Ender's World

by Orson Scott Card

  We formed The TDG Group at MCU. With Gen. Van Riper’s permission, we quit work early every Friday afternoon and met in the conference room to play TDGs for a couple hours. Sometimes he joined us. Everybody was invited. We got mostly officers, but some enlisted Marines and even some civilians showed up. Each week, two or three people were responsible for bringing new TDGs for the group to play and leading the discussion on their own scenarios. We experimented with different formats for presenting a scenario and different techniques for leading the discussion. Then we started exporting TDGs to the various schools, teaching the instructors how to author them and lead the discussions. The Basic School took the desks out of one of their large classrooms and replaced them with sand tables so brand-new lieutenants could do TDGs on three-dimensional terrain. I made TDGs the centerpiece of my Maneuver Warfare 101 course.

  I submitted “Enemy Over the Bridge” to the Marine Corps Gazette, not sure what the editors would make of an article that wasn’t really an article. They published it in the April 1990 issue and solicited solutions from the readers. We got more than a hundred submissions. One was sketched on a C-Ration carton, as it might expediently have been done in the field. TDGs had struck a nerve. They became a regular feature in the Gazette, with a new game published each month and selected solutions published two months later. The Gazette’s editor-in-chief, Col. John Greenwood, became a regular member of The TDG Group. To this day, TDGs remain an integral part of Marine Corps culture and one of the most indelible reminders of the Maneuver Warfare Revolution.

  Reading also was a critical part of the Maneuver Warfare Revolution. All Marines now were expected to read regularly as part of their professional development. One of my final duties before being transferred from Quantico in the summer of 1990 was to help put together the Commandant’s Reading List, which assigned titles by rank and category (strategy, tactics, logistics, leadership, etc.). I edited what became known as the Book on Books, a catalog of all the titles, with a synopsis of each. One of my first acts was to make sure Ender’s Game got on the list. This is the entry I wrote for the first Book on Books:

  Card, Orson Scott. Ender’s Game (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press)

  Cpl/Sgt; Tactics

  This is the story of the development of a military genius in the guise of clever, brash, exhilarating, and extremely enjoyable science fiction. Even if you do not like science fiction, you will love this book—and you will learn a lot in the process. Alien “buggers” have already unsuccessfully attacked the earth and are coming back for another try. Outnumbered and ill-equipped, the earth leaders know the only hope of survival rests in finding a military genius who can outfight the buggers. They choose young Ender Wiggin, and his intense training comes in the form of space-age war games. Ender thinks he is but one student among many, but the administrators of the battle school have a particular curriculum in mind for the young soldier, who will be put to the severest test. The tactics Ender develops in his training are based on fluidity, adaptability, tempo, deception, ambiguity, and a keen appreciation for the enemy. If this sounds remarkably similar to maneuver warfare, it is.

  I like to think I was personally responsible for the sale of thousands of copies of Ender’s Game. It is hard to find a Marine of my generation who is not intimately familiar with the book, and to this day, if you were to describe someone as “an Ender,” you would be hard-pressed to find a Marine who did not know exactly what you mean. The term has found its way into the professional jargon.

  The Marine Corps University has produced no less than three discussion guides for leaders to use while discussing Ender’s Game in a group setting as part of a professional military education program in their units. Two are available online at:

  http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/lejeune_leadership/LLI%20Documnets/Enders%20Game%201.pdf

  http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/lejeune_leadership/LLI%20Documnets/Enders%20Game%202.pdf

  I quote from the third of these to provide an idea of the professional topics that Marines explore through Ender’s Game:

  Leadership: How many different kinds of leaders can you find in the book? What advantages and disadvantages do they have? What is it about the most effective leaders in the story that seems to set them above the rest of the pack? Does this reflect your experience? How do we define leadership and evaluate some of the leaders in the book such as Colonel Graff, Mazer Rackham, Bonzo Madrid, Rose the Nose, Petra, Bean, Peter, and Valentine?

  Training and team-building: What is different about how Battle School does training and education than what we see in the military? Why is this? What features of military training and education should be in Battle School? What features in Battle School should be in the military? How is conflict between leaders and followers, between leaders, and between followers handled? What seems to be the glue that holds cohesive teams together and makes them effective inside and outside the Battle Room? What tears teams apart?

  Maneuver Warfare/Tactics: What is it about Ender’s method that contributes to his tactical success in and outside of the Battle Room? Why do other armies and leaders fail when he succeeds? Card has much to say about the role of “extra practice,” trust between leaders and team members, innovation, and non-formulaic approaches/unpredictability.

  As that discussion guide notes, “Ender’s Game is about more than the difficulty and excitement that competition provides in preparing for combat. There are lessons in training methodology, leadership, and ethics as well. Such richness in range and treatment has made Card’s book an oft-read and re-read title for many years; Ender’s Game has been a stalwart item on the Marine Corps Reading List since its inception.”

  That evening in Quantico in early 1990, when Scott Card visited, my Maneuver Warfare 101 class broke Ender Wiggin down as a commander, analyzed the heck out of him. I argued that the essence of what made him a great commander was that Ender, a “Third,” combined the dominant traits of his two older siblings. Obviously, all three Wiggin children were extremely intelligent, which always helps. But what was critical was that Ender merged Peter’s ruthless cruelty with Valentine’s extreme empathy. Alone, each trait was disqualifying, and so Peter and Valentine both eventually were deemed unsuitable as potential commanders. But the merging of those traits in Ender was the critical element for potential greatness.

  Always very self-aware (another valuable trait in a commander), Ender comes to recognize that trait in himself. Granted leave back in Greensboro after graduating from the Battle School, he has an exchange with Valentine. He says:

  “In the moment when I truly understand my enemy, understand him well enough to defeat him, then in that very moment I also love him. I think it’s impossible to really understand somebody, what they want, what they believe, and not love them the way they love themselves. And then, in that very moment when I love them—”

  “You beat them.” For a moment she was not afraid of his understanding.

  “No, you don’t understand. I destroy them. I make it impossible for them to ever hurt me again. I grind them and grind them until they don’t exist.”

  (In perhaps the most famous line from The Art of War, Sun Tzu says: “Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.”)

  That short exchange between Ender and Valentine, I argued, was the central revelation and the most important passage of the entire book, in which you get the essence of what makes Ender Wiggin a brilliant commander. (You also, of course, get the starting point for Speaker.)

  Even Ender’s name is revealing of this character trait. We are told that Andrew Wiggin is called “Ender” from a very young age because Valentine mispronounces “Andrew.” That is a nice literary device, but I always felt it was more than a little transparent. “Ender” is not merely a name; it is a fundamental description of Wiggin as a tactician. He is very much an ender: exploiting that gift for utterly ruthless empathy, he goes decisively for the heart of each situation to finish it quickly. “Ender” is fundamentally bot
h who and what he is.

  After Ender has defeated the formics in the climactic battle, Mazer Rackham says: “You made the hard choice, boy. All or nothing. End them or end us.” [Emphasis mine.]

  As Sun Tzu said: “Hence what is essential in war is victory, not prolonged operations.”

  This idea of ending, which Card captures so compellingly as a character trait, continuously occupies every military commander and theorist as a matter of military theory, namely: how best to take apart an enemy? Sun Tzu said: “Should one ask: ‘How do I cope with a well-ordered enemy host about to attack me?’ I reply: ‘Seize something he cherishes and he will conform to your desires.’” Clausewitz called it the center of gravity:

  [O]ne must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents [i.e., the two opposing sides] in mind. Out of those characteristics, a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed.

  While Clausewitz explores the source of a combatant’s strength, Warfighting chooses to approach from the direction of a combatant’s weakness, using the term critical vulnerability:

  So we seek to strike the enemy where, when, and how he is most vulnerable…Of all the vulnerabilities we might choose to exploit, some are more critical to the enemy than others. It follows that the most effective way to defeat our enemy is to destroy that which is most critical to him. We should focus our efforts on the one thing which, if eliminated, will do the most decisive damage to his ability to resist us.

  I think this formulation is the one closest to Ender’s own thinking. This thought always seems to be foremost in his mind whenever he is in a fight. Granted, he offers a rational explanation for acting this way in each case, whether through his inner thoughts or later explanation, but I believe that is mere rationalization. I think ruthlessly exploiting the critical vulnerability is an intrinsic part of his character. He does it time and again. It is, literally, who he is.

  Scott insisted he had none of these ideas in mind when he wrote Ender’s Game. Right.

  Anyway, I began by saying that I knew Ender Wiggin very well.

  After that long day at Quantico, when the faculty at the Marine Corps University treated Scott Card like a rock star and my Maneuver Warfare 101 class had the privilege of dissecting Ender’s Game with the author, Scott signed my marked-up, dog-eared paperback copy. He wrote: “To John Schmitt—A man who understood Ender better than I did—Scott.”

  Nice of him to say, although manifestly not true, of course. Still, I consider it one of the finest compliments of my professional career.

  John F. Schmitt was commissioned a second lieutenant in the US Marines after graduating from North-western University in June 1981. He spent four years as an infantry commander in the Second Marine Division in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. In 1986, he was assigned to the Doctrine Center in Quantico, Virginia, where he wrote the keystone Marine Corps doctrinal manuals Ground Combat Operations, Warfighting, and Campaigning. He left active duty in 1993 and is self-employed as a military consultant and writer. He resides in Champaign, Illinois, with his wife and three children.

  TDG 90-1

  “ENEMY OVER THE BRIDGE”

  The following is an example of a tactical decision game like those in use at the Marine Corps University as a tool for developing military judgment and decision-making ability. The basic idea behind these deceptively simple games is to create a hypothetical battlefield dilemma of some sort and require the players to develop a solution under pressure of a time limit. The games work best in groups of up to about a dozen, where Marines can argue the merits of various plans. The games are designed to teach students how to think rather than what to think, the rationale being that because each situation is unique, it is futile to try to provide the right answer in advance for every conceivable situation. There are no absolute right or wrong answers. As long as a solution reflects the tenets of Maneuver Warfare, it is the “right” answer.

  THE SITUATION

  You are the commanding officer, Third Battalion, Sixth Marines. Your battalion consists of a scout platoon, two tank companies (A and C), and two mechanized infantry companies (B and D). Friendly forces hold the bridge and the riverline to the west. (Intelligence reports the river is unfordable.) Friendly reconnaissance elements are operating west of the river. Tomorrow morning the division begins a major offensive west across the river, with the division’s main effort in Sixth Marines’ zone. Your battalion will spearhead the regiment’s attack.

  You are to occupy the assembly area south of Hamlet in preparation for the morning attack across the river commencing at 0400. You are moving northwest toward the assembly area as shown. At 2000, your scout platoon, which is forward reconnoitering the route, reports enemy infantry occupying your assembly area in strength and continuing to reinforce. The size of the enemy force is unknown but estimated to be at least a company. Further, the scout platoon commander reports he has just met an allied reconnaissance team that was operating west of the river but has been forced east across the river under fire. The reconnaissance team leader reports there is no sign of friendly forces holding the riverline or the bridge and that enemy infantry with some light vehicles and tanks has been moving across the bridge for at least thirty minutes. This is all the information your scout commander can tell you.

  Originally published in Marine corps Gazette, April 1990. The scenario has been simplified slightly from the original.

  As the battalion commander, what will you do?

  REQUIREMENT

  Within a five-minute time limit, give your solution in the form of the fragmentary order you will issue to your subordinates—to include the intent behind your plan—and support it with an overlay sketch.

  ONE SOLUTION TO “ENEMY OVER THE BRIDGE”

  This was my original solution to “Enemy Over the Bridge,” published in the Marine Corps Gazette, with three other solutions, June 1990.

  BATTALION COMMANDER’S ORDER

  “The battalion attacks immediately to seize the bridge in order to cut off the flow of enemy forces east and to secure a bridgehead for the division’s attack at 0400 tomorrow. Scout platoon: Move west toward Wharton Farm to clear the engagement area and determine enemy dispositions along that axis. Charlie will be attacking from your rear, so imperative you clear the vicinity of the assembly area. Alpha Company, with Delta in trace: Attack the bridge as rapidly as possible via Engmont Farm to sever the enemy movement east and secure the bridgehead. You are the main effort. Charlie: Probe west in order to determine size of enemy force and contain it in the assembly area. Develop the situation based on your estimate, but do not become decisively engaged. Most important, keep the enemy force fixed where it is. Bravo: You are reserve. Take up position near Engmont Farm, prepared to reinforce Alpha and Delta or attack south toward Hamlet to destroy the enemy.”

  EXPLANATION

  Occupying the assigned assembly area is no longer relevant since the situation has changed dramatically. Although the enemy in the assembly area may be the immediate problem, the more critical problem is the situation at the bridge. To keep a potentially bad situation from getting worse and to facilitate the division’s offensive launching on time, I must secure the bridge. The situation in the assembly area is too obscure to commit to a decisive engagement—nor is it important at this stage to do that—although I do want to develop the situation there. My scout platoon is a problem: they are caught between the enemy and Charlie Company with a fight about to break out. I have to extract them without exposing them to Charlie’s fire. By pushing them west, I get them out of the way and I use them for their primary mission of gaining information about the situation. I soon will have information about the situation on the northern flank from Alpha and Delta; I have no other means of getting information about the situation on the southern flank. The location of my reserve, Bravo Company, at Engmont Farm protects my route to the bridge and allows me both to
reinforce quickly toward the bridge and to attack toward Hamlet, although I realize it is out of position if I need it in the south.

  Q. There is another side to the story I’ve wanted to know. What is the story behind the pilots and officers of the invasion force in Ender’s Game? As a reader, knowing Ender, Bean, Dink, Petra, and the others, it would be extremely interesting to see the battles from the invasion force’s point of view. Was the faith of the other pilots shaken when Petra’s group was temporarily paralyzed by her meltdown? What was going through the pilots’ minds when faceto-face and hopelessly outnumbered in their last encounter? All of them more or less plummeted to the formic home world without regard for themselves.

  A. Remember that the pilots in the final battle had information that the pilots who fought the early battles did not: they had seen Ender win battle after battle. By this point they had absolute faith in his ability.

  At the same time, they also knew that the other pilots’ victories in all the previous battles meant nothing if this last fleet was beaten at the formics’ home world.

  They could see how many formic ships there were; they could imagine a fleet like this surrounding Earth. Though everyone they knew back home was already old or dead, they still had loyalty to the world and the human race they had so recently left, and whose only protection they were.

  There are many examples of courageous soldiers making assaults like this one, with little chance of individual survival, for the sake of carrying the overall battle. Countless examples of small groups fighting to the last man to buy time for a larger group to get away, regroup, or prepare to counterattack.