The Portable Plato

by Plato

  Yes, he said.

  They are like faces which were never really beautiful, but only blooming; and now the bloom of youth has passed away from them?

  Exactly.

  Here is another point: The imitator or maker of the image knows nothing of true existence; he knows appearances only. Am I not right?

  Yes.

  Then let us have a clear understanding, and not be satisfied with half an explanation.

  Proceed.

  Of the painter we say that he will paint reins, and he will paint a bit?

  Yes.

  And the worker in leather and brass will make them?

  Certainly.

  But does the painter know the right form of the bit and reins? Nay, hardly even the workers in brass and leather who make them; only the horseman who knows how to use them—he knows their right form.

  Most true.

  And may we not say the same of all things ?

  What?

  That there are three arts which are concerned with all things: one which uses, another which makes, a third which imitates them?

  Yes.

  And the excellence or beauty or truth of every structure, animate or inanimate, and of every action of man, is relative to the use for which nature or the artist has intended them.

  True.

  Then the user of them must have the greatest experience of them, and he must indicate to the maker the good or bad qualities which develop themselves in use; for example, the flute-player will tell the flute-maker which of his flutes is satisfactory to the performer ; he will tell him how he ought to make them, and the other will attend to his instructions?

  Of course.

  The one knows and therefore speaks with authority about the goodness and badness of flutes, while the other, confiding in him, will do what he is told by him?

  True.

  The instrument is the same, but about the excellence or badness of it the maker will only attain to a correct belief; and this he will gain from him who knows, by talking to him and being compelled to hear what he has to say, whereas the user will have knowledge?

  True.

  But will the imitator have either? Will he know from use whether or no his drawing is correct or beautiful? or will he have right opinion from being compelled to associate with another who knows and gives him instructions about what he should draw?

  Neither.

  Then he will no more have true opinion than he will have knowledge about the goodness or badness of his imitations?

  I suppose not.

  The imitative artist will be in a brilliant state of intelligence about his own creations?

  Nay, very much the reverse.

  And still he will go on imitating without knowing what makes a thing good or bad, and may be expected therefore to imitate only that which appears to be good to the ignorant multitude?

  Just so.

  Thus far then we are pretty well agreed that the imitator has no knowledge worth mentioning of what he imitates. Imitation is only a kind of play or sport, and the tragic poets, whether they write in Iambic or in Heroic verse, are imitators in the highest degree?

  Very true.

  And now tell me, I conjure you, has not imitation been shown by us to be concerned with that which is thrice removed from the truth?

  Certainly.

  And what is the faculty in man to which imitation is addressed?

  What do you mean?

  I will explain: The body which is large when seen near, appears small when seen at a distance?

  True.

  And the same object appears straight when looked at out of the water, and crooked when in the water; and the concave becomes convex, owing to the illusion about colours to which the sight is liable. Thus every sort of confusion is revealed within us; and this is that weakness of the human mind on which the art of conjuring and of deceiving by light and shadow and other ingenious devices imposes, having an effect upon us like magic.

  True.

  And the arts of measuring and numbering and weighing come to the rescue of the human understanding—there is the beauty of them—and the apparent greater or less, or more or heavier, no longer have the mastery over us, but give way before calculation and measure and weight?

  Most true.

  And this, surely, must be the work of the calculating and rational principle in the soul?

  To be sure.

  And when this principle measures and certifies that some things are equal, or that some are greater or less than others, there occurs an apparent contradiction?

  True.

  But were we not saying that such a contradiction is impossible—the same faculty cannot have contrary opinions at the same time about the same thing?

  Very true.

  Then that part of the soul which has an opinion contrary to measure is not the same with that which has an opinion in accordance with measure?

  True.

  And the better part of the soul is likely to be that which trusts to measure and calculation?

  Certainly.

  And that which is opposed to them is one of the inferior principles of the soul?

  No doubt.

  This was the conclusion at which I was seeking to arrive when I said that painting or drawing, and imitation in general, when doing their own proper work, are far removed from truth, and the companions and friends and associates of a principle within us which is equally removed from reason, and that they have no true or healthy aim.

  Exactly.

  The imitative art is an inferior who marries an inferior, and has inferior offspring.

  Very true.

  And is this confined to the sight only, or does it extend to the hearing also, relating in fact to what we term poetry?

  Probably the same would be true of poetry.

  Do not rely, I said, on a probability derived from the analogy of painting; but let us examine further and see whether the faculty with which poetical imitation is concerned is good or bad.

  By all means.

  We may state the question thus:—Imitation imitates the actions of men, whether voluntary or involuntary, on which, as they imagine, a good or bad result has ensued, and they rejoice or sorrow accordingly. Is there anything more?

  No, there is nothing else.

  But in all this variety of circumstances is the man at unity with himself—or rather, as in the instance of sight there was confusion and opposition in his opinions about the same things, so here also is there not strife and inconsistency in his life? Though I need hardly raise the question again, for I remember that all this has been already admitted; and the soul has been acknowledged by us to be full of these and ten thousand similar oppositions occurring at the same moment?

  And we were right, he said.

  Yes, I said, thus far we were right; but there was an omission which must now be supplied.

  What was the omission?

  Were we not saying that a good man, who has the misfortune to lose his son or anything else which is most dear to him, will bear the loss with more equanimity than another?

  Yes.

  But will he have no sorrow, or shall we say that although he cannot help sorrowing, he will moderate his sorrow?

  The latter, he said, is the truer statement.

  Tell me: will he be more likely to struggle and hold out against his sorrow when he is seen by his equals, or when he is alone?

  It will make a great difference whether he is seen or not.

  When he is by himself he will not mind saying or doing many things which he would be ashamed of any one hearing or seeing him do?

  True.

  There is a principle of law and reason in him which bids him resist, as well as a feeling of his misfortune which is forcing him to indulge his sorrow?

  True.

  But when a man is drawn in two opposite directions, to and from the same object, this, as we affirm, necessarily implies two distinct principles in him?

  Certainly.

  One
of them is ready to follow the guidance of the law?

  How do you mean?

  The law would say that to be patient under suffering is best, and that we should not give way to impatience, as there is no knowing whether such things are good or evil; and nothing is gained by impatience; also, because no human thing is of serious importance, and grief stands in the way of that which at the moment is most required.

  What is most required? he asked.

  That we should take counsel about what has happened, and when the dice have been thrown order our affairs in the way which reason deems best; not, like children who have had a fall, keeping hold of the part struck and wasting time in setting up a howl, but always accustoming the soul forthwith to apply a remedy, raising up that which is sickly and fallen, banishir.g the cry of sorrow by the healing art.

  Yes, he said, that is the true way of meeting the attacks of fortune.

  Yes, I said; and the higher principle is ready to follow this suggestion of reason?

  Clearly.

  And the other principle, which inclines us to recollection of our troubles and to lamentation, and can never have enough of them, we may call irrational, useless, and cowardly?

  Indeed, we may.

  And does not the latter—I mean the rebellious principle—furnish a great variety of materials for imitation? Whereas the wise and calm temperament, being always nearly equable, is not easy to imitate or to appreciate when imitated, especially at a public festival when a promiscuous crowd is assembled in a theatre. For the feeling represented is one to which they are strangers.

  Certainly.

  Then the imitative poet who aims at being popular is not by nature made, nor is his art intended, to please or to affect the rational principle in the soul; but he will prefer the passionate and fitful temper, which is easily imitated?

  Clearly.

  And now we may fairly take him and place him by the side of the painter, for he is like him in two ways: first, inasmuch as his creations have an inferior degree of truth—in this, I say, he is like him; and he is also like him in being concerned with an inferior part of the soul; and therefore we shall be right in refusing to admit him into a well-ordered State, because he awakens and nourishes and strengthens the feelings and impairs the reason. As in a city when the evil are permitted to have authority and the good are put out of the way, so in the soul of man, as we maintain, the imitative poet implants an evil constitution, for he indulges the irrational nature which has no discernment of greater and less, but thinks the same thing at one time great and at another small—he is a manufacturer of images and is very far removed from the truth.150

  Exactly.

  But we have not yet brought forward the heaviest count in our accusation:—the power which poetry has of harming even the good (and there are very few who are not harmed), is surely an awful thing?

  Yes, certainly, if the effect is what you say.

  Hear and judge: The best of us, as I conceive, when we listen to a passage of Homer, or one of the tragedians, in which he represents some pitiful hero who is drawling out his sorrows in a long oration, or weeping, and smiting his breast—the best of us, you know, delight in giving way to sympathy, and are in raptures at the excellence of the poet who stirs our feelings most.

  Yes, of course I know.

  But when any sorrow of our own happens to us, then you may observe that we pride ourselves on the opposite quality—we would fain be quiet and patient; this is the manly part, and the other which delighted us in the recitation is now deemed to be the part of a woman.

  Very true, he said.

  Now can we be right in praising and admiring another who is doing that which any one of us would abominate and be ashamed of in his own person?

  No, he said, that is certainly not reasonable.

  Nay, I said, quite reasonable from one point of view.

  What point of view?

  If you consider, I said, that when in misfortune we feel a natural hunger and desire to relieve our sorrow by weeping and lamentation, and that this feeling which is kept under control in our own calamities is satisfied and delighted by the poets;—the better nature in each of us, not having been sufficiently trained by reason or habit, allows the sympathetic element to break loose because the sorrow is another’s; and the spectator fancies that there can be no disgrace to himself in praising and pitying any one who comes telling him what a good man he is, and making a fuss about his troubles; he thinks that the pleasure is a gain, and why should he be supercilious and lose this and the poem too? Few persons ever reflect, as I should imagine, that from the evil of other men something of evil is communicated to themselves. And so the feeling of sorrow which has gathered strength at the sight of the misfortunes of others is with difficulty repressed in our own.

  How very truel

  And does not the same hold also of the ridiculous? There are jests which you would be ashamed to make yourself, and yet on the comic stage, or indeed in private, when you hear them, you are greatly amused by them, and are not at all disgusted at their unseemliness; —the case of pity is repeated;—there is a principle in human nature which is disposed to raise a laugh, and this which you once restrained by reason, because you were afraid of being thought a buffoon, is now let out again; and having stimulated the risible faculty at the theatre, you are betrayed unconsciously to yourself into playing the comic poet at home.

  Quite true, he said.

  And the same may be said of lust and anger and all the other affections, of desire and pain and pleasure, which are held to be inseparable from every action—in all of them poetry feeds and waters the passions instead of drying them up; she lets them rule, although they ought to be controlled, if mankind are ever to increase in happiness and virtue.

  I cannot deny it.

  Therefore, Glaucon, I said, whenever you meet with any of the eulogists of Homer declaring that he has been the educator of Hellas, and that he is profitable for education and for the ordering of human things, and that you should take him up again and again and get to know him and regulate your whole life according to him, we may love and honour those who say these things —they are excellent people, as far as their lights extend; and we are ready to acknowledge that Homer is the greatest of poets and first of tragedy writers; but we must remain firm in our conviction that hymns to the gods and praises of famous men are the only poetry which ought to be admitted into our State. For if you go beyond this and allow the honeyed muse to enter, either in epic or lyric verse, not law and the reason of mankind, which by common consent have ever been deemed best, but pleasure and pain will be the rulers in our State.

  That is most true, he said.

  And now since we have reverted to the subject of poetry, let this our defence serve to show the reasonableness of our former judgment in sending away out of our State an art having the tendencies which we have described; for reason constrained us. But that she may not impute to us any harshness or want of politeness, let us tell her that there is an ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry; of which there are many proofs, such as the saying of “the yelping hound howling at her lord,” or of one “mighty in the vain talk of fools,” and “the mob of sages circumventing Zeus,” and the “subtle thinkers who are beggars after all”; and there are innumerable other signs of ancient enmity between them. Notwithstanding this, let us assure our sweet friend and the sister arts of imitation, that if she will only prove her title to exist in a well-ordered State we shall be delighted to receive her—we are very conscious of her charms; but we may not on that account betray the truth. I dare say, Glaucon, that you are as much charmed by her as I am, especially when she appears in Homer?

  Yes, indeed, I am greatly charmed.

  Shall I propose, then, that she be allowed to return from exile, but upon this condition only—that she make a defence of herself in lyrical or some other metre?

  Certainly.

  And we may further grant to those of her defenders who are lovers of poetry an
d yet not poets the permission to speak in prose on her behalf: let them show not only that she is pleasant but also useful to States and to human life, and we will listen in a kindly spirit; for if this can be proved we shall surely be the gainers—I mean, if there is a use in poetry as well as a delight?

  Certainly, he said, we shall be the gainers.

  If her defence fails, then, my dear friend, like other persons who are enamoured of something, but put a restraint upon themselves when they think their desires are opposed to their interests, so too must we after the manner of lovers give her up, though not without a struggle. We too are inspired by that love of poetry which the education of noble States has implanted in us, and therefore we would have her appear at her best and truest; but so long as she is unable to make good her defence, this argument of ours shall be a charm to us, which we will repeat to ourselves while we listen to her strains; that we may not fall away into the childish love of her which captivates the many. At all events we are well aware151 that poetry being such as we have described is not to be regarded seriously as attaining to the truth; and he who listens to her, fearing for the safety of the city which is within him, should be on his guard against her seductions and make our words his law.

  Yes, he said, I quite agree with you.

  Yes, I said, my dear Glaucon, for great is the issue at stake, greater than appears, whether a man is to be good or bad. And what will any one be profited if under the influence of honour or money or power, aye, or under the excitement of poetry, he neglect justice and virtue?

  Yes, he said; I have been convinced by the argument, as I believe that any one else would have been.

  And yet no mention has been made of the greatest prizes and rewards which await virtue.

  What, are there any greater still? If there are, they must be of an inconceivable greatness.

  Why, I said, what was ever great in a short time? The whole period of three score years and ten is surely but a little thing in comparison with eternity?