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The Lost Ranger: A Soldier's Story

Page 23

by Mehlo, Noel


  The main encampment at the USATC for troops was located where the Saunton Park Housing estate is currently located (Figure 172). The original encampment relied on tents, to later be replaced by more permanent structures due to the Devonshire weather. There were also smaller encampments at Croyde, where there is now a holiday village, and another known one at Lincombe. It is unknown which of these camps the Rangers stayed at during either the advanced party or the main body’s stay. General Raaen recalled the unit being billeted in or near Barnstaple with some men in Quonset huts. Mr. Bass indicated to me that if the men were billeted in Quaonset Huts, they must have been at Braunton Camp based on his research. The USATC headquarters was in Woolacombe at the Woolacombe Bay Hotel.9

  Figure 172: U.S. Assault Training Center, Woolacombe troop encampment at Saunton Park. (RAF photo public domain) The USATC had lesson plans, directives, orders and other such similar direction regarding the implementation of its training regimen. The Rangers would have been provided these and been briefed on them in preparation for their exercises. Tactics and principles of assaulting a heavily defended enemy coastline had been proposed, discussed and refined at the month-long conference in London during May 1943. This concept had been translated into separate lesson plans for each element of the Infantry Assault Team. While the individual lessons may have been modified with experience, all maintained their adherence to the basic principle of "engineer-like" infantry dealing with enemy defenses.5 An example of one such exercise for a company in assault of a fortified beach follows.

  Using Baggy Point fortified with pillboxes and manned open emplacements as the objective, the assault forces were ordered to take the area identified as “Red Beach”. The training area was indicated on a sketched map of the area, and was approximately 1200 yards long. The “German” forces were assumed to be a reinforced platoon, and the situation called for enemy reserves having been immobilized by preparatory bombardment and paratroopers.

  The scenario established that the allied battalion was ordered to make a daylight landing on Red Beach, assault and overcome the beach defenses and push inland to capture the battalion objective. Two companies from the battalion made up the assault wave, reinforced by eight M4 Sherman tanks. The immediate company objective was to assault the beach defenses head-on and seize the beach exit. The unit would then cover the support company landing. Chemical mortars were to be used to provide smoke cover. The problem was set to end when the unit secured these objectives and moved off the beach. It was a live fire exercise.

  The USATC had mock-ups of landing craft to use to make the assaults from. The umpire indicated to the men that the ramp was down signaling that they begin their assault. On the second run, the Rangers came out guns blazing. They used all of their weapons including their rifles, Thompson sub-machine guns, BARs, machine guns, and fired two rounds from their mortars at each pillbox. The men employed their Bangalore torpedoes to blow gaps in the barbed wire obstacles. Next, Rooney, the flamethrower man rushed the pillbox hosing it with a two second blast across the outside face followed by a four second blast in the aperture of it. The Rangers had switched out a halfpound Nitro-Starch training charge with a two-pound pole charge and thrust it into the opening resulting in quite the explosion. To round out the assault, the Rangers assaulted the surrounding trench network with concussion grenades, guns and bayonets.

  Hathaway reported that their umpire Major Bach jumped up and down on a sand dune, clapping his hands and yelled at them, “You can't do that. You can't do that!" To which the platoon leader yelled back, "We're doing it, aren't we?" During their after action review, they had a spirited debate with their umpire as to the safety rules in place at the USATC, and were told that they had violated all of them. He was convinced by the Rangers that there wouldn’t be safety rules in place where they were going. The next day, the USATC issued the Rangers green brassards for their left arms to indicate that they were exempted from the standard rules applied to other units training at the center.

  The Rangers also made acquaintance with a battalion of the 29th Infantry Division, 116th Infantry Regiment, who would later join them at Omaha. Hathaway reported that due to the lack of typical spit and polish in the Ranger units, a certain lieutenant colonel from the 29th Infantry Division, 116th Infantry Regiment paid a visit to the Rangers billeting area. The 29th Infantry Division had a reputation for being pretty spit and polish during the war, particularly before D-Day, while the Rangers were a bit more relaxed in that regard concerning things like campsite appearance. After making some demands of the Rangers regarding the state of their cleanliness and leaving their quarters under threat of a return inspection, the men began laying plans to bobby-trap their hut. The officer had been eavesdropping and heard these plans and that ended any “inspections” of the unit from outsiders. The Rangers did have an additional run-in with this same lieutenant colonel while marching due to one of the Ranger lieutenants smoking during the march. The Rangers didn’t seem worse for wear over these run-ins.

  As part of the final exam of the small advanced force of Rangers to train at the USATC, the men were given an exercise at Training Area F – Baggy Point. This small area is on a small peninsula at “Croyde Point” on the southern end of Morte Bay and three miles south of the village of Woolacombe. Croyde Point also referred to as Baggy Point or Craggy Point and sits atop one hundred foot cliffs not too unlike the Normandy coastline. The cliffs were considered unassailable as they consisted of unstable shale sheer faces. The Rangers were given the task of assaulting the machine gun emplacement that protected a pillbox, which was in turn part of a defensive position atop the point. The pillbox was protected by the machine gun position such that it needed to be neutralized before assaulting the pillbox. The pillbox overlooked the practice assault beaches and faced the not too distant Woolacombe. There was a schoolhouse in Woolacombe where several high ranking staff officers were conducting a briefing at the time of the exercise.

  The Ranger force decided to assault the obstacle from the seaward side up the cliffs. They opted to use rifles, Thompson sub-machine guns, BARs, flamethrowers, 24 pound pole and 48 pound satchel charges. They travelled light, not carrying any unnecessary weight. The Rangers reported that the side of the cliff they decided to climb consisting of granite and shale, and an easy climb. The unrelenting climbing and cliff training is evidenced by the confidence of this small group of men from both the 5th and 2nd Ranger Infantry Battalions. The plan was to climb laterally up and along the cliff, just under the crest in order to avoid detection. They used their bayonets and fighting knives to climb. The Rangers also expected the defending force not to expect a seaward assault as most previous units had made the assault from the landward side.

  The men moved into position, with teams ready to assault both the machine gun and pillbox. The men began the attack. The machine gun was neutralized, and the flamethrower trooper let the pillbox have it followed up with the demolitions team placing the explosive charges. “Fire in the hole” was called with the Rangers retreating to a safe distance. The blast was such that part of the aperture and cliff face blew up and out into Morte bay. The men reported a “hell of a roar.” The ground shook and windows as far away as Woolacombe rattled or shattered from the blast, including windows at the aforementioned schoolhouse full of officers. I can only imagine the conversations surrounding that event in that schoolhouse. The umpires didn’t know of the Ranger plans, and were surprised at the ferocity of the attack.7

  Richard Bass discovered that the Rangers were not the first unit to realize the importance of a seaborne assault on Baggy Point. In the USATC Journal for October 22, 1943, a small “raider” section came to the center for specialized training in raider tactics and techniques. They trained in handling rubber boats, particularly in surf, cliff scaling, forced marches, hand-to-hand combat and night operations. It is unknown what unit this was. The entry reads:

  “The practice of landing small groups by rubber boats in odd places has been sufficie
ntly successful, to lead, to the attempt to make a much more important factor of it. It is referred to as “Infiltration Landings”. In several of the early trials he (Captain Melody) made successful landings on the rocks of Baggy Point. About the first of September 1943, a “raider” section of one officer and 29 men was set up for specialized training in raider tactics and techniques. The mission was to land on rocky shores, inaccessible to ordinary craft and establish a small bridgehead. The experiment was so successful that an infantry company is now being trained in these tactics. The ultimate aim is to make this nucleus of a larger group which will land on an unfavorable - hence weakly defended coast, and establish a strong bridgehead which will neutralize enemy coast artillery fire on the assault troops on the beaches. Note that the concept has departed from that of raiding in its usual sense. These forces, to be known as infiltration troops, are not to be hit and run - but to hold on to what they seize till the main force can take over. In this point they resemble airborne units and are in fact, intended to be used in conjunction with them. They carry enough supplies for 48 to 72 hours - counting on resupply over the beaches or by air as the situation permits”.

  The remainder of the 5th Ranger Infantry Battalion arrived at the USATC on April 3. It was upon arrival at Braunton that Major Schneider physically took command of the unit. It was at this time during the change of station that the 5th Ranger Infantry Battalion changed attachment from the VIII Corps to the V Corps. The remainder of the 2nd Ranger Infantry Battalion also arrived at the USATC on this date. The training commenced for both battalions. In some instances, the training was conducted jointly, while at other times, each battalion operated on its own. In researching the USATC, accounts of both battalions will be discussed as they are all pertinent to the overall importance of the training received here in relationship to June 6, 1944.

  Hathaway recalled the training for the entire battalion being almost identical to that of the advance Ranger force in March. The commands of the USATC and Rangers eliminated the exercise on Croyde Baggy Point. I wonder if the broken windows had anything to do with that decision. Hathaway stated “Many of the techniques practiced here were used during the invasion of Normandy, France.” He indicated that the Rangers trained in conducting assaults of strong points, understanding of mines and street fighting.

  The biography of JR Copeland states: “At the US Assault Training Center, the Rangers participated in assault training. They practiced advanced assault landing movements, land mine detection, demolitions training, and street fighting.” {Graves} Mr. Bass indicated to me that no specific area at the USATC was devoted to street fighting. The Rangers must have done this based on their previous experience in these techniques first learned stateside.

  Colonel Robert Black offered the following concerning the USATC: “The two Ranger Battalions met at Bruanton, North Devonshire, England. They trained in amphibious landings, making their way over beaches and attacking fortifications using live ammunition demolitions and flamethrowers.”10

  Henry Glassman wrote of their time at the USATC. “At Braunton, the Rangers took the Assault Course, under the direction of the Assault Training Center. Training included fire and movement assaults on strongpoints and hedge hogs, combined Naval Operation landings, study of mines and demolitions and street fighting.”11

  The B Company Morning report notes: S/Sgt Hull, 17 April 44 returned to duty assigned and joined from Headquarters, 10th Replacement Depot. He rejoined his unit as a Squad Leader in the 2nd Platoon. PFC Morris M Prince, 2nd Ranger Infantry Battalion wrote an unpublished manuscript called “Co A, 2nd Ranger BN, Overseas, Then Over the Top” in 1948. It is located at The Command and General Staff College Library. Concerning the training at the USATC, he wrote: “Our training was continually stressed and emphasized along these lines. We were especially proficient to work in small bands of squads and sections. To work independently from other units, using our own initiative, hitting hard and striking fast”. He wrote that the Rangers were experts in every weapon and explosive available to an infantry division. This included small arms and automatic weapons. He wrote that “we knew how, where and when to use this equipment.”

  PFC Prince spoke of the combined training with the Royal Navy. He indicated the mutual respect that grew between the two groups as they trained on the coast of England for D-Day. This sentiment creeps up in many veterans accounts of this relationship. He stated that the Americans left a positive impression on the British in how they handled their assignments, regardless of the assignment.

  PFC Prince wrote: “Of all the training, maneuvers, and operations we Rangers have undergone about the most interesting and radical we have ever encountered was done at the Armies assault training school.” He indicated that it was there that the Rangers learned the most up to date techniques of assaulting a static defensive position. This included both how to plan and execute such operations. They trained further in bazookas, flamethrowers, Bangalore torpedoes, beehive charges, rifle grenades and other weapons. They mastered the use of demolitions as they assaulted pillboxes and other strongpoints. He wrote that “the work was most instructive and educational, not to mention exciting and interesting. The school thoroughly felt that when a soldier had completed the course at this school that he was more prepared for actual combat than at any other time of his Army career.” The Rangers built a cockiness and confidence in having completed what he referred to as the “grind there.”

  He described the Ranger Quonset or Nissen huts as “dirigible-shaped affairs.” He indicated that the 2nd Ranger Infantry Battalion was billeted on the Army grounds, on the outskirts of Braunton. The Rangers felt strange to be among the other Army units at the USATC, as they had not been stationed with Army units in this setting for some time. He described the Quonset huts as being cold as the two potbelly stoves per structure were unable to heat the structures very well. The Rangers soon took to visiting the cities of Illfracombe and Barnstaple to visit local establishments for food and beverage, and to meet the young ladies of the area. The men would receive passes in the evenings to do participate in these extra-curricular activities.

  “It didn't take us long to buckle down and to get our teeth into things,” described PFC Prince. The training was next described in his account. The first few days consisted of fundamentals and basic principles. Next were classroom courses that began to teach the concepts of the USATC with their squad level tactics. He described them as categories of “demolition and explosive group; mine and booby-trap class; barbed wire obstacles; and a weapons group that combined the bazooka, flame thrower, anti-tank grenades and individual arms into one class.” He described that each of the classes was taught and coached by experts in each of the subjects. The Rangers thought that these qualified instructors taught more to the men than had been done in all of the previous training combined.

  The Rangers that were trained in barbed wire and beach obstacle breaching were taught every known way to blow and cross the obstacle. The men who learned demolitions went further than they had before and were taught even the explosive formulations of the materials they worked with in addition to the business of using the explosives. The Rangers at the mine and booby-trap classes were taught the most up to date methods of how to lay, blow, and neutralize a minefield. The new technology of mine detection was taught and methods for probing for mines and booby traps were taught. The men in the various weapons squads were further honed to perfection in terms of the use and tactics involved with their assigned weapons systems. Per PFC Prince, “they learned how to use their weapons and when to use them. They got to know the functioning of their arms and they were made experts on the firing of all guns.” The already fit Rangers were brought to the peak of physical fitness through road marches, speed marches and climbing.12

  On the tactical side of things, the Rangers of both battalions were reorganized in the manner prescribed by the USATC, and after the initial classroom work, they began to run tactical field problems completely independently of e
ach other, while working toward the common goal. This was not difficult for the strong-willed, well-trained Rangers. They used all of the training had to date to easily run squad, platoon and company level problems. PFC Prince reported the men often sang while they worked. I found this to be interesting.

  The Rangers performed the dry runs and wet run problems as did many other units who trained at the USATC. These men had their training modified for their needs and the upcoming requirements of D-Day. The purpose of the dry run is to perfect the technique of the assault section in coordinating the phases of the assault subteam in the attack. The problem will vary with each assault range used; the section leader prior to his assault must assemble his section; explain the plan of action; and check the execution. The attack should be made in accordance with the technique uttered in the training notes published by USATC For a wet run, PFC Price described a typical exercise at Baggy Point in Training Area F. He wrote that a defensive position would be set on Baggy Point, including simulated pillboxes controlling all of the approaches to the point. He described the use of dummy targets places around the mock up to portray machine gun emplacements which were then surrounded by barbed wire. The Rangers objective was to take and hold this position while at the same time reorganize and either hold or prepare to move to a new objective. They were to prepare to hold in the event of an enemy counter attack. The 2nd and 5th Rangers reportedly shared in some of the training elements over the three weeks there.

  PFC Prince went on to describe in exacting detail the tasks of the Assault Section as described earlier in this chapter. The plan of attack was well rehearsed. 1. The wire cutting team (barbed wire breaching) led off,

 

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