The Sword and the Shield

by Christopher Andrew

  118. Some of the Hess conspiracy theories were examined in the BBC2 documentary, Hess: An Edge of Conspiracy (presenter: Christopher Andrew; producer: Roy Davies), first broadcast January 17, 1990.

  119. Borovik, The Philby Files, pp. 216-18.

  120. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 334-7.

  121. Borovik, The Philby Files, p. 216.

  122. Borovik, The Philby Files, p. 217n.

  123. Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, p. 154. At a meeting with Christopher Andrew in August 1990, Cairncross admitted that he did supply intelligence from Bletchley Park to the NKGB before the battle of Kursk but declined to give details.

  124. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 314; Pincher, Too Secret Too Long, p. 396. 125. Borovik, The Philby Files, p. 218.

  126. vol. 7, ch. 2, para. 1.

  Chapter Eight

  Victory

  1. As late as 1990 Valentin Falin, head of the International Department of the Central Committee, which was largely responsible for determining foreign intelligence requirements, claimed that intelligence reports in 1943 showed that some in Washington as well as in London were considering “the possibility of terminating the coalition with the Soviet Union and reaching an accord with Nazi Germany, or with the Nazi Generals, on the question of waging a joint war against the Soviet Union”:

  Therefore when we talk about Stalin’s distrust with regard to Churchill, at a certain stage towards those surrounding Roosevelt, not so much towards Roosevelt himself, we should pay attention to the fact that he based this mistrust on a very precise knowledge of specific facts.

  The “facts” produced by the Center were, in all probability, mere conspiracy theories of the kind which, in greater or lesser degree, distorted Soviet intelligence assessment throughout, and even beyond, the Stalinist era. (Interview by Christopher Andrew with Valentin Falin in Moscow for BBC2, December 12, 1990.)

  2. On CPUSA operations against Trotskyists and heretics, see Klehr, Haynes and Firsov, The Secret World of American Communism; quotation from p. 89.

  3. vol. 6, ch. 12. On the FBI bugging of Nelson, see also Klehr, Haynes and Firsov, The Secret World of American Communism, pp. 216-17. The disappointingly discreet account of Nelson’s career, Steve Nelson, American Radical, by Nelson, Barrett and Ruck, makes a brief reference to his work on the secret Party control commission (p. 242).

  4. vol. 6, ch. 12. On Hopkins, see above, chapter 7.

  5. See above, chapter 7.

  6. Benson and Warner (eds.), VENONA, p. xviii, n. 30 and document 10. The authors suggest the author of the letter to Hoover “might have been” Mironov. One of the files noted by Mitrokhin makes Mironov’s authorship virtually certain. While imprisoned by the NKVD in 1945, Mironov tried to smuggle to the American embassy in Moscow information about the massacre of the Polish officer corps similar to that contained in the letter to Hoover in 1943 (vol. 5, section 11). A study of the letter by Ben Fischer, written without access to Mitrokhin’s notes on KGB files, seeks to make sense of Mironov’s bizarre claim that Zarubin and his wife were working for, respectively, Japanese and German intelligence, as a way “to grab FBI attention” and ensure that Hoover acted against them. But Mr. Fischer also acknowledges evidence that Mironov “may have been mentally disturbed” (Fischer, “‘Mr. Guver,’” pp. 10-11.). KGB files suggest both an obsessional hostility to Zarubin from Mironov and a determination that the West should learn the truth about the massacre of the Polish officer corps. In the letter to Hoover, Mironov claimed that his real name was Markov; Mitrokhin’s notes, however, refer to him as Mironov.

  7. Zarubin to Center, June 3, 1943: VENONA decrypts, 2nd release, pp. 157-8. Zarubin moved to Washington during June.

  8. Following the corrupt governorships of Huey and Earl Long, Sam Jones established a reputation for scrupulous honesty. On his term as governor, see Dawson, The Louisiana Governors, pp. 255-9.

  9. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. The US “military intelligence officer” may have had knowledge of the information on Zarubin’s involvement in the massacre of Polish officers contained in Mironov’s letter to Hoover.

  10. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.

  11. Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, pp. 196-7.

  12. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.

  13. Samolis (ed.) Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 53-5. This SVR hagiography predictably makes no mention of Zarubin’s various misadventures in the United States.

  14. vol. 5, sec. 11. Sudoplatov wrongly claims that Mironov was simply “hospitalized and discharged from the service” on the grounds of schizophrenia; Special Tasks, p. 197.

  15. VENONA decrypts, 4th release, part 4, pp. 115-16.

  16. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2; vol. 6, app. 2, part 7. Zarubin’s immediate successor as resident in New York in the summer of 1943, probably on a temporary basis, had been Pavel Klarin (codenamed LUKA); VENONA decrypts, 2nd release, pp. 180ff. On Abbiate’s previous career see above, chapter 4.

  17. VENONA decrypts, 3rd release, part 2, pp. 205-6.

  18. VENONA decrypts, 3rd release, part 3, p. 175. The telegram from the Center appointing Abbiate as resident refers to him by his codename SERGEI, identified in the NSA decrypt as Pravdin (Abbiate’s alias in the USA). Apresyan’s transfer to San Francisco was not necessarily a demotion in view of the forthcoming organizing conference of the United Nations, attended by NKGB agent Harry Dexter White and presided over by the GRU agent Alger Hiss.

  19. vol. 7, ch. 2, 1; app. 3, n. 21.

  20. Among the documents Philby passed to the NKGB were the German foreign ministry documents obtained by OSS in Switzerland and probably also supplied by NKGB agents in OSS. Philby, My Silent War, pp. 84-6; Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 141-2.

  21. Borovik, The Philby Files, pp. 232-3.

  22. Philby, My Silent War, ch. 6; Cecil, “The Cambridge Comintern.” On Krötenschield, see Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends, pp. 103-4, 124-5.

  23. Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends, p. 114. From 1944 to 1947 Modin was responsible for the files of the Five at the Center, before being posted to London to act as their controller.

  24. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 314.

  25. Pincher, Too Secret Too Long, p. 397.

  26. Cecil, A Divided Life, pp. 74-5.

  27. vol. 7, ch. 10, para. 9.

  28. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 309-12; Cecil, “The Cambridge Comintern.”

  29. vol. 7, ch. 10, app., para. 2.

  30. See above, chapter 7.

  31. There are a number of references to Fuchs’s codenames in the VENONA decrypts. Fuchs said later that he never knew which branch of Soviet intelligence he was working for. During his interrogation after his arrest in 1950 he claimed to have been previously unaware that more than one branch existed. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 323.

  32. vol. 6, ch. 6. The GRU did, however, keep control of its agents in the Anglo-Canadian atomic research center at Chalk River; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 325-6.

  33. Norwood ceased contact with SONYA (referred to in KGB files as FIR) in 1944. However, the first contact between Norwood and her new (unidentified) controller recorded in Mitrokhin’s notes took place in 1945. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 17.

  34. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 17.

  35. VENONA decrypts, 5th release, part 2, p. 249. Norwood’s codename at this period was TINA.

  36. West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, p. 234.

  37. VENONA decrypts, 1st release, pp. 8-9.

  38. FBI FOIA 65-58805, file 38, p. 7.

  39. VENONA decrypts, 1st release, pp. 8-9.

  40. FBI FOIA 65-58805, files 38, 40.

  41. VENONA decrypts, 1st release, pp. 25, 27.

  42. Gold’s evidence to the FBI on renewing contact with Fuchs is reprinted in Williams, Klaus Fuchs, Atom Spy, pp. 206-12.

  43. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 1.

  44. The agents in Rosenberg’s ring included the scientist William Perl (GNOME), who provided intelligence on jet engines, and the military electronics engineers Joel
Barr (METRE) and Alfred Sarant (HUGHES), both of whom were radar experts; VENONA decrypts, 1st release, pp. 12, 18-19, 47, 51. On the origins of the Rosenberg spyring, run initially — according to Semenov — “on the principles of a Communist Party group,” see Weinstein and Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood, pp. 177-9.

  45. VENONA decrypts, 1st release, pp. 15, 36, 45-6.

  46. Radosh and Milton, The Rosenberg File, ch. 3.

  47. VENONA decrypts, 1st release, pp. 44-5; 3rd release, pp. 255-6, 261-6. Hall explained his belief that his atomic espionage had been a way “to help the world” in the BBC Radio 4 documentary VENONA (presenter: Christopher Andrew; producers: Mark Berman and Helen Weinstein), first broadcast March 18, 1998.

  48. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.

  49. VENONA decrypts, 2nd release, p. 424.

  50. Bentley, Out of Bondage, pp. 160-1. The first VENONA decrypt in which Akhmerov reports intelligence from Bentley is dated December 11, 1943; VENONA decrypts, 2nd release, pp. 430-1.

  51. Bentley, Out of Bondage, pp. 163-5. Bentley’s story is, once again, largely corroborated by VENONA and other evidence. Cf. VENONA decrypts, 3rd release, part 1, pp. 26-8; and Klehr, Haynes and Firsov, The Secret World of American Communism, pp. 312-15.

  52. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. Doubtless through a slip of the pen, Mitrokhin also refers to Perlo in this note as PEL. VENONA and other sources make clear that PEL (also codenamed PAL and ROBERT) was Greg Silvermaster. The other members of Perlo (RAIDER)’s group, all described as Communists, were Charles Kramer, Edward Fitzgerald, Harry Magdoff, John Abt, Charles Flato and Harold Glasser.

  53. VENONA decrypts, 3rd release, part 1, pp. 26-8.

  54. Bentley, Out of Bondage, pp. 166-7. Once again, VENONA confirms the substance of Bentley’s version of events.

  55. VENONA decrypts, 3rd release, part 1, p. 272.

  56. Bentley, Out of Bondage, pp. 173-7.

  57. VENONA decrypts, 1st release, part 1, p. 14; 3rd release, part 2, pp. 139, 152, 196.

  58. Bentley, Out of Bondage, pp. 179-80.

  59. VENONA decrypts, 3rd release, part 2, pp. 17-18. In January 1945 White was appointed Assistant Secretary of the Treasury.

  60. Romerstein and Levchenko, The KGB against the “Main Enemy,” pp. 111-12. George Silverman, to whom (according to Bentley) Currie rushed to deliver his warning “sort of out of breath,” is identified by the VENONA decrypts as a Soviet agent (codenamed ELERON [AILERON]). Currie himself may well be the agent codenamed PAGE to whom there are a number of references in the decrypts. Though denying that he had ever been a Soviet spy, Currie later acknowledged that he been entertained at Gorsky’s home. Senior White House officials such as Currie were among the very small group privy to the highly classified information that OSS had obtained a charred NKGB codebook. There is no reference to Currie in Mitrokhin’s notes.

  61. The senior FBI agent who took part in the early analysis of the VENONA decrypts, Robert Lamphere, wrongly claims in his memoirs (The FBI-KGB War, pp. 87ff) that the NKGB codebook was later used to assist the process of decrypting. National Security Agency, Introductory History of VENONA and Guide to the Translations, p. 8.

  62. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 295.

  63. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 1. vol. 7, ch. 2, para. 22.

  64. vol. 6, ch. 6.

  65. Holloway, “Sources for Stalin and the Bomb,” p. 5.

  66. vol. 7, ch. 2, para. 19.

  67. Albright and Kunstel, Bombshell, pp. 121-7.

  68. Albright and Kunstel, Bombshell, ch. 15. The career of Morris and “Lona” Cohen is summarized in vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.

  69. Albright and Kunstel, Bombshell, pp. 138-9.

  70. NKGB report to Beria, July 10, 1945, first published in Kurier Sovietski Razvedke (1991); extract reprinted in Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, appendix 4, pp. 474-5 (Sudoplatov misidentifies MLAD as Pontecorvo).

  71. The story of Lona Cohen’s trip to Albuquerque is briefly told in the short biography of her in Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, p. 71. See also Albright and Kunstel, Bombshell, ch. 17.

  72. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. Unsurprisingly, this remarkable tale improved with the telling. In some recent Russian versions, Mrs. Cohen hid the documents in a box of Kleenex. The less elaborate account noted by Mitrokhin appears more reliable. He does not, however, identify the Los Alamos scientist who supplied the documents.

  73. vol. 6, app. 2, part 5. The first VENONA reference to Yatskov’s responsibility for ENORMOZ dates from January 23, 1945; VENONA decrypts, 1st release, p. 60.

  74. Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 169-71.

  75. VENONA decrypts, 3rd release, part 2, p. 268.

  76. Though Mitrokhin’s notes include references to most of the best-known, as well several hitherto-unknown, Soviet spies in the wartime United States, all refer to NKVD/NKGB agents. There is thus no reference to Hiss, who worked for Soviet military intelligence.

  77. VENONA decrypts, 3rd release, part 3, p. 207.

  78. k-27,appendix, para. 21.

  79. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 343-8.

  80. Kimball, Forged in War, p. 318.

  81. VENONA decrypts, 3rd release, part 3, p. 207. A footnote to this decrypt, added by NSA in 1969, identifies ALES as “probably Alger Hiss.” The corroborative evidence now available puts that identification beyond reasonable doubt. Of the four Americans (other than US embassy staff) who went on to Moscow after Yalta, only Hiss fits Gorsky’s description of ALES (Moynihan, Secrecy, pp. 146-8). Gordievsky recalls a lecture in the Centre in which Akhmerov referred to his wartime contact with Hiss. Hungarian intelligence files on the Noel Field case show that Field also identified Hiss as a Soviet agent. Whittaker Chambers, the ex-GRU agent who exposed Hiss, testified that, as indicated by Gorsky’s telegram, Hiss first began supplying intelligence to Moscow in 1935. Both Chambers and Bentley, like Gorsky, implicated some of Hiss’s family, as well as Hiss himself, in Soviet espionage. Further evidence pointing to Hiss came from the Soviet defector Igor Guzenko in 1945. Though the statute of limitations prevented Hiss’s prosecution for espionage in 1950, the evidence used to convict him of perjury in that year, for lying about providing government documents to a Communist spyring, remains compelling. See, inter alia: Breindel, “Hiss’s Guilt,” New Republic (April 15, 1996); Schmidt, “The Hiss Dossier,” New Republic (November 8, 1993); Weinstein, Perjury; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB. ALES, in the Cyrillic alphabet, looks like a contraction of “Alger Hiss”—one of a number of Soviet codenames at this period which contain clues to the identity of the agent concerned.

  82. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 347. On the basis of Akhmerov’s contact with Hiss (very unusual in the case of a GRU agent), Andrew and Gordievsky wrongly deduced that Hiss was by now an NKGB agent, in common with other leading American GRU agents of the late 1930s.

  83. vol. 5, sect. 4. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 350-1. In 1946 SMERSH was reorganized on a peacetime basis and returned to the control of the MGB, the post-war successor of the NKVD.

  84. Bethell, The Last Secret; Tolstoy, Victims of Yalta; Tolstoy, Stalin’s Secret War, ch. 17; Knight, “Harold Macmillan and the Cossacks”; Mitchell, The Cost of a Reputation, chs. 1, 3, 5. Tolstoy provides the most detailed and moving description of the forced repatriation of the Cossacks, but, as Knight demonstrates, exaggerates the personal responsibility of Harold Macmillan, minister-resident in Italy and political adviser to Supreme Allied Commander Field Marshal Alexander. Mitchell also concludes that Macmillan’s “responsibility for what ultimately occurred must be adjudged as small.” Tolstoy’s charge that Lord Aldington (formerly Brigadier Toby Low) had committed war crimes in connection with the repatriation led to the award to Lord Aldington in 1989 of 1.5 million pounds damages for libel.

  85. The fourth White general on Smersh’s “most wanted” list, Timofei Domanov, was a former Soviet citizen whose fate, unlike that of the other three, had been sealed at Yalta.

  86. vol. 5, sect. 4. A senior Britis
h officer reported, “All relations with Soviets most friendly with much interchange WHISKY and VODKA”; Knight, “Harold Macmillan and the Cossacks,” p. 239.

  87. vol. 5, sect. 4, paras. 2-4.

  88. For legal reasons, six words have been omitted from the first sentence of Mitrokhin’s note; they do not contain the name of the lieutenant-colonel. vol. 5, sect. 4, para. 5. The memoirs of the Deputy Chief of the Red Army, General Sergei Matveyevich Shtemenko, make no reference to bribery but confirm part of the sequence of events in the KGB files: “The Soviet government then made a firm representation to our allies over the matter of Krasnov, Shkuro, Sultan Ghirey, and other war criminals. The British stalled briefly; but since neither the old White guard generals nor their troops were worth much, they put all of them into trucks and delivered them into the hands of the Soviet authorities” (Tolstoy, Stalin’s Secret War, p. 298).

  89. Alexander instructed on May 22, 1945, “All who are Soviet citizens and who can be handed over to Russians without use of force should be returned by 8th Army. Any others should be evacuated to 12th Army Group.” It has been argued that 5 Corps, the section of the Eighth Army which handed over the Cossacks, subsequently concluded that it had none the less been given “freedom of action” to use force if necessary. Controversy continues. Mitchell, The Cost of a Reputation, pp. 49-54. Brigadier Low left for Britain on May 22 or 23, some days before the “repatriation” began. There is no suggestion that, if bribery occurred, he was in any way cognizant of it.

  90. Knight, “Harold Macmillan and the Cossacks,” pp. 248-52.

  91. Tolstoy, Victims of Yalta, pp. 182, 188, 193, 266-8. The execution of the generals was announced in a brief note in Pravda on January 17, 1947.

  Chapter Nine

  From War to Cold War

  1. vol. 8, ch. 2.

  2. The large literature on the Gouzenko case includes Bothwell and Granatstein (eds.), The Gouzenko Transcripts; Granatstein and Stafford, Spy Wars, ch. 3; Sawatsky, Gouzenko; Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds, ch. 21. Christopher Andrew interviewed Mrs. Gouzenko and her daughter (both of whom live under other names) in Canada in November 1992.