“I suggest that you be there too,” said Laval. “Then we will be able to discuss this matter between the three of us.”157
THE AMERICAN AIRCRAFT RETURNING JACQUES CHABAN-DELMAS to France touched down on a prefabricated metal runway near Saint-Lo. If de Gaulle’s national military delegate remained doubtful that General Ismay’s advice that the Paris insurrection should not begin before mid-September was anything but wise, he only needed to survey the damage eight weeks of modern warfare had inflicted on northern France.
Immediately after Rennes was liberated, one of de Gaulle’s nominees, the experienced colonial administrator Bernard Cornut-Gentille, installed himself as the department’s new préfet. De Gaulle requested Eisenhower’s permission to visit Rennes, but Chaban-Delmas arrived first; Cornut-Gentille welcomed him handsomely. Once Le Mans was liberated another Gaullist préfet in waiting, Jean-Louis Costa, took office.
With the opposing front lines so fluid, Chaban decided to cross the German lines disguised as a foppish young man bicycling between summer tennis parties carrying a tennis racket and a couple of unplucked chickens. Chaban left Rennes in a US Army Jeep, carrying his bicycle in the back. On reaching Le Mans, Prefect Costa arranged the next phase of Chaban’s return to Paris. As a fit young rugby player Chaban was undaunted by a two-hundred-kilometre bicycle ride provided he could avoid the Germans. Dropped off at a quiet section of the front by American liaison officers, Chaban donned tennis attire and began pedalling through Beauce’s pleasant countryside and picturesque villages, all worryingly silent as he neared the German lines. His wariness was justified by a burst of machine-gun fire which miraculously left him untouched. Passing through unliberated villages, Chaban saw pro-Vichy posters bemoaning Allied bombing raids: “Les anglais, eux. Toujours eux.”—“The English, them. Always them.”158
Nearing Chartres, Chaban heard an aircraft engine above him; his white tennis clothes had been spotted, an Allied fighter-bomber flew low enough to machine-gun him but veered away. Approaching Brou, Chaban met trouble not, as he feared, from the Germans but local résistants. These local toughs merely laughed when Chaban announced, “I am the National Military Delegate of General Koenig, the commander of the French Forces of the Interior. I am returning from a mission in London. I have important and urgent information to give the Resistance in Paris. Let me pass. Help me get back.” Though initially sceptical, these young résistants decided to take Chaban to their local chief, a former gunsmith. Despite listening to Chaban’s story, he remained unconvinced.
“If you’ve got a car,” said Chaban, “why not send someone to Le Mans to see the préfet de la libération, Jean-Louis Costa. Ask him. He will confirm to you that I really am the National Military Delegate; that I have come from London and must reach Paris as soon as possible. And, just so that your people know, the Americans are at Connerré. Between Connerré and Brou I didn’t come across any Germans, but there might be some stragglers.”
While awaiting confirmation of Chaban’s identity the gunsmith gave him a room for the night.159 Once his story checked out, the gunsmith’s men woke him somewhat penitently at around 6am. After breakfast, Chaban retook the road, pedalling ever eastwards until inevitably he was stopped at a German checkpoint where he gave his prepared story; a young husband who had merely bicycled out of underfed Paris seeking food for his family. When asked if he had encountered any Americans, Chaban replied, “Not a single one.”
The weather had been fine all day, but nearing Christ de Saclay rain began falling, drenching Chaban’s tennis whites. Nevertheless he reached Villacoublay by 5pm. From there the rain intensified into a bucketing deluge, making Chaban more conspicuous as he crossed the deserted Pont de Sevres. From there he headed for the 16th Arrondissement’s Stade Jean-Bouin where he knew the caretaker, Monsieur Martin, was certain to take him in.
“Why? Monsieur Delmas!” said Martin. “You look like a drowned cat.”
Without asking questions, Martin’s wife gave Chaban a hot drink while he telephoned a friend for a change of clothes. Leaving Martin’s home by the back door, Chaban ran fleetly across the empty stadium to the opposite stand’s exit which placed him beyond the big Saint-Cloud checkpoint. From there he went to a secret lair on the Rue Claude-Lorrain.
AT 9PM RAOUL NORDLING’S FIRST ENCOUNTER with Alexandre Parodi began warily outside the Gare Montparnasse. Used to clandestine discipline, Parodi worried that Nordling might have been followed, but his concerns were unfounded. Nordling needed clarification that he was no longer just another neutral consul in occupied Paris; that henceforward he was negotiating on behalf of de Gaulle’s provisional government.160
Once this issue was settled, Nordling drove to the Matignon for another audience with Pierre Laval. With Parisian utility workers also on strike, Paris seemed as ghostly as during June 1940. Passiing through the Matignon’s gates at around 9.30pm Nordling was impressed by the encroaching darkness as caretakers wandered candle-lit corridors. Nordling took out the small pocket torch he had recently acquired. Laval, carrying a similar device, met Nordling in an antechamber and led him into the premier’s study where an oil lamp burned brightly. While awaiting Otto Abetz they discussed the political situation; it seemed inevitable that Pétain would be deposed, but Laval’s hopes for a transitional government, which required both Herriot’s and Jeanneney’s co-operation, were falling apart. Laval recognised that soon he too would have to leave Paris.161
Abetz also arrived carrying a small hand-torch. When Nordling explained the political prisoners’ urgent situation, Abetz fobbed him off, painting a dishonestly rosy picture of their conditions; claiming Oberg informed him personally that cattle wagons did not carry one hundred and twenty prisoners, but merely eighty (which was bad enough). Furthermore Abetz informed Nordling that the Red Cross would feed the prisoners before their departure—another lie. But Nordling was not interested in comparatives, he wanted the deportation trains stopped altogether and prisons where “politicals” were held transfered to the authority of the Red Cross. To reassure Abetz, Nordling offered to allow German guards to remain and then be given safe conduct to rejoin other German forces when they withdrew.
“And with whom would you like me to sign a convention concerning political prisoners?” asked Abetz wryly.
“One would imagine a convention between yourself and the Gaullist government in Algiers,” replied Nordling.
“So where is the Algiers government?” asked Abetz.
“I am taking on this role in the name of the French government,” said Nordling.
“What are you talking about?” scoffed Laval. “If you’ll excuse me, Monsieur le Consul, until the new order comes in, I am the one who represents the French government.”162
Nordling replied that he was representing de Gaulle’s provisional government in Algiers. At this revelation Abetz refused to continue negotiations. Supported by Laval, Abetz told Nordling he should leave. Abetz also reminded the envoy that political prisoners came under Oberg’s authority.
Nordling politely drew Abetz’s attention to Germany’s increasingly desperate military situation, suggesting that the German authorities should not dismiss an opportunity to leave some good will behind.
“So you think Germany has lost the war?” said Abetz sarcastically.
“I think, in any case, that things are going very badly for your armies, Monsieur l’ambassadeur,” replied Nordling.163
Nordling recognised that he had made as much progress as he could. That same day a train of cattle wagons left Pantin carrying 2,453 political prisoners to an uncertain future inside the Third Reich.164
16 August 1944
AFTER LYING IN A DITCH ALL DAY, Field Marshal von Kluge arrived at the HQ of Sepp Dietrich’s 1st SS Panzer Corps late in the evening of 15 August. Meanwhile his chief of staff, General Gunther Blumentritt, had frantically complained to General Jodl about the state of German forces withdrawing from Argentan, and asked for a new army commander. SS Panzer General Paul Hausser w
as considered as an emergency replacement. When Kluge explained that his absence was spent taking cover after RAF Typhoons shot up his convoy, Hitler was unconvinced and decided Kluge should go. Before that happened, Kluge recommended the immediate withdrawal of all German forces from the Falaise-Argentan gap. The message was sent to OKW at around 2am in the small hours of 16 August.165
Recognising that he had insufficient troops to hold France, Hitler finally agreed not only to evacuate “the pocket” but to establish a new line further east, behind the Orne and Dives rivers; more than the frayed von Kluge originally asked for.166 The stress of those weeks, witnessing once proud divisions being destroyed, combined with his profound inner turmoil over 20 July, had turned Hans-Gunther von Kluge into a broken reed. Even if it was unfair to blame Kluge for the failure at Mortain, Hitler realistically recognised that Kluge was of no further use to him and needed to be replaced by Field Marshal Walter Model. Unlike many high-ranking Germans, Model did not belong to the old aristocracy, which was thoroughly represented in the 20 July conspiracy; he was middle class, immensely good at his job and a thorough-going Nazi. Having sorted out several dangerous situations on the Eastern front, Model became known as Hitler’s “fireman”. The same day as his appointment to go to France, Hitler awarded Model the diamond clasp upgrade to his Knight’s Cross. “Were it not for you, your heroic efforts and your wise leadership of brave troops,” said Hitler effusively, “the Russians might have been in East Prussia today, or even the gates of Berlin.” These words indicated that Hitler recognised that the war was no longer going his way.167
AFTER VISITING GENERAL WALKER’S US XX CORPS at Chartres, and Haislip’s XV near Mantes, Patton returned to his Third Army HQ around 6.30pm. It was then that he took a call from Bradley ordering him to use Leclerc’s 2e DB and the US 90th and 80th Infantry Divisions to advance on Trun “to meet the Canadians and close the Argentan-Falaise pocket”. General Gerow would command these divisions as the reconstituted V Corps.168
16 August was also the day on which operational secrecy around the Falaise battles was lifted. The press corps visited the front, immediately making Patton enough of a star to efface his gaffe-prone past.169 Towards the end of the afternoon reporters arrived at Fleuré where Leclerc’s staff updated them on the 2e DB’s achievements. Since Africa, Christian Girard had tried strenuously to make Leclerc more press-friendly, and gladly noted in his diary that his general “received them graciously”, sitting on the ground in the middle of a meadow. Later that evening, after an excellent supper cooked by Fleuré’s schoolteacher, Leclerc received an urgent message from Patton ordering him to a staff meeting at Valframbert.170
Prompted by intelligence warnings from Bradley’s HQ that a German counterattack might materialise around Argentan, Leonard Gerow had driven through an unpleasantly wet night to Alençon where an impromptu HQ was set up at the Hôtel de France. Confusingly, Patton had sent Major General Hugh Gaffey to temporarily assume command of V Corps and lead the operation to link up with the British at Trun. The two American major generals agreed between them that Gaffey would lead the attack but Gerow would take over as corps commander the following evening.171
At around 11pm, accompanied by Girard and a bodyguard, Leclerc arrived at V Corps’ new HQ. Gaffey explained to the Frenchmen that he was ordered to mount an attack for the morning of 17 August. They were to advance on Trun to finally close the pocket, thereby preventing any more German forces from escaping eastwards. Politely, Gaffey asked Leclerc for his viewpoint. Girard watched intently. Spotlights directed onto the maps lit up the faces of the officers perusing them, leaving all else pitch black. North of Argentan was the Forêt de Gouffern. Between the 2e DB’s starting position at Fleuré and Gaffey’s objective at Trun were the town of Argentan itself, the forest and then a network of country roads and villages; territory which could be doughtily defended by a desperate opponent.
Between the dillemma of wanting his division to take part in worthwhile actions and also keeping it strong enough to make its dash for Paris, Leclerc’s heart must have sank. Girard writes that Leclerc looked irritated as he looked at the map before saying in French, “The terrain is utterly unfavourable to an armoured division” and “the operation ought to be an infantry matter”. Then, through Girard, Leclerc asked Gaffey what sort of support he was offering the 2e DB.
“A regiment of three battalions,” Gaffey replied.
Leclerc pursed his lips. At Alençon and the Forêt d’Écouves the 2e DB executed a large envelopement but not against an enemy they had watched dig in for five days. Such an operation could not help but be costly for the 2e DB’s infantry, his valued veterans.
“I have orders to attack tomorrow morning,” said Gaffey. “I will attack tomorrow morning.”
“It’s terrible!” Girard wrote in his journal. For the next hour the discussion swung to and fro as he translated Leclerc’s argument that such an attack would write off two divisions as effective units. Nor did the timescale offer Leclerc’s G3, André Gribius, nor his intelligence officer, Paul Repiton-Préneuf, time to prepare anything.
“Nothing is prepared,” ran Leclerc’s protest. “There aren’t enough men. There hasn’t been any reconnaissance, no fresh information, no reserves, no one beside us, no possibility of exploitation.”
Gaffey had not expected this.
“I am in command,” said Gaffey imperiously. “And I have given you an order.”
“It is not executable,” came the French reply. “There isn’t a third of what’s needed.”
“Are you refusing to obey orders?” asked Gaffey before turning to an orderly and saying something that sounded to Girard like an instruction to take notes. Leclerc asked if the matter could be referred back to Patton. Gaffey replied that he would indeed refer back to Patton but only once the attack was ready to start; that he certainly would not telephone Patton in the middle of the night. “We felt like we were caught in a trap,” wrote Girard.
Driving in darkness back to Fleuré, Leclerc was fuming, fearing that his division would be wrecked the following day.172
Pierre Billotte was waiting to see him.
“They wanted me to set off tomorrow morning at dawn and advance virtually alone from south to north towards Falaise,” said Leclerc, shaking his head. “I refused. What do you think?”
“I think you were quite right,” replied Billotte. “You’ve done what was asked of us since the 8 August. Since Montgomery has not succeeded from north to south with a whole army group, how does Bradley’s chief of staff imagine that we can accomplish this with one division? It’s flattering, but it isn’t exactly realistic. And if by some miracle we got there, what state would we be in? We would certainly be incapable, should the moment arise, of liberating Paris, which remains our essential objective as determined by de Gaulle. So I can only support you. Perhaps you should expect some severe reactions from the Americans, but they will probably cool down.”173
Unknown to Leclerc that night, his fears for the 2e DB were unfounded. Bradley had telephoned Patton at 11.30pm delaying Gaffey’s attack.174
THAT SAME WEDNESDAY, Madame Herriot inspected what she believed would become her new home, the Hôtel de la Présidence de la Chambres des Deputés. The Germans had left it filthy, yet in spite of everything the Herriots decided to move in. It was not to be. At 10.15pm, SS Hauptsturmführer Noseck arrived at the Hôtel de Ville in full black SS uniform and informed Herriot that the German government had decided to reintern him. Incandescent with rage, Herriot yelled, “You don’t play with a man’s dignity like this. It’s certainly true that this is not the first time that Germany has broken its word and it won’t be the last. I’ve always known you were pigs. You have no honour.”
Noseck was unmoved. Laval’s last gamble had failed.175
“This is that pig de Brinon!” Laval yelled.
In fact this development was the handywork of those extreme collabos, Déat and Darnand, who, like the Germans, found Laval’s uncertain loyal
ties infuriating. They found Otto Abetz’s efforts at humanity pretty infuriating too. So Déat and de Brinon turned to the SS, meeting Karl Oberg’s adjutant, Colonel Knochen, that afternoon to warn him that Laval intended to change camp, to do a “Badoglio.”* They also warned Knocken that a new government led by Herriot would join Pétain’s and de Gaulle’s supporters in an uprising of all Frenchmen against the Germans. Knochen referred to Oberg. Oberg had always despised Laval, believing that a palindromic surname could only belong to a two-faced person. Himmler was informed and the order to re-arrest Edouard Herriot arrived an hour later.176
RAOUL NORDLING NEVER HAD TO BEHAVE AU CLANDESTIN. Yet his second meeting with Alexandre Parodi began with a singular dance of walking to and fro across theatre land’s Boulevard des Capucines before they finally acknowledged each other outside the Café de la Paix. Deciding that that famous restaurant was too conspicuous, they repaired to a small bar on the pokey Rue Boudreau behind the Opera. Parodi was accompanied by senior Gaullist linkman, Count Alexandre de Saint-Phalle; both were inconspicuously dressed.177
After Nordling described his meeting at the Matignon the previous evening, Parodi confirmed that the GPRF would allow German prison guards safe conduct out of Paris if the prisons could be placed under the authority of the Red Cross. In Algiers the GPRF considered ordering raids on the prisons and transit camps but rejected this idea because the guards were invariably well armed. It had even been reported that Fresnes was equipped with gas supplies to use on inmates if the prison was stormed. While the last ingredient was undoubtedly untrue, in view of these factors Nordling’s negotiations seemed the wiser option, if only the Germans would listen. Parodi told Nordling that Algiers wanted him to continue the good work. Many important resistance prisoners were held at Fresnes; though since 14 August the German authorities had begun sending them to Germany.178
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