The Lost Ranger: A Soldier's Story

by Mehlo, Noel

  General Kraiss of the 352nd Division was beginning to realize the futility of his position by June 8 in the face of the successful Allied landings. Well half of his Division was east engaged in bitter struggle against the British forces near Bayeux, France. Many of his remaining forces were nearly decimated by the Americans as they fought their way off of Omaha Beach. His command informed him that substantial reinforcements would not become available for 48 hours. As a result, and with knowledge gained from captured Allied plans discovered on D-Day, he knew that his time was running out. The Americans had more divisions on the field than the Germans and were landing more troops daily. Kraiss wanted to avoid a total rout by the Americans. He ordered his remaining uncommitted troops south of the Aure River to mount a defense, using the flooded Aure valley in his defensive strategy.4

  The village of Grandcamp was an exception to his tactical retreat. The Germans positioned there did not head south. Grandcamp was a small fishing village with modest port facilities located about two miles west of Point du Hoc. The coastal area was incorporated into the Atlantik Wall. From east to west were WN78 at the eastern edge of town, WN79 on the western edge, WN80 just to the south of WN79, and WN82 at the point the coast turns southwest toward the Vire River mouth. More importantly, the Maisy Battery, consisting of WN83, WN 84, WN85 and WN89 in support was located southwest of Grandcamp near and southwest of the town of Maisy. This battery had many artillery pieces capable of adequately defending this region of the Normandy coast. Some of the 155mm guns had a range to at least the area around Saint-Pierre-du-Mont.1 The German strategy of interlocking fields of fire dictated the positioning of this battery, and that of other positions and mobile units in the region. Each position had a definitive purpose. The Germans were ready for a fight at Grandcamp and the surrounding area.

  As an aside, the Maisy Battery was at least as an important artillery position as Point du Hoc in terms of German defensive strategy of the coastline. There is much buzz about the former as it has recently been unearthed and is being carefully restored by Mr. Gary Sterne. It is not the intent of my book to debate the importance of Point du Hoc versus Maisy Battery. The Rangers were involved in knocking out the guns at both locations. The historical facts of this statement, including unit records and photographic evidence are clear that there were heavy artillery at both positions. It is also clear that the Provisional Ranger Group destroyed them both.

  The defenses at Grandcamp included a stream valley known as Le Véret. This small ten foot wide creek under normal conditions has a sluice gate at its mouth with the Normandy coast that keeps the seawater out. The Germans flooded the valley by manipulating the sluice gate. This gate is often referred to when describing the Ranger actions on June 8. It is located at Pont du Hable, Cricqueville-en-Bessin, Lower Normandy, France using today’s mapping. The result was a well flooded obstacle with but a single stream crossing at a bridge on the Coastal Highway (D 514) leading from Point d Hoc to Grandcamp. The bridge was and is about 600 yards east of Grandcamp. The Germans had located WN 78 along the high ground west of the stream with defenses in depth. These defenses included extensive minefields, machine gun positions, mortar positions and light artillery positions. Balkoski described that the Germans had “sited every weapon at their disposal on the eastern edge of town to cover it.”4 The Germans also had positions on the eastern valley, but as the Americans approached from their rear (east) they abandoned the defensive works in favor of the more advantageous western valley slopes and ridge.

  Companies B & E were given the mission of moving west to take and hold the high ground overlooking the Sluice Gate Bridge at Grandcamp. The companies moved in column formation with B Company in the lead. They advanced down the slope along the road leading to the bridge. The After Action Report (AAR) has them arriving at the vicinity of the bridge near 1000 hours, which coincidentally conflicts with the Company Morning Report. The leading elements of the companies approached within 25 yards of the bridge itself when the Germans unleashed machine gun and heavy concentrated mortar fire on the Rangers, pinning them down. Both companies withdrew to the high ground overlooking the valley east of the Sluice Gate Bridge. After taking up defensive positions, they were joined by D Company, arrived from Point du Hoc. They radioed for fire support (AAR). The Ranger companies lacked heavy weapons to deal with the fire pouring on them. In their 1000 hour radio traffic to VOCG 29 B Company reported heavy resistance 1 kilometer south of Grandcamp. The VOCG 29th responded to hold their present position until relieved by the 116th Infantry Regiment. They were formally relieved at 1730 hours, although the 116th reached their position and fought past them by 1600 hours. Figure 274 illustrates the area discussed above.

  Figure 274: Allied map showing German defenses at Grandcamp. Note flooded area to east (right) of map. Where this area joins the coast is the “Sluicegate” where B Company took positions and fought. (NARA) Their call for assistance was answered by the British cruiser HMS Glasgow and the 3rd Battalion of the 116th Infantry Regiment with support from several C Company tanks of the 743rd Tank Battalion. The Glasgow rained fire on the Germans for the better part of an hour beginning her barrage at 1455 hours. She fired 113 rounds on the German positions.5 The HMS Glasgow was the seventh vessel to carry the name. She was built on the Clyde River. She was a Southampton-class light cruiser, and displaced 11,930 tons with a top speed of 32 knots (59 km/h). During Operation Neptune, she was assigned to Gunfire Bombardment Support Force C for Omaha Beach with the U.S. battleships USS Texas and USS Arkansas, the French cruisers Montcalm and Georges Leygues, nine US destroyers battleships USS Texas and USS Arkansas, the French cruisers Montcalm and Georges Leygues, nine US destroyers inch Mk XVI guns and plenty of 40-mm antiaircraft guns and other light armament.6 She is shown in Figure 275.

  Figure 275: HMS Glasgow (Imperial War Museum, public domain) After Glasgow worked them over, the Sherman tanks rumbled across the bridge shortly after 1600 hours. The Germans had to be kicking themselves for not blowing up this bridge. It was a small bridge, but represented the only viable crossing leading into Grandcamp. After crossing the bridge, one of the Sherman tanks was knocked out by a mine. Immediately following the tanks, Companies K and L of the 116th rushed across the bridge and began their assault on the Germans.4 Company K worked the north side of the road, while Company L formed abreast of them and worked the west bank areas south of the road. The U.S. Infantry assault incorporated marching fire from their numerous BARs and silenced the German machine guns as they advanced.

  The northern defenses were stubborn, and required close-in fighting. This fighting led to one of the acts that resulted in one of the eleven Congressional Medals of Honor awarded to U.S. forces during the invasion according to the U.S. Army Center of Military History. T/Sgt Frank D. Peregory of Virginia was a member of the 29th Infantry Division, 116th Infantry Regiment, K Company. When his unit approached the western slopes, the German machine gun fire inflicted many casualties and damage. The 29ers called in artillery strikes and tank fire with no effective results. T/Sgt Peregory advanced up the hill under fire. After he worked to the crest, he discovered a German trench system. Without hesitation he entered the trench and traversed the 200 yards to the main enemy fortifications. He encountered a squad of enemy riflemen and attacked them with hand grenades and his bayonet. He killed 8 and captured 3. After this, he continued to move along the trench forcing the surrender of an additional 32 Germans including their machine gun crew. His daring action opened the way for the remainder of the battalion to advance and secure their objective.7 He was a World War II Sergeant York. His Medal of Honor citation reads:

  On 8 June 1944, the 3d Battalion of the 116th Infantry was advancing on the strongly held German defenses at Grandcamp-Maisy, France, when the leading elements were suddenly halted by decimating machine gun fire from a firmly entrenched enemy force on the high ground overlooking the town. After numerous attempts to neutralize the enemy position by supporting artillery and tank fire had proved ineffect
ive, T/Sgt. Peregory, on his own initiative, advanced up the hill under withering fire, and worked his way to the crest where he discovered an entrenchment leading to the main enemy fortifications 200 yards away. Without hesitating, he leaped into the trench and moved toward the emplacement. Encountering a squad of enemy riflemen, he fearlessly attacked them with hand grenades and bayonet, killed 8 and forced 3 to surrender. Continuing along the trench, he single-handedly forced the surrender of 32 more riflemen, captured the machine gunners, and opened the way for the leading elements of the battalion to advance and secure its objective. The extraordinary gallantry and aggressiveness displayed by T/Sgt. Peregory are exemplary of the highest tradition of the armed forces.

  The assault by Companies K and L resulted in fierce close-quarters combat that was reported to be tougher than that encountered on D-Day. The German MG-42 bursts were answered in kind by American BAR bursts. There was a reported symphony of M-1, mortar, and other small arms fire. The 75mm guns of the Sherman tanks seemed to drown out the other sounds when they fired. When the men closed on each other, the blasts from hand grenades and screams and shouts of men completed the sounds of battle. Mapping of this action is in Figure 276.

  Figure 276: U.S. Army mapping showing June 8 action at Grandcamp, west of Omaha Beach (USACMH)5 While this occurred, D and E Company from the 5th Rangers took defensive positions around the Sluice Gate Bridge to protect the position from any counterattack at 1930 hours. They sent out patrols back east to Point du Hoc to clear out any missed Germans along the coast.

  Meanwhile, Company I of the 116th passed through the other two companies and into Grandcamp under the command of 2nd Lieutenant Norvin Nathan. He led his men to the western edge of town, clearing out stubborn snipers and other emplacements. “Organized resistance was over by dark. In the action, which some soldiers of the 5th Rangers and 3rd Battalion, 116th, described as more severe than their D-Day fighting, the Germans had lost one of their strongest coastal positions in the V Corps alone.”5 The 2nd Battalion of the 116th followed 3rd Battalion into Grandcamp and cleared much of the area by sunset of June 8.4

  Figure 277: German prisoners are led past the Rangers' command post on Pointe du Hoc on D-Day plus 2, June 8, 1944. U.S. Signal Corps (NARA) As they came together for the first time since the invasion, the 2nd Ranger Infantry Battalion was reorganized at Point du Hoc in the late morning and early afternoon of June 8. A June 8 photo of the men is shown in Figure 277. They had suffered tremendous loss. Black wrote that of the 512 enlisted and 33 officers of the battalion that made the assault, preliminary casualty numbers were 247 enlisted and sixteen officers. Of these, 65 men and five officers paid the ultimate price. The Rangers and other GIs began to scour the field for the fallen and wounded. The battlefield was still fresh as described by Hatfield. He went on to describe the litter on the battlefield. There was all manner of equipment, spent ammunition cartridges, backpacks, gas masks, used and unused first aid equipment and supplies, photos of loved ones, girlie pictures, weapons, pieces of broken weapons and parts of men strewn about. Command thought through their plans and decided to place the 2nd Rangers in reserve to rest. They finally assembled on the exit lane to Point du Hoc at 1600 hours and left the point turning right on the coastal road (Insigny Road or D 514) toward Grandcamp, following the route taken by elements of the 5th Rangers and 116th Regiment, 3rd Battalion earlier in the morning.8 They marched quietly as the dead bodies of Germans and Americans had been gathered and lined up along the roadsides for the grave details to begin their grim work. Hatfield wrote that the 2nd Rangers were “too exhausted for further action.”9

  By 1930 hours, Grandcamp had been cleared of all enemy resistance. The 5th Rangers, B Company occupied a portion of the all-around defense on the eastern high ground overlooking the valley. The 5th Rangers set up their command post in an abandoned German tunnel. About a mile from the point, the 2nd Rangers took a trail to the right behind defensive lines formed by B Company of the 5th Rangers. Rudder led his men to the gentle slopes overlooking the sluice gate, sea and the hard fought ground across the valley. They set up their bivouac in the trenches and other defensive positions constructed by the Germans. PFC Prince of 2nd Ranger Infantry Battalion, A Company wrote that the area was swampy and damp. He also said, “It was cold that night, colder than we had expected it to be. We weren't equipped against this frost, so besides having to sweat out the Jerries, we had to endure a night of coldness.” The 2nd Rangers did not know until the next morning that the lumps all over the ground were unarmed mines left by the Germans. In their hasty retreat across the valley, there was insufficient time to set the mines. The 2nd Rangers supply trucks carrying their baggage and supply arrived from the beachhead. They were provided with their bedrolls and pup tents, packs, ammunition, water and most importantly, hot food. Prince wrote, “Instead of our usual "K" rations, we were issued 10-1 rations. That day we were able to partake in our first decent and balanced meal since we had disembarked from our boat. It was appetizing to eat a hot meal, and the hot coffee we drank put new life into us. We almost felt human again, instead of the savage animals we had turned into during our battling.”10 The 2nd Rangers were also afforded field showers and a change of uniform for the first time in days.

  They received new weapons and uniforms to replace unserviceable issue. Machine guns were added back to their ranks. The unrelenting paperwork was filled out.8 PFC Robert Prince wrote, “Due to our strenuous fighting and heavy losses, a last minute's change decide a to put us into a reserve position and to let our brethren Ranger Bn., the 5th, do this job for us. And do it they did, in a grand Ranger fashion, overcoming and routing the Heinies in a decisive victory. The Fifth had sustained a few casualties but they made up for it in ground gained, Krauts killed and wounded, plus innumerable stores of weapons, equipment and prisoners taken.” He went on to state that the men could finally get a moment to truly relax after almost three days.10 They lit up cigarettes and cleaned their bodies. Most of the men did not shave as a rite of passage so to speak. The battalion slept peacefully the night of June 8 allowing the men to feel refreshed the next morning. During the night, the Luftwaffe used a night bomber and dropped light bombs ¼ mile south of the Ranger position, but not on it at 2400 hours.9 One exception to these reports comes from Lt. Kerchner of the 2nd Rangers who recorded in a wartime diary that the 5th Rangers “shot 4 jerries” overnight. He said everyone in his battalion was “jumpy.”

  The next morning, 5th Ranger Infantry Battalion Companies A, C and F were given the mission of cleaning out the strongpoint of batteries at Maisy along with 1st Battalion of the 116th Infantry Regiment. They were supported by two halftracks of the Second Rangers and a company of the 81st Chemical Weapons Battalion. The mission was a successful one capturing three 105 Howitzers, numerous small arms and large stocks of ammunition and food, and 90 prisoners.11 The details of these actions of A, C and F Companies are further described in Intact by Raaen. The 116th Infantry Regiment, 1st Battalion went south of the flooded Le Véret Stream valley and attacked toward Isigny.

  The 2nd Rangers moved out about 1600 hours on June 9 en route to their next bivouac west of Osmanville. They passed through Grandcamp to get there based on a pocket journal kept by Lt Kerchner dated June 9, 1944. The end of the two day engagement for Grandcamp-les-Bains and the Maisy Battery cost the 5th Ranger Infantry Battalion 28 casualties. The Germans suffered 40 men killed and 165 prisoners. The end of June 8 yielded more casualties for B Company. These included S/Sgt Vern L Detlefsen, Tec 5 Joseph W. Levesque, and PFC Carl W. Morgan, Jr all listed as SWA. Morgan’s status would be revised to reflect he later died of his wounds. He is not listed in Glassman, but Black included him in his book, Rangers of World War II. Morgan is another Ranger who was partially lost to history.

  On June 9, B Company left Grandcamp les Baines at 1300 hours and travelled eight miles to Osmansville, France arriving at 1500 hours during a light rain. Company F of the 2nd Ranger Infantry Battalion managed to capture a Germa
n Headquarters unit with their payroll. On June 10, an enemy plane bombed the bivouac site at 0400 hours. On June 11, B Company left Osmanville at 0100 hours, and arrived at Bois Du Molay at 0230 hours. The Provisional Ranger Group was placed in V Corps Reserve. June 11 was the first mail call the Rangers had in France.

  The remainder of this chapter is a detailed look at what the 5th Ranger Infantry Battalion did in the summer 1944. The existing books and stories covering the summer basically just glaze over this period, discussing the guarding of prisoners, training replacements, guarding the west coast of France and going on patrol. The importance of the finer details surrounding these events to this story is that they inform about how S/Sgt Hull later became lost to history. In order to tease out the facts, I had to draw on more source material from the National Archives and other books than perhaps anywhere else in this work. Records of other units working with or around the battalion were researched and compared. The sheer amount of turnover of manpower and of movement of the unit and organizational attachment became all too important as this area of research was investigated. The summer of 1944 bears the most in terms of potential for research of the battalion by future historians.