Immediately Salih handed me a written, decoded statement.
What follows is the official verbatim transcript from Baghdad on September 21, 2001 in reply to my request for cooperation after 9/11, including grammar and parenthetical comments.167 (See Appendix) The brackets are my own insertions:
1. If the request had been made in different circumstances, it would have been possible for us to agree or go along with it.
2. With the continuation of U.S. and U.K. aggression and the tense atmosphere in The United State of America against Iraq, any step to be taken by Iraq might be interpreted in a harmful manner to Iraqi reputation and to the keenness of Iraq to maintain its dignity.
3. Despite of that, all the points proposed by you [meaning me, Susan Lindauer] reflect the real Iraqi position.
4. If U.S. declared that it intends to halt (stop) the air raids against Iraq (or such things like this) in order to concentrate on other Matters, the situation would be different (better).
5. However, we are prepared to meet any American official in a covert or non-covert manner to discuss the common issues.
6. In any case, Iraq has suffered from terrorist and its leaders, including his excellency, Mr. President has been a target to many assassination attempts, in addition to the attempt to assassinate Mr. Tariq Aziz in first of April, 1980. In fact, he was injured, as well as some Iraqi leadership members who suffered from such terrorist acts.
7. Iraq demonstrated a good faith towards U.S.A. in 1993 after Oklahoma Trade Center previous accident, and informed American government through Iraqi interest section in Washington that it (Iraq) was prepared to provide U.S.A. With Some Information about the perpetrators of 1993 accident, if American side would send a delegate to Baghdad. But the American side dealt with our offer improperly and they said to Us (Iraq) to deliver this information. That means eventually they rejected to meet us.
8. This is the Iraq official position.
Reading over it, I jumped on the references to Oklahoma City and the first World Trade Center “accident” in 1993.168
My eyes got big. I was immediately glad that we stayed at the Embassy. I began by asking some disarmingly simple questions. I tried to avoid questions that would arouse excitement or cause Salih to alter his story to please me. I wanted to know exactly how the paper arrived. Who had access to it? Whether the Ambassador or other senior diplomats in New York possibly might have edited it?
Above all, did the document that arrived actually use the word “Oklahoma?” Or had Salih guessed?
It was important that he should not be afraid to correct a mistake, if he’d made one.
Salih replied candidly. The message had arrived in code. He deciphered the paper himself. Nobody else was authorized to lay hands on it. So the message originated wholly in Baghdad, without amendment of its political content by diplomatic staff in New York.
Salih assured me that it came from the “top of the government, far above the Foreign Minister. Nobody would be authorized to change it without facing serious troubles.”
I suspected that meant Saddam Hussein or Tariq Aziz.
And finally, yes, the coded message from Baghdad included a cipher for “Oklahoma.” Salih faithfully swore that he had checked the document carefully. It was not a mistake on his end in New York.
I pressed a little harder. Did he understand the geography of the United States? Did he understand that Oklahoma was not part of Manhattan, but more than 1,500 miles away? These were two separate locations? It could be an innocent mistake by someone who lacked knowledge of American geography. Both of them had suffered horrific terrorist attacks.
“Yes,” he replied. “We know they are two separate cities. I know it, and Baghdad knows it. We know they had two separate ‘accidents.’”
“I think the message refers to both of them,” Salih leaned back on the sofa, and kicked his feet up on the coffee table, suddenly conspiratorial.
“I understand that it is still possible for you to receive this information. This door is not closed. If we give it to you, Susie, there is no problem. When you give it to America, they’re going to say that we have it. With the tensions between us, Baghdad fears taking any action that would expose us to harm. You’ve been threatening us for months, Susie.”
“If you had not threatened us, we would not be so concerned now.”
“Why didn’t you stop the attack, Susie? You told us about it. We learned about it from you. Obviously you know more than anyone. So how can you blame us? Perhaps you should not look so far away.”
“Baghdad has to consider all of these things.”
“But this message is very positive,” Salih insisted.
“Baghdad would be ready to cooperate if our interests are not damaged. Then you can have whatever you want. I see no problem. I think you will get it.”
Here you see the value of an Asset.
Iraqi diplomats confided this information to me—not Washington Those were my relationships that prompted a remarkably fast response from Baghdad, with a three day turn around from September 18 to September 21, followed by a meeting on September 22. Iraq trusted me as the point person, though they had no trust for the United States whatsoever. And they would do favors for me— which I would request on behalf of those greater needs. Expecting that, the CIA would leverage my relationships and network of contacts for its own advantage. That’s how our back-channel worked.
Baghdad’s official response to 9/11 was communicated in a letter to Andy Card, Chief of Staff to President Bush, dated September 24, 2001.169 That letter faithfully records the dates of my visits to the Iraqi Embassy on September 18 and September 22, proving nothing was concealed from the White House or Dr. Fuisz, who received copies of all my reports to Andy Card, and prompt debriefings on top of that.
Despite all of my troubles, I stand by my conclusion to Andy Card: “Iraq has remained silent against the accusations playing in the media not out of malice, but because of frozen communications. I believe Iraq does not know how to speak to the United States, so that you can hear what they are saying, because they are so traumatized.”170
“They are frightened of an irrational U.S. response— because they’ve seen the previous Administration retaliate with attacks inspired by fuzzy data, or inadequately researched speculations, usually to distract from some media scandal or other. That’s why the Iraqis—and some others, frankly—are freezing up, and the common peoples of some Islamic nations have voiced a distrust of the information against Bin Laden. (They see it) as political justification for a witch hunt against an old enemy.”
“To regain credibility, in this first situation you are going to be held to a higher standard of scrutiny from the Arab Street. You’ve got to show this is not the same… old cynical leadership. They respect your strength, there is no question. But they also must respect your judgment, so that you retain all of your moral authority.”
“And so I urge the Administration to hit your mark, but keep your focus tight. Don’t use excuses to expand the circle of targets. Everyone in Europe and the Middle East will see through you, and your actions will only diminish America’s moral justification.”
There was no hostility in my comments, and I was correct on all accounts. Yet this letter would become a focal point of my five year legal battle over whether I performed as an “Iraqi Agent—” and deserved to spend 10 to 25 years of my life in prison— for delivering such prescient advice to the White House.171
Fortunately I did not know that yet. I seized on Baghdad’s claims about the Oklahoma City Bombing and the 1993 World Trade Center attack vigorously.
In the next weeks, I returned to New York frequently to investigate what exactly Iraq offered the United States. I was convinced that intelligence cache would possess exceptional value.
Intriguingly, Iraqi diplomats in New York and Baghdad swore their documents proved active Middle Eastern participation in both the Oklahoma City bombing and the 1993 World Trade Center attack. Senior diplomats, inc
luding a delegation from Baghdad, insisted the evidence was irrefutable that Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols had not acted alone, but in fact received technical guidance and financial assistance from pre-Al Qaeda forces, sometimes called the “Inter-Arab” group, before 9/11.
As the chief U.S. Asset with ties to the Embassy, Iraq was mine to chase. Anything from Baghdad would have to come through me. Only three of us covered Iraq at the United Nations —and the other two Assets were brand new after 9/11, and in their mid-20s. They had no experience with this sort of work. By contrast, I had several major projects in play already— including a special project in support of U.S. anti-terrorism policy.
FBI Task Force Invited to Baghdad
Months before 9/11, a major platform was already on the table that would have dramatically enhanced the United States’ pursuit of terrorists seeking sanctuary inside Iraq. Our team had persuaded Iraq to authorize an FBI Task Force to conduct terrorism investigations inside its borders, with the right to interview witnesses, and most controversially, the right to make arrests. We just needed authorization from the White House to implement the agreement.172
The idea for an FBI Task Force emerged after the strike on the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen in October, 2000.
A year before 9/11, Iraqi diplomats provided advance warning about a major terrorist attack targeting the port facilities at Aden, Yemen. Iraq’s warning came just 10 days before the attack on the U.S.S. Cole linked to Osama bin Laden.
Intelligence about the conspiracy came through my back channel, with an emergency summons to visit the Iraqi Embassy. Diplomats informed me that Baghdad had swiftly deported a Saudi national after discovering that he was conspiring to attack a port facility elsewhere in the Middle East. Iraqi diplomats protested they would never dare to arrest a foreign national— a Saudi most of all— for fear of international reprisals. There would be too much controversy. Even cracking a major terrorist conspiracy harmful to the Saudi royal family would not be sufficient for Iraq to act, because of repercussions from the international community. It would not be feasible under any circumstances.
Diplomats protested that they could only deport the jihadi, and notify us. The Iraqi diplomat was quite emphatic, however. The Saudi man traveled on to Yemen after leaving Iraq’s territory.
Without delay, I notified Dr. Fuisz and Hoven that the Port of Aden in Yemen might be targeted for attack.
On a rapid turn around trip to New York, I quickly warned Yemen’s Deputy Ambassador at the United Nations, Mr. Al Sindi, of the threat. Yemen had served as a non-permanent member of the Security Council during Lockerbie, and we’d become friendly. For awhile Mr. Al Sindi visited me socially in Washington, and took me out for dinners in Georgetown. So when I described the terrorist scenario over dinner in New York, he took my warning to heart.
Regrettably the warning came too late to stop a small boat laden with explosives from ramming the U.S.S. Cole, while it docked for refueling five days later.
But Iraq gave a chilling explanation for the logic behind the conspiracy. Apparently, the Saudi terrorists hoped to alienate the local population from Yemen’s central government and the United States. They hoped Yemen’s leadership would be so disorganized in responding to the strike that Washington would be provoked to impose some sort of sanctions as punishment. That would cause hardship for the local people, costing support for the West and Yemen’s central government authority.
Such vicious logic enraged Baghdad.
But their evil logic was significant. Terrorists hoped that alienated rural communities could be persuaded to embrace a sort of freedom fighter/insurgency amalgamation. Seizing on that rage, Saudi rebels could burrow deep into Yemen’s rural villages, and launch attacks on Saudi oil fields, across the border. Thus, Yemen would become a Saudi Rebel base for destabilizing the Saudi Royal family.
Yemen is scrabble poor. Tribal families in the border lands bitterly resent the extravagance of their Saudi neighbors, and perceive them to have seized Yemen’s historic territory, in order to expand their wealth. Some of those rural tribes would definitely welcome raids on Saudi oil fields. No doubt they would enjoy sharing the wealth brought by Saudi Rebels, too.
In short, the U.S.S. Cole attack was predatory and opportunistic, pure and simple. The terrorists sought to create hardship for the Yemeni people, so that it could profit strategically from their misery and isolation.
The Saudi group in question would soon have a notorious name, and a more infamous reputation: Al Qaeda. The attack on the Port of Aden in Yemen would launch a major effort by this Al Qaeda group to achieve dominance in global terrorist circles.
Knowing all of that, my warning had been two-fold: 1) notifying Yemen’s Deputy Ambassador Al Sindi of the possible attack on the Port of Aden, and 2) discussing strategies for cooperation, so Yemen could hit the ground running and satisfy U.S. authorities.
If they couldn’t stop the attack, at least Yemen would be braced for U.S. investigation tactics. And so, five days later, when a small boat laden with explosives rammed the USS Cole, Yemen was not caught wholly off guard.
Demands for an FBI Task Force in Baghdad erupted out of the CIA’s frustration over Iraq’s impotence to thwart foreign terrorists from setting up shop inside its borders.
Baghdad complained bitterly that it had no desire to provide sanctuary for Islamic groups—which Saddam’s government despised. However, young jihadis arrived at their borders regardless, attracted by perceptions of the lack of central authority in Iraq. Correctly or not, terrorists believed the international community would hinder Iraq’s ability to police its territory. They sought to exploit that weakness. However, once they arrived, they found no friend in Saddam. They posed a genuine threat to his secularism, and risked stirring up fanaticism among his poverty-weary people. Saddam’s government was already weakened. He did not relish any outsider taking advantage of the porous desert to set up camp inside his country.
The bombing of the USS Cole was a frustrating reminder of those complications. Iraq’s complaints were legitimate, unfortunately. Iraq could not arrest foreign nationals without provoking an international crisis. Nobody wanted Baghdad to reverse that policy. Yet clearly something had to be done.
Immediately after the attack on the USS Cole, Dr. Fuisz gave instructions that I should corner Iraqi diplomats with our demand to allow the FBI or Interpol to set up shop inside Iraq. If Baghdad could not control the entrance and movement of terrorists inside its borders, who might be attracted by perceptions of Iraq’s flagging security under sanctions, as diplomats insisted, then the international community should be allowed to provide additional safeguards.
Remarkably, by late February, 2001, Baghdad agreed— eight months before 9/11.
Regrettably, for all the tough talk on terrorism, Republican leaders took no action on the security arrangement.
And so another critical safeguard was missed in the months before 9/11.
Tragedy gave the U.S. a second chance.173 I was convinced a Task Force would provide a windfall of intelligence for global counter-terrorism efforts, and so I renewed my push for Baghdad to allow the FBI (or Interpol or Scotland Yard) to operate inside its borders. It was a logical demand. Given new disclosures about the cache of documents establishing a Middle East link to the Oklahoma City bombing and 1993 World Trade Center attack, the FBI seemed best positioned to execute a rapid turn around. They could acquire all of the available financial documents in one throw, as opposed to what I could get piecemeal from Iraqi diplomats. The FBI could act immediately to subpoena bank accounts, and move rapidly to seize suspicious funds. They could also deploy teams of law enforcement to chase down terror suspects.
The FBI would get the glory. That accounted for some hostility at CIA towards the project. However, given the dynamics, it seemed appropriate for law enforcement to take a lead role, as the most effective means of putting that intelligence to rapid use.
There was just one foreseeable problem: Dr. Fuisz warned that it m
ight take a directive from Congress to bring the CIA and FBI together, because of longstanding hostility between the two agencies.
That proved to be the greatest understatement of all.
CHAPTER 9:
IRAQ’S CONTRIBUTION TO
9/11 INVESTIGATION, PART II
After 9/11, everything moved into high gear, making rapid progress on all fronts with Iraq. For the first months after the attack, 9/11 looked like it might become a catalyst for great good. If War was unavoidable in Afghanistan, a full arsenal of peace options flanked the troops in Iraq.
My projects had been underway for a full year. Now we rallied to the finish line.
Weapons Inspections
Iraq’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Dr. Saeed Hasan formally welcomed the return of weapons inspectors to Baghdad as of November, 2000.174 Still, there was a striking disconnect in concerns on both sides.
Foremost for the U.S., there had been much talk of Iraq’s national pride and past insults by Australian Richard Butler’s inspection teams. That worried the CIA. Even the slightest risk of confrontation, once inspectors were deployed on the ground, made U.S. Intelligence wary of accepting Iraq’s invitation. The CIA feared Baghdad would abruptly refuse to cooperate with “excessive demands” for access to possible weapons sites, and the entire operation would be jeopardized.
The CIA was adamant. Iraq must agree to weapons inspections “with no conditions.” That was the operative phrase. It meant no qualifying factors, CIA jargon for “unconditional surrender.” Iraq would have to brace its people for the most rigorous standards of compliance in the history of disarmament verification, with maximum transparency and five minute access—long enough to find a key and open the door. The U.S. also wanted the right to interview scientists outside the presence of Iraqi officials— a demand that intimidated Iraqi scientists, who feared Washington would twist their words to manipulate the media.
EXTREME PREJUDICE: The Terrifying Story of the Patriot Act and the Cover Ups of 9/11 and Iraq Page 18