EXTREME PREJUDICE: The Terrifying Story of the Patriot Act and the Cover Ups of 9/11 and Iraq

by Susan Lindauer

  So much for Spy Games 101. The concierge gave me permission to enter the lobby. When I returned, he smugly told me that I should come back tomorrow at 10 o’clock.

  I groaned.

  On my second approach to the Libya House, stony-faced embassy staff descended en masse to the lobby, and bickered in Arabic over whether I should be allowed upstairs. All of us crowded into the elevator. No one spoke. They glowered. Every suspicious eye turned on me. As we got off the elevator, diplomats grabbed my purse and my light rain coat, convinced that I carried recording devices.

  “Why have you come here?”

  The Libyan diplomat, Mr. Amarra, could have been a bedouin, tall and lean, haggling over spices at the soukh. Except he was sharp eyed, and I learned later that he spoke seven languages fluently.

  “Why have you come here?” His fingers twisted on the tiny Turkish coffee cup. In the doorway embassy staff hovered, listening to every word I spoke, ready to fetch more of the exquisite Arab coffee, a thick almost syrupy concoction, which the Libyan diplomat generously offered. I remember that he leaned forward, eyes piercing me and very much suspicious.

  “That is a very important question. It requires a very important answer.”

  The “very important” explanation is that I was “an Asset”— a private citizen with specialized interests or skills that allowed me to establish contact with otherwise extremely difficult to reach groups and individuals on behalf of the intelligence community. Most ironically, my own value as an Asset derived from the profound sincerity of my activism against sanctions and military aggression—the formal thrust of U.S. policy towards those same countries. My outspoken opposition to the official direction of U.S. policy, and my deep confidence in the ability of dialogue to resolve conflicts gave me a critical advantage. Indeed, my work could not have been accomplished otherwise.

  Globally, there were just 5,000 Assets before the 9/11 attack, according to George Tenet, CIA Director for both the Clinton and Bush Administrations.81

  Only three Assets covered the Iraqi Embassy at the United Nations—and the other two started after 9/11.82 Nobody except me covered Libya at the United Nations for most of the 1990s, because of Libya’s extreme isolation. Thus, we occupied a fairly elite and privileged group. At the point that I approached Libya to start talks for the Lockerbie Trial, Washington politicians and U.N. diplomats had given up entirely, believing it was far too difficult, maybe impossible.

  I visited the Libyan Embassy to get things “unstuck,” and establish a friendly channel for dialogue that tackled several other obstacles, as well. Later I would do the same for the weapons inspections in Iraq.

  Often Assets are teasingly called “useful idiots.” Far from derogatory, it marks a necessary distinction inside Intelligence circles. Assets exist outside the ordinary boundaries of the community, even while supplying “must have” access and information that make us critical to the total operation. An intelligence officer who oversees an Asset is known as “a handler.” The Asset exists as a mark to be exploited, or mined, to determine whatever we know. Many times Assets have no idea whatsoever that they have been tapped by intelligence. They might be deeply offended to realize that the CIA or Defense Intelligence has begun tracking them. Ignorance strengthens their indignation— and deniability— if challenged. That can be highly advantageous.

  Intelligence officers routinely use covers for introduction to potential Assets, in order to protect themselves from hostile reactions by unwilling individuals, who might get upset and rebuff the approach if they understood who was really making it. That’s universal to intelligence gathering around the world. An Asset only gets a fragment of the truth on a “need to know” basis— if they’re trustworthy. However, if you’re around long enough—and if the Asset proves strong enough—you can figure out what the handler is really trying to do. A strong Asset strives to create the opportunity that intelligence relies on to move forward.

  That’s the game for an Asset. That determines our value. It’s not a passive role. In effect we agree to play with all of the smoke and mirrors and cul de sacs, applying our most stubborn tenacity and creative risk taking to advance shared goals. That’s crucial to understanding why I wanted in, and why Arab diplomats at the United Nations responded so positively towards me.

  If you’re a Mark, it is critically important to figure out why somebody has approached you. What do they want to accomplish? What’s their agenda? What’s stuck that the Asset is determined to fix? There might be advantages for both sides if the project succeeds—like getting out from sanctions. Irregardless, it would be disappointing if the Mark doesn’t recognize that something’s in play. That’s part of testing their sophistication and worthiness to join the game.

  And it is a game. The first rule is that there are no rules. That gets a little hairy sometimes. You’re there to get something done, usually because it’s needs a good kick to get unstuck. Whatever gets in the way, gets jettisoned. It’s supremely creative.

  By the way, it’s usually flattering to be approached. It means you’ve got something worth having or knowing.

  A friendly approach is much better than an unfriendly approach.

  On the downside, meetings between handlers and Assets don’t usually disclose the full purpose of the Operations, or the activities of other players. Assets don’t receive intelligence reports, except on a strictly need to know basis, for example if knowing one part will guide how the Asset interacts with another part of a project. We are pawns on a chess board. We are not allowed to see the whole game.

  In short, by our very function and purpose, Assets are not “agents,” properly called “case officers” of one or another U.S. Intelligence Agencies. As Hoven used to remind me, “agents” are foreigners. Americans are “case officers” by right of birth. That’s one way older spooks get around admitting their affiliations, he used to joke. If they’re asked to identify themselves using incorrect language— “Are you an agent?” they can deny it without perjury.

  So what’s the purpose of an Asset? What gives the Asset value?

  Assets are specially prized for our access. We are vital and necessary surrogates for intelligence officers who otherwise lack the specialization necessary to penetrate those exclusive groups. In this way, Assets form the core of human intelligence.

  We are eyes and ears— primary sources of information—in contrast to secondary sources called “analysts” who review raw data collected from Assets, and try to connect the dots, in order to diagram trends and players in some cubicle at Langley. Assets are “on the ground” with greater breadth and intimacy than a cold report. It’s why some experts call human Assets the single best source of raw intelligence, far superior to electronic surveillance. That’s particularly true if the Asset is highly perceptive and capable of connecting random facts into a reasonable picture of unfolding events.

  A corollary is that screwing your Assets undermines the entire foundation of intelligence gathering.

  And where did our team fall on this spectrum?

  Dr. Fuisz told me that I was “uncanny” in my perceptiveness. Paul Hoven told me that I could deduce trends and scenarios “weeks and months ahead of the analysts.”

  Most significantly, because of the U.N. sanctions and the resulting isolation of my countries, I was almost unique in having those contacts. The pariah status of Libya and Iraq throughout the 1990s stymied other approaches routinely used to outreach less controversial embassies. U.S. and British intelligence couldn’t get access to Libyan or Iraqi diplomats— except through me. So we needed each other. It was a symbiotic relationship.

  For obvious reasons, therefore, my handlers would not have wanted me, the Asset, to stop functioning in my normal sphere of public activities. Put another way, the pursuit of my specialty work—my activism against war and sanctions— was necessary to build those difficult relationships.

  Incidentally, during the Clinton Administration, a State Department official once observed in pr
ivate conversation that there was an extra design in using me: They were showing these authoritarian governments— most cleverly, I must add—that in a democracy, activists who oppose the government on one issue can be recruited as allies on other matters. Opposition in one area does not render an activist an enemy on all things. That’s the greatness of democracy. We respect each other, and we disagree with each other. And still we can work together.

  My activism was most genuine, however. I campaigned passionately against sanctions at the United Nations and in the Halls of Congress for years. I considered it morally disgraceful that the United States would inflict such misery on the Iraqi people, particularly. I grieved for Iraqi mothers who struggled to feed their children, and Iraqi teachers who despaired of books and pencils to educate their students; and Iraqi doctors facing empty medical cupboards when suffering people begged for pain killers or heart medication or oxygen canisters to breathe.

  Those peoples were my motivation. Anything that I could contribute to help lift those wretched sanctions, I would gladly do. If my contribution was to act as a back channel to Baghdad, for the purpose of supporting counter-terrorism and non violence, then I would gladly dedicate myself wholeheartedly to the task. At least on that one topic, I would try to make a difference.

  And so I was never quiet about my beliefs. On the contrary, I was outspoken in my criticism. I could get “into the room” with Iraqi diplomats. And I could get “into the room” with American Intelligence. And I never stayed silent in the presence of either group. I lobbied Iraq and Libya hard to support non-violence in all forms, including anti-terrorism and weapons disarmament. By turn, I lobbied Congress and U.S. Intelligence to oppose sanctions and military aggression, even short bombing raids.

  I beseeched Ambassadors on the United Nations Security Council to wake up to the misery of sanctions destroying Iraqi society. I warned embassies that their cruel support for sanctions undermined the integrity of the U.N.’s humanitarian mission on all fronts, which should be to support diplomacy and engagement; supply medical and social services to needy peoples; and build up infrastructure that promotes self sufficiency and economic development.

  While my outspoken activism evidently frustrated the Justice Department, U.S. Intelligence expected me to oppose U.S. policy while visiting the Iraqi Embassy and the Libya House. The authenticity of my activism was paramount for maintaining the strength of my contacts. Otherwise my whole outreach would have collapsed.

  Only somebody on the outside, who does not understand how Intelligence works, would question the efficacy of those actions. Those should be called “Intelligence Dummies.” Sure as heck they have no understanding of the difficulties of engagement.

  Oh yes, we understood each other very well. If the CIA had demanded that I make a choice, I would have chosen my activism first. We would have said our good byes, for I would never give up my values. And yet the strength of my sincerity and my unshakable devotion to my causes made the rest of my work viable.

  In turn, I enjoyed an extraordinary opportunity to contribute to the causes I loved most. That was my motivation for participating.

  The Justice Department should not have worried. Oversight of my activities was intense. I had two handlers, Hoven and Dr. Fuisz. So naturally, I had twice the number of debriefings. Typically, Dr. Fuisz and I met every week or 10 days. By 2001, during back channel talks on resuming the weapons inspections, Dr. Fuisz and I spoke on the phone every single work day, in addition to our weekly meetings.

  My relationship with Paul Hoven was doubly intense. From the start in 1993, Hoven and I met at least once a week, more frequently during a crisis.

  By the end, I estimate that I attended more than 450 meetings with Dr. Fuisz and close to 650 meetings with Hoven.

  The question was, could I prove it? The answer was yes.

  Crucial for my future legal defense, a group of heavy-hitter Republican Congressional staffers gathered socially every Thursday evening at the old Hunan Restaurant on the Senate side of Capitol Hill.83 The Hunan served alcohol, though Hoven and I never drank until after our debriefings. The restaurant was pitch black, and the crystal shrimp with walnuts was delicious. That made everybody happy, while this cabal of Congressional staffers talked policy and plotted conspiracies. That’s where Hoven and I caught up, whispering in one of the dark corners.

  The Chief of Staff for Senator Kit Bond from Missouri used to come. Legislative staff for Senator Chuck Grassley would be seated at the long table in the pitch black room. Pat Wait, Chief of Staff for GOP Rep. Helen Bentley was a regular fixture, as was Kelly O’Meara, Chief of Staff for GOP Rep. Andrew Forbes. Nobody in this crowd could be called a light weight. Mixed in would be top White House journalists like Jerry Seper from the Washington Times. The Washington correspondent for the Asian Wall Street Journal. And Hoven and me.

  Occasionally other spooky types would show up, as well.

  As the token progressive Democrat— on the opposite end of the ideological spectrum—my presence baffled these hard leaning conservatives. But the dark corners of the restaurant gave Paul and me a safe place to retreat for private conversations about Libya and Iraq. During times of crisis or intensive action on our projects, Hoven and I met a second time at our homes, as well.

  My witness list would not be boring, for sure. At trial, some of these folks could have expected subpoenas. They would have been compelled to acknowledge that Paul Hoven and I forged a tightly bonded relationship for almost 9 years that was publicly observed. It’s doubtful they understood the full nature of our work. It was clandestine, after all. But they could definitely confirm that Hoven and I had done it together. That would be the crucial admission, which accounts for why Hoven and I chose the Hunan for our meetings in the first place. We wanted supremely credible, high level witnesses to observe our engagement, in case anything should happen to either one of us.

  Debriefings safeguarded me as an Asset, because they guarantee full disclosure, oversight and prompt feedback. Nobody has to worry that an American citizen would be wheeling and dealing with Libya or Iraq for a decade without somebody paying close attention. That would never happen. In my experience, it would be impossible.

  After my indictment, I was confident the candor of my disclosures would save me from prison. Nobody could claim ignorance of my activities. Nothing had been concealed. For example, the Justice Department indicted me for taking a trip to Baghdad in March, 2002. As it turns out, my invitation as a guest of Iraq’s Foreign Ministry had been reported to Andy Card in a letter dated March 1, 2001—one year before the trip occurrred.84 In it, I offered to delay or reject the invitation outright, if so instructed. That letter was one of 11 progress reports to the White House and CIA, describing the success of talks to resume weapons inspections.85

  My commitment to full disclosure was reliable at all times, and fully documented in my papers.

  Other individuals—such as Jesse Jackson, Scott Ritter and ex-Chess Champion, Bobby Fischer, did receive explicit warnings not to travel to Iraq or Yugoslavia. By contrast, I was not warned off. I interpreted that as a deliberate and informed decision on their part. At that moment we were making excellent progress on behalf of the 9/11 investigation and securing Iraq’s commitment to the weapons inspection process.86 All aspects of our project carried great value to the U.S. and its allies in Europe and the Middle East. At this stage, I don’t think the majority of rank and file U.S. intelligence had insight to the secret war agenda of the Bush Administration. For certain, they did not confide in me.

  There was another reason. By the nature of the work, an Asset always seeks to maintain and expand her circle of contacts, in order to broaden the scope of access. A handler would be loath to stop an Asset from expanding those contacts. The Asset gains value precisely because of the ability to interact with difficult sources, and create fresh opportunities for action and dialogue.

  That’s why Andy Card never discouraged my meetings at the Iraqi Embassy or the Libya House
, and why I believe I was never told to cancel my trip to Baghdad. Although secretly the White House intended to pursue a totally different course of action than what I offered, policymakers needed to know what Iraqi officials were thinking and planning. They needed my raw intelligence. My conversations with Iraqi officials gave insight to Iraq’s intentions towards the world community. For different reasons perhaps, both sides needed to exploit my back-channel. And I agreed to be exploited.

  Whether we liked each others’ politics or not, this needed to get done. And it had to get done right. It was really that simple. And I had a strong track record of success.

  You need only look at Libya today to know that back-channel dialogue succeeded admirably, in fact.

  Before the fall of Gadhaffi, Libya had fully reformed, having renounced its sanctuary for terrorists and WMD development —my two favorite causes as an Anti-War Asset.

  The situation was very different in May 1995, when I first approached Libyan diplomats. My first meetings at the Libya House occurred at a time when Tripoli held pariah status in the international community. The FBI snatched anybody who walked into the Libya House even once, and sat them down for a serious conversation.

  They did not try to stop me.

  Why? Because Assets can be extremely difficult to replace—especially with regards to countries like Iraq and Libya. Nobody else could step in, particularly in those years.

  And yet it was incredibly shrewd of American Intelligence to use me. Because of my activism, I could establish rapport with individuals they could not otherwise get close to, inside nations officially cut off from the United States. Most unusually Arab diplomats respected the motivations for my engagement—which were totally sincere on my part. They welcomed me as a guest to their embassy. They recognized that I opposed acts of violence, not people or culture or religious teachings. Most importantly, the Arabs had vastly more incentive to cooperate, because they recognized the consistency of my opposition to violence in all directions. I opposed military aggression by the West with the same passion that I opposed terrorism. As such, I could engage in topics that would ordinarily be off limits.