Cross and Scepter

by Bagge, Sverre

  Against this background, it comes as no surprise that the union of the three countries eventually collapsed. Sweden became a fully independent kingdom under its own king and Norway became a Danish dependency. It is a more open question when the point of no return was reached. The fact that the Swedes did not elect their own king in the period between Karl’s death in 1470 and Gustaf Vasa’s election in 1523 may indicate that they regarded the union as a possibility throughout the period. However, a more plausible explanation is that they intended to keep the Danish king at bay by means of endless negotiations, while ostensibly keeping the door open for a revival of the union. In addition, the protectors may have been afraid of offending their fellow aristocrats by claiming a higher rank; Karl Knutsson’s failures would likely have served as a warning.

  Although the union was renewed as late as in 1520, it seems gradually to have become a less realistic alternative. In 1457, the Swedes on their own initiative chased Karl Knutsson out of the country and invited Christian I to be their king. In 1497, there was a rebellion against Sten Sture, but it would hardly have succeeded had not King Hans arrived with an army. In the years between 1517 and 1520, Christian II repeatedly mobilized great and costly armies against the Swedes and was repeatedly defeated. His last and greatest mobilization only succeeded because Sten Sture was killed. Even then Christian was aided by a Swedish opposition movement, which was, however, more anti-Sture than pro-Danish. Thus, Swedish support for a union was gradually diminishing between 1457 and 1520. Whether or not a different course of action by Christian might have saved it in the 1520s, remains an open question, but the most likely answer is no. In any case, the best he could hope to achieve would be to become a figurehead in the aristocratic republic of Sweden. By contrast, Gustaf and his successors developed a strong monarchy in Sweden, partly based on the foundations laid by the Stures, which made Sweden into a great European power in the next century.

  Recently, however, Harald Gustafsson has argued that the union was a realistic alternative throughout the period and that even Gustaf Vasa’s election in 1523 did not put a definitive end to it. Gustaf did not confine his ambitions to Sweden but tried to get hold of as much as he could from the other countries as well. He occupied the Bohuslän region of Norway and parts of Halland and Blekinge in Denmark, and he tried to hold on to them as long as possible. Gustaf was an ambitious man who may well have wanted to extend the borders of Sweden. However, when he proclaimed himself king on June 6, 1523, he knew not only that the Danes had rebelled against Christian, but also that their candidate to the throne was Christian’s uncle Frederik. Although Gustaf would not have declined the union throne for patriotic reasons, it seems extremely unlikely that he believed it would be offered to him. In addition to satisfying personal ambition, Gustaf’s election must have aimed at blocking any attempt to renew the union under a new and more acceptable Danish ruler.

  As we have seen, dynastic unions were a common phenomenon in the later Middle Ages. The likelihood of any such union becoming permanent seems to have been greatest when one of the partners was significantly stronger than the other, and when they were situated close to one another. Castile and Aragon (from 1479) and England and Scotland (from 1603) are examples of this. However, both of these unions met with considerable problems later in their history and within both there has recently been a revival of separatist movements. A successful example that does not fit this pattern is Poland-Lithuania, in union from 1386. The populations in the two countries were about equal, but the territory of Lithuania was about three times as large as that of Poland. This was a loose union, however, and the two countries themselves were not very centralized, which meant that there was no strong incentive to oppose the union. The Habsburg Empire would also seem to be an exception. It consisted of a large number of countries without any core area strong enough to dominate the others. Considerable diplomacy was therefore needed to hold it together, but the emperor also had some extra advantages: the imperial title, which gave some prestige and symbolic power, and the Counter Reformation, which enabled him to defeat the Protestants in Bohemia and achieve stricter control of the country. Finally, the threat from the Turks enabled him to come forward as a liberator of Christians from Turkish rule.

  Within Scandinavia, Denmark was clearly the strongest country in the later Middle Ages, but it was not strong enough to force the other two to remain in the union. Geography was a further obstacle. Although there was a common border between Denmark and Sweden and even a point where the borders of all three countries met, the territory covered by the union was far larger than that of England-Scotland or Castile-Aragon, and the leading country was situated at its southern end. Thus, the odds for an enduring union were not great. If successful, a long-term Scandinavian union would more likely have conformed to the Poland-Lithuania model than to the two Western examples. It would have been a loose union under a common king, with considerable independence granted to its individual partners.

  State Formation in the Later Middle Ages

  The Kalmar Union raises the issue of medieval versus early modern state formation, which has been so frequently discussed among historians and political scientists—the latter particularly after the publication of Charles Tilly’s 1975 anthology on the subject and his account of European state formation from 990 to 1990, published in 1990. Was the union a step backwards compared to the formation of the three kingdoms in the previous period, or even evidence that this formation rested on a weaker foundation than assumed in the previous pages? Were the previously independent kingdoms merged into a union in such a way that their borders became blurred? And were the borders endangered by castle administration?

  The building of castles from the thirteenth century onwards initially increased the king’s control over his territory and facilitated the extraction of resources from the peasants. With a castle and a garrison of armed knights, they could easily be forced to pay taxes and serve the king in other ways. On the other hand, the king became more dependent on the castellan, who often appropriated most of the revenues for himself. Consequently, as this system was gradually introduced all over Scandinavia during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and the same king ruled over the whole area, there might seem little reason to uphold the traditional national borders. There are examples also of territories on both sides of the border being joined under the same lord. It has even been claimed that the borders between the countries were still unsettled in the early sixteenth century and that it was pure coincidence that they were reestablished as they had been in the previous period (Harald Gustafsson).

  However, the very fact that the borders were so quickly and relatively easily restored and remained intact despite conflicts and unions argues against Gustafsson’s thesis. Admittedly, the division of Sweden might have continued if King Birger had not murdered his brothers, although we might also predict that a new series of struggles would sooner or later have resulted in the kingdom once more being united. The inter-Nordic principality in the border region between the three countries had disappeared by the settlement of 1319. The division of Norway between Magnus Eriksson and his son Håkon was abolished with Magnus’s death in 1374. Scania was acquired by Magnus in 1332 but not incorporated into Sweden, and it was easily reconquered during the Danish revival and Magnus’s troubles in the 1360s. Concerning the territories temporarily occupied by Gustaf Vasa and returned to king Fredrik of Denmark and Norway, Gustafsson may be right that the attitude of the population in the area would not have posed a serious obstacle to permanent possession. However, the fact that this had been Danish and Norwegian land for centuries probably would have. No doubt, medieval and early modern kings fought for land, but they fought even more for rights. Gustaf Vasa must have known that it would be very costly in the long run to keep these territories and that the more prudent course of action would be to respect King Frederik’s rights. He soon returned the occupied territories and concluded a formal treaty with Frederik’s successor Christian III in 1
541.

  Concerning the relationship between the union and the individual countries, it is significant that the union as such had no particular name—the term “Kalmar Union” is modern. It was referred to as “these three kingdoms,” evidence that the individual kingdoms were regarded as the real units. This may seem paradoxical against the background of our previous discussion about the importance of the dynasty, which in the beginning served as the only criterion for distinguishing between the countries. However, the distinction between the king’s person and the monarchy as an institution was developed further as a consequence both of the union and the strengthening of the aristocracy. The council of the realm became the highest authority within each country and was understood as sharing in the king’s power. When the first union, the one between Norway and Sweden, was entered into in 1319, the two councils of the realm met for the first time without a king—he was three years old at the time—and concluded a treaty on the government of the two realms during his minority. In the early fourteenth century, both Sweden and Denmark were defined as elective monarchies and Norway followed suit in the fifteenth century. The union between Denmark and Norway in 1450 was concluded by the two councils of the realm, despite the fact that the king was not a minor as he had been in 1319, and (also in contrast to 1319) it was explicitly stated that the union should last forever. Thus, the union strengthened the institutionalization of government and confirmed that individual realms were its fundamental units. Neither the borders between the countries nor their political institutions were merged as a result of the union. The term “these three kingdoms” was thus no empty formula but a precise description of the character of the union. Both the local and the central administrations may have been weak by later standards, but there was an idea that the individual len were part of a legally defined territory, from which they could not be separated, at least not under normal circumstances.

  From this point of view, we may also consider the discussion about national versus constitutional interests. Rather than rejecting the importance of national interests in favor of constitutional ones, we should regard the former as an important factor in the development of the latter. Admittedly, the growth of constitutional ideas can be traced back to the gradual formation of an “aristocracy of the realm” from the thirteenth century onwards, which would in any case have led to some kind of division of power between the king and the aristocracy, parallel to what happened in countries like England and France at about the same time. The council of the realm increased its importance during the fourteenth century, although even during the Swedish rebellion against Erik of Pomerania in the 1430s, the members of the council are not clearly identifiable. The definitive institutionalization seems to have occurred shortly afterwards. From the mid-fifteenth century, the councils in all three countries consisted of members of the top aristocracy and the bishops, and they took over the decision-making functions of the larger assemblies. A country’s council now became the aristocracy’s main tool for limiting the king’s power. It also elected the king and regarded itself as the main representative of the people. As the bishops were ex officio members of the council, it also represented the interests of the Church. Although the Church was still a powerful organization, it now to a greater extent acted politically through the council of the realm and by securing its rights in the election charters. This was in line with developments all over Europe, the later Middle Ages being the great period of aristocratic constitutionalism and attempts to limit the power of monarchs, kings as well as popes.

  It is no coincidence that the formalization of the council of the realm and aristocratic government took place after the deposition of Erik of Pomerania in 1439–1442. Ideologically, this marked the transition from the realm being defined by the king to its being defined by the people. The realm was a collective entity, with laws and institutions specific to it, and it was governed by a council of the realm. This was stated with especial clarity in Sweden, which actually managed without a king for around fifty years. Although opposition between the king and the council was less marked in Denmark and Norway, similar ideas were formulated there also, notably during interregnums. In such a situation, the council insisted on taking control of all the castles in the country until the new king had been elected. There was both a practical and a theoretical reason for this. Practically, it was important to prevent the candidate for the throne from presenting the council with a fait accompli. Theoretically, it expressed an idea of sovereignty as delegated by the people as represented by the council of the realm. Admittedly, this was a highly theoretical “people”; the council was an exclusively aristocratic assembly and not in any practical sense representative of the people as a whole, but we are nevertheless dealing with an important constitutional principle. These constitutional principles were further developed in King Hans’ 1483 election charter, in which the king had to accept his subjects’ right to rebellion. Its wording stipulates that if the king acts unjustly, the good men of the realm should “teach” him to mend his ways, and, if this fails, they are allowed to use force against him. The paragraph was probably introduced in hopes of convincing the Swedes to accept King Hans, but it was used again in the election charters for Denmark and Norway issued by Christian II (1514) and Frederik I (1524).

  What were the consequences of the union for internal development in the three kingdoms? During the last two centuries of the Middle Ages, are we dealing with the continuation of an on-going process of state formation or with a reversal of the trends of the previous period? As we have seen, no Scandinavian ruling king was killed by his subjects in the over five hundred years between 1286 and 1792. Apart from that, however, the succession to the throne seems to have been at least as problematic as in the previous period, and there were depositions of kings as well. However, in contrast to the previous period, the political elite at the time repeatedly had to deal with the problem of dynastic discontinuity. The Danish dynasty became extinct in the direct male line in 1375, and two grandsons of the previous king—both minors—were candidates to the throne. Thanks largely to Margrete’s political skill, her son was elected, but the important point was that there were institutions, notably the council of the realm, that could carry out an election and guarantee that it was respected. A disputed election did not lead to a prolonged civil war as happened several times in the previous period. The next crisis, Olav’s death and the succession of Erik, was solved in a similar way. After the deposition of Erik, the urgent need for a king resulted in the unanimous election of Erik’s sister’s son, Christoffer of Bavaria, an election that was accepted in all the three countries. Christoffer’s death without issue might have created a new crisis, but the Danish council of the realm solved the problem by quickly electing Christian of Oldenburg. There were alternative candidates, including a Danish nobleman, but once more, the elected candidate was universally accepted. Christian’s election solved Denmark’s problem with dynastic discontinuity for the next four hundred years. The problem of younger brothers was also solved, despite the fact that Christian as well as many of his successors had more than one son.

  Once elected, a Danish king could normally expect to rule until his death. However, as many as two of the six kings who ruled between 1375 and 1523 were deposed. Erik of Pomerania can to some extent be said to have deposed himself by remaining in Gotland instead of returning to Denmark to deal with the problems there. His deposition was a clear expression of the constitutionalist ideology of the council of the realm, but was also an expression of lawful procedure. A king who does not carry out his duties is a king no more. Again the council was able to carry out a unanimous election; the new king was universally accepted, and no attempt was made to reinstate Erik. The second deposition, of Christian II, was more problematic. It started as a rebellion by the aristocracy in Jutland—traditionally of rebellious temper—but quickly spread to the rest of the country. Lacking money to recruit an army, Christian fled Denmark without serious resistance. However, this was only
a temporary retreat; he was the brother-in-law of the Emperor Charles V, received aid in Germany, and formed a continuous threat in the following period, even after he had been captured and imprisoned during a failed attempt to conquer Norway (1532). The disputed succession after Frederik I’s death in 1533 resulted in a new attempt to restore him, the so-called Count’s War (1534–1536), named after the leader of the rebellion army, Count Christoffer. At first glance it would appear that we are back to the internal struggles of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, but in fact, the situation was extraordinary. The Reformation was under way, accompanied by peasant rebellion, tension between the burghers and the aristocracy, and an intervention from Lübeck, where a radical Protestant and populist government had replaced the old merchant aristocracy.

  Rather than reverting to the internal strife that characterized the previous period, however, the political system in Denmark seems in most cases to have been able to solve the problems that resulted from the lack of a direct heir to the throne. This in turn points to the common interests of the monarchy and the aristocracy and the advantages for the monarchy as such, if not directly for the individual king, of the elective system that had developed in Denmark. There was now an institution with sufficient authority to elect the king, to see to it that his election was respected, and even to depose a king without exposing the country to a civil war. At the same time, the council of the realm did not try to exploit its authority to manage without a king. Despite the increasing importance of constitutionalist ideas, the aristocracy needed the king. The king was essential for order and stability and for solving, or at least minimizing conflicts between individual aristocrats. Characteristically, the Danes also rejected the idea of electing a member of the aristocracy king, this in contrast to the Swedes. They preferred foreigners with some links to the old dynasty. We might in this context think of the ancient idea that royal blood confers special power, but the most important consideration must have been the relative independence of factional loyalties. In contrast to what happened in East Central Europe when the national dynasties became extinct, the Danish council did not elect their kings from prominent foreign dynasties, but instead chose German princes of moderate rank. Apparently, the principal motivation was not to gain powerful allies, but to have a king whose main interest would be his new country.