Saga of Chief Joseph

by Helen Addison Howard

  My own return was hastened by a request, said to be sent in from Joseph, asking on what terms he could surrender.6

  Joseph’s peace action delayed Howard in parley with the messenger. The terms of surrender as laid down by Howard were unconditional, and Joseph would be tried by a military court of regular officers. During the negotiations the Indians’ rear guard fired a farewell shot at the army pickets. While the cavalry made a forty-mile round trip to the ferry, the hostiles safely reached the start of the famous trail. The Nez Perce messenger, with his wife and two others, afterward surrendered to the general.

  When the cavalry and volunteers reached Dunwell’s Ferry they found the boat had been cut adrift and had floated a half mile down the river. A scouting party of Nez Perces had anticipated them and even burned all the buildings. The next morning the troops received orders to return to Kamiah.

  Forty more Nez Perces—twenty-three warriors and seventeen women and children—were captured by Howard’s troops at Weippe on July 16. These captives, according to Yellow Wolf, were members of Red Heart’s band and were a part of the reservation Indians who had just returned from a buffalo hunt in Montana. Being caught fraternizing with the hostiles, they were seized as prisoners, although apparently they had no desire to become involved in the war.

  The Nez Perces appear to have been divided on their future plans. The chiefs called a council “of momentous consequence” on the Weippe prairie near the start of the Lolo Trail. Before the older tribal leaders Joseph made his last appeal by passionately condemning further retreat from Idaho:

  What are we fighting for? Is it for our lives? No. It is for this land where the bones of our fathers are buried. I do not want to take my women among strangers. I do not want to die in a strange land. Some of you tried to say, once, that I was afraid of the whites. Stay here with me now, and you shall have plenty of fighting. We will put our women behind us in these mountains, and die on our own land fighting for them. I would rather do that than run I know not where.7

  According to Yellow Bull, a member of White Bird’s band, both Joseph and White Bird wanted to cross the mountains to Montana and return to the Salmon River in Idaho among the Shoshone. “Joseph was really the chief,” Yellow Bull further testifies, “but he appointed Pile of Clouds [a medicine man] as the war-leader to carry out his directions.”8 Looking Glass, however, insisted on going to the country of the Crow Indians to enlist that tribe’s aid. McWhorter declares Looking Glass was aggressive and dominated the councils. He became the war leader at the Weippe powwow.

  Overruled by the council, Joseph finally consented to this plan and agreed to lead his people out of this land of bondage and deliver them into freedom. Messengers were sent ahead to Charlot and Michel, chiefs respectively of the Flathead and Pend d’Oreille tribes in western Montana, to ask permission to pass through their country.9

  On July 17 Howard dispatched the battalion of cavalry under Major Mason, accompanied by McConville’s company of volunteers and Indian scouts, to determine whether or not the Nez Perces had indeed headed for the Lolo Trail.

  However, to forestall pursuit, the chiefs had cunningly prepared an ambush about three miles from Orofino Creek. Here, unaware of the danger that lurked in the silent aisles of this primeval forest, Mason’s troops threaded their way in single file around boulders and fallen logs which choked their passageway for seventeen miles. Fresh bloodstains and horsehair on down timber showed where the Nez Perces had jammed their ponies over all obstacles. From this mute testimony the troops knew they were not far behind the enemy. Five Indian scouts preceded the column by several hundred yards.

  Concealed nontreaty warriors listened for the sound of the hoofbeats of approaching cavalry. The noise made by hoofs clicking on rocks told them that soldiers were advancing. Silently the braves watched five red men ride along the trail, their rifles lying across their saddles. The hidden Indians let this advance guard come close as they were waiting for the main force to enter the ambuscade.

  Shortly the file of Mason’s cavalry approached the trap. Suddenly, shots rang out from far up the canyon. McConville and Chapman, heading the column, immediately halted and waited for the troops to close up, the majority being yet outside the dangerous area. Chapman, the interpreter, went ahead to reconnoiter.

  An alarming discovery the whites made is best described by Lieutenant William R. Parnell, an eyewitness:

  While we were at a halt, the pawing of the horses removed some leaves and dirt, and exposed a quantity of fresh sawdust. Upon investigation we found considerable of it covered over in a similar manner. We then discovered that many of the trees had been sawed off, here and there, near the trail, at a height of three or four feet from the ground, leaving the trees still standing on their stumps and easily supported by the adjacent trees. The marks of the saw were covered over with dirt and bark, and no doubt would have escaped observation had we not been stopped by the attack on our advance. We overtook them too soon for their purpose, their object evidently being to let us pass until our rear-guard had advanced beyond that point, whereupon some fifty or sixty warriors who were concealed in the timber were to drop the trees across the trail and block our retreat while they would attack us in front and rear from behind the fallen trees, for they had done the same thing some distance ahead.10

  McConville’s volunteers and Captain Winters’ Company E of the First Cavalry immediately dismounted and deployed as skirmishers through the dense underbrush and fallen timber. Chapman returned from his reconnoitering, and meanwhile the troops came upon the body of one of their scouts where the sound of gunfire had been heard. Two others of the five had been wounded; and the other two, after killing an Indian of the ambushing party, had surrendered to the Nez Perces.

  The troops then rejoined the main command under Major Mason, who ordered immediate retreat before the rear guard of Indians could surround his men and throw them into confusion. His quick action probably saved his force from annihilation.

  However, L. V. McWhorter scouts the sawed-through trees as a “myth” as his Indian informants denied any knowledge of the trap. They also disclaimed suffering any casualties. Only five scouts were in the original rear guard, White Cloud told McWhorter. They remained behind to watch for pursuing soldiers. Should any enemies be sighted, “two were to ride ahead with news of the danger, so that the warriors could prepare to hold the troops back on the trail until the families could escape to a place of safety.”11 Walaitits did bring word to the chiefs that soldiers were following after the main band. So Two Moons and another party rode back to join the original five under Rainbow as leader in time for the attempted ambuscade.12 On hearing the approach of the Army’s Nez Perce scouts who were discussing the fresh pony tracks in their native tongue, the hostiles hid in the brush and waited. When the advance guard came in sight, Rainbow, for some unaccountable reason, fired and wounded one. His men then started shooting and routed the army scouts.

  Despite statements by McWhorter’s Nez Perce informants that they possessed no saws with which to fell trees, it would seem that the telltale signs detected by the military cannot be dismissed so completely as a “myth.” Parnell’s account is told in matter-of-fact detail, and the Indians employed similar obstructionist tactics during their withdrawal after the Canyon Creek conflict. It is possible the rear-guard scouts only (exclusive of Two Moons’ group) endeavored to cut down trees in order to blockade the passage of any pursuing force and were overtaken before they could finish the job. The whites then mistakenly interpreted the Indians’ intentions as an attempt to corral them for massacre. The Nez Perces might have been loath through pride or loyalty to their famous leader to admit to McWhorter the failure of their design, which appears to have been due to Rainbow’s ill-timed shot. Or the ones interviewed could have been honestly unaware of their comrades’ initial preparations for defense.

  Since the hostiles’ surprise plan had failed and the soldiers were on their guard, the Indians did not attempt to attack the sup
erior numbers. The safety of the families, in McWhorter’s words, was “the paramount object in view.” The troops hastily retreated toward Kamiah, arriving there the next morning.

  Thereafter the volunteer forces remained in Idaho to assist Captain Trimble in scouting duty. Despite the ill feeling between the regulars and the citizen allies, amicable relations and mutual trust existed between the leaders. Proof of this is found in a letter to Governor Brayman of Idaho. Colonel Edward McConville, in command of the volunteers, wrote:

  I would respectfully call the attention of the Governor to the uniform Kindness shown to my [me] by General Howard and the members of his staff in fact all the officers we came in contact with while in the field.13

  Before he left Idaho, Howard publicly thanked the volunteers for their valuable services.

  The Lolo reconnaissance party revealed to the general that the Nez Perces were definitely on their way toward Missoula, Montana, and that the rough character of the country would make it impossible for cavalry to operate effectively against the hostiles on this trail. Howard was satisfied, though, that his efforts had driven the warring bands from the country and stopped the raids upon the citizens. His Clearwater victory, although not decisive, had ended hostilities in Idaho. The Nez Perce campaign had officially ended in his department, but the general of the army ordered him to pursue and capture, if possible, the hostiles. Thereafter, they became facetiously known to the press as “Howard’s Indians.”

  The general now proposed to divide his command by leaving a small garrison at Kamiah, and proceeding with his main force over the Mullan wagon road through the Coeur d’Alenes to Missoula. Several factors caused Howard to decide upon this plan: He could make a show of force on the northern route and thereby intimidate unfriendly chiefs among the Coeur d’Alene and Spokane tribes; he could give assurance to the settlers of those regions; and he could also block Joseph if he attempted to return to Idaho by that route. Major Green’s cavalry from Boise would be left to guard Camas Prairie against any small scouting parties that the hostiles might have left behind.

  Howard and his cavalry were halfway to Cold Spring, where he would be joined by the artillery and infantry, when he received messages from Colonel Watkins, the Indian Bureau inspector, and Agent John B. Monteith, that the Indians were returning to Kamiah. Another message reported the Nez Perces to be burning houses on the North Fork of the Clearwater. Captain Throckmorton, in command at Kamiah, reported his position was threatened by the Indians. James Lawyer, head chief of the Kamiah treaty faction, informed Howard that the hostiles had stolen several hundred ponies from his people.

  This alarm had been caused, the general learned later, by a small rear guard which had followed the cavalry on its return from the Lolo Trail. The warriors had seized the opportunity to make a surprise raid on the stock of Indians and whites living around Kooskia. They made off with nearly five hundred horses. Hence, Howard did not deem it advisable to leave the vicinity until the arrival of forces under Green, or those of Colonel Frank Wheaton, whose Second Infantry was being rushed from Georgia. He moved his command to Camas Prairie, the strategical center of the late scene of hostilities. This raiding party detained the general and gave the Nez Perces a favorable head start over the trail.

  The delay caused Howard to discard his first plans. He decided now to lead his main command, which would form the army’s right column, over the Lolo Pass, and leave Camas Prairie to be guarded by Major John Green’s troops from Fort Boise, in case the Nez Perces returned to Idaho by another route while he was in pursuit. Colonel Wheaton’s infantry he would send as the left column by the northern route, supported by a battalion of the First Cavalry under Colonel Cuvier Grover and two hundred mounted volunteers from Washington Territory. This column would proceed by way of Coeur d’Alene Mission to Missoula.

  Howard’s own command consisted of a battalion of the Fourth Artillery, in charge of Captain Marcus P. Miller; a battalion of the Twenty-first Infantry, captained by Evan Miles; and a battalion of four companies of the First Cavalry, officered by Major George Sanford, which joined Howard at Kamiah.

  The general had to wait eight days for Major Green to come from Fort Boise, so that he did not start his entire command over the Lolo Trail until July 26. This delay subjected him to much abusive criticism from the press and the citizens of Idaho. Because of his religious nature, the newspapers accused him of refusing to fight on Sunday. In fact, the national press, without realizing the difficulties he faced, or without giving the Nez Perces credit for their great fighting ability, charged Howard, the sixth ranking general of the Civil War, with being incompetent and dilatory. The truth was that the Bitterroot Mountains presented a barrier of the first magnitude to any military force that attempted to cross them.

  As proof of the general’s ability, Sergeant Martin L. Brown stated to the writer in an interview:

  Howard was a Christian man and a praying man, and I never saw it interfere with either his duty or his bravery.

  But those people who were always criticizing him didn’t realize that it was quite a feat of generalship on Howard’s part to take several hundred men, mules, and horses over some of the roughest, steepest trails anywhere, and keep a good lookout for possible ambuscades. It speaks well for the general that no part of his column was ever ambushed. Although we sometimes marched 40 miles14 in a day, we went slower than the Indians, as Howard always camped at the best feeding grounds, and where good water could be found. He aimed to save the strength of his men and animals as much as possible, for he never knew when they might be called on for an emergency. Even so, part of the soldiers had to miss their sleep a third of the night to keep a guard on the camp and the animals. Then it was usually hard to find good grazing as the Indians would have been there ahead of us, and so had the advantage.

  Yes, all things considered, the only wonder was that with a column strung out four or five miles through the densest timber, Howard made as good time as he did.15

  Further praise of Howard’s generalship comes from the historian, Cyrus T. Brady, who writes:

  Joseph had enough horses to remount his tribe several times. . . . The cavalry in pursuit had no remounts. The infantry had to go afoot. That Howard was able to keep so close behind the Indians is marvelous. That the infantry could keep up is even more remarkable.16

  Meanwhile, the Nez Perces were pushing their way over the steep trail covered with rockslides, choked with fallen timber, and washed out in many places by the freshets of bygone years. At night they camped beside swampy lakes where the ponies grazed on wire grass, the women dug edible roots, and the men fished for salmon in deep pools of the Middle Fork of the Clearwater. The Indians cut temporary lodgepoles of spruce, hemlock, and white-pine trees. Although it was late in July, they kept fires burning all night to temper the chill air of these high altitudes, where rain fell daily and frosts lingered on the mountain slopes.

  The Lewiston Teller extra of August 5, 1877, made a mysterious reference to Joseph:

  The Indians report that White Bird and Joseph with his best warriors and good stock left the LoLo trail and turned through to the South fork of the LoLo of the Bitter Root and made camp at the Warm Springs near the head of that fork from which point he can cross into the Elk City trail without discovery from the other side.

  This unexplained comment suggests that Joseph still wanted to remain in Idaho and sustains the Nez Perces’ claims that he was neither the war chief nor the main leader. Evidently White Bird and the other chiefs again applied coercion against him and his men, for they followed the others across the Bitterroots.

  As the Indians climbed toward the pass on the Montana border, the trail became rougher and steeper and wound along the ridges. Trees appeared stunted as compared to the giants growing at a lower elevation. Jagged boulders lacerated the horses’ feet. Rains made the narrow trail slippery and dangerous to man and animal. A misplaced step would hurtle a pony or a person over the brink to a quick death in yawning chasms far
below.

  At Summit Prairie near the Idaho-Montana boundary, the Nez Perces paused to graze their overworked horses. Many animals had been abandoned along the trail because of broken legs or raw backs. The pursuing troops mercifully shot them. On reaching the summit of Lolo Pass the Indians found footprints of white men’s boots.

  Howard had sent telegraphic messages to Captain Charles C. Rawn, commanding officer at Fort Missoula, to blockade the hostiles in Lolo Canyon until the general’s pursuing force could come up, or until Colonel John Gibbon could bring Rawn reenforcements from Fort Shaw on Sun River in northern Montana. In pursuance of these orders, Rawn had sent out a small scouting party. Thus it happened that, three hours before the first Nez Perce reached the pass, Second Lieutenant Francis Woodbridge, with a reconnaissance party of four soldiers from Fort Missoula, had stood there and gazed westward to see if the Indians were coming. The dense timber, however, completely hid from his view the long procession of people and animals winding along the trail. Having scouted the Lolo as far as the Clearwater without seeing any trace of the hostiles, Woodbridge had started back.

  On July 21, several days after Woodbridge left the fort, not hearing from him, Captain Rawn detailed First Lieutenant Charles A. Coolidge and a party of volunteers to search for him. The searchers met Woodbridge’s detachment in the trail on July 22, and they continued together toward Fort Missoula. Later that same day a half-breed, John Hill, who had been a prisoner in the Nez Perce camp, overtook Coolidge’s party. He gave information as to the whereabouts of the Indians and the route they were traveling. Accompanied by the breed, the soldiers hastened on to report to Captain Rawn.