Paris '44: The City of Light Redeemed

by Mortimer Moore, William

  “Does the General know what it’s about?” Hitler asked.

  “Yes, my Führer,” replied Burgdorff.26

  Then Hitler began a habitual harangue, telling von Choltitz how he took the German people in hand in 1933 and gave them purpose through the Nazi Party.

  “A people who do not surrender can never be defeated,” said Hitler. “Such a thing has never happened in history …”

  “Was he deluded?” von Choltitz wondered, listening while Hitler “trotted out all the old nonsense, so that I actually had to bite my tongue hard three times, to stop myself from bursting out.”27 Eventually Hitler calmed down sufficiently to discuss Normandy, which emboldened von Choltitz to interject, “My Führer, I am the general commanding the 84th Corps in Normandy, I have come …”

  But Hitler gestured von Choltitz to be silent.

  “Yes, I am perfectly aware,” said Hitler, talking down von Choltitz in a tone of astonishing self-assurance, vaunting the counterattack (the Mortain operation was happening at the time) which would drive the Allies back into the sea.

  Having come from Normandy, where he witnessed German soldiers facing insuperable odds, von Choltitz was horrified. Moving on to the assassination attempt, von Choltitz saw Hitler’s hideous glee at unmasking everyone who opposed him. With his mouth frothing, arms shaking, and fists banging on the table, Hitler told von Choltitz in grim detail how the People’s Court was condemning dozens of officers to the gallows at Plotzensee where they were hung with piano wire, “high and short”, suffering a slow, agonising end, rather than the long drop that would dispatch them quickly.28

  “You needn’t be alarmed,” said Hitler, “It is not as though only the Army had taken part in this attempt by a few generals to usurp power. The whole people, with its opposition, slight though it is, whether it comes from middle class, Social Democrat or Communist circles, took part in it.”29

  Watching Hitler’s eyes gleaming vindictively, von Choltitz realised he was mad.30

  “Those usurpers wanted to surrender German soil,” Hitler rambled on. “I will not yield a single yard of German soil.”

  Von Choltitz stiffened himself and said, “My Führer, the 84th Corps has been practically wiped out in defensive battle.”31

  “General, you are going to Paris,” said Hitler, changing the subject and appearing to calm down. “You will keep order in this city which is an important staging post for our troops. Cooperate with Oberg. You will receive every assistance from here. I am nominating you general commanding all Wehrmacht troops in the city. You have all the absolute powers that a general can be given. You have the powers of a general commanding anywhere that is under siege.”

  When the interview finished Hitler offered his hand again, accompanied by a ferocious stare full of “suspicion and utter cruelty”. Outside, von Choltitz found Burgdorf. Gripping the younger general’s arm, von Choltitz said, “Burgdorf, this is crazy!”

  “What would you have me do?” Burgdorf shrugged.

  Breathing deeply, von Choltitz waited in an ante-room while the written order was produced. It read as follows:

  1. The troops on the Western Front who, with exemplary valour, are fighting a superior enemy can expect, from any German finding himself in France, that he will do everything possible to assist them. From now onwards no German able to bear arms may be present in the rear areas unless his presence serves the immediate interests of the troops fighting at the front. This particularly refers to the area of Gross Paris.

  2. With immediate effect, I nominate Major-General von Choltitz “Befehlshaber of all German troops in Gross Paris.” He is responsible to me for the following matters.

  i) Paris must, as quickly as possible, shed its character as a place of leave with its unhealthy symptoms. The city must not become a reservoir of refugees and cowards, but a place of fear for anyone who is not an honest auxiliary or who is not supporting the troops fighting at the front.

  ii) All unneccessary German administrators and, in particular, all those who do not have to be there, must leave as soon as possible. Men capable of fighting should go to the front line. Any unjustified entry must be rigourously forbidden. There will be no withdrawal of military command services or any other important service without my permission.

  iii) The area of Gross Paris must be protected from all acts of rebellion, subversion or sabotage.

  3. To accomplish this task the general commanding Wehrmacht troops in Gross Paris is empowered to give orders to all ranks of the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS, to detachments and organisations outside the Wehrmacht, to National Socialist Party and civilian services. In the event that orders derived from the Wehrmacht or any other high command of the Reich might conflict with the mission of the General commanding Gross Paris, I must be informed by Oberkommando der Werhmacht (OKW).

  4. The General commanding Gross Paris is placed under the orders of the military commander in France. Where the military protection of Gross Paris is concerned, and the use of personnel made available for combat at the front, he will take his instructions from the High Command of the Western Front. The General commanding Gross Paris will retain the staff of the preceeding commander.

  5. Following instructions from the Chief of OKW, he will receive the jurisdictional powers of any commander of a city under siege.

  On the face of it, these orders made perfect military sense. But as von Choltitz re-read the document, mindful of Hitler’s recent tirade, it became clear that this order was carte blanche to wreck Paris. Consoling himself with a stiff drink, von Choltitz shared a mess table with a senior SS officer whose name goes unmentioned in his memoirs but who turned out to be Robert Ley.32

  Von Choltitz met Ley again later that evening on the train, advancing down the carriage corridor towards him, resplendent in his black uniform, copiously decorated with silver braid knots around the epaulettes and collar. Ley had also seen Hitler that day. As a result of 20 July, Hitler told him that new laws were being prepared whereby the families of anyone who committed treason were subject to reprisals. The concept of Sippenhaft—that traitors possess bad blood which runs in their family—was not entirely new in Nazi Germany, but it took 20 July to crystallise it into a law. In his memoirs von Choltitz claims it was the first time he heard about Sippenhaft and he was profoundly disturbed to learn that the families of Stauffenberg, von Tresckow and others were being dismantled; adults sent to concentration camps and children farmed out to foster parents. Railway couchettes are uncomfortable places to sleep, but Ley’s news caused von Choltitz an utterly sleepless night en route to the most fateful weeks of his life.33

  FOR SEVERAL DAYS PATTON’S US THIRD ARMY pushed southwards “like a great torrent flooding through a breach in a dam”. The 2e DB was part of that torrent, rolling through country towns like Coutances, Gavray, La Haye-Pesnel and Avranches. Heading for the north bank of the Selune, southeast of Ducey, Dronne’s Spaniards found the road lined with French country folk cheering Les Leclercs. “We’ve been waiting for you,” said a 1914–1918 veteran. “You’ve been a long time coming. Well, here you are.”34 Guided by Eugene Bosquet, a young soldier whose family lived nearby, Putz’s battalion continued until dusk. On reaching the Selune the 2e DB began camouflaging its vehicles for the night. Old desert hands knew the importance of this. If air cover was scarce camouflage could be a vehicle’s only protection.35

  As part of Hitler’s counterattack, the Luftwaffe was active that night. Of course Hitler never expected the thrust to be halted at Mortain, the attractive Norman town after which it was named. But a gutsy holding action by the US 1st and 30th Infantry Divisions on Hill 314 meant Mortain was as far as Hitler’s reckless counterattack got. From the 2e DB, only GT Langlade* became involved; sending a mixed force which took some prisoners. But the decisive factor was Allied air supremacy, with British rocket-carrying Typhoons being directed onto the Panzer formations strung out along country lanes.36

  Despite crippling losses, Hitler wanted Kluge to continue, even th
ough the assault was clearly ineffective. The attack by Canadian First Army (Operation Totalize) towards Falaise, a little over twenty-four hours after the Mortain operation, presaged encirclement of all German forces in Normandy, pushing Kluge to the brink of despair. On the Allied side, the German failure at Mortain created splendid opportunities for exploitation. But it all came at dreadful cost as Dodge ambulances queued for about half a mile to access overloaded field hospitals. Mortain, like many pretty Norman towns, was wrecked.37

  9 August 1944

  PIERRE LAVAL SPENT 8 AUGUST ON THE ROAD, only arriving in Paris during the small hours of the 9th along with his wife and daughter, Countess de Chambrun. He then went straight into a hectic programme of negotiations, calling on the Municipal Council, headed by Pierre Taittinger, along with the Council of the Department of the Seine, headed by Victor Constant, to maintain governmental continuity until the liberation in the “general interest”. Therefore Marshal Pétain should be brought to Paris from Vichy.38

  At first Laval was gratified to discover that not only die-hard collabos accepted his idea, but also politicians who remained relatively uncompromised by Vichy. These included a few who remained in contact with Roosevelt’s former ambassador to Vichy, Admiral Leahy, such as Anatole de Monzie, Georges Bonnet and Camille Chautemps.39 But even if national bodies could be assembled and Pétain brought to Paris, Monzie thought it was too late and frankly informed Laval that he was too unpopular to reconvene anything on his personal initiative. Pétain might possibly retain enough personal prestige to perform that role, but not Laval. In any case, by Monzie’s estimation, such efforts were pointless since the National Assembly would reconvene automatically at the liberation.40 Laval listened calmly, then charmingly declared that he merely wished to install a transitional government to continue the duties of the state. Monzie thought Laval seemed like “Pierrot of the good old days” before 1940.41

  But Monzie’s view was correct. Probably the only person Laval spoke to that day, whose position in post-war France remained untainted by collaboration was “the Gentleman of Paris”, Raoul Nordling, who visited the Matignon pleading for the release of French political prisoners before the inevitable German departure. Even on this pressing issue, so dear to Gaullist hearts, no one was going to approach Laval except through a neutral intermediary.42

  DIETRICH VON CHOLTITZ ARRIVED IN PARIS that evening. According to his memoirs, the forces available to carry out Hitler’s nihilistic orders totalled a mere six thousand on the day he took command, but even then several anti-aircraft batteries—whose equipment was versatile enough to be used against ground forces—were already pulling out. The only tanks available to him were mainly French Hotchkiss and Somua models taken into German service in 1940 and given Wehrmacht designations. Since these were unsuitable for frontline service they were used for internal security work. But those six thousand men were, to use a phrase popular among French historians, intra muros—within the walls, or old boundaries—of the city of Paris. Von Choltitz’s motives for massaging down the available manpower in his memoirs are probably suspect; in post-war Germany many of his contemporaries regarded him as a disloyal officer. In any case, his forces also included around three thousand administrative and security personnel, including die-hard prison guards still running holding camps around the city, and another eight thousand outside the city boundary.43 To this might be added an uncertain number of French personnel: Milice and members of similar collabo organisations; those shameless enough to remain.

  Meanwhile, the Wehrmacht’s three service HQs were pulling out. Stulpnagel’s replacement, Luftwaffe General Karl Kitzinger, was ordered to prepare fallback positions similar to the 1914–1918 Western Front along the rivers Somme, Aisne, Marne and Saone. To man this new line, Army Group B needed to extricate as many forces as possible from the Normandy débacle.44 But time was against them; nor did the lower reaches of the Seine represent a natural defence line. The Allies soon took several easy crossing points.45

  Immediately under him, von Choltitz had General Hubertus von Aulock, a tough Silesian soldier whose brother, Andreas, had made the Americans pay dearly for Saint Malo. Taking position south and southwest of the city, von Aulock’s makeshift corps comprised battlegroups from the 48th and 338th Infantry Divisions and a shock battalion sent from the First Army, but little in the way of heavy equipment beyond anti-aircraft guns (88mm) which were a mixed blessing without heavy tractors to pull them, and less effective with inexperienced crews. There were around sixty aircraft based at Le Bourget, but these rarely flew unless Allied aircraft were firmly committed elsewhere. Von Choltitz’s only hope of reinforcements was that Army Group B would divert units retreating from Normandy. While such limited personnel and light arsenals were insufficient to defend the city in open battle, skilfully placed they could be used to fight prolonged rearguard actions, inflicting severe losses on the Allies and causing much destruction. After Normandy, the Allies did not underestimate the fighting qualities of the German soldier in defence.46

  Of those staff officers who knew Paris well, several were recalled to Berlin for questioning over 20 July, especially associates of General von Stulpnagel. However, von Choltitz already knew his departing predecessor, Boineburg-Lengsfeld, and asked him to stay on in whatever capacity could be devised.

  “No, I have nothing more to do here,” Boineburg-Lengsfeld replied.

  Over dinner at the Maison Coty, von Choltitz discussed Hitler’s orders.

  “I beg you,” said a horrified Boineburg-Lengsfeld, “avoid anything that could bring such destruction to this city. You would never be able to justify such madness.”

  “You’ve got to watch out for that Führer!” said von Choltitz wryly. “That old corporal hates all us other generals. It’s us and only us who are responsible for the success of the Allied landings!”47

  Installing himself at the Hôtel Meurice and inheriting most of Boineberg-Lengsfeld’s staff, von Choltitz felt he was joining a Prussian aristocrats’ house party. Lieutenant Dankwart von Arnim, Boineburg’s ADC whom von Choltitz took over, was a distant relation. Colonel Hans Jay was an old friend, while Adolf von Carlowitz, a reserve officer, was another cousin who always called him “Dietz”.48

  Had he the inclination, von Choltitz could have done immense damage with the means available. Many Parisian buildings have significant timber structure which burns easily. Water supplies could be cut off; gas supplies were sufficient to boost conflagrations. The principal reason used to avoid this was that the city’s main thoroughfares and glorious bridges were routes which the Germans needed kept open as long as possible so that forces escaping from Normandy could make their retreat.49 Yet only around 10% of the German forces evacuating France went through Paris.50

  During the early days of his appointment von Choltitz certainly appeared to take Hitler’s orders seriously. But the results do not bear this out. It fell to Sonderführer Robert Wallraf to welcome the officers of a demolition battalion to their temporary lodgings in the Chamber of Deputies. “They were young, tough, suntanned men who seemed well-used to whatever the war offered them,” wrote Wallraf. “With the contemptuous air of soldiers having recently arrived from the Eastern Front, they seemed well pleased with their new abode.”

  The stocky, taciturn engineer colonel particularly interested Wallraf. “If you’ve got to blow up forty-two bridges, it’s not going to be easy,” Wallraf remarked.

  “Easy?” replied the engineer colonel mockingly. “I’m not interested in whether it’s easy or difficult. The essential thing is that I get it done.”

  “When you start work on the bridges the Resistance may well shoot at you from windows and rooftops,” warned Wallraf.

  “Oh we’re used to that sort of thing,” replied the unfazed colonel. “We got out of Stalingrad with Russians sniping at us from all sides. We’ve blown up mines in Kharkov behind Russian lines. Even with the Russians in full advance we got it done. In Kiev we were prisoners for a night, but were libe
rated the following day. This is a jolly one, a few dozen bridges! It’s nothing to men like us.”

  “How are you proposing to do it?” asked Wallraf.

  “Aircraft bombs,” replied the colonel. “We’ll pack a few bombs under the span of each bridge and blow it up. We ought to do thirty or forty in a day.”

  “Do you honestly think they will let you do that?” asked Wallraf, appalled.

  “At each bridge we’ll have a machine-gun post and if that isn’t enough, maybe a tank,” replied the sapper colonel. “You’ve no idea how people respect machine-guns and tanks.”

  Although these grimly practical sappers were under his command, von Choltitz avoided discussing their task with anyone. The following day Wallraf witnessed an extraordinary conversation.

  “Have you got explosives?” asked von Choltitz as though addressing a child.

  “No Sir,” replied the engineer colonel. “I have not.”

  “But what are you going to do without explosives?” asked von Choltitz.

  “Sir, I’ve been ordered to use either aircraft bombs or torpedo heads.”

  “Have you lorries to carry them?” asked von Choltitz.

  “No Sir.”

  “Well, then,” replied von Choltitz. “We’ll have to consider tomorrow how you’re going to proceed. I haven’t the time at the moment. We must also consider the best way to blow up the bridges in one go. If you would think about that and report back to me tomorrow.”

  Thus von Choltitz’s obfuscations deferred the blowing of the city’s bridges.51

  “THERE IS CONSIDERABLE CONFUSION,” General Omar Bradley later wrote, “as to whose ‘historic’ idea it was to turn US forces north and encircle the Germans” in what would become “the Falaise pocket”. “Let me put it plainly. It was my idea.”52 However, given the opportunity that presented itself, the idea was sufficiently obvious for Bradley to remark to his ADC, Chet Hansen on 8 August, “The German is either crazy or he doesn’t know what’s going on. I think he is too smart to do what he is doing. He can’t know what is going on in our sector. Surely the professional generals must know the jig is up.”