHTINSKY talks about the private investigation of the terrorist attacks in Moscow, Volgodonsk, and Buinaksk - In their testimony, Krymshamkhalov and Batchayev mention three men who were, according to them, involved in the terrorist attacks - the apartment-house bombings in Moscow and Volgodonsk: Lazovsky, Ugriumov, and Patrushev. I want to ask about the first two, to begin with. Don t you find it strange that they only mention people who are dead? Ugriumov, according to the official account, died of a heart attack in the Grozny airport, where he had his office. Lazovsky was killed not far from a church near his dacha outside of Moscow&

  To me, of course, this doesn t seem strange. I ll explain why. With Lazovsky, it s not completely definite that it s him. The photographs have to be examined and a serious identification has to be made. But it s highly probable that it s him. I think the whole logic of the events says that it must be him. Lazovsky was a prominent security agent. He was involved, without any doubt, in a whole series of terrorist attacks that had taken place earlier in Moscow.

  To assume that this man wasn t connected to the operations in 1999 is something that I personally can t do. In the interview with Galkin that you published (that story requires separate commentary, by the way), in the second interview, there s an interesting sentence: But I think that in life there are no accidents. I, too, don t believe in such accidents: Max Lazovsky couldn t have been killed by accident in the neighborhood where he lives, which is, incidentally, not the most undesirable neighborhood.

  Let me remind you that Lazovsky was killed on April 28, 2000, at the entrance to the Uspensky Cathedral, in his township, soon after the General Prosecutor s Office had issued a warrant for his arrest. A. Litvinenko and I describe this episode in greater detail in our book, The FSB Blows Up Russia. There s another account according to which the man they killed was Lazovsky s double, and Lazovsky is still alive. I ve been told this by at least three officers of the FSB.

  With Ugriumov, there was information immediately after his death that his death was not an accident, that he didn t die of a heart attack, that there was a messenger, who brought him a package, and maybe also an offer to commit suicide.

  This information was published for the first time (at least, that s where I first saw it) on Korzhakov s Stringer website. In other words, this information seems to have come from a serious source.

  Do you really consider Korzhakov a serious source?

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  I think that Korzhakov definitely has connections to people with information. I can give one example. Already in 1999, a person who was a guest at Korzhakov s birthday party told me that a decision had been made to squeeze Berezovsky, Gusinsky, Dorenko, and Kiselev out of Russia. As you can see, that information turned out to be accurate. Only Kiselev was left unsqueezed. People have a habit of talking. I have a habit of listening.

  But you re a serious person, a serious researcher. You really think that methods from movies like Schizophrenia are still being used, when a person can be given an order, through a messenger, to commit suicide? You seriously believe that any general from the FSB is still capable of carrying out such an order?

  No, I don t know the answer to that question. But I know for certain that Ugriumov didn t die of natural causes.

  This is your personal assumption?

  Well, of course it s an assumption. But it s an assumption about which I m personally convinced. The fact that Lazovsky had a connection to the September 1999 bombings is also an assumption. But this is also an assumption about which I m convinced. And not just because Lazovsky was the vice president of a foundation whose president was the well-known GRU agent Suslov.

  There are no such accidents, either. We have just one solitary living witness left - Patrushev.

  But in your opinion, how well-informed, competent, and even, let s put it this way, personally literate, are the fighters Krymshamkhalov and Batchayev? Do they have information about Patrushev s activity? Or, for instance, is it possible to suppose that they know that Patrushev gave someone an order? Do they have access to the top floors of the Lubyanka?

  No, of course not. On that level, their competence must be equal to zero. However, from a purely formal point of view, Krymshamkhalov and Batchayev are suspects in crimes committed in Russia in September 1999. They are considered suspects by Russian law enforcement. And if these suspects name only three names and one of them is Patrushev, I think that we must take such statements very seriously and to determine why and on what grounds they consider Patrushev in particular to be the instigator and organizer of the bombings that took place in Russia in 1999.

  In addition, it never happens in history that one group of people organizes a coup and another group comes to power. It s obvious that those who take the risk of being executed for the coup are the ones who come to power in the event of its successful outcome. This is exactly the case with Patrushev. These are people who took a serious risk, because, as Galkin told you, there are no accidents.

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  It cannot be an accident that Patrushev was appointed Director of the FSB a few days before the beginning of the series of bombings; it cannot be an accident that, prior to this, the FSB was headed by Putin. These are people who took a serious risk for the sake of a major political operation, for the sake of an enormous reward called Russia. Just between ourselves, the 300 dead people in this operation should not sound like a serious number to them, considering that significantly greater numbers of people who are just as innocent are dying in the Chechen war. Even the way in which the hostage situation in the Dubrovka theater was handled makes it clear that the human factor is not central for people like Patrushev and Putin.

  If we re talking about Dubrovka, then I think that the aim of that operation was no so much to free the hostages as to destroy the terrorists. But my question is different.

  Krymshamkhalov s and Batchayev s testimony contradicts the theory that the whole thing was some kind of FSB plot. Krymshamkhalov and Batchayev themselves admit that they transported the explosives. But then they only talk about dead people. What does this mean? And why did they give this testimony, why did they send this declaration to the Commission?

  I don t agree that Krym
shamkhalov s and Batchayev s testimony contradicts the theory that the bombings were carried out by the FSB. On the contrary, precisely this testimony proves that the operation was planned very seriously, that the necessity of setting up terrorists to be arrested was taken into account. These decoys were supposed to be people like Krymshamkhalov and Batchayev, capable of telling the public nothing except that they admit to being guilty. Let s imagine what would have happened if this whole lowest rung had been arrested by Russian law enforcement. They would have said that they were delivering the explosives on orders from Khattab and Basaev. And the whole case would have been closed.

 

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