The Portable Plato

by Plato

  He would indeed, replied Simmias.

  And when you see a man who is repining at the approach of death, is not his reluctance a sufficient proof that he is not a lover of wisdom, but a lover of the body, and probably at the same time a lover of either money or power, or both?

  Quite so, he replied.

  And is not courage, Simmias, a quality which is specially characteristic of the philosopher?

  Certainly.

  There is temperance again, which even by the vulgar is supposed to consist in the control and regulation of the passions, and in the sense of superiority to them—is not temperance a virtue belonging to those only who despise the body, and who pass their lives in philosophy?

  Most assuredly.

  For the courage and temperance of other men, if you will consider them, are really a contradiction.

  How so?

  Well, he said, you are aware that death is regarded by men in general as a great evil.

  Very true, he said.

  And do not courageous men face death because they are afraid of yet greater evils?

  That is quite true.

  Then all but the philosophers are courageous only from fear, and because they are afraid; and yet that a man should be courageous from fear, and because he is a coward, is surely a strange thing.

  Very true.

  And are not the temperate exactly in the same case? They are temperate because they are intemperate—which might seem to be a contradiction, but is nevertheless the sort of thing which happens with this foolish temperance. For there are pleasures which they are afraid of losing; and in their desire to keep them, they abstain from some pleasures, because they are overcome by others; and although to be conquered by pleasure is called by men intemperance, to them the conquest of pleasure consists in being conquered by pleasure. And that is what I mean by saying that, in a sense, they are made temperate through intemperance.

  Such appears to be the case.

  Yet the exchange of one fear or pleasure or pain for another fear or pleasure or pain, and of the greater for the less, as if they were coins, is not the exchange of virtue. O my blessed Simmias, is there not one true coin for which all things ought to be exchanged?—and that is wisdom; and only in exchange for this, and in company with this, is anything truly bought or sold, whether courage or temperance or justice. And is not all true virtue the companion of wisdom, no matter what fears or pleasures or other similar goods or evils may or may not attend her? But the virtue which is made up of these goods, when they are severed from wisdom and exchanged with one another, is a shadow of virtue only, nor is there any freedom or health or truth in her; but in the true exchange there is a purging of all these things, and temperance, and justice, and courage, and wisdom herself are the purgation of them. The founders of the mysteries would appear to have had a real meaning, and were not talking nonsense when they intimated in a figure long ago that he who passes unsanctified and uninitiated into the world below will lie in a slough, but that he who arrives there after initiation and purification will dwell with the gods. For “many,” as they say in the mysteries, “are the thyrsus-bearers, but few are the mystics,” —meaning, as I interpret the words, “the true philosophers.” In the number of whom, during my whole life, I have been seeking, according to my ability, to find a place;—whether I have sought in a right way or not, and whether I have succeeded or not, I shall truly know in a little while, if God will, when I myself arrive in the other world—such is my belief. And therefore I maintain that I am right, Simmias and Cebes, in not grieving or repining at parting from you and my masters in this world, for I believe that I shall equally find good masters and friends in another world. But most men do not believe this saying; if then I succeed in convincing you by my defence better than I did the Athenian judges, it will be well.

  Cebes answered: I agree, Socrates, in the greater part of what you say. But in what concerns the soul, men are apt to be incredulous; they fear that when she has left the body her place may be nowhere, and that on the very day of death she may perish and come to an end—immediately on her release from the body, issuing forth dispersed like smoke or air and in her flight vanishing away into nothingness. If she could only be collected into herself after she has obtained release from the evils of which you were speaking, there would be good reason to hope, Socrates, that what you say is true. But surely it requires a great deal of argument and many proofs to show that when the man is dead his soul yet exists, and has any force or intelligence.

  True, Cebes, said Socrates; and shall I suggest that we converse a little of the probabilities of these things?

  I am sure, said Cebes, that I should greatly like to know your opinion about them.

  I reckon, said Socrates, that no one who heard me now, not even if he were one of my old enemies, the Comic poets, could accuse me of idle talking about matters in which I have no concern:—if you please, then, we will proceed with the enquiry.

  Suppose we consider the question whether the souls of men after death are or are not in the world below There comes into my mind an ancient doctrine which affirms that they go from hence into the other world, and returning hither, are born again from the dead. Now if it be true that the living come from the dead, then our souls must exist in the other world, for if not, how could they have been born again? And this would be conclusive, if there were any real evidence that the living are only born from the dead; but if this is not so, then other arguments will have to be adduced.

  Very true, replied Cebes.

  Then let us consider the whole question, not in relation to man only, but in relation to animals generally, and to plants, and to everything of which there is generation, and the proof will be easier. Are not all things which have opposites generated out of their opposites? I mean such things as good and evil, just and unjust—and there are innumerable other opposites which are generated out of opposites. And I want to show that in all opposites there is of necessity a similar alternation; I mean to say, for example, that anything which becomes greater must become greater after being less.

  True.

  And that which becomes less must have been once greater and then have become less.

  Yes.

  And the weaker is generated from the stronger, and the swifter from the slower.

  Very true.

  And the worse is from the better, and the more just is from the more unjust.

  Of course.

  And is this true of all opposites? and are we convinced that all of them are generated out of opposites?

  Yes.

  And in this universal opposition of all things, are there not also two intermediate processes which are ever going on, from one to the other opposite, and back again; where there is a greater and a less there is also an intermediate process of increase and diminution, and that which grows is said to wax, and that which decays to wane?

  Yes, he said.

  And there are many other processes, such as division and composition, cooling and heating, which equally involve a passage into and out of one another. And this necessarily holds of all opposites, even though not always expressed in words—they are really generated out of one another, and there is a passing or process from one to the other of them?

  Very true, he replied.

  Well, and is there not an opposite of life, as sleep is the opposite of waking?

  True, he said.

  And what is it?

  Death, he answered.

  And these, if they are opposites, are generated the one from the other, and have their two intermediate processes also?

  Of course.

  Now, said Socrates, I will analyze one of the two pairs of opposites which I have mentioned to you, and also its intermediate processes, and you shall analyze the other to me. One of them I term sleep, the other waking. The state of sleep is opposed to the state of waking, and out of sleeping waking is generated, and out of waking, sleeping; and the process of generation is in the one case falling asleep, and in
the other waking up. Do you agree?

  I entirely agree.

  Then, suppose that you analyze life and death to me in the same manner. Is not death opposed to life?

  Yes.

  And they are generated one from the other?

  Yes.

  What is generated from the living?

  The dead.

  And what from the dead?

  I can only say in answer—the living.

  Then the living, whether things or persons, Cebes, are generated from the dead?

  That is clear, he replied.

  Then the inference is that our souls exist in the world below?

  That is true.

  And one of the two processes or generations is visible —for surely the act of dying is visible?

  Surely, he said.

  What then is to be the result? Shall we exclude the opposite process? and shall we suppose nature to walk on one leg only? Must we not rather assign to death some corresponding process of generation?

  Certainly, he replied.

  And what is that process?

  Return to life.

  And return to life, if there be such a thing, is the birth of the dead into the world of the living?

  Quite true.

  Then here is a new way by which we arrive at the conclusion that the living come from the dead, just as the dead come from the living; and this, if true, affords a most certain proof that the souls of the dead exist in some place out of which they come again.

  Yes, Socrates, he said; the conclusion seems to flow necessarily out of our previous admissions.

  And that these admissions were not unfair, Cebes, he said, may be shown, I think, as follows: If generation were in a straight line only, and there were no compensation or circle in nature, no turn or return of elements into their opposites, then you know that all things would at last have the same form and pass into the same state, and there would be no more generation of them.

  What do you mean? he said.

  A simple thing enough, which I will illustrate by the case of sleep, he replied. You know that if there were no alternation of sleeping and waking, the tale of the sleeping Endymion would in the end have no meaning, because all other things would be asleep too, and he would not be distinguishable from the rest. Or if there were composition only, and no division of substances, then the chaos of Anaxagoras would come again. And in like manner, my dear Cebes, if all things which partook of life were to die, and after they were dead remained in the form of death, and did not come to life again, all would at last die, and nothing would be alive—what other result could there be? For if the living spring from any other things, and they too die, must not all things at last be swallowed up in death? 33

  There is no escape, Socrates, said Cebes; and to me your argument seems to be absolutely true.

  Yes, he said, Cebes, it is and must be so, in my opinion; and we have not been deluded in making these admissions; but I am confident that there truly is such a thing as living again, and that the living spring from the dead, and that the souls of the dead are in existence, and that the good souls have a better portion than the evil.

  Cebes added: Your favourite doctrine, Socrates, that knowledge is simply recollection, if true, also necessarily implies a previous time in which we have learned that which we now recollect. But this would be impossible unless our soul had been in some place before existing in the form of man; here then is another proof of the soul’s immortality.

  But tell me, Cebes, said Simmias, interposing, what arguments are urged in favour of this doctrine of recollection. I am not very sure at the moment that I remember them.

  One excellent proof, said Cebes, is afforded by questions. If you put a question to a person in a right way, he will give a true answer of himself, but how could he do this unless there were knowledge and right reason already in him? And this is most clearly shown when he is taken to a diagram or to anything of that sort.34

  But if, said Socrates, you are still incredulous, Sim- mias, I would ask you whether you may not agree with me when you look at the matter in another way;—I mean, if you are still incredulous as to whether knowledge is recollection?

  Incredulous I am not, said Simmias; but I want to have this doctrine of recollection brought to my own recollection, and, from what Cebes has said, I am beginning to recollect and be convinced: but I should still like to hear what you were going to say.

  This is what I would say, he replied:—We should agree, if I am not mistaken, that what a man recollects he must have known at some previous time.

  Very true.

  And what is the nature of this knowledge or recollection? I mean to ask, Whether a person who, having seen or heard or in any way perceived anything, knows not only that, but has a conception of something else which is the subject, not of the same but of some other kind of knowledge, may not be fairly said to recollect that of which he has the conception?

  What do you mean?

  I mean what I may illustrate by the following instance: —The knowledge of a lyre is not the same as the knowledge of a man?

  True.

  And yet what is the feeling of lovers when they recognize a lyre, or a garment, or anything else which the beloved has been in the habit of using? Do not they, from knowing the lyre, form in the mind’s eye an image of the youth to whom the lyre belongs? And this is recollection. In like manner any one who sees Simmias may remember Cebes; and there are endless examples of the same thing.

  Endless, indeed, replied Simmias.

  And recollection is most commonly a process of recovering that which has been already forgotten through time and inattention.

  Very true, he said.

  Well; and may you not also from seeing the picture of a house or a lyre remember a man? and from the picture of Simmias, you may be led to remember Cebes;

  True.

  Or you may also be led to the recollection of Simmias himself?

  Quite so.

  And in all these cases, the recollection may be derived from things either like or unlike?

  It may be.

  And when the recollection is derived from like things, then another consideration is sure to arise, which is—whether the likeness in any degree falls short or not of that which is recollected?

  Very true, he said.

  And shall we proceed a step further, and affirm that there is such a thing as equality, not of one piece of wood or stone with another, but that, over and above this, there is absolute equality? Shall we say so?

  Say so, yes, replied Simmias, and swear to it, with all the confidence in life.

  And do we know the nature of this absolute essence?

  To be sure, he said.

  And whence did we obtain our knowledge? Did we not see equalities or material things, such as pieces of wood and stones, and gather from them the idea of an equality which is different from them? For you will acknowledge that there is a difference. Or look at the matter in another way:—Do not the same pieces of wood or stone appear at one time equal, and at another time unequal?

  That is certain.

  But are real equals ever equal? or is the idea of equality the same as of inequality?

  Impossible, Socrates.

  Then these (so-called) equals are not the same with the idea of equality?

  I should say, clearly not, Socrates.

  And yet from these equals, although differing from the idea of equality, you conceived and attained that idea?

  Very true, he said.

  Which might be like, or might be unlike them?

  Yes.

  But that makes no difference: whenever from seeing one thing you conceived another, whether like or unlike, there must surely have been an act of recollection?

  Very true.

  But what would you say of equal portions of wood and stone, or other material equals? and what is the impression produced by them? Are they equals in the same sense in which absolute equality is equal? or do they fall short of this perfect equali
ty in a measure?

  Yes, he said, in a very great measure too.

  And must we not allow, that when I or any one, looking at any object, observes that the thing which he sees aims at being some other thing, but falls short of, and cannot be, that other thing, but is inferior, he who makes this observation must have had a previous knowledge of that to which the other, although similar, was inferior.

  Certainly.

  And has not this been our own case in the matter of equals and of absolute equality?

  Precisely.

  Then we must have known equality previously to the time when we first saw the material equals, and reflected that all these apparent equals strive to attain absolute equality, but fall short of it?

  Very true.

  And we recognize also that this absolute equality has only been known, and can only be known, through the medium of sight or touch, or of some other of the senses, which are all alike in this respect?

  Yes, Socrates, as far as the argument is concerned, one of them is the same as the other.

  From the senses then is derived the knowledge that all sensible things aim at an absolute equality of which they fall short?

  Yes.

  Then before we began to see or hear or perceive in any way, we must have had a knowledge of absolute equality, or we could not have referred to that standard the equals which are derived from the senses?—for to that they all aspire, and of that they fall short.

  No other inference can be drawn from the previous statements.

  And did we not see and hear and have the use of our other senses as soon as we were born?

  Certainly.

  Then we must have acquired the knowledge of equality at some previous time?

  Yes.

  That is to say, before we were born, I suppose?

  True.

  And if we acquired this knowledge before we were bom, and were born having the use of it, then we also knew before we were born and at the instant of birth not only the equal or the greater or the less, but all other ideas; for we are not speaking only of equality, but of beauty, goodness, justice, holiness, and of all which we stamp with the name of essence in the dialectical process, both when we ask and when we answer questions. Of all this we may certainly affirm that we acquired the knowledge before birth?