The Second Oswald

by Richard Popkin

  The bag and bullet No. 399 suggest that more was going on than the Commission recognized. There are many, many discrepancies in the evidence and in the Commission case. The critics have made much of these unanswered questions (and Weisberg’s book is probably the best collection of them so far, though they are often stridently overstated). All of this, however, usually builds up to a big “So what?” since the critics still have not been able to present a reasonably plausible counter-explanation of what could have happened. Why, for example, should Oswald have tried to implicate himself as the assassin? I shall try to suggest why in what follows.

  Seven

  The Second Oswald

  The twenty-six volumes contain numbers of strange episodes in which people report that they saw or dealt with Oswald under odd or suggestive circumstances: for example, that Oswald was seen at a rifle range hitting bull’s eyes, that he and two Latin types tried to get financing for illegal activities from Mrs. Sylvia Odio; that Oswald tried to cash a check for $189 in Hutchinson’s Grocery Store. These instances, and there are many of them, were dismissed by the Commission—though it continued to consider them up to the very end—principally on the grounds that they occurred when Oswald apparently was not there, or they involved activities Oswald reportedly did not engage in, such as driving a car.

  Of course it is not uncommon for false reports of identification to turn up during a much publicized criminal investigation. However, in many of the cases ultimately dismissed by the Warren Commission, after much investigation and consideration, the witnesses seem reliable, and have no discernible reason for telling falsehoods so far as one can judge; they seem to be, in the Commission’s overworked term, “credible.” For example, Bogard, a car salesman, reported that on November 9, 1963, a customer came in to his showroom, gave his name as Lee Oswald (and, of course, looked exactly like the late Lee Harvey Oswald), went driving with him, and told him that he (Oswald) would come into a lot of money in a couple of weeks. Not only did Bogard have the corroboration of his fellow employees and an employee’s wife, but he was also given a lie-detector test by the FBI. The FBI reported on February 24, 1964, that “the responses recorded were those normally expected of a person telling the truth” (XXVI: 577-78).

  When the Commission had just about concluded its work, somebody still worried about this, so on September 1, 1964, the FBI was queried as to what questions Bogard had been asked when he underwent the lie-detector test. On September 19, 1964, the FBI replied, giving the questions and Bogard’s answers. What they had asked amounted to an interrogation as to whether his story was true, whether Oswald had been his customer, and whether a photograph of Oswald portrayed his customer (XXVI:682). All one can say is that by normal standards of credibility, the FBI had established, both through finding corroborating witnesses and by its polygraph test, that Bogard was a credible witness.

  Nevertheless, the Commission had satisfied itself from other testimony that (a) Oswald didn’t drive, and (b) he spent November 9th in Irving, writing a strange letter to the Soviet Embassy. Cases such as the Bogard episode, varying in their degrees of confirmation and reliability, have attracted the attention of critics from the time of Leo Sauvage’s article in Commentary in the Spring of 1964. They stirred rumors in the press from late November, 1963, onward. If these cases could not have actually involved Oswald and yet seem actually to have happened, then what? The Commission chose finally to dismiss them since Oswald could not have been the person in question. Leo Sauvage suggested someone was trying to imitate Oswald, that there was a second Oswald. Critics have brought up the second Oswald as an insufficiently explored phenomenon that might throw light on the case.

  But why a duplicate Oswald? The Commission picture of Oswald is that of a pretty trivial individual of no significance until November 22, 1963. But the cases suggesting that duplication occurred begin at least as early as September 25, 1963, the day Oswald left for Mexico, when a second Oswald went into the office of the Selective Service Bureau in Austin, Texas, gave his name as Harvey Oswald, and wanted to discuss his dishonorable discharge. Yet Oswald at this time was riding a bus toward Mexico. (See Report, 731-33.)

  Some have suggested that the point might have been to frame Oswald, but only a few instances of this kind seem to have any relevance to such a goal. I would suggest that the cases of apparent duplication can be classified in two distinct groups, according to the times when they took place. Rather than dismiss them, I suggest that it is more plausible to interpret them as evidence that Oswald was involved in some kind of conspiracy which culminated in the events of November 22, when the duplication played a vital role both in the assassination and the planned denouement, and may have been the reason for Tippit’s death. Although the hypothesis of a second Oswald must necessarily be tentative and conjectural at this stage, I would suggest that it can resolve a large number of troubling problems concerning the assassination and provide a more plausible explanation of the case than that offered by the Commission.

  If we turn to the data in a search for clues as to when Oswald might have started to get involved in affairs that might form some meaningful pattern, we find that the record compiled by the Commission indicates that as far back as Oswald’s stay in New Orleans, some strange conspiratorial activities were going on. On the one hand, the correspondence of Marina Oswald and Ruth Paine indicates that Oswald was unhappy both because of his family life and his economic life, and wanted to return to Russia with his family.

  On the other hand, from late May onward. Oswald started his pro-Castro activities, corresponded actively with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New York, the Communist Party, and the Socialist Workers Party, usually giving them false or misleading information about his activities. He spent a good part of his meager funds printing leaflets, membership applications and cards, etc., and hiring people to distribute literature. But, very significantly I think, he made no effort to change his FPCC Organization from a fiction into a reality. It never had any members except Oswald and the clearly fictitious “Alec J. Hidell”!

  Mark Lane devotes Chapter 10 of Rush to Judgment to the problem of Hidell, and makes much of the fact that there was a Marine whom Oswald knew, John R. Heindel, who, in an affidavit, declared that “I was often referred to as ‘Hidell’”. Lane suggests that this is what Oswald may have called him and tries to show that the Commission did an inadequate job by purporting to demonstrate that Hidell was a fictitious person. However, the Hidell who plays a part in Oswald’s life definitely seems to have been fictitious. A Sgt. Robert Hidell was given as a reference by Oswald in New Orleans around May 16, 1963 (XXII: 145). A Dr. A. J. Hideel (sic) is listed on Oswald’s international vaccination form as having given Oswald a vaccination on June 8, 1963 (XVII:693). The name is printed with Oswald’s equipment, and the doctor’s address is P.O. Box 30016, New Orleans, whereas Oswald’s Post Office box was No. 30061. A. J. Hidell appears as a name on various identification cards that Oswald had in his possession when he was arrested, including a Selective Service card which had Oswald’s photo on it. The signature of A. J. Hidell on various documents is in Oswald’s inimitable handwriting, including the order blank for the Carcano (XVII:677-8 and 681-3). Exhibit 819, Oswald’s membership card in the New Orleans branch of the FPCC, is signed “A. J. Hidell” by Marina. All the checking by various investigative groups could turn up no Hidell who met the conditions of being a participant in Oswald’s life in Dallas and New Orleans, and the data certainly makes it look as if Oswald was inventing a series of Hidells with various functions. Lane is, of course, right in saying that Sgt. Heindel was never asked whether he had played any part in Oswald’s life. Heindel, incidentally, was from New Orleans. His affidavit, in fact, deals mainly with what a poor soldier Oswald was when he was stationed in Japan (VIII: 318).

  In any case, Oswald made no effort to look for local leftists or to seek sympathizers for the FPCC, for instance at Tulane University, where he might have found them. The one person who came to se
e him, Marina says, he treated as an anti-Castroite plant. To confuse matters, Oswald even put the address of the anti-Castroites on some of his literature. Oswald lied to the FPCC, the police, and the FBI about his organization, claiming it had thirty-five members, that it met at people’s homes, that he, Oswald, received telephone or postal instructions from Hidell.

  These deceptive activities culminated in August 1963, with Oswald’s visit to the anti-Castroites, Carlos Bringuier and friends, and his expression of interest in joining, and helping their para-military activities. In a few days he followed this with his distribution of FPCC literature near their headquarters, which caused a fight with them—they felt they had been betrayed by him. But according to the reports of the police and others, the fight was not a fight at all: Oswald simply put his arms down and told Bringuier (a former functionary under Batista) to hit him. Subsequently, Oswald pleaded guilty to disturbing the peace, when he was clearly innocent, and Bringuier pleaded innocent, when he had in fact struck the blow. In jail Oswald demanded to see the FBI, and tried to convince agent Quigley that he, Oswald, really was involved in pro-Castro activities. The arrest was followed by Oswald’s appearance on radio and TV defending Cuba against Bringuier and others. Oswald sent distorted reports and clippings of his achievements to the FPCC, and, in an undated memorandum to himself, outlined all of the data he now had to show that he actually was a pro-Castro activist (XVI: 341-43).

  This memorandum seems to have been designed for the Cuban Embassy in Mexico to convince them of his bona fides. But a problem remains—why, if Oswald was pro-Castro, and wanted to go to Cuba, didn’t he organize real FPCC activities instead of fake ones? Why did he lie about and distort his accomplishments to the FPCC, the Communist Party, and apparently the Cuban Embassy? It is interesting that Oswald lied to almost everybody, whether friend or foe. In Russia, even from the outset, he put false information about his family on forms, false information that differed from form to form about his mother being dead, having no siblings, etc. (XVIII:427, for example). The memorandum suggests he wanted to fool the Cubans, since his organization of materials is deliberately misleading. Oswald last wrote to the FPCC on August 17, 1963, telling of all that had happened, and indicating that a good many people were now interested (on August 1, 1963, he had revealed that there were no members of his branch); that he had received many telephone calls (Oswald had no phone); and that he wanted lots of literature, especially about travel restrictions to Cuba (XX:530). The FPCC didn’t hear from him again, but on September 1, 1963, both the Communist Party and the Socialist Workers Party heard from him that he was planning to move to Washington, Baltimore, or Philadelphia, and wanted to contact them there. But Oswald didn’t write them again until November 1, 1963. As far as we can tell he wrote to no one until then.

  Marina says Oswald had decided to go to Cuba via Mexico in August. The letters announcing his plans to move East may have been to mislead the FBI, if Oswald knew they were reading his mail, and his insistence on an interview with Quigley may have been to make sure that they were aware of his existence. Was Oswald really trying to get to Cuba and Russia through Mexico? The evidence suggests that he was not. He had earlier applied for a visa to go to Russia, and he had his new passport. On July 1, 1963, Oswald had asked the Russians to rush Marina’s visa, but to treat his separately. He didn’t write them again, as far as we know, until the letter of November 9th, though Marina had written on July 8th pressing her case. In August, the Russian Embassy had informed the Oswalds that the material had been sent to Moscow for processing, and Oswald made no effort to speed up the matter.

  On September 22, 1963, he told Mrs. Paine’s friend, Mrs. Kloepfer, that it usually takes six months to go to Russia (XXIII: 725). Then he apparently went to Mexico City a couple of days later, on September 25th, on a fifteen-day visa (not the six-month one that he might easily have obtained), visited the Cuban Embassy and asked for a transit visa to go to Russia via Cuba. By linking his trip to Cuba with a Russian voyage, he led the Cubans to call the Russian Embassy, who said the case would take months to handle. Oswald then became furious with the Cubans, not the Russians, and, according to Sylvia Duran of the Cuban Embassy, he claimed he was entitled to a visa because of his background, partisanship, and activities (XXV: 636). Any investigation of these probably would have led to his being turned down.

  He said he needed a visa right away because his Mexican one was running out and he had to get to Russia immediately. He obviously could have gotten to Russia faster by traveling from New Orleans to Europe. The Russian Embassy apparently was not helpful and indicated it would take four months before anything was done. Though the Report (p. 735, note 1170, based on confidential information) says that Oswald came back to both the Cuban and Russian Embassies, there is no evidence that he really pressed his case. Señora Duran had given him her phone number, yet he doesn’t seem to have used it. He doesn’t seem to have known of or cared about the final disposition of his case by the Cubans a few weeks later. By linking his application for a Cuban visa to a Russian one, Oswald seems to have precluded any rapid action. If the Report is correct that Oswald had only $200 when he left New Orleans, he couldn’t have gotten to Russia anyway. Oswald’s dealings with Russian bureaucracy surely taught him, as his notes on Russia indicate, that quick action was most unlikely.

  The abortive trip to Mexico seems to have involved a good many mysterious and as yet unexplained elements. The same could be said about Oswald’s political activities in New Orleans during that summer. In both cases, however, there are signs of a similar sort of pattern. Oswald seems to have contrived to give people the impression that he was engaged in pro-Castro activities, and that he intended to travel to Cuba and Russia. His actual behavior was, however, in contradiction to these apparent aims in various respects; and his behavior in Mexico seems almost to have been designed to make sure that he could not succeed in his avowed aim of going to Cuba and Russia. Much remains to be clarified about Oswald’s activities in New Orleans and Mexico, but from what we already know, these activities strongly suggest some sort of conspiratorial involvement.

  Eight

  The Two Oswalds in Texas

  At the very same time that Oswald was in Mexico, a series of unusual events was occurring in Texas. On September 25, the visit of “Harvey Oswald” to the Selective Service in Austin (for 30 minutes) took place. The Report (p. 732) dismisses it because Oswald wasn’t in Austin. Mrs. Lee Dannelly, the Assistant Chief of the Administrative Division, interviewed this purported Oswald, and on November 24, 1963, before she knew that it couldn’t have been Lee Harvey Oswald, told her boss in great detail what had taken place in this meeting.

  She described how Oswald had told her that he was registered in Florida, and was living in Fort Worth, how he was having difficulties in employment because of his discharge from the Marines, etc. Mrs. Dannelly, like most of the others who saw the second Oswald, definitely identified Oswald as the person she had dealt with from his photograph (XXIV: 729-34).

  A Texas newspaper editor, Ronnie Dugger, said that Mrs. Dannelly is reliable (XXIV:736). Her account is also somewhat confirmed by reports that Oswald was seen that day in a car in Austin by a printer and a waitress (XXIV:734. 73(5. 740, and 743). On the evening of September 25, a Mrs. Twiford of Houston received a phone call from Oswald between 7 and 9 P.M. Oswald could not have been in Houston then, according to all known means of surface transportation that were then available to him (he doesn’t seem to have traveled by air either), yet it appeared to be a local call. Oswald claimed he wanted to see Mr. Twiford, the Socialist Labor Party leader for Texas, before flying to Mexico (XXIV:726 and XXV:4-5). This may have been Oswald, calling long distance, though why, if he was planning to defect to Cuba, he should care to see Twiford is a mystery. Could it have been the second Oswald creating mystifying data about Oswald’s whereabouts?

  On September 26, the striking incident involving Mrs. Sylvia Odio is supposed to have occurred. Mrs. Odio, a Cuban
refugee leader in Dallas, reported to the Commission that she and her sister were visited by two Latins and one “Leon Oswald,” who claimed they had come from New Orleans, were about to leave on a trip, and wanted backing for some violent activities. Then, and in a phone call the next day, Mrs. Odio was told more about Leon Oswald by one of the Latins called Leopoldo: The next day Leopoldo called me... then he said, “What do you think of the American?” And I said, “I don’t think anything.”

  And he said, “You know our idea is to introduce him to the underground in Cuba, because he is great, he is kind of nuts … He told us we don’t have any guts, you Cubans, because President Kennedy should have been assassinated after the Bay of Pigs, and some Cubans should have done that … And he said, “It is so easy to do it.” He has told us (XI: 372).

  She was also told that Oswald had been in the Marine Corps and was an excellent shot. When Mrs. Odio heard of the assassination, she was sure these men were involved. When she saw Oswald’s picture, she knew! (XI:367-89). When Mrs. Odio testified, attorney Liebeler asked her, “Well, do you have any doubts in your mind after looking at these pictures that the man in your apartment was the same man as Lee Harvey Oswald?” to which she immediately replied, “I don’t have any doubts.” (See Appendix III). The Commission made sporadic attempts to discount Mrs. Odio’s story, though she had the corroboration of her sister who was present when the three gentlemen called upon Mrs. Odio, but they kept finding that Mrs. Odio was a quite reliable person, sure of what she had reported. Finally, Manuel Ray, the leftist anti-Castro leader, gave her a testimonial and said she would not have made up the story nor have had delusions; Cisneros, the former leader of JURE, said she was reliable (XXVI:838-39). The only conflicting evidence was that of a Mrs. Connell, who said Mrs. Odio had told her she had previously known Oswald and that he had spoken to anti-Castro groups, which if true would indicate that Oswald had been more involved with anti-Castro elements in the Dallas area than Mrs. Odio admitted.