Paris '44: The City of Light Redeemed

by Mortimer Moore, William

  It is also believed that German troops used the truce to infiltrate the Ile de la Cité. Monsignor Brot, archdeacon of Notre Dame, was surprised when FFIs patrolling the Pont-au-Double complained of being fired at by snipers inside Notre Dame; either behind the main roof parapet or from the towers. It was certainly possible for snipers to hide there. Infiltration merely involved tagging along with workmen who frequent such a building: “Germans or mauvais Français—’bad Frenchmen’ or ‘Miliciens’—could mix among them and take positions in the towers or among the rafters,” wrote Brot. Following calls to the Préfecture, patrols of gardiens searched Notre Dame’s empty spaces but found no one. “Often during the course of the day,” Brot continued, “people on the barricades fired at the Cathedral, each time believing they had seen someone behind the statues or the buttresses. The glasswork, luckily not the most valuable, suffered. Even the lodgings of both the treasurer and the archdeacon received a few hits.” The spectre of gunmen hiding out in Notre Dame continued until the liberation.113

  JUST WHEN NORDLING NEEDED HIS HEALTH, his bon-viveur years exacted their vengeance. His chest tightened, and he became breathless and barely conscious. This inconvenient heart attack rendered him unfit to travel across the lines of two opposing armies. Instead his brother, Rolf Nordling, would accompany Saint-Phalle to Allied Headquarters.114

  Nordling asked his nephew, Édouard Fievet, to collect Saint-Phalle from the Rue Séguier and, supposing Sweden’s pennant was insufficient to satisfy German checkpoints, Nordling advised Fievet to take Bender with him. After an edgy exchange with German guards on the Place Saint-Augustin, they reached the Place de la Concorde before experiencing more difficulties at the Pont de la Concorde, where SS men insisted they got out of the car with their hands up. After words with Bender, they were allowed to pass. Once Saint-Phalle had been collected and they came back the other way, the SS troops on the Pont de la Concorde cheered.115

  While resting in his study, Nordling was disturbed by three German Feldgendarmes asking him to release one of their men then incarcerated among the Santé’s political prisoners. No one could be returned to German custody without Nordling’s authority. It became clear that this man was wanted for treason, a capital offence. Nordling chose to be difficult.

  “He’s my prisoner,” insisted Nordling.

  “He ought to be shot,” said a Feldgendarme.

  “Then I categorically refuse to release him,” said Nordling.

  Dissatisfied, the Feldgendarmes departed, but returned later bearing a Feldgendarmerie certificate claiming the prisoner was an agent who must not fall into Resistance hands. Nordling telephoned the Santé’s director and had him interrogate the prisoner, who asked to remain at the Santé. Feeling for a pretext to obstruct the Feldgendarmes, Nordling noticed their certificate was unstamped and so refused to act upon it. They returned with the required stamp. So Nordling said there were not enough stamps. Thanks to Nordling the prisoner survived.116

  IT WAS LATE AFTERNOON BEFORE Rolf Nordling’s two-car convoy finally left Paris. In the first car, a torpedo Citroen decorated with Swedish and white pennants, Alexandre de Saint-Phalle drove while Erich Posch-Pastor sat beside him and Rolf Nordling, Jean Laurent and the French colonel Ollivier sat behind. Bender followed in a German car. According to Dronne’s account, von Choltitz placed Bender at Nordling’s disposal, which Nordling confirms. Nordling and Dronne also wrote that Bender had no precise written orders from von Choltitz, who would not have wanted a document bearing his signature to fall into the wrong hands.117 Although he subsequently denied knowing Bender, von Choltitz agreed that, if they were stopped at a German checkpoint, he could be telephoned and would give verbal authority for the party to pass.118

  Unlike Bender, Erich von Posch-Pastor carried documents confirming his service to the Resistance, intended to ensure his favourable treatment in Allied hands. Jean Laurent was included because, as a director of the Banque de l’Indochine, he had met de Gaulle during 1940 when France was falling. While Laurent probably over-egged his closeness to de Gaulle, his role in financing the Resistance was important. Dronne wrote that Colonel Ollivier (aka Jean Arnould or “Jade Amicol”) urgently needed to leave Paris. The Jade Amicol réseau was virtually the last British-backed cell remaining in northeast France. It ran hundreds of agents from the Couvent de la Sainte-Agonie in the 13th Arrondissement where its radio was hidden.119

  Saint-Phalle approached the first checkpoint nervously. Luckily Bender’s confident authority got them through that post, and several other posts around Versailles and Saint-Cyr. Past Trappes they speeded along tree-lined, sun-dappled roads until, inevitably, they were stopped by a Waffen SS officer wearing a Feldgendarmerie gorget plate. As the officer and two soldiers inspected the two multi-flagged cars, a senior officer appeared, red with anger.

  “What’s going on here?” he asked furiously.

  Bender explained.

  “Since July 20th, we don’t listen much to Wehrmacht generals,” said the officer.

  Bender eventually got him to agree to drive back to Versailles with him from where von Choltitz could be telephoned. “It will only take half an hour,” Bender said.

  Surprisingly the SS officer agreed. Leaving the others under the watchful guard of four Waffen SS troopers, Bender and the SS officer returned to Versailles.

  “We’re all going to get shot in that ditch,” said Arnould, mumbling his rosary. The five emissaries waited nervously for Bender’s return. Bender got through to von Choltitz easily, but their return was obstructed by a newly arrived artillery unit. With immense relief they were permitted to cross the lines and continue on their way. Bender returned to Paris.

  But combat engineers were laying landmines in no-man’s land. An officer showed Saint-Phalle a map before courteously offering to walk ahead of their car. After a hundred metres, the sapper officer announced, “The American lines are five hundred metres ahead.” Angry shouts of “Traitor!” were audible from nearby foxholes, but the sapper officer muttered, “Orders are orders.” Saint-Phalle edged the Citroen gently forward into a darkening countryside that seemed familiar. Turning towards Neauphle le Vieux, he recognised his grandmother’s house. Then an American ordered him to halt. Saint-Phalle explained his mission in English, mentioning that his wife was American.120

  * Chef d’Escadrons is a French cavalry rank equivalent to major, which literally means squadron leader. The RAF rank is derived from it.

  * A sergeant in a colonial regiment, Georges Dukson was captured in 1940. In 1943 he escaped back to Paris, earning his living as a small-time trader in the Batignolles until the Insurrection’s outbreak offered an opportunity to distinguish himself, taking part in the seizure of the 17th Arronndissement’s mairie on 19 August and the fighting on the Rue Boursault.

  Chapter 7

  Paris Saved, 22–25 August

  22 August 1944 (continued)

  WANDERING AMONG THE RBFM’S PARKED TANK-DESTROYERS, Raymond Maggiar knew where everyone wanted to go. For him the whole rotten mess of conflicted French loyalties, which particularly affected the French Navy, would finally make sense if the 2e DB could liberate Paris. Nearby two Rochambelles knelt by an ambulance praying aloud, “Saint Geneviève, please let us return to Paris!”

  “Poor little girls,” said a passing captain.

  “They would do better to plead with Eisenhower,” replied Maggiar.1

  At Shellburst, Eisenhower’s head was full. Around four million souls lived in Paris and its environs who needed four thousand tons of food daily; supplies the Allied Expeditionary Force simply did not have. De Gaulle’s hand-written letter, delivered by General Juin two days earlier, increased the pressure. In the margin Eisenhower wrote, “We might be obliged to go into Paris.” All intelligence reports pointed that way. And, while Eisenhower knew nothing of men like Raoul Nordling and Bobby Bender, the fact that the Paris Resistance had negotiated a local truce suggested that von Choltitz wanted a way out. Writing to General George Marsh
all, Eisenhower acknowledged that it was preferable from the logistical viewpoint to bypass Paris, delaying its liberation until the German Fifteenth Army in the Pas de Calais was also destroyed. Alternatively, Paris was France’s largest city and Ike recognised that if Hitler made a stand there it could impede Allied progress eastwards, obliging his forces to go in before they could do anything else. There was also a third possibility: that the Germans might generously allow Paris to fall into Allied hands like a ripe plum. “That would please us, wouldn’t it?” Eisenhower suggested to Marshall.2

  The information Gallois gave Sibert that morning resulted in Eisenhower famously saying, “Well, what the hell, Brad. I guess we’ll have to go in.” Bradley later wrote contemptuously that “emissaries of the Resistance sneaked out of Paris into our lines with frantic pleas for help” and that, “Reluctantly, I delegated the task to Gee Gerow’s Vth Corps and asked him to send Leclerc’s French 2nd Armoured Division.”3 Other narratives indicate that Bradley’s attitude was more amenable on the day.

  Bradley’s Piper Cub returned to Laval at around 7pm to find Colonel Lebel, Gallois, Leclerc and Repiton-Préneuf waiting impatiently beside the grass landing strip. Bradley got out and gestured for Leclerc to come to him.

  “Well, you win,” said Bradley. “They’ve decided to send you to Paris.”

  In simple, emphatic sentences the US 12th Army Group commander said, “An important decision has been taken and the three of us carry a very great responsibility, heavy with consequence; me, because I have given the order to take Paris. General Leclerc because he has the task of seizing the capital, and Commandant Gallois because it was due to information that he brought us that we are acting and due to his insistence.”

  Hearing this, Gallois felt such relief that he simply wanted to sleep. As Leclerc turned towards his own aircraft Bradley called him back. “We’re not having a big battle,” Bradley told Leclerc “I want you to remember one thing above all: I don’t want any fighting in Paris itself. It’s the only order I have for you—at no cost is there to be heavy fighting in Paris.”

  Leclerc saluted.4

  And so the decision was taken.

  “Au revoir, Monsieur,” Bradley told Gallois.

  Serenely twirling his cane, Leclerc walked towards his Piper Cub. “I’ve absolutely got to get back to my HQ before nightfall,” he told Gallois. “I will send you instructions tonight.”5

  At Fleuré Leclerc’s staff strained their eyes against the lowering sun, sighing with relief as his aircraft approached the landing strip and bounced along the grass. Pumped with adrenalin, Leclerc jumped youthfully to the ground. “Direction Paris,” he said, mounting the Jeep Koufra to ride the last few metres to the apple orchard where his CP was sited. Bearing “the smile of great moments”, approaching his command tent Leclerc called out sonorously, “Gribius, mouvement immediat sur Paris! ”6

  While Leclerc was at Eagletac a letter arrived from de Gaulle regarding Guillebon’s advance guard.

  I saw Trevoux and read your letter. I approve your intention. One needs a unit at least in contact with Paris without delay.

  I saw Eisenhower on the 20th. He promised me that you would be sent to Paris. General Koenig is, at the moment, with Eisenhower, so is General Juin. He is au courant.

  I will sleep tonight at Le Mans and try to meet up with you tomorrow.

  (Signed: Charles de Gaulle)

  An order soon arrived from General Gerow demanding that the 2e DB set off within the hour. Since it was now dark and Paris was two hundred and fifty kilometres away, the division’s logisticians, Lantenois and Compagnon, had quite a task. Petrol tankers would have to leave first, through countryside still infested with German stragglers, to provide refuelling points in the Chartres-Tourville area. However one looked at it, US General Gerow’s new goal, that the 2e DB reach Paris by the 24th, was unrealistic unless they reached Rambouillet in strength by the evening of the 23rd. If that was not possible, if there was serious resistance, they would seize the bridges at Gennevilliers northwest of Paris which control the loop of the Seine between Billancourt and Nanterre.7

  FOR GUILLEBON’S ADVANCE GUARD, getting into Paris on the 23rd seemed feasible. The 2/RMT’s Maurice Jourdan wrote, “After a night sleeping on hay, we found ourselves at Arpajon. There I received the order warning our sections to look our best since we might have the honour of being first into Paris, which was said to be free of Germans. We rummaged in our packs for the last clean shirt, and polished up our faces as well as our vehicles. We wanted to be ready to meet those Parisian girls. Many of us had never seen Paris where those lovely girls were certain to be. The end of the journey was close.”8

  But Guillebon was disappointed that several western arteries into Paris were barred, certainly to his small force. Beginning the day patrolling the west and northwest approaches cost the Spahis Marocains one killed and two wounded. They strapped the slain Spahi to a Jeep’s bonnet and continued.9 The road into Dampierre was mined, but Lieutenant Marson claimed the local château uneventfully, circled the front esplanade and reported back before finding a clear northerly route. Meanwhile Guillebon’s infantry hooked up with local FFIs and began lifting mines.10

  Around Port-Royal-des-Champs, Guillebon’s Spahis met more German resistance. An armoured car was badly shot up entering Voisins, and at Guyancourt the Germans fought hard to hold a defunct airfield, costing the RMT its brave Chief-Sergeant Vourc’h and other casualties.11

  23 August 1944

  FOR MOST OF THE 2e DB EVERYTHING BEGAN AT MIDNIGHT. Amid a flurry of intense activity, campfires were extinguished, tents dismantled, rolled up and stowed, and baggage organised and strapped to the sides of tanks, half-tracks, lorries and Jeeps.12 Massu heard the news at 2am amid an intense rainstorm. His men were “drunk with happiness”.13 Captain Charles d’Orgeix of the 12e Cuirassiers, from an old Parisian family, had defended the city’s northern approaches against insuperable odds in 1940.14 When Leclerc’s order came d’Orgeix was close to tears; he commanded a squadron of Shermans; his own was called Paris.15 Their new mission burnished a desire for smartness. Three weeks’ worth of grime was wiped away and razors appeared. Those who had never seen Paris were teased by those who had; many had family there while others had been colonials their whole lives.16

  All night Gribius prepared plans; GTs Dio and Langlade would advance via Sées, Mortagne, Châteauneuf-en-Thymerais, Maintenon, Rambouillet; while GT Billotte would make the main push from Mamers, Nogent-le-Rotrou, Chartres, Ablis and Limours. That Billotte’s battlegroup would be first into Paris had long been decided. Billotte’s Gaullist credentials were impeccable. He also thoroughly understood the politics of the situation. After the difficulties with the Americans Billotte was amazed they were on their way at last.17

  To accompany the 2e DB into Paris, General Hodges designated the US 4th Infantry Division which was recuperating in a rest area nearby. The 4th had landed on Utah Beach on D-Day, took Cherbourg, helped repulse the Mortain counterattack, and was part of the final operation to close the Falaise pocket. Its commander, General Raymond “Tubby” Barton, was loved by his men and a friend of Hemingway. As Hodges saw it, it was not Leclerc’s division that would liberate Paris but Gerow’s V Corps.18

  Gerow’s HQ received orders for Paris from Shellburst as soon as they were drafted. Particularly emphasised was that heavy fighting should be avoided. However, this only applied to central Paris, the area within its traditional boundaries. Outside that area artillery and air support could be used. Attached was a situation report, numbering the FFI, including the police, at twenty-five thousand, saying they controlled substantial areas of the city. Based on their intelligence, Eisenhower and Gerow believed the Germans would withdraw once the Allies arrived in force.19

  GT LANGLADE WAS ON ITS WAY BY 6AM, their day’s target being Rambouillet. Colonel Peschaud’s route teams marked the way as dark clouds promised more rain.20 Grim, burnt-out vehicles from the previous week reminded them that more fighti
ng lay ahead.

  After backtracking through Alençon, Dronne’s Spaniards were glad to leave Normandy’s dangerous, undulating valleys behind them and enter Beauce’s less complex landscape. Dronne thought les Beaucerons’ welcome cooler than in Normandy, which he attributed to cooler blood.21

  Passing through villages developed a particular routine; the rumble of engines sent villagers into their houses, fearing they were German. Doors and shutters closed. Once the tanks entered the village, curious kids saw green vehicles with their white stars and yelled, “Les Americains! Les Americains! ” Doors opened, everyone came out, even more overjoyed on discovering that they were French.

  “Where are you from?” villagers would ask.

  “From Chad,” replied RMT members.22

  Such scenes made General Bradley write, “Concerned that Leclerc’s forces might be engulfed by champagne-bearing well-wishers and thus diverted and delayed in their mission, I also asked Gerow to send Ray Barton’s battle-hardened 4th Infantry Division to help. Goaded by that threat, Leclerc’s men, nearly overwhelmed with wine and women, rolled and reeled into Paris.”23

  Since it was unthinkable to send an armoured division into a major engagement without infantry support, it seems surprising that Bradley should write things which would inevitably offend French sensibilities. Billotte later wrote that Bradley, “in a book of memoirs under his name, referring to the conduct of the 2e DB en route for Paris, mentioned things that he had neither seen nor verified; namely that the column dawdled along and that its men were drunk all along the route, partying with the population. Allegations utterly without foundation and unworthy of such a great military leader. As if the Free French, who were returning after four years to liberate Paris, were going to waste a single second on the way to accomplishing the ambition of their lives!”24 Paul de Langlade also protested against Bradley’s criticisms in his memoirs.25 Most of the 2e DB, including Leclerc, had not seen their homes and families for longer than nearly any Allied soldiers except the Poles. Their imaginations raced with joy or horror at what they might find, feelings common to all ranks without exception.