The U.S. would have difficulty achieving results without that input.
On the other hand, you can see the problem for Republican leaders.
Finally, after 9/11, President Bush had a chance to hurdle international antipathy towards U.S military aggression against Iraq. Right up to that moment, world opinion had turned against Washington. Current U.S. policy against Iraq was doomed. Baghdad was poised on the cusp of rehabilitation. Cooperation with anti-terrorism would have been one more factor to justify that end. It didn’t take Saddam very long to figure that out.
Where would that leave the White House? Back at square one without an excuse to launch their war.
But I did not understand that yet.
With the world discombobulated by 9/11, the White House seized its advantage and rushed to rev up its propaganda machine, with Vice President Cheney and Senator John McCain as its mouthpiece. In a calculated push to link Iraq to Al Qaeda, the White House launched one of the most blatant and audacious deceptions in the War on Terrorism.
Not for the first time, my credentials posed a serious problem for Neo-Cons at the White House. Our team had monitored Iraq’s enormously poor enthusiasm for various jihadi groups since 1996—including Iraq’s rejection of overtures from Bin Laden in 1998, immediately after his infamous jihad fatwa against the west.156
In the early spring of 1998, before the U.S. Embassy bombings in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi, Kenya, I played a first-hand role in assessing whether Bin Laden would find sanctuary or financial support from Libya or Iraq.157 In one of the very first investigations of what I call “Pre-Al Qaeda” structure and support, I approached both embassies, and expressed sympathy and appreciation for Bin Laden’s cause.
Their reaction was stark. Libyan diplomats declared me ‘persona non grata’ at their Embassy in New York, and commanded that I must go away and never return. They would not meet with me again.
As for Baghdad’s reaction, Iraqi diplomats voiced great alarm. They quizzed me extensively as to what Islamic cleric had set up shop in Washington, who could possibly preach support for Bin Laden’s cause. They urged me to explore Islam through a different mosque, and expressed dismay that my understanding had suddenly become so dark. Iraqi diplomats argued that Bin Laden does not follow true Islamic beliefs. They warned that in my quest to understand their religion, I had come across unholy teachings. They urged me to abandon any new friends preaching these terrible things. They were horrified.
They pushed very hard to identify who my new radical friends were. They wanted names and nationalities. Like I said, Saddam tracked these people all over the world.
All of this was reported to Dr. Fuisz, who delightedly instructed me to return to the United Nations and apologize to Libya and Iraq. He told me to say that I had made a great mistake in my enthusiasm, and that I recanted my support for Osama Bin Laden.
Diplomats from both embassies expressed profound relief.
Our project was important because it established one of the earliest benchmarks for the response that would greet Osama in Middle East nations alienated from the United States. Would his compatriots find sanctuary and welcome in Libya or Iraq? Absolutely not. Baghdad and Tripoli were onto Osama’s game years before Al Qaeda hit our radar. They saw him as a serious threat. They demanded that I stay away from his followers— or stay away from them.
My career as an Asset was itself a history of Iraq’s opposition to radical Islamic terrorism.
And so within days of the 9/11 attack, I headed for New York to meet with Libyan and Iraqi diplomats. Both Dr. Fuisz and Hoven urged me to act as rapidly as possible to secure the highest levels of cooperation from both countries. I performed at their demand.
Paul Hoven would later tell the FBI that he spoke with me 40-50 times after 9/11.158 That speaks for itself.
Dr. Fuisz was typically smooth, quoting John F. Kennedy: “Ask not what your country can do for you, ask you what you can do for your country. You don’t ask for anything right now.”
It must be understood that I had to do the fieldwork before Dr. Fuisz and Hoven could report back to the Intelligence Community, as my handlers.
At the end of the day, I was the one in direct contact with Iraqi officials. These were my diplomatic sources. My team would succeed or fail—and the policy would succeed or fail— based on the aggressiveness of my outreach.
After 9/11 nobody was playing. The CIA damn well wanted everything turned over immediately. People like Dr. Fuisz and Hoven took this investigation very seriously. They pushed me to the limit. The attack required it.
For that matter, I had Libya, too. That was easy. In my conversations with Libya’s Ambassador, Issa Babaa, he quickly reminded me that Libya was the first nation in the world to warn Interpol about Osama bin Laden in 1995. (Egypt issued the first warrant for his arrest in 1996.) Given that long-standing animosity between Gadhaffi and Bin Laden, it was easily confirmed that Libya would have no present day linkages to Al Qaeda that could be exploited for intelligence purposes. On the other hand, Libya was praised in media reports for voicing sympathy for the 9/11 victims, including Tripoli’s recognition that over 90 nations lost their fellow country-men that day. The tragedy struck world-wide.
I communicated those messages from Libya’s Ambassador to Dr. Fuisz. When the media praised Libya’s cooperation, I reasonably concluded my messages had made it up the intelligence chain, and that the success of my efforts was recognized and appreciated.
With regards to Libya, I think it was appreciated.159 A few weeks later, the New York Times lauded Libya’s contribution with the headline: “Three New Allies Help CIA in its Fight against Terror.” “Since Sept 11, CIA officials have opened lines with intelligence officials from several nations that Washington has accused of supporting terrorism.”
Importantly, those meetings at the Libya House occurred on the same days—the same trips to New York—as my meetings at Iraq’s Embassy. I visited one after the other.
It is with a mixture of pride, amusement and disgust, therefore, that I recall one count of my federal indictment: “On or about September 19, 2001, Susan Lindauer a/k/a “SYMBOL Susan,” met with an officer of the Iraq Intelligence Service in Manhattan.”160
The date was actually September 18. The feds got the wrong day. And I certainly hoped my diplomat friend, Salih Mahmoud, had ties to Iraqi Intelligence. It would make my success much easier to achieve. That was the whole point of the trip, after all.
It must be underscored that the Justice Department never disputed that my work occurred. On the contrary, the federal prosecutor, Edward O’Callaghan, argued that I should serve 10 to 25 years in prison because it did occur. He simply argued that my CIA handler, Dr. Fuisz, was interested in Libya and only Libya—Not Iraq.
That’s right! According to the Justice Department, the CIA did not care about Iraq’s relationship to Al Qaeda after 9/11. They did not want to know anything about it.
I am not making that up.
The alleged evidence supporting these accusations are what I call “hinky.” And that’s putting it politely.
According to the FBI, an Iraqi diplomat named Salih Mahmoud (whom I fully acknowledge working with) treated me to lunch on three afternoons in Manhattan.161
On September 8, 2001, the Iraqi diplomat allegedly bought us both lunch for $33.50. My half of that was apparently $16.75 with tax and tip.
On September 13, he bought the two of us lunch for $27.57 at 2:17 pm, according to a time-stamped receipt. My half of that bill would have come to $13.78.
And on September 22, he allegedly bought us lunch for $31.85—My half was $15.92.
The grand total of this misadventure totaled $92.92—By deduction, my half share for three lunches in the most expensive city in the world totaled $46.46. I found that somewhat insulting, though most amusing. All receipts were date and time stamped. So the feds couldn’t fudge the meetings, which helped my defense enormously.
Curiously, none of those lunches took plac
e on September 19, 2001—the date cited in my indictment. Yet this was the evidence used to justify criminal charges against me.
I mean, come on—didn’t the FBI have anything better to do? The Justice Department wanted to put me on trial for eating a cheeseburger?!
Ah, but was it American Cheese! Was it a patriotic cheeseburger? Or was it the “French” fries, which irked the Justice Department? That’s what a jury had to decide.
Remember now, a defendant is innocent until proven guilty—even under the Patriot Act.
Here’s the punch line, which I could not wait to share with a jury: The FBI had the wrong Susan. The diplomat in question, Salih Mahmoud, had a girlfriend named Susan, who worked at the United Nations. We joked about her all the time, that he had “another Susan, since he couldn’t have me.” She was the “other woman.” Or maybe I was the “other woman.” Whatever—we were two different American women.
Apparently the FBI didn’t figure that out in its investigation. That’s what happens when the Intelligence Community cannibalizes its Assets! Nobody knows what the hell’s going on. It’s pandemonium!
I used to giggle deliriously, anticipating my pleasure as I exposed my “rival” to a jury. Given the gravity of the charge— eating a cheese burger with a friendly Iraqi diplomat, you can only imagine how I savored the imaginary moment.
And how did we know this ‘other Susan’ was the real cheeseburger fiend? Because September 8 was three days before 9/11. Witnesses would testify that I stopped visiting New York several weeks before 9/11.162 They would testify that I warned friends and family to stay out of New York City, too. The CIA had not yet decided they wanted me dead. They were still trying to keep me alive. Thus, on September 8, I was tucked at home in Maryland, safe from terrorists and federal prosecution.
Critically, this innocuous receipt for a cheeseburger guaranteed that my Defense would have the right to introduce our 9/11 warnings to the Court! There was no way the Prosecution could keep it out!! Hence, I flatly barred my attorney from pushing to drop that charge.
I also had a hard alibi for September 13, 2001. When the FBI broke open the hard drive of my computer, they discovered that somebody created a letter to Andy Card at the White House, at exactly the time of day that I was supposedly sitting in that restaurant with Salih Mahmoud.163 The date and time stamp on the visa receipt proved it was impossible for me to have traveled to New York for the lunch, except in a time warp. Or perhaps a magic carpet!
Did I mention that New York City lies 214 miles from my home in Takoma Park, Maryland?
Later, staff at the Bureau of Prisons speculated that perhaps a friend snuck into my house and posed as me, creating the letter to Andy Card as an alibi, while I conducted the meeting in New York. (And you guys think I’m paranoid!)
It added to the pleasure of my jury fantasy. After all the trouble, I hope it was a good burger! I think New York City owes me one on the house! Hell, they should name a cheeseburger after me on Wall Street, for all the trouble they caused me! And by God, it better have American cheese! Or maybe pepper jack! That’s spicy enough!
All of which explains why I wear my indictment with a peculiar sort of pride. The indictment proves beyond any doubt that I definitely functioned as a “First-Responder” to the 9/11 tragedy. I confess wholeheartedly that I appeared at the scene of the crime, even if the FBI got all its facts and dates wrong. Without question, I visited my embassy contacts in New York right after 9/11.
But if I wasn’t that “other Susan” eating cheeseburgers with Salih Mahmoud, then what exactly did I contribute to the 9/11 investigation? And why would the U.S. government be so frightened, that I would be arrested and gagged from disclosing it?
Where do I start—
Brace yourselves.
Iraq’s efforts to contribute to the 9/11 investigation were far more substantial than Republican leaders wanted to acknowledge to the American people.
With tragic irony, I strongly believe the Republican leadership’s refusal to accept Iraq’s assistance has resulted in long term damage to the War on Terror, with dire consequences for future security. In my opinion, the Republican failure has left a back door wide open for another major terrorist strike on the United States.
And let me tell you why.
Iraq’s Official Response to 9/11: Frustration and the Oklahoma City Bombing
Immediately after 9/11, Iraq was much more frustrated and reluctant to contribute than Libya.
First of all, Iraqi diplomats in New York and Baghdad numbered among the very few in the world who possessed direct knowledge that America’s top leaders unequivocally expected 9/11 in its precise construction and modus operendus.
How did they know? Because I told them. Our team pushed Baghdad hard to supply details of the conspiracy from May, 2001 onwards. And we threatened them with a massive retaliatory attack if they failed.
In Iraq’s eyes, that strained our credibility.
In back channel communications from Baghdad, Iraqi diplomats challenged me sternly: “Obviously you knew the attack was coming, because you kept telling us about it. You should have stopped it, Susan—instead of blaming us today.”
“Why didn’t you stop it?”
“We will tell you why. You didn’t stop it, because you’ve been planning to attack us all along. This is your excuse. That’s why the United States let (9/11) happen!”
“You didn’t want to stop it.”
“Your government allowed this to happen to its own people, so you could declare war on us. And now you complain!”
Iraqi diplomats nailed it.
They also guessed, probably correctly, that their old enemy, Israel’s Mossad, gave the CIA intelligence about the attack—and the Mossad now sought to lay blame at their door.
To Baghdad’s way of thinking, that made perfect sense. That did not make Iraqi diplomats sympathetic, however. Most Americans will not like to hear this. But any sort of debriefing requires candor. Otherwise it’s worthless. So I will say it straight up—Iraqi diplomats got incensed by our outrage over the 9/11 strike.
“This bombing, it happens every day all over the world. And Americans don’t care! Other families suffer. Other homes are destroyed. Schools are bombed. Commerce is disrupted. This is the way. It is your way.”
“This is what America does to other countries. You drop the bombs! Now you are suffering, too, and you’re angry. Well, damn your hypocrisy!”
On my first trip to New York on September 18, those were the sentiments of Iraqi diplomats. What else could we expect after running 20,000 sorties over Iraq’s sovereign air space by this time? And that clock would keep running on the sanctions and no fly zones for an additional 18 months, until the U.S. invasion.
The problem was that Baghdad possessed vast amounts of exactly the sort of raw intelligence and sourcing that the U.S. required to launch a muscular and effective counter-strike on Al Qaeda. Say anything else about Saddam— his government had phenomenal tracking on terrorist cells throughout the Middle East, particularly with regards to Islamic agitators. My handlers and I were specially convinced that Baghdad would have access to bank accounts or financial records— the greatest prize of all after 9/11.
If Saddam didn’t have it already, he could get it. And that was exactly the sort of premium intelligence the U.S. needed most.
The problem was getting the stuff handed over to us.
Immediately after 9/11, I began badgering my diplomatic contacts by phone. I urged Iraqi officials to express condolences for the 9/11 families. And I pushed hard for cooperation with the 9/11 investigation, especially with regards to identifying Al Qaeda operations and financial mechanisms. Dr. Fuisz and I had very precise conversations about what sort of documents would be worthwhile to lay hold of.
On September 18, 2001—one week after the 9/11 attack—I headed to New York to meet my diplomatic contacts.164 Libya was generous in its condolences for the 9/11 victims and their families, noting the international scope of suffe
ring.
Iraq was scathing. Baghdad caught on with lightning speed that the U.S. government was remarkably silent about its advance knowledge of the attack. Diplomats were also sharp on point that their great tormentor, the United States, urgently required Baghdad’s help to achieve the most substantial results.
Our need galled Iraqi diplomats. They stressed that New York had no authority to grant my request. The decision would have to come from the highest levels of government in Baghdad. From Saddam himself. Or Tariq Aziz. Diplomats in New York would take no action until authorization was received. “Oh no, no,” I shook my head. “You must push Baghdad hard. The global community demands a rapid reply.”
And that’s what we got.
Very late on the night of September 21, 2001, my diplomatic contact, Salih Mahmoud, phoned my home in Maryland with an urgent request that I should return to New York as quickly as possible to receive the official response from Baghdad.165
Early the next morning, on September 22, I jumped in my car and hit Interstate 95, heading north to Manhattan through Delaware and New Jersey. At my speeds, it’s about 3 ½ hours in each direction, a long day after meetings, but always productive.
When I got to New York, my meeting with Salih Mahmoud took place inside the Embassy. I wanted to gather as much feedback from other diplomats as possible. Also, the spooks could audiotape meetings inside the embassy, standard practice during a crisis. In this situation, Langley would have the capability to authenticate my reporting, and they could add to the analysis. So it was necessary for the conversation to stay inside the embassy. Unhappily for federal prosecutors, I would have resisted any suggestion to move our meeting to a restaurant.
Salih was late arriving. Apparently he was enjoying lunch with his girlfriend, the “other Susan.” That’s a lunch I dearly wish I could have shared with them, since I am ultimately the one who paid for it. And it cost a great deal more than $31.85, I can tell you now.166
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