Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Premier Zhao Ziyang

by Adi Ignatius

  In 1985, Xiaoping spoke of the matter again. Why? I believe it had to do with the fourth Congress of the All China Writers’ Association in December 1984.

  That meeting was held after the Cleansing of Spiritual Pollution Campaign had been unceremoniously ended amid negative domestic and international responses. In accordance with Yaobang’s suggestion, the message from the Central Committee to this meeting made no mention of anti–spiritual pollution or anti-liberalization. When the message was being drafted, Yaobang said that he would like to see the phrase “anti-liberalization” gradually fade away. It was also decided that the Department of Organization would not interfere in the leadership of the Writers’ Association, allowing the group to elect its own leaders. Full creative freedom was emphasized.

  All of these were right to do. The problem, however, was that under the circumstances, those who had been criticized or punished through the Anti–Spiritual Pollution Campaign would then feel free to unleash their anger in meetings of this kind, sometimes making extreme or inappropriate comments against those who had actively participated in the campaign. As for the leadership, almost everyone who was a “leftist” or had been active in the campaign lost in the elections.

  Of course, this embarrassed [conservative ideologues] Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun while provoking the displeasure of Party elders. Ultimately, it left Deng Xiaoping the impression that Hu Yaobang had encouraged people in the literary and artistic realms to unleash their dissatisfaction with Deng’s Anti–Spiritual Pollution Campaign. That is why he repeated his request to Qili and Qiao Shi to relay his message to Yaobang, asking him to speak more about anti-liberalization. The wording that he used was very harsh; he said that some people had opposed China’s domestic and foreign policies in the name of Yaobang, in other words, “using Yaobang’s name to oppose Deng Xiaoping.”

  However, Yaobang did not take the matter seriously. On issues such as this, there ordinarily would have been a meeting of the Secretariat; Yaobang would have delivered a speech and then afterward gone to Deng for a talk. At the time, it was impossible to take a position opposed to Deng Xiaoping’s. Of course, various opinions could be voiced and issues could be discussed with Deng.

  The question I still can’t answer is: Why did this not get Yaobang’s attention? Why did he not take it seriously? It is possible that he believed Deng’s method was inappropriate, that he himself had not done anything wrong and was therefore not willing to change course. And he may have believed the issue would not have been resolved by talking to Deng, that Deng would not have accepted his position—and so he avoided the issue. All of this aggravated Deng’s sense that Yaobang was moving further and further away from him on the issue of anti-liberalism.

  From October 1983, when Deng proposed the Anti–Spiritual Pollution Campaign, to July 1987, when Deng suggested that some people were pursuing liberalization in Yaobang’s name, the dispute centered on the correctness of the campaign. Their disagreement grew increasingly obvious and intense; they became increasingly confrontational.

  The last debate on the Anti-Liberalization Campaign before Yaobang stepped down erupted at the end of the Sixth Plenum of the 12th Central Committee in September 1986, when the Central Committee was passing the “Resolution on Building a Spiritual Civilization.” The first draft was written under Yaobang’s supervision. There was no mention of anti-liberalization. When the draft was discussed at Beidaihe, Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun proposed adding a reference to anti-liberalization, and most people, including myself, agreed. Yaobang made a concession by accepting the addition.

  However, when it came up for discussion at the group level at the Sixth Plenum of the 12th Central Committee, Lu Dingyi [a liberal writer in the Party’s ranks] and a few others said they did not agree with such content. When the resolution was put up for a vote, Lu Dingyi gave an impromptu speech, in which he said, “The Gang of Four used the term ‘bourgeois liberalization’ during the Cultural Revolution as a way to punish people, and it is therefore inappropriate.” Lu’s speech won some applause from those attending the meeting.

  [Conservative elders] Wang Zhen and Bo Yibo gave speeches insisting that anti-liberalization be retained, and also won applause. Yaobang gave an ambiguous response. I also made a simple statement, saying that the draft had been discussed many times over, and since most people supported keeping the phrase, I agreed that it remain unchanged.

  Then Deng Xiaoping spoke extremely seriously. He said, “I have talked about anti–bourgeois liberalization more than anyone, and have been the most persistent. Not only must we mention it now, but we will continue to mention it for the next ten, twenty years. It doesn’t matter when the phrase was used and who used it in the past. That is not important.” That was it; he had made it final. The plenum passed the resolution with all participants raising their hands.

  Since the meeting was chaired by Yaobang, the General Secretary, and his ambiguous stand had caused Deng to directly intervene at the last moment, Deng’s dissatisfaction with Yaobang was undeniable. When reports about the meeting were later circulated, Yaobang arranged for dissemination only of the passed resolution, without mention of the discussions that had taken place or Deng’s speech. Later Bo Yibo attacked Yaobang on this issue, asking why Deng’s speech had not been disseminated.

  On the surface, the debate at the meeting concerned Deng’s criticism of Lu Dingyi’s speech. But it was clear that Deng was actually criticizing Yaobang, because he knew Lu’s views represented Yaobang’s.

  However, the actual debate during the Sixth Plenum of the 12th Central Committee had no significant influence on Deng’s attitude toward Hu. Before this incident, Deng had already made up his mind to remove Yaobang. Deng had been planning for a smooth transition with a reshuffling of the leadership at the 13th Party Congress, and not the route that ended up being used. So even though Deng showed dissatisfaction with Hu at this meeting, it had no bearing on whether he wanted Hu to continue on as General Secretary.

  There were other aspects of Hu that Deng criticized. For example, Deng believed that Hu was not prudent enough. (Before he made Hu General Secretary, Deng had already perceived this as a failing.) On foreign policy, Hu had been too warm toward [North Korean leader] Kim Il Sung and had granted North Korea’s demands too casually: for example, the demand for China to supply jets, to train Korean pilots at Chinese air force bases, and to deploy the Chinese air force in an emergency. Immediately upon his [Hu’s] return to Beijing, Deng rejected the proposal. And when visiting Japan, Hu had invited three thousand Japanese youths to visit China without having first discussed it. Deng felt discomfited. Yet Hu was General Secretary and had already extended the invitation, so it was difficult to change it. Yaobang exchanged personal correspondences with Japan’s [Prime Minister Yasuhiro] Nakasone and held a banquet for him at his home. Deng was also displeased with this, saying, “China never engages in personal diplomacy. It appears that some of us lack the ability to deal with Nakasone properly.”

  Nevertheless, I believe that none of these issues had any significant impact on the relationship between Deng and Hu, since Deng had always been clear about Hu’s merits as well as his shortcomings. Even though Deng criticized Hu about these matters, they did not affect his basic trust and judgment of Hu.

  In addition to liberalization, the issue that did affect Deng’s relationship with Hu was a January 1985 interview Yaobang granted Lu Keng [a well-known Hong Kong journalist]. In a meeting with Qili and Qiao Shi in July 1985, Deng said that Yaobang’s talk with Lu Keng had been highly improper. Lu Keng had disparaged our domestic and foreign policies, but disguised his comments as flattery of Yaobang. Yaobang had responded frivolously, not choosing his words with care; in fact Yaobang had encouraged him. I was not told about this at the time.

  During the summer of 1986, Deng Xiaoping said to [China’s president] Yang Shangkun, “Do you know about Yaobang’s talk with a journalist?” He asked Yang to find the minutes and read them. Shangkun told me about this when
he returned from Beidaihe and said that Deng thought Yaobang’s talk with Lu Keng was way out of line, and he was very angry about it. Shangkun later asked the General Office to send me a copy.

  Lu Keng was a senior journalist who had once been branded a “rightist.” He applied for entrance to Hong Kong in 1978, and had become the chief editor there of Bai Xing [Ordinary People] magazine. When he interviewed Yaobang, he said that one aim of the talk was to allow the world to get to know Hu Yaobang better.

  Lu said that the nation’s image was closely related to that of Yaobang. He praised Yaobang as an enlightened, honest, and straightforward political leader; one who never plotted conspiracies, was generous, open-minded, understanding, full of vigor. Besides praising Yaobang, Lu Keng also asked him, “Why don’t you take over the Central Military Commission while the old man Deng is still alive? If you do not, how will you handle the situation if, in the future, the military commanders oppose you? Would you be able to take things under control?”

  Yaobang responded by saying he’d never considered the issue: “[Zhao] Ziyang and I are busy with economic and Party affairs. The army is a place for the observance of seniority, so right now with no war to fight, let Xiaoping have this position. That way, Ziyang and I can concentrate on managing the economic and Party affairs.”

  During the interview, Lu Keng also made derogatory comments about Chen Yun, Wang Zhen, Hu Qiaomu, and Deng Liqun.

  The talk was sure to provoke Deng’s displeasure. The reference to the Central Military Commission position especially displeased him. Deng could have interpreted this to mean that deep in Yaobang’s heart, he agreed with what Lu Keng had said.

  When Deng spoke to Qili and Qiao Shi in July 1985, in order to send a message to Yaobang, Deng mentioned the Lu Keng interview. In the summer of 1986, at the meeting at Beidaihe, Deng again mentioned this talk and discussed this matter with Party elders such as Yang Shangkun.

  My speculation is that Deng, already unhappy with Hu Yaobang’s views on liberalization, was galvanized by the Lu Keng interview and decided to remove Yaobang.

  Yaobang resigned in January 1987, but as early as the summer of 1986 at Beidaihe (or even earlier), Deng had made up his mind. Deng’s criticisms of the talk between Yaobang and Lu Keng became widely known. When Yaobang visited Europe, reporters asked about a leadership reshuffle and whether Comrade Xiaoping would be retiring. It was Yaobang’s habit to let down his guard and speak freely. Some of the things he said were not appropriate. Some Party elders began openly speculating that Yaobang was creating the public impression that Deng would retire. This also affected Deng’s view toward Hu.

  For all these reasons, Deng told Yang Shangkun and other elder comrades in the summer of 1986 at Beidaihe that he had made a big mistake: that he had misjudged Yaobang. This remark was a decisive one. He then revealed to them that by the 13th Party Congress, Hu would no longer be General Secretary. In other words, the decision that Yaobang would no longer be General Secretary had been finalized by Deng and Party elders in the summer of 1986 at Beidaihe.

  How and exactly with which Party elders Deng discussed this, I don’t know. But after that, it was clear that some Party elders, including Yang Shangkun and Bo Yibo, had changed their attitudes toward Yaobang. Before that, even though they criticized Hu and disagreed with some of his remarks, they still showed Hu some amount of respect. After, their disrespect, displeasure, and disregard all rose to the surface.

  This all took place while Yaobang was drafting the “Resolution on Building a Spiritual Civilization” for the Sixth Plenum of the 12th Central Committee. The draft failed to pass during discussions. Not only were there requests for minor revisions, but many people felt it was fundamentally inadequate, and some even raised doubts about whether the resolution was necessary at all. [Conservative ideologue] Deng Liqun gave a long speech at the discussion and put out a revised draft that was drastically different, quoting Deng Xiaoping at great length. Deng Xiaoping disagreed with Deng Liqun’s speech and his revision. He said, “Even though Deng Liqun used my remarks, his aim was to push us toward the left.” Yet a majority disagreed with the original draft and it failed to pass.

  After returning from Beidaihe, Yaobang told me through his secretary Zheng Bijian that he believed it was still necessary to have such a document, but the fact that there were so many disagreements put him in a difficult position. He wished to hear my opinion. I said that I had always wondered whether we even needed the resolution, but if Yaobang believed it necessary, I would support it. As for the opposing comments, we could adopt whatever could be adopted, and use persuasion to get it to pass. I was now prepared to actively support the resolution. After several revisions, it did finally pass.

  When the resolution was discussed at the Sixth Plenum of the 12th Central Committee, it was discussed whether to add a line about “training people to have a communist conscience,” which implied a nationwide program for the education of communist ideology. Both Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun proposed adding it in and Chen Yun noted his agreement. Yaobang and the comrades on the drafting committee disagreed. They believed that conducting a “communist education program” among the general population (as opposed to just within the Communist Party) was unrealistic and impractical. However, since Chen Yun had expressed agreement, it was a difficult matter to handle.

  I suggested quoting Chairman Mao’s “On New Democracy” [1940] to support the idea of omitting the clause. Chairman Mao had said, “Our system is that of the communist, but our current policies are that of a new democracy.” Comrade Hu Yaobang agreed with this, so we cosigned a letter and sent it to Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun. Deng was quick to reply that he was in agreement with us, so Chen Yun did not insist. The matter was thus resolved.

  During this period, comments from Party elders critical of Yaobang’s working style and his efforts in the areas of foreign policy, economic policy, and Party reorganization were becoming public. This traced in part to what happened at Beidaihe. They also said Hu was not concentrating on the administration of the Party, but rather was overly involved in economic affairs. They said a Communist Party’s General Secretary should not be so enthusiastic about visiting capitalist countries. And they scoffed at the press coverage that claimed he had replied to several thousands of letters from ordinary people and visited many rural counties in a few days.

  During this time, Yaobang could not do anything right. Most of Yaobang’s suggestions at Secretariat meetings were resisted and rejected by the elders. His work as a leader had already become very difficult.

  Shortly after the Sixth Plenum of the 12th Central Committee, Yaobang told me that Comrade Xiaoping had spoken with him. Deng said that he was going to resign from the Politburo Standing Committee and from his position as chairman of the Central Advisory Commission. He wanted Yaobang to succeed him and to allow a younger person to take over as General Secretary. Deng told Hu that if this happened, it would lead to a great number of retirements among the Party elders. Yaobang also told me that he had suggested me for the position of General Secretary, since I was younger than him, while people even younger were not yet ready for the position.

  Since Deng had never spoken to me about whether he would retire or not, or what responsibilities Yaobang would have, I could not comment at the time. As for recommending me for the position of General Secretary, I replied to Yaobang, “I have said many times that among the leaders between the ages of sixty and seventy, you are the only appropriate one. You and I are within the same age group; if you were to retire, how could I be the successor? If it is to be done, then it should go to someone younger.”

  I also said, “If you think there is no younger person who is ready, a vacancy can also be considered for the General Secretary position. The Politburo Standing Committee [PSC] and the Politburo can be chaired in turn by the different members of the PSC. This could help to train the younger comrades.”

  Yaobang said that my suggestion would be considered. At that moment, I spoke casually
because it was not a formal discussion and was in the context of his merely relaying to me what Deng had suggested and how he had responded. More important, I in fact did not want to be General Secretary, but wanted to continue as Premier to manage economic reform. When Hu related what Deng had said, he seemed calm and showed no signs of being upset.

  After the Sixth Plenum of the 12th Central Committee, Comrade Yaobang appeared to be in very good spirits and excited about his work. He visited Jiangsu Province, Shanghai, and many other places. He gave speeches and enjoyed prominent exposure in the newspapers. I felt that he had interpreted Deng’s talk simply as a proposal “to make the leadership younger,” that Deng would retire and he would succeed Deng in his current position so as to impel a bunch of Party elders to retire. It is possible that he interpreted it in this way without noticing that Deng’s attitude toward him had fundamentally changed.

  In December 1986, student demonstrations broke out in several cities. In Shanghai, they were very large. Not only were there street protests, but demonstrators stormed the municipal government building.*

  This incident shocked Deng Xiaoping. On December 30, he called Yaobang, Wan Li, Hu Qili, Li Peng, [Vice Minister of the State Education Commission] He Dongchang, and me to his home to speak about the student protests. He said, “The student demonstrations that have taken place recently have not happened by chance. They are the result of the lax control over bourgeois liberalization.” He named [dissident astrophysicist] Fang Lizhi and [liberal writer] Wang Ruowang, then blamed Yaobang for neglecting to expel Wang Ruowang from the Party. He had asked him to do so long ago, why had it not been done? As for the demonstrations, he proposed firm measures to quell them, even if that meant resorting to the means of dictatorship.

  Deng in fact was assigning all responsibility for the student demonstrations to Yaobang. The emotional outburst revealed the increasingly deep rift between him and Hu on the issue of liberalization. The transcript of Deng’s speech was immediately printed and disseminated to various levels of administration, so many people knew about it.