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The Portable Plato

Page 38

by Plato


  Most certainly.

  Then I may infer courage to be such as you describe?

  Why, yes, said I, you may, and if you add the words “of a citizen,” you will not be far wrong;—hereafter, if you like, we will carry the examination further, but at present we are seeking not for courage but justice; and for the purpose of our enquiry we have said enough.

  You are right, he replied.

  Two virtues remain to be discovered in the State—first temperance, and then justice which is the end of our search.

  Very true.

  Now, can we find justice without troubling ourselves about temperance?

  I do not know how that can be accomplished, he said, nor do I desire that justice should be brought to light and temperance lost sight of; and therefore I wish that you would do me the favour of considering temperance first.

  Certainly, I replied, I should not be justified in refusing your request.

  Then consider, he said.

  Yes, I replied; I will; and as far as I can at present see, the virtue of temperance has more of the nature of harmony and symphony than the preceding.

  How so? he asked.

  Temperance, I replied, is the ordering or controlling of certain pleasures and desires; this is curiously enough implied in the saying of “a man being his own master”; and other traces of the same notion may be found in language.

  No doubt, he said.

  There is something ridiculous in the expression “master of himself”; for the master is also the servant and the servant the master; and in all these modes of speaking the same person is denoted.

  Certainly.

  The meaning is, I believe, that in the human soul there is a better and also a worse principle; and when the better has the worse under control, then a man is said to be master of himself; and this is a term of praise: but when, owing to evil education or association, the better principle, which is also the smaller, is overwhelmed by the greater mass of the worse—in this case he is blamed and is called the slave of self and unprincipled.

  Yes, there is reason in that.

  And now, I said, look at our newly-created State, and there you will find one of these two conditions realized; for the State, as you will acknowledge, may be justly called master of itself, if the words “temperance” and “self-mastery” truly express the rule of the better part over the worse.

  Yes, he said, I see that what you say is true.

  Let me further note that the manifold and complex pleasures and desires and pains are generally found in children and women and servants, and in the freemen so called who are of the lowest and more numerous class.

  Certainly, he said.

  Whereas the simple and moderate desires which follow reason, and are under the guidance of mind and true opinion, are to be found only in a few, and those the best born and best educated.

  Very true.

  These two, as you may perceive, have a place in our State; and the meaner desires of the many are held down by the virtuous desires and wisdom of the few.

  That I perceive, he said.

  Then if there be any city which may be described as master of its own pleasures and desires, and master of itself, ours may claim such a designation?

  Certainly, he replied.

  It may also be called temperate, and for the same reasons?

  Yes.

  And if there be any State in which rulers and subjects will be agreed as to the question who are to rule, that again will be our State?

  Undoubtedly.

  And the citizens being thus agreed among themselves, in which class will temperance be found—in the rulers or in the subjects?

  In both, as I should imagine, he replied.

  Do you observe that we were not far wrong in our guess that temperance was a sort of harmony?

  Why so?

  Why, because temperance is unlike courage and wisdom, each of which resides in a part only, the one making the State wise and the other valiant; not so temperance, which extends to the whole, and runs through all the notes of the scale, and produces a harmony of the weaker and the stronger and the middle class, whether you suppose them to be stronger or weaker in wisdom or power or numbers or wealth, or anything else. Most truly then may we deem temperance to be the agreement of the naturally superior and inferior, as to the right to rule of either, both in States and individuals.

  I entirely agree with you.

  And so, I said, we may consider three out of the four virtues to have been discovered in our State. The last of those qualities which make a State virtuous must be justice, if we only knew what that was.

  The inference is obvious.

  The time then has arrived, Glaucon, when, like huntsmen, we should surround the cover, and look sharp that justice does not steal away, and pass out of sight and escape us; for beyond a doubt she is somewhere in this country: watch therefore and strive to catch a sight of her, and if you see her first, let me know.

  Would that I could! but you should regard me rather as a follower who has just eyes enough to see what you show him—that is about as much as I am good for.

  Offer up a prayer with me and follow.

  I will, but you must show me the way.

  Here is no path, I said, and the wood is dark and perplexing; still we must push on.

  Let us push on.

  Here I saw something: Halloo! I said, I begin to perceive a track, and I believe that the quarry will not escape.

  Good news, he said.

  Truly, I said, we are stupid fellows.

  Why so?

  Why, my good sir, at the beginning of our enquiry, ages ago, there was justice tumbling out at our feet, and we never saw her; nothing could be more ridiculous. Like people who go about looking for what they have in their hands—that was the way with us—we looked not at what we were seeking, but at what was far off in the distance; and therefore, I suppose, we missed her.

  What do you mean?

  I mean to say that in reality for a long time past we have been talking of justice, and have failed to recognise her.

  I grow impatient at the length of your exordium.

  Well then, tell me, I said, whether I am right or not: You remember the original principle which we were always laying down at the foundation of the State, that one man should practise one thing only, the thing to which his nature was best adapted;—now justice is this principle or a part of it.

  Yes, we often said that one man should do one thing only.

  Further, we affirmed that justice was doing one’s own business, and not being a busybody; we said so again and again, and many others have said the same to us.

  Yes, we said so.

  Then to do one’s own business in a certain way may be assumed to be justice. Can you tell me whence I derive this inference?

  I cannot, but I should like to be told.

  Because I think that this is the only virtue which remains in the State when the other virtues of temperance and courage and wisdom are abstracted; and, that this is the ultimate cause and condition of the existence of all of them, and while remaining in them is also their preservative; and we were saying that if the three were discovered by us, justice would be the fourth or remaining one.

  That follows of necessity.

  If we are asked to determine which of these four qualities by its presence contributes most to the excellence of the State, whether the agreement of rulers and subjects, or the preservation in the soldiers of the opinion which the law ordains about the true nature of dangers, or wisdom and watchfulness in the rulers, or whether this other which I am mentioning, and which is found in children and women, slave and freeman, artisan, ruler, subject,—the quality, I mean, of every one doing his own work, and not being a busybody, would claim the palm—the question is not so easily answered.

  Certainly, he replied, there would be a difficulty in saying which.

  Then the power of each individual in the State to do his own work appears to compete with the other political v
irtues, wisdom, temperance, courage.

  Yes, he said.

  And the virtue which enters into this competition is justice?

  Exactly.

  Let us look at the question from another point of view: Are not the rulers in a State those to whom you would entrust the office of determining suits at law?

  Certainly.

  And are suits decided on any other ground but that a man may neither take what is another’s, nor be deprived of what is his own?

  Yes; that is their principle.

  Which is a just principle?

  Yes.

  Then on this view also justice will be admitted to be the having and doing what is a man’s own, and belongs to him?

  Very true.

  Think, now, and say whether you agree with me or not. Suppose a carpenter to be doing the business of a cobbler, or a cobbler of a carpenter; and suppose them to exchange their implements or their duties, or the same person to be doing the work of both, or whatever be the change; do you think that any great harm would result to the State?

  Not much.

  But when the cobbler or any other man whom nature designed to be a trader, having his heart lifted up by wealth or strength or the number of his followers, or any like advantage, attempts to force his way into the class of warriors, or a warrior into that of legislators and guardians, for which he is unfitted, and either to take the implements or the duties of the other; or when one man is trader, legislator, and warrior all in one, then I think you will agree with me in saying that this interchange and this meddling of one with another is the ruin of the State.

  Most true.

  Seeing then, I said, that there are three distinct classes, any meddling of one with another, or the change of one into another, is the greatest harm to the State, and may be most justly termed evil-doing?

  Precisely.

  And the greatest degree of evil-doing to one’s own city would be termed by you injustice?

  Certainly.

  This then is injustice; and on the other hand when the trader, the auxiliary, and the guardian each do their own business, that is justice, and will make the city just.

  I agree with you.

  We will not, I said, be over-positive as yet; but if, on trial, this conception of justice be verified in the individual as well as in the State, there will be no longer any room for doubt; if it be not verified, we must have a fresh enquiry. First let us complete the old investigation, which we began, as you remember, under the impression that, if we could previously examine justice on the larger scale, there would be less difficulty in discerning her in the individual. That larger example appeared to be the State, and accordingly we constructed as good a one as we could, knowing well that in the good State justice would be found. Let the discovery which we made be now applied to the individual—if they agree, we shall be satisfied; or, if there be a difference in the individual, we will come back to the State and have another trial of the theory. The friction of the two when rubbed together may possibly strike a light in which justice will shine forth, and the vision which is then revealed we will fix in our souls.

  That will be in regular course; let us do as you say.

  I proceeded to ask: When two things, a greater and less, are called by the same name, are they like or unlike in so far as they are called the same?

  Like, he replied.

  The just man then, if we regard the idea of justice only, will be like the just State?

  He will.

  And a State was thought by us to be just when the three classes in the State severally did their own business; and also thought to be temperate and valiant and wise by reason of certain other affections and qualities of these same classes?

  True, he said.

  And so of the individual; we may assume that he has the same three principles in his own soul which are found in the State; and he may be rightly described in the same terms, because he is affected in the same manner ?

  Certainly, he said.

  Once more then, O my friend, we have alighted upon an easy question—whether the soul has these three principles or not?

  An easy question! Nay, rather, Socrates, the proverb holds that hard is the good.

  Very true, I said; and I do not think that the method which we are employing is at all adequate to the accurate solution of this question; the true method is another and a longer one. Still we may arrive at a solution not below the level of the previous enquiry.

  May we not be satisfied with that? he said;—under the circumstances, I am quite content.

  I too, I replied, shall be extremely well satisfied.

  Then faint not in pursuing the speculation, he said.

  Must we not acknowledge, I said, that in each of us there are the same principles and habits which there are in the State; and that from the individual they pass into the State?—how else can they come there? Take the quality of passion or spirit;—it would be ridiculous to imagine that this quality, when found in States, is not derived from the individuals who are supposed to possess it, e. g. the Thracians, Scythians, and in general the northern nations; and the same may be said of the love of knowledge, which is the special characteristic of our part of the world, or of the love of money, which may, with equal truth, be attributed to the Phoenicians and Egyptians.

  Exactly so, he said.

  There is no difficulty in understanding this.

  None whatever.

  But the question is not quite so easy when we proceed to ask whether these principles are three or one; whether, that is to say, we learn with one part of our nature, are angry with another, and with a third part desire the satisfaction of our natural appetites; or whether the whole soul comes into play in each sort of action—to determine that is the difficulty.

  Yes, he said; there lies the difficulty.

  Then let us now try and determine whether they are the same or different.

  How can we? he asked.

  I replied as follows: The same thing clearly cannot act or be acted upon in the same part or in relation to the same thing at the same time, in contrary ways; and therefore whenever this contradiction occurs in things apparently the same, we know that they are really not the same, but different.

  Good.

  For example, I said, can the same thing be at rest and in motion at the same time in the same part?

  Impossible.

  Still, I said, let us have a more precise statement of terms, lest we should hereafter fall out by the way. Imagine the case of a man who is standing and also moving his hands and his head, and suppose a person to say that one and the same person is in motion and at rest at the same moment—to such a mode of speech we should object, and should rather say that one part of him is in motion while another is at rest.

  Very true.

  And suppose the objector to refine still further, and to draw the nice distinction that not only parts of tops, but whole tops, when they spin round with their pegs fixed on the spot, are at rest and in motion at the same time (and he may say the same of anything which revolves in the same spot), his objection would not be admitted by us, because in such cases things are not at rest and in motion in the same parts of themselves; we should rather say that they have both an axis and a circumference ; and that the axis stands still, for there is no deviation from the perpendicular; and that the circumference goes round. But if, while revolving, the axis inclines either to the right or left, forwards or backwards, then in no point of view can they be at rest.

  That is the correct mode of describing them, he replied.

  Then none of these objections will confuse us, or incline us to believe that the same thing at the same time, in the same part or in relation to the same thing, can act or be acted upon in contrary ways.

  Certainly not, according to my way of thinking.

  Yet, I said, that we may not be compelled to examine all such objections, and prove at length that they are untrue, let us assume their absurdity, and go forward on the understanding that herea
fter, if this assumption turn out to be untrue, all the consequences which follow shall be withdrawn.

  Yes, he said, that will be the best way.

  Well, I said, would you not allow that assent and dissent, desire and aversion, attraction and repulsion, are all of them opposites, whether they are regarded as active or passive (for that makes no difference in the fact of their opposition)?

  Yes, he said, they are opposites.

  Well, I said, and hunger and thirst, and the desires in general, and again willing and wishing,—all these you would refer to the classes already mentioned. You would say—would you not?—that the soul of him who desires is seeking after the object of his desires; or that he is drawing to himself the thing which he wishes to possess: or again, when a person wants anything to be given him, his mind, longing for the realization of his desires, intimates his wish to have it by a nod of assent, as if he had been asked a question?

  Very true.

  And what would you say of unwillingness and dislike and the absence of desire; should not these be referred to the opposite class of repulsion and rejection?

  Certainly.

  Admitting this to be true of desire generally, let us suppose a particular class of desires, and out of these we will select hunger and thirst, as they are termed, which are the most obvious of them?

  Let us take that class, he said.

  The object of one is food, and of the other drink?

  Yes.

  And here comes the point: is not thirst the desire which the soul has of drink, and of drink only; not of drink qualified by anything else; for example, warm or cold, or much or little, or, in a word, drink of any particular sort: but if the thirst be accompanied by heat, then the desire is of cold drink; or, if accompanied by cold, then of warm drink; or, if the thirst be excessive, then the drink which is desired will be excessive; or, if not great, the quantity of drink will also be small: but thirst pure and simple will desire drink pure and simple, which is the natural satisfaction of thirst, as food is of hunger?

  Yes, he said; the simple desire is, as you say, in every case of the simple object, and the qualified desire of the qualified object.

 

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